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ABSTRACT 
Rifat Atay 
University of St Andrews 
Thesis: "Religious Pluralism and Islam: A Critical Examination of 
John Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis" 
This dissertation makes a full critical analysis of John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis 
(which views great world religions as equally valid ways of salvation/liberation) from an 
Islamic perspective. To be able to do this, it begins with a survey of Islamic responses to 
the problem of religious diversity by employing Alan Race's threefold taxonomy 
(exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism). Chapter one concludes that al-Maturidi's 
exclusivistic and AtefI's inclusivistic approaches cannot satisfactorily answer the matter in 
hand, namely "why a compassionate and loving God should exclude totally or partially the 
vast majority of human beings from salvation/liberation. " Arkoun's pluralistic viewpoint 
comes closer to Hick's but is incomplete, immature and radically reductionist. 
The dissertation, then, starts examining Hick's pluralism. First, it gives an extensive 
account of pluralism. At the fundamental level, Hick argues for the veridicality of one's 
experience in order to establish the right of one to believe, which in turn creates the 
problem of religious diversity: several religions claiming to offer the best way of 
salvation/liberation. Before putting forward his own theory, Hick examines other 
naturalistic (Durkheimian and Freudian) and religious (exclusivistic and inclusivistic) 
accounts of religions. He dismisses them as unsatisfactory and poses his religious 
interpretation of religion. Drawing the Kantian distinction of noumenon and phenomenon, 
Hick claims that religions, with their personal gods and impersonal absolutes, are 
phenomenal responses to the noumenal Real. His soteriological criterion of transformation 
from "self-centredness to Reality-centredness" contends that great world religions are 
equally valid ways of salvation/liberation. Since the noumenal Real is totally ineffable, 
religious language should be understood mythically/metaphorically. 
After careful critical consideration, the thesis concludes that Hick's pluralism cannot 
be compatible with Islam, unless it is modified from three angles: the total ineffability of the 
Real must be replaced with a "moderate ineffability" (hence moderate pluralism), a 
hermeneutical reading of the holy texts should replace Hick's mythical approach, and 
Hick's primarily ethical soteriological criterion needs to be extended to include the ritual 
aspect of religion. This modified version of Hick's pluralism is named "moderate 
pluralism. " The thesis concludes that moderate pluralism is compatible with Islam and 
offers a way forward particularly in its dealing with other religions. 
vi 
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Introduction 
Despite the implications of John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis for Islam (for instance, 
in matters of religious language and theology) few studies have examined, from an Islamic 
perspective, the status of the hypothesis in an Islamic context. In this thesis, therefore, I 
offer a critical examination of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis from an Islamic viewpoint. 
Hick views religions as cognitive totalities which are all equally effective in transforming 
human beings to a better state of being through their salvational/liberational methods. 
Throughout my study, this is what I will be calling the pluralistic option. My aim is to 
study Hick's thesis thoroughly to see whether, from an Islamic standpoint, it offers a 
viable way of accounting for the diversity of religions. In order to do this, I will first give 
an extensive critical account of the pluralistic option and then eventually reproduce a 
modified version of it as a workable thesis. Finally, I shall test this modified version 
against the Islamic milieu, highlight possible problems and offer solutions for them. 
The conflicting truth-claims of different religions and, in particular, their diverse 
approaches to the concept of salvation pose an immensely difficult problem both for the 
followers of particular religions and for philosophers of religion. Almost every religion 
claims that its followers can reach, in Hick's hybrid term, "salvation/liberation" through its 
teachings and way of life, while other ways are regarded either as insufficient for this 
purpose or partly or totally in the dark. Thus the question must be faced whether all these 
conflicting claims to truth, which are claimed to derive from the same source, the Ultimate 
Reality, could be true at the same time. If not, the question arises whether any particular 
claim has a privileged position, or whether none is ultimately justifiable. 
More practically, one could argue that religion still plays a significant role in many 
international and political problems, as it did in the past. The primary reason for some of 
today's conflicts often appears to be religious intolerance. The Palestinians and the Israelis 
in the Middle East, and the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs in Europe are cases in point. If, 
therefore, we reach a consensus between various religious traditions, we could perhaps 
ease or avoid similar difficulties in the future. As Hans Küng puts it, "no world peace 
without peace between the religions. "1 Thus one could conclude that one of the most 
urgent, if not the only, problem facing philosophers of religion today is that of accounting 
religious diversity, bearing in mind the cognitivity and originality of religions. 
The number of theories dealing with the question of the plurality of religions have 
gradually increased from the nineteenth century onwards. There are naturalistic 
explanations for religion (Ludwig Feuerbach, Emil Durkheim and Sigmund Freud) on the 
one hand and religious or theological explanations on the other (in Christianity, for 
instance, those of Hendrik Kraemer, Karl Rahner, Ernst Troeltsch, W. Cantwell Smith and 
John Hick). 
1 Küng, H, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, trans. Bowden, J, London: 
SCM Press, 1991, xv, 7 1ff. 
As I stated at the outset, my main concern in this dissertation will be the examination 
of Hick's pluralism from within an Islamic perspective, since pluralism appears to offer a 
better and more comprehensive understanding of religious diversity. What do we mean by 
a "better and more comprehensive account of religious diversity? " As a Muslim, I believe 
that we are born with religious sensibilities which are mostly shaped by the societies into 
which we are born. Thus, I believe Hick is right in saying that a great majority of human 
beings are religious according to the "accident of birth: " one becomes a Christian because 
one is born into a Christian society, and the same applies to a Muslim, a Buddhist, a 
Hindu, etc. Conversions and other religious or irreligious choices are exceptions as far as 
the accident of birth is concerned. Thus to confine (as in exclusivism) or reserve primarily 
(as in inclusivism) salvation/liberation to the adherents of a particular religion seems 
incompatible with the fundamental Muslim belief in an all-loving, compassionate and 
merciful Ultimate Being. It would mean ruling out the opportunity of salvation for the 
majority of humankind on the basis of geographical and cultural differences which they 
have no hand in. Moreover, theoretically speaking, Islam accepts plurality not particularity 
(exclusivism or inclusivism) as a general principle; i. e. the religious situation of the 
universe is deliberately designed to be pluralistic. Therefore, every human being should be 
included in a salvational/liberational scheme, if there ever could be one, regardless of one's 
religious affiliation, as long as one is a good human being who strives for the betterment of 
humanity. That is to say, as long as one lives by the Golden Rule ("it is good to benefit 
others and evil to harm them")2, which is common to the great world religions. This is 
what pluralism means, and for this reason it might probably constitute a better and more 
comprehensive understanding of religious diversity. 
I now turn to the question: why study religious pluralism and Islam? Firstly, as I said 
in the opening lines, Hick's hypothesis has serious implications for Islam as a religion 
claiming to have absolute truth as traditionally understood. In fact, some scholars have 
jumped to quick conclusions to celebrate Hick's works as the announcement of the end of 
Christian particularity, on the one hand, and the beginning of the acceptance of Islam's 
final truth, on the other. I refer to this as "the Islamisation of Christianity" or any other 
religion for that matter. 3 Such was the excitement of Abdus-Samad Sharafuddin of King 
Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, for instance, in the aftermath of The Myth of God 
Incarnate .4 Sharafuddin praises 
"the rightly guided authors of The Myth, " for they want 
"all Christians to become one God worshippers, "5 which of course is the call of Islam, 
2 AIR, 313-314,316. 
3I always get the same "this is Islam" reply from friends when I tell them about Hick's thoughts 
about Christ and Incarnation as metaphorical truths, thus the name "Islamisation. ' However, when I 
tell them about his thoughts about Islam and other religions, they feel rather disappointed. 
4 Hick, J, ed., The Myth of God Incarnate, London: SCM Press and Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1977. 
S Cohn-Sherbok, D, "Incarnation and Trialogue, " iq, Jý(ý1n. 1R. a. Orld. Rý. DlýerýC. ýa1tkýS, ed. D 
Cohn-Sherbok, London: Macmillan, 1991,18 (cited from Sharafuddin, A, About the Myth of God 
Incarnate-An Impartial Survey of its Main Topics, Jeddah: King Abdul Aziz University Press, 1978, 
ii). 
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primarily for Christians and Jews6 and then the rest of humanity? He also describes the 
book "like a rational, godsend lightning [that] strikes the London horizon to explode an 
agelong blunder in Christian thought. "8 However, since probably Sharafuddin was not 
aware of Hick's earlier work in "the Copernican Revolution in Theology, "9 which does not 
recognise an absolute religion including Islam, he in the end attempts to prove the Qur'anic 
truth against the already-falsified Christian truth in order to "win converts to Islam. "lo 
Thus, instead of "polemical attempts to win converts to Islam"" in the light of Hick's 
critical work about the Christian doctrines, Muslims, I believe, should study Hick's 
thought in its entirety more closely, because its conclusions are as much related to Islam or 
any other religion as they are to Christianity. 
Secondly, at a personal level, the question of religious diversity has always been both 
an existential and an intellectual one for me. As a Muslim, since my early childhood I 
would wonder why Allah12 allows others to remain outside the circle of Islam. By "others" 
here, I refer to the followers of all other religions. Despite the fact that I used seriously to 
worry about this question, I never had any opportunity to discover a convincing answer to 
it during my formal education. Sociologically speaking, Christians and Jews received a 
different treatment within Islamic societies than non-believers because, it was assumed, 
they shared the same belief in one God despite their different understandings of it. 
However, theologically speaking, both Jews and Christians were also projected as infidels, 
or as deluded. Hence, in addition to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jews and Christians were 
part of my problem too when I thought about the universal salvific will or saving grace of 
Allah. 
Traditionally, there are certain ways of thinking developed, sustained and followed 
by Muslims with regard to "others. " In fact I would say Islam has been sociologically 
inclusivist, eschatologically exclusivist and politically pluralist in its relations towards other 
religions. The Sufis' pluralistic line (similar to Hick's) has never been a popular choice 
either theologically or philosophically. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians have been treated 
differently from other traditions in legal terms, but eschatologically, like the followers of 
other religions, they were deemed not to be saved either. When I as a Muslim looked at the 
history of Islam, occupying a period of more than fourteen centuries, I saw at best less than 
half the world's population saved, given optimistic calculations. That is to say, if we 
consider the inclusivist view that some Jews and Christians are also saved in addition to 
Muslims. What of the rest? Some Muslims maintain tentatively that we will never know for 
6 The Qur'an 3: 64. 
7 The Qur'an 34: 28. 
8 Cohn-Sherbok, "Incarnation and Trialogue, " 18 (cited from Sharafuddin, About the Myth of God 
incarnate, i). 
9 GUF, 12-132. 
10 Cohn-Sherbok, "Incarnation and Trialogue, " 19. 
11 Cohn-S herbok, "Incarnation and Trialogue, " 19. 
12 Subsequently, I shall use mostly Allah when I talk about the Muslim notion of God rather than 
God or the Real. 
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sure: Allah knows best and we hope for his mercy towards them. The majority, inclined to 
take an exclusivist approach, remark that they will go to the eternal fire of hell. 
In Islam, the literature on pluralism is so small as to be marginal compared to 
Christian writings. Despite the pluralistic character of Islam, it is unfortunate for Muslims 
to discover that contemporary Islamic pluralist literature was inaugurated by non-Muslim 
pluralists, such as Hick13 and like-minded others, '` apart from a few other individuals 
writing rarely on the subject. 15 
When I first came across Hick's writings during my MA studies, I felt that, despite 
having certain drawbacks like any other hypothesis, he was stating what I was waiting to 
hear, particularly on the philosophical front. I have since become aware of the fact that 
Hick's name has been synonymous with religious pluralism since the 1980s and that many 
studies of his version of religious pluralism have been carried out in different parts of the 
world, especially the English speaking world. '6 This was firstly because Hick wrote as a 
Christian, in English, which made him accessible to many people. Secondly and more 
importantly, Hick's hypothesis relativised Christ, limiting Jesus' role as saviour to 
Christians only. Therefore Christians felt obliged to respond to Hick's hypothesis. 
However, despite the similar importance of pluralism for Islam, very little work has been 
done from an Islamic perspective to test the reliability of Hick's hypothesis within an 
Islamic environment. I was puzzled to discover only one comparative study done from an 
Islamic standpoint. '7 The work in question looks at the issues from a traditionalist point of 
view, 18 possibly due to the influence on its author of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, an Islamic 
scholar whose ideas are compared to Hick's. Thus Aslan ignores the modernist, or less 
orthodox, works of Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida, two modernist 
Egyptian commentators from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and of 
Mahmoud M Ayoub and Mohammed Arkoun, two contemporary Muslim pluralists. More 
astonishingly, despite his Turkish origin, Aslan never refers to the heated dispute in Turkey 
between Süleyman Ate;, an inclusivist, and Talat Kogyigit and other exclusivist Turkish 
scholars in the late `S0s and early `90s. We cannot, I believe, be content with the 
traditionalist line, if we seek a satisfactory and comprehensive Islamic response to 
pluralism. Therefore we must go beyond the traditionalist circle and consider other, 
alternative but equally valid, voices from the modernist and pluralist strands of Islam. This 
is what I hope to achieve in this study. 
13 Hick, J and H Askari, eds., The Experience of Religious Diversity, Hants, England and 
Brookfield, Vermont, Gower Publishing, 1985. 
14 Cohn-Shcrbok, D, ed., Islam in a World of Diverse Faiths, London, Macmillan, 1991. 
15 For example, Fazlur Rahman, Ismail R Faruqi, Mahmoud Ayoub and S. H. Nasr 
16 Just to have an idea, one could quote the Figures up to 1993: 18 doctoral theses and six full-length 
books (Badham, P, "The Life and Work of John Hick, " in God, Truth and Reality: Essays in Honour 
of John Hick, A Sharma, cd., New York, St Martin's Press, 1993,5). Since then, to my 
knowledge, two books, both reworked doctoral dissertations, have been added to this list. 
17 Asian, A, Ultimate Reality and Its Manifestations in the Writings of John Hick and Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, Lancaster: Lancaster University, PhD, 1995. 
18 Asian, Ultimate Reality, 4. 
Introclucliof 1 
Before beginning to lay out the chapters of my thesis, I would like to say a word 
about the scope of the project. I restrict my study of religions in this thesis to Christianity 
and Islam only and will not be going into detailed discussion of other religions except 
where they are either raised by Hick or absolutely necessary to make my point. This 
restriction is based on three reasons. In the first place, Hick is a Christian and uses 
frequently Christian materials; I am a Muslim and rely on Islamic materials which enable 
me to judge Hick's hypothesis more easily. In the second place, Christianity and Islam are 
in some respects similar in their approach to the question of religious diversity. That is to 
say, despite the general implications of the diversity of religions for all the world religions, 
Christianity and Islam felt the problem more acutely because of their traditional exclusive 
claims to truth and salvation. For Christianity, exclusivity came in the form of a 
commitment to belief in Jesus Christ as God Incarnate, and in Islam it took the form of the 
Qur'an as the final and conclusive revelation of God. Thirdly, both are theistic religions 
which broadly resemble each other in many ways and share some common features. 
Therefore it makes sense to apply Hick's thesis, which arises from objections to Christian 
exclusivism, to a religion which is so like Christianity in many ways. 
The dissertation consists of five chapters: (1) Islam and Other Religions, which 
briefly describes the problem and gives a summary of three attempts by Islamic scholars to 
deal with religious diversity, (2) The Need for a Pluralistic Hypothesis, which explains 
how Hick arrived at his pluralistic hypothesis (3) Religious Pluralism, which gives a full 
account of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, (4) A Critique of the Pluralistic Hypothesis, 
which presents problems associated with Hick's pluralism and discusses them at length, 
and (5) Moderate Pluralism and Islam, which reproduces a modified workable version of 
Hick's pluralism and tests its viability for an Islamic context. 
The first chapter, Islam and Other Religions, prepares the ground for Hick's 
pluralistic hypothesis by providing a short description of the wider problem and discussing 
possible attempts to solve it from an Islamic perspective. After a brief discussion of why a 
new outlook is needed in the study of religions and their relations to each other, I move on 
to examine the commonly offered religious solutions to the problem of religious diversity 
from a Muslim perspective. In this respect, as a first attempt by a Muslim within an Islamic 
context, I use the threefold typology of Alan Race, exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism 
to test the claims of the exponents of the typology that, besides Christianity, it can also be 
successfully applied to any other tradition in order to examine its attitude towards other 
traditions. Additionally, despite certain problems regarding its appropriateness, Hick and 
others writing in this area also employ it commonly in their work, which makes it 
convenient to follow throughout the thesis. Exclusivism maintains that there is only one 
certain way of salvation; others ways, though they may include traces of truth, do not lead 
to salvation. As an example of this outlook within Islam, I will examine the thought of al- 
Maturidi (d. 333/944). 19 Inclusivism accepts that there is more than one way of salvation, 
19 Dates refer, respectively, to the Islamic, Hijri, lunar and the Gregorian solar calendars. 
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but claims one is better than others, and in some sense defining for salvation. This view is 
represented by the work of Suleyman AtefI. Pluralism holds that all great world religions 
are equally effective in offering salvation. I will study the work of Muhammad Arkoun, as 
an Islamic example. These three stances, of which exclusivism has been the dominant in 
many cases, can be witnessed across many religions with different intonations, though I 
will be dealing only with Muslim instances, since my concern is only Hick's thesis and 
Islam. Neither of the Muslim scholars refers to or is aware of the typology, but I believe 
the traces of each paradigm can be seen in all three, as I shall demonstrate shortly. The 
Christian exclusivist and inclusivist attitudes will be dealt with briefly towards the end of 
the second chapter, when I discuss Hick's criticism of these options. 
I will conclude in this chapter that our new contemporary religious situation really 
requires us to reconsider the relationship between religions. In this context, Race's 
typology could be a useful tool in analysing Islamic attitudes towards other traditions. It 
will demonstrate that, on the one hand, exclusivist and inclusivist approaches do not offer 
plausible options and are unsuccessful in accounting for the universal salvific will of the 
Divine. On the other hand, while Arkoun's pluralistic approach takes into account the 
possibility of universal salvation, it is too secularist, reductionist and historicist. This will 
lead us to consider Hick's hypothesis which, I believe, with a few modifications may 
constitute a better explanation of the religious phenomena. 
In chapter two, The Need for a Pluralistic Hypothesis, I follow Hick's arguments as 
to why we need a new hypothesis of religions. The chapter will explain the steps upon 
which Hick founds his thesis. The first step is "the right to believe. " Here, starting from 
the veridicality of one's experience, I establish the justifiability of experiencing the world 
around us religiously. This basic trust in one's experience leads to the observation that 
there are different accounts of experiencing the world religiously, what Hick calls "the 
directory of Gods. " This plurality of religions, Hick suggests, calls for some explanation. 
Before producing his own views, he first evaluates the existing solutions to the problem, 
which I summarise under the title of "The Interpretations. " Following Hick, we examine 
various interpretations of the plurality of religions from naturalistic and religious or 
confessional perspectives and the reasons why Hick considers these to be unsatisfactory. 
With regard to naturalistic accounts, we look at Freud's psychological and Durkheim's 
sociological accounts of religion and Hick's critique of them. I present Hick's criticism of 
the religious explanations, exclusivism and inclusivism, dubbed as "the particularistic 
theories, " in two steps. The first brief step is his critique of classical responses, which 
Hick names "Ptolemaic epicycles, " referring to Ptolemy's efforts to save the incorrect 
picture of the universe before Copernicus' theory. The second considers a recent 
discussion Hick had with contemporary Christian exponents of exclusivism and 
inclusivism. This updated defence of these positions will illustrate both how Hicks' 
hypothesis has been received by modern day Christians and proves Hick's point that 
whatever way they are stretched, the traditional responses are finally inadequate. 
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Hick concludes that naturalistic explanations fail because they do not respect the 
realist claims of religion. He does not claim that the naturalistic interpretations are 
necessarily wrong, a claim which Hick thinks is at present undemonstratable, but that they 
are unsatisfactory in that they fail to give a comprehensive account of the phenomenon of 
religion. Religious explanations, on the other hand, cannot account for the fact that an all- 
loving and compassionate God leaves the majority of the population either totally or 
partially in the dark through no fault of their own. Having considered all the previous 
options, we conclude that a new hypothesis is needed in order to explain "the new religious 
disposition of the universe of faiths. " Thus we come to Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. 
In chapter three, Religious Pluralism, I give a comprehensive account of Hick's 
view. Here I consider how Hick developed his thesis, looking initially at the issue from a 
Christological perspective, hence the title "a Christian theology of religions. " For him the 
problem started out as that of how to understand Christology and where to place Christ's 
role as saviour in a religiously plural world. I list his objections to traditional Christology 
and arrive at his "Copernican revolution in theology, " according to which the Incarnation 
should be understood metaphorically rather than literally. This results in viewing Jesus as a 
saviour among many, and the claim that a Christian theology of religions should be 
theocentric (God-centred) not Christocentric (Christ-centred). Hick, however, did not stop 
there and moved forward to develop his pluralistic hypothesis of religions. He now called it 
a philosophy not theology of religions, and gave a comprehensive account of major world 
religions by applying the Kantian epistemological distinction between noumenon and 
phenomenon to the religious epistemology. Here we observe how Hick postulates an 
ineffable noumenal Real as the ground of all religious experiences, and locates the great 
religions of the world as we know them as phenomenal responses to that noumenal Real. 
At the phenomenal level, God and the Absolute constitute different categories, which are 
schematised by us as personal and impersonal respectively, resulting in seemingly 
incompatible conceptions of the phenomenal Real. In fact these different conceptions do not 
conflict, since they exist only at the phenomenal level and do not apply to the noumenal 
Real itself. In this Kantian model, Christology has ceased to be the starting point for Hick. 
His discussion focuses on the more philosophical issue of how to understand the 
phenomenon of diverse religions, their claims to truth and their attitudes to salvation. 
Finally in this chapter, I turn to examine Hick's understanding of religious language as 
myth/metaphor and his soteriological criterion of "salvation/liberation as human 
transformation. " 
In addition to brief criticisms of Hick offered here and there in the previous chapters, 
I felt a separate chapter was needed for a fuller critique of Hick's hypothesis. Hence 
chapter four, A Critique of the Pluralistic Hypothesis, is devoted entirely to a critique of 
Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. Various criticisms of Hick are grouped under three headings. 
Firstly, I will deal with the claims that, contrary to Hick's assertions of comprehensiveness 
and non-confessionalism, he is heavily dependant on Western culture and philosophy; i. e. 
that his view is confessional, reduces religions to only ethical packages, and that it is finally 
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reductionist and non-comprehensive. Secondly, I examine problems associated with the 
postulation of a totally ineffable noumenal Real and its eventual redundancy. Finally, 
Hick's criterion of salvation/liberation as human transformation and its ability to account 
for the diverse methods and aims of religions will be discussed. I will conclude that some 
charges are irrelevant, while others constitute serious objections, and Hick's thesis 
consequently needs some modification. 
Chapter five, Moderate Pluralism and Islam, will be the decisive chapter in which I 
begin by constructing a modified version of Hick's pluralism, taking account of the 
relevant objections. I shall call this modified version "moderate soteriological pluralism" 
(derived from the "moderate ineffability of the noumenal Real" and the soteriological 
efficacy of the great world religions). However, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to it 
mostly as "moderate pluralism" and, from time to time, as "Hick's modified pluralism, " 
since I retain certain elements of Hick's hypothesis in my modification. I then deal with the 
possible implications of this moderate pluralism for Islam, and the likely responses of 
Islam to these implications. In developing his hypothesis, Hick focuses on five great world 
religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Throughout his 
pluralistic writing, first, he gathers evidence from these traditions to prove the viability of 
his hypothesis and then tests it against these five religions to assert that his hypothesis is 
supported by them and, consequently, gives a better account of them. That is to say: it 
respects their realistic claims, unlike the naturalistic account of religion as delusion, and 
gives a comprehensive explanation of them as realities revolving around the Ultimate 
Reality, rather than revolving, exclusively or specifically, around a religious tradition, as 
portrayed by exclusivism and inclusivism respectively. This is an important claim to make, 
yet, as Hick acknowledges, substantiating it is not an easy task. Thus its validity for other 
religions, as a comprehensive philosophical thesis, has to be tested by the members of the 
religions for which Hick thinks his thesis works. This has already been done from a 
Christian perspective by many, and is what I will be doing in the final chapter from a 
Muslim perspective using a modified version of Hick's hypothesis. 
In my modification of Hick's hypothesis, I focus my attention on three points: i) 
against his reductionist mythical/metaphorical approach towards religious language, I call 
for a "hermeneutical approach"; ii) against Hick's total ineffability of the noumenal Real, I 
argue for a "moderate ineffability"; and iii) I believe the scope of his soteriological criterion 
needs to be widened by Dan Cohn-Sherbok's "viability principle. " When I move to the 
Islamic context, I deal with four primary concerns. I address, firstly, the paramount 
question of reconciling the strict monotheistic faith of Islam and the validity of the different 
religions argued by Hick? "The principle of plurality, " as attested by the Qur'an and the 
Prophetic traditions, leads the solution here. Next I deal with the verses carry an apparently 
exclusivist tendency, which brings us to the prophethood Muhammad and the question of 
salvation. The third important point is "freedom of religion" and law of apostasy as 
understood and applied to the Other (especially the people of the Book). Finally in this 
chapter, I demonstrate the workability of hermeneutical understanding of the Qur'an in the 
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example of kufr (unbelief). I conclude first that this modified version of Hick's hypothesis 
is compatible with Islam. Secondly, from an Islamic perspective, the diversity of religions 
understood in this way does not pose a threat to religious cognitivity. Finally, Hick's 
modified pluralistic hypothesis might contribute positively to the interreligious dialogue and 
peace, which may in the long run benefit world peace a lot. 
A note on Islamic terminology: throughout my study, I differentiate between the 
wider, literal, meaning of Islam, i. e. submission to the will of God (and its noun form a 
muslim, a submitter) and the colloquial use of it in a limited sense as the name of the 
institutionalised religion, Islam (and its noun form as commonly known a Muslim). I shall 
use "islam/muslim" without a capital "i" or "m" to refer to the state of total submission to 
the will of God and the one who submits, and "Islam/Muslim" with a capital "I" or "M" to 
denote the Islamic religion and one who follows it. I use God and Allah synonymously. 
Since I operate within a certain time limit, I will engage with Hick's academic 
material up to and including May `99. 
I shall refer to Hick's works in abbreviated forms which will be given at the 
beginning of the thesis, unless the work is an article, in which case I will give the full 
details where I first mention it. Other works will be cited in the order of the author's 
surname, book, place of publication, publisher and date published, and given directly 
beneath the pages where they are first quoted. In the articles, I follow the order of surname, 
title, journal followed by volume no, issue and date, if available. Subsequently, I use a 
short name for the book or the article beside the author's surname. Full details can be found 
in the bibliography, which has been divided into two parts: one for Hick's works and the 
other for the rest. 
For Qur'anic quotations, I use The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, M. M. Pickthall 
translation20 with minor modifications where necessary. 21 For Biblical quotations, I follow 
The New English Bible with the Apocrypha, joint committee translation. 22 For a Prophetic 
tradition (hadith) quotation, I give the name of the collection, chapter it appears, and hadith 
number, e. g. Muslim, the Book of Faith, hadith no: 1235. 
20 London: Everyman, 1992. 
21 From time to time, I also quote a translation of a specific verse by an author, particularly, if it is 
areferred one by the author to make his point. 
22 Oxford, OUP & CUP, 1970. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. ISLAM AND OTHER RELIGIONS 
"Don't forget the nut, being so proud of the shell, 
The body has its inward ways, 
the five senses. They crack open, 
and the Friend is revealed. 
Crack open the Friend, you become 
the All-One. " 
Jalal al-Din Rümi' 
1.1. Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to give a brief description of the problem of religious 
diversity and discuss three possible solutions produced from Islamic perspectives. To this 
end I shall consider and then employ Alan Race's threefold framework of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism. To my knowledge, this will be the first attempt to analyse 
Islamic attitudes towards other religions by using Race's typology. I will examine one 
Muslim scholar's ideas to exemplify each of these categories: al-Maturidi, Suleyman 
Ate, and Mohammed Arkoun respectively. Even though the threefold typology is not 
commonly used in Islamic pluralist literature, I shall test its appropriateness for assessing 
Islamic responses to religious diversity. Since the typology is frequently employed by 
Hick to evaluate Christian responses to other religions, it might be a useful tool 
understand Islamic attitudes before moving into Hick's context. The Muslim exclusivist 
and inclusivist solutions will also serve as a case study for Hick's assumptions about 
Christian exclusivist and inclusivist responses that they are inadequate to deal with the 
problem. Lastly in this chapter, I study Arkoun's thought as a possible case in pluralism, 
which is close to Hick's position in some points and better in some. But over all it is 
unsatisfactory. 
1.2. A Brief Historical Background 
Historically speaking many of the religions have been in contact with each other 
throughout the centuries. If we take the theistic religions, for instance, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam have confronted each other almost from the start, and have had 
bitter-sweet experiences of each other since they have all arisen in the same part of the 
world, i. e. the Middle East. But opportunity for genuine dialogue and mutual 
understanding was rarely possible before the seventeenth century. This was due to the 
dominance of certain religions in particular regions of the world both culturally and 
politically. Once such dominance asserted itself, the dominant tradition considered itself 
the truest religion and felt the hand of God upon itself, while subordinate religions 
I Rumi, J al-D, Unseen Rain: Quatrains of Rund, trans. Moync, J and C Barks, Putney, Vermont: 
Threshold, 1986,19. 
"formed a negative image" of the other as a defence mechanism2 and hoped the help of 
God would be with it soon. 
However, the situation changed during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries 
when the European Enlightenment took place. The Enlightenment brought with itself the 
authority of reason to solve problems, and was "extremely critical of traditional organized 
Christianity. "3 This was followed by the development of anthropological studies, 
whereby Western civilisation came to recognise that there were other civilisations and 
religions very different from its own. Three elements have helped the rapid spread of this 
discovery: (i) the increasing number of anthropological books about the world religions 
available for public consumption, (ii) the journeys made to countries by Westerners as 
observers of those religions, and (iii) the massive immigrations from the East to the West 
after the second World War which promoted a better understanding through personal and 
familial relations. Hick thinks that immigration was the most important factor in the 
development of consciousness of other religions in the West, which was in fact the main 
determinant igniting his interest in the subject after his move to Birmingham. 4 One could 
add to these the recent important developments in communications technology from 
newspapers to telephone, radio, television and lately the internet and e-mail. These turned 
the world into what is commonly described as a "global village. "5 Therefore, the days 
when "religion" was associated only with one's own religion had passed and people were 
faced more acutely with the question of other religions. Put another way, no religion can 
progress any further by ignoring others, as happened in the past. As Gordon D Kaufman 
states clearly: 
"We have become interconnected with each other in countless ways... Although culturally we 
are increasingly aware both of our diversity and of our interdependence, the meaning of this 
for our religious institutions and traditions, and for our religious self-understandings, has 
barely begun to dawn upon us. It is important, however, that we find new and more adequate 
ways to think about both the diversity and the interconnectedness of our human religiousness, 
if our various religious heritages are to contribute positively to the building of a world in 
which we, in all our differences, can live together productively and in peace... We need a way 
to understand our religiousness which can honour the integrity and meaning of each of the 
great religious traditions and yet open them to appreciation of and reconciliation with each 
other"6 
Thus we have to find new ways of understanding each other compatible with "both the 
diversity and the interconnectedness of our human religiousness. " This certainly makes 
the problem of religious diversity a more urgent one. 
2 Watt, W M, Religious Truth for Our Time, Oxford: Oneworld, 1995,89-90. 
3 Watt, Religious Truth, 85. 
4 ROF, 13. 
5 Watt, Religious Truth, 84. 
6 Kaufman, G D, "Religious Diversity and Religious Truth, " in, Q ,Tý and ýtý ity;. $, says w 
0! li? Ur qý jQhrl ýjýk, ed. Sharma, A, New York: St Martin's Press, 1993,148. 
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Despite the general implications of awareness of other religions and of the 
confrontation with them for all the great world religions, Christianity and Islam felt the 
problem more acutely because of their particularly exclusive claims to truth and salvation 
which also made them "missionary faiths. "7 For Christianity, exclusivity came in the 
form of Jesus as God Incarnate and in Islam, it took the form of the Qur'an as the final 
and conclusive revelation of God. 8 Just to clear misperceptions, it is worth noting that the 
comparison should be not between Muhammad and Jesus but between Jesus as the God 
incarnate and the Qur'an as the binding, final message of God. 9 Because the Qur'an "as 
God's word inlibrate, occupies in Islam the same place that Christ as God's word 
incarnate in Christianity. " 10 From the nineteenth century onwards we observe a gradual 
increase in the study of other religions in the Christian world, resulting in the production 
of several theories and books, ranging from naturalistic (e. g. Ludwig Feuerbach and Emil 
Durkheim), to exclusivist (e. g. Hendrik Kraemer and Karl Barth), inclusivist (e. g. Karl 
Rahner) and pluralist (e. g. Ernst Troeltsch, Wilfred C Smith and Keith Ward) accounts 
of religions. 
Islam's relationship with other religions has always been a complex one. During the 
Meccan period, in the early years, it confronted the pagan Arabs. Muslims were also 
aware of Christians and were on good terms with them. In fact, when Muhammad first 
received the divine revelation his wife Khadija took him to her relative Waraqa bin 
Nawfal, "who had some knowledge of the Bible and may have been a Christian. "" 
Waraqa reassured Muhammad that what he experienced was similar to what had 
happened to Moses and was a divine revelation. 12 When the number of Muslims 
increased in Mecca and they were persecuted by the Meccans, "the Negus of Abyssinia, 
who ruled over a Christian kingdom"13 gave them refuge and accepted a group of 
emigrant Muslims into his country in 615/616 CE, who were followed by a second group 
of emigrants in 618? CE. 14 The pagan Meccans sent two delegates to the Negus who 
argued in front of him for the "extradition" of Muslims15 on the grounds that Muslims 
neither liked Christians nor respected Christianity. But the king refused the deportation of 
Muslims16 after listening to what Muslims had to say about Jesus as a major prophet. '7 
7 Carey, G, "Christianity and Islam: Building Dialogue. " Dialogue , October 1996,4. 8 Smith, W C, On Understanding Islam: Selected Studies, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1981, 
238-239; Schoun, F, Understanding Islam, trans. Matheson, DM, London: Unwin/Mandala, 1976, 
52. 
9 Schoun, Understanding Islam, 87. 
10 Schimmel, A, "The Muslim Tradition, " in 1hp, WQrjd'$, ýýligjQu Qed. F Whaling, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark: 1984,133. 
11 Watt, W M. A Short History of Islam, Oxford: Oneworld, 1996,13. 
12 Watt, A Short History of Islam, 13. 
13 Bodley, RVC, The Messenger: The Life of Mohammed, London: Robert Hale, 1946,6. 
14 Bodley, The Messenger, 74,80; Watt, W M, What is Islam?, London: Longmans and Beirut: 
Librairie du Liban: 1968,97,99-100. 
15 Hamidullah, D M, Introduction to Islam, Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1981,171. 
16 Probably because of this and other affinities between Christianity and Islam, the Qur'an 5: 82 
declares that "the nearest of them in affection to those who believe (to be) those who say: Lo! We 
are Christians. That is because there are among them priests and monks, and because they are not 
proud. " Bodley writes that "the Abyssinians were Nestorian Christians and tolerant to other creeds" 
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Furthermore, we observe that as soon as the Prophet settled in Madina, he signed a 
pact with the Jews. The treaty recognised all inhabitants of Madina, regardless of their 
religion, as equally good members of the community, declared the freedom of practice of 
religion and guaranteed mutual protection for both sides against any outside attack. 
Furthermore the Qur'an attests that Muslims are allowed to eat the food of the people of 
the Book, ahl al-kitab (Jews and Christians) and the marriages formed with them are 
valid, 18 which gave them direct acceptance to the Muslim society. It is also compulsory 
for Muslims to believe and accept all the prophets sent and the books revealed before 
Muhammad. 19 This resulted, as we shall see later in detail, in harmonious and civilised 
plural religious communities as witnessed in Spain under Muslim rule, in Baghdad during 
the Abbasides, and lately in the Ottoman Empire20 It was so harmonious that, as H. A. R. 
Gibb puts it nicely, "to the peoples of the conquered countries the Arab supremacy 
signified at first little more than a change of masters. There was no breach in the 
continuity of their life and social institutions, no persecution, no forced conversion. "21 
Despite all these positive signs, there are also verses in the Qur'an which severely 
criticise both Jews and Christians especially on their failure to uphold the Oneness of 
God, tawhid, and to preserve their scripture from distortion. At times the verses are so 
harsh as to describe some of the ahl al-kitab, the people of the Book, as "infidels. " There 
are also verses defining Islam as the final and full religion for all humanity and stating 
that no other religion will be accepted from anybody else. 22 This and other evidence put 
together by conservative scholars brought forward a very exclusive aspect of Islam, as a 
result of which not only other religious followers but also different Muslim 
denominations suffered. Historically, one might suggest that Islamic societies have 
always been more pluralistic and generally treated their fellow religionists better than 
Christian societies. In other words, "Islam may perhaps be said to have been more 
successful than Christianity in dealing with cultural differences. "23 However, 
theologically speaking Muslims were and still are mostly exclusivists, except for some 
Sufis, who argued for pluralism but were never accepted among the mainstream of 
Islamic thought. The main reasons for this exclusivist tendency are (i) other scriptures 
(74). He also points out that "while the Abyssinians had the deepest respect for Mohammed and 
what he stood for, they were already Nestorian Christians whose fundamental beliefs differed little 
from those of the Moslems" (263). 
17 Armstrong, K, Muhammad: A Western Attempt to Understand Islam, London: Victor Gollancz 
Ltd: 1992,122-23. 
18 The Qur'an 5: 5. Nevertheless the jurists did not favour marrying Muslim girls to ahl al-kitab 
because of the heavy impact of the father on children. They also insisted that the children should be 
brought up as Muslims, if one of the parents is Muslim regardless of who it is. These and other 
factors, I suggest, pushed Muslims towards a more exclusivistic attitude to others. 
19 The Qur'an 2: 285. 
20 Gibb, HAR, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey, London and New York: OUP, 1957,3-5. 
21 Gibb, HAR, Mohammedanism, 4. 
22 The Qur'an 3: 19,85. 
23 Watt, Religious Truth for Our Time, 82. 
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were all held to be distorted and (ii) Islam and the Qur'an abrogated all other forms of 
religion. They might lead one to somewhere, but, it was maintained, none is as good as 
Islam because it is the most well-preserved, the surest and the purest of them. As will be 
seen shortly, some exclusivists also hold that (iii) one has to accept the message of 
Muhammad in order to be saved. As an indication of theological exclusivism, one need 
only mention, as Smith rightly observes, the division of the society into Muslims and 
non-Muslims (ghayr Muslim). 24 Thus, as in Christianity, despite good examples in certain 
periods, Islam failed to develop a more positive and pluralist attitude towards other 
religions. This is so especially in the twentieth century, probably because of the 
increasing tension between the East and the West and of the dominance of the Western 
culture and outlook in many parts of the world, in addition to bitter memories of 
colonialism. The lack of a world power among the Muslim nations today has made them 
more and more conservative and defensive of the superiority of their religion. This trend 
has now started to change, but it is still in its infancy compared to Christianity. I shall 
now try to trace these different attitudes and illustrate them in Islam, starting from the 
more traditionalist approach, exclusivism, to the more moderate, inclusivism, and to the 
more tolerant approach, pluralism. 
1.3. Three Approaches to Other Religions -Race's Typology 
The typology was first introduced by Alan Race in his book Christians and 
Religious Pluralism to classify Christian responses to other religions. 25 Race does not 
give precise definitions of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism at first. He rather states 
that it is adopted as a "broad typological framework" which can accommodate "most of 
the current Christian theologies of religions. " Regarding the flexibility of the typology, he 
writes: 
"Each heading contains within it a number of different options or variations of a theoretical 
type, and the differences between these variations are largely a matter of emphasis on the part 
of the particular writers concerned. The general theoretical type indicated by each heading 
remains the constant factor which warrants the inclusion of a number of approaches under 
one heading. "26 
Because of this flexibility, in every chapter for all three paradigms he employs a 
descriptive rather than a definitive method. Thus we observe that at the beginning of his 
discussion on "exclusivism, " instead of a definition, he starts with the two characteristics 
of the New Testament. Its overall reading on the one hand presents Christianity as the 
"absolute or final" faith and on the other, projects a "negative evaluation of other 
faiths. "27 He then provides us with the data suggesting Christian exclusivism, such as 
24 Smith, W C, The Meaning and End of Religion, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991,299. 
25 Race, A, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian theology of religions, 2nd 
ed., London: SCM Press, 1993,7. 
26 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 7, cf. 150. 
27 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 10. 
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John 14: 6 "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by 
me" as understood by the Protestants and the "`Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' (Outside the 
Church no salvation)" dogma of the Catholic Church. 28 Later Race comments that as a 
general character, exclusivism "counts the revelation in Jesus Christ as the sole criterion 
by which all religions, including Christianity, can be understood and evaluated. "29 
He is, however, more specific on "inclusivism. " He remarks that it is 
"both an acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths, a dialectical `yes' and `no. ' On the one 
hand it accepts the spiritual power and depth manifest in them, so that they can properly be 
called a locus of divine presence. On the other hand, it rejects them as not being sufficient for 
salvation apart from Christ, for Christ alone is saviour. To be inclusive is to believe that all 
non-Christian religious truth belongs ultimately to Christ and the way of discipleship which 
springs from him. Inclusivism therefore involves its adherents in the task of delineating lines 
between the Christian faith and the inner religious dynamism of the other faiths. "30 
The decisive role of Christ for salvation "as the final way of salvation" is essential for 
both exclusivism and inclusivism, but the latter recognises the "operation of the grace of 
God in all the great religions of the world working for salvation. "31 For inclusivism, Race 
notes, these are "equally binding convictions. " While exclusivism creates a 
"confrontation" between the "religions" and the Christian faith, inclusivism aims to 
integrate "creatively" other religions into "Christian theological reflection. "32 
When we move to pluralism, again Race starts with description; only half-way 
through the chapter he provides us with a definition during his discussion of "relativism. " 
Thus we discover that by pluralism, he means that 
"there is not one, but a number of spheres of saving contact between God and man. God's 
revealing and redeeming activity has elicited responses in a number of culturally conditioned 
ways throughout history. Each response is partial, incomplete, unique; but they are related to 
each other in that they represent different culturally focused perceptions of the one ultimate 
divine reality. "33 
Race is aware of the apparent danger with pluralism that it could create an 
"undifferentiated syncretism" which may render the "choice between traditions" as 
"arbitrary or meaningless: " i. e. "if all faiths are equally true, then all faiths are equally 
false. "34 To solve this dilemma, he examines the proposals of four Christian scholars: 1. 
Troeltsch's "ecumenical model of truth; " 2. Hick's "the Religion of the Concrete Spirit" 
(the Real-centred philosophy of religions); 3. Paul Tillich's "Christ as the principle of the 
process of creative transformation; " 4. WC Smith's "the personal faith of men and 
28 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 10. 
29 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 11. 
30 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 38. 
31 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 38. 
32 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 38. 
33 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 77-78. 
34 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 78. 
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women. " Race concludes that despite the problems each carry with it, all are confident 
that these can be overcome through a long process of "dialogue on many levels. "35 
Before beginning to apply three-fold typology in Muslim context, a few words are 
in order about its viability. Christian scholars have raised some questions about its 
appropriateness to analyse properly Christian attitudes towards other religions. Ian 
Markham, for instance, taking the lead from Hick's account, suggests that the 
categorisation conflates three points: "(1) the conditions for salvation, (2) whether the 
major world religions are all worshipping the same God, and (3) the truth about the 
human situation. "36 He further claims that while the theory focuses on the first, it is 
perplexed about the second, and in the third, connects "truth questions with 
soteriology. "37 He reckons that this commonly used threefold paradigm therefore distorts 
options and is unsatisfactory 38 for encompassing new approaches. To illustrate this, he 
develops an approach which he calls "Christian pluralism"39 according to which he 
accepts "the pluralist soteriological account, " yet affirms "the Christian narrative as 
true, "40 and defines salvation as a "turn from self-centredness to other-centredness"41 in 
the form of "self-giving love. " He believes that "although the Christian metaphysics is 
true, it is treated in this context as secondary to the major truth of love. "42 Markham 
accuses Hick of "agnosticism, " that is, his claim that "one cannot have better or worse 
metaphysical accounts" of the world. 43 Thus according to Hick's "religious ambiguity of 
the universe" principle, great world religions, though salvifically all effective, are no 
better or worse than each other. 44 Markham, however, agrees with the exclusivist 
theologian Leslie Newbigin, who claims that "traditions can grow, develop, and be `more 
true' than other traditions. "45 In Newbigin's case Christianity is "more true" than other 
traditions. Markham concludes that the mind is capable of making sense of the world and 
therefore "we are able to formulate better or worse accounts of the world"46 a claim from 
which pluralism proper demurs. 
The formerly inclusivist Gavin D'Costa, however, replies to Markham's criticisms 
on the grounds that they are misleading. D'Costa contends that the three conflated points 
which Markham exposes in his paper are misinterpreted by him, because the text quoted 
from Hick on the three-fold paradigm primarily addresses the question of the possibility 
35 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 104-105. 
36 Markham, I "Creating Options: Shattering the 'Exclusivist, Inclusivist, and Pluralist' Paradigm, " 
January 1993,34. 
37 Markham, "Creating Options, " 34. 
38 Markham, "Creating Options, " 34. 
39 Markham, "Creating Options, " 39. 
40 Markham, "Creating Options, " 34. 
41 Markham, "Creating Options, " 36. 
42 Markham, "Creating Options, " 39. More controversially in the same page he contends that "some 
people might be nearer salvation if they were converted to atheism. " 
43 Markham, "Creating Options, " 38. 
44 Hick defines great world religions as "vast complex religio-cultural totalities, each a bewildering 
mixture of varied goods and evils" (ROF, 14). 
45 Markham, "Creating Options, " 38. 
46 Markham, "Creating Options, " 38. 
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of salvation outside Christianity, which D'Costa thinks is a "strictly a priori theological 
question. "47 However, the question of whether "the major world religions are all 
worshipping the same God, " Markham's second critical point, is partly related to 
"conditions for salvation" and partly depends on a "complex a posteriori examination of 
the historical particularities of the religion being examined. "48 D'Costa warns that, 
contrary to Markham's misleading accusations, many of those who use the typology are 
aware of the "different order of tasks. " 
D'Costa then turns to Markham's new option, "Christian pluralism", and claims 
that Markham, rather than transcending the three-fold paradigm, 49 actually "hovers 
between pluralism and inclusivism, not because he transcends these categories, but 
because there are certain unanswered questions"5° in his thesis. Markham, firstly, does 
not answer whether "salvation is ultimately a matter of doing certain things" and 
secondly, does not clarify the relationship existing between "Christ, God and such acts of 
love and compassion within the `non-Christian' world. " If Markham maintains, D'Costa 
contends, that the charitable actions observed in the non-Christian religions are not 
related to "the God revealed in Christ, " he will be a "pluralist" in Hick's sense. If, on the 
other hand, Markham believes that there exists such a connection, namely that these acts 
are considered implicitly "the work of Christ, " he will be an inclusivist. 51 
Race also responds to critics of his typology ten years on in the second edition of 
his book. He identifies three main points of scrutiny. First, the complexity of the "history 
of global religious life" does not allow us to group Christian responses under three 
headings. Race responds that even though religions are different phenomenologically, 
there is a "family likeness between" them as "alternative loci of `transcendent vision and 
human transformation. "52 
The second point concerns the diversity of responses to other religions and the 
incapacity of the typology to represent them properly. He states that the "types" are not 
"rigid categories" and they can sustain a "number of variations. " To illustrate the point, 
Race shows how Karl Barth's position might be treated in different categories depending 
on his earlier or later writings, e. g. exclusivist or inclusivist 53 
The third point is related to the inability of Race's typology to further the Christian 
understanding of other religions through "the process of encounter and dialogue between 
religious traditions. "54 To this challenge he replies that both the process of encounter and 
of dialogue "serve" "different purposes" and are "informed by different theologies" and 
"theological assumptions. " He examines the case of John Cobb, the process theologian 
47 D'Costa, G, "Creating Confusion: A Response to Markham, " January 1993,42. 
48 D'Costa, "Creating Confusion, " 42. 
49 Markham, "Creating Options, " 34. 
50 D'Costa, "Creating Confusion, " 45. 
51 D'Costa, "Creating Confusion, " 45. 
52 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 150. 
53 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 150-151. 
54 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 151-152. 
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who "writes from a Christocentric perspective. " Race shows that even though ambiguities 
exist because of Cobb's writing, it could be located within either inclusivism or 
pluralism, relying on different parameters 55 
1.3.1. The Availability of a Pluralistic Option 
Nevertheless, the logical consistency of Race's typology has been attacked recently 
from all corners and even lost one of its important allies: D'Costa. He recently engaged in 
a "conceptual spring cleaning exercise"56 and changed his mind by committing what he 
described as an "act of public self-humiliation, " believing that the threefold typology was 
no longer tenable. 57 He thinks that the typology as it is found in different versions is false, 
misleading and incoherent, because it does not really focus on the important questions at 
stake. D'Costa argues that there can be no such thing as pluralism or inclusivism, since 
they all operate within the logic of exclusivism which best demonstrates the way in which 
the typologies work. Put simply, inclusivist and pluralist typologies must logically be 
some form of exclusivism. That is to say, "there are certain claims to truth and those other 
claims that do not conform to these initial claims, explicitly or implicitly, are false. "58 
D'Costa purports that, one way or the other, there is always some exclusion in pluralism 
which is claimed to be the best and most autonomous in illustrating the diversity of 
religions. The reason for pluralism's collapse back into exclusivism is due to the fact that, 
like exclusivism, "tradition specific criteria for truth" are concomitant with all pluralists 
and eventually any position that does not correspond to these criteria is "excluded from 
counting as truth (in doctrine and in practice). "59 He contends that: 
"the real differences between those called pluralists, inclusivists and exclusivists are not, for 
example, that salvation may be attained by one who is a Muslim in this life (on this they may 
all agree), or that certain forms of loving one's neighbour are to be valued (on this too they 
may all agree), but rather they disagree in what counts as normative truth and how it 
operates. "60 
For an exclusivist and an inclusivist, the normative truth is one's own tradition, whereas 
pluralists have their own ways of defining what a normative truth is. D'Costa takes issue 
particularly with pluralism, since it claims to be the best of all explanations, especially its 
claim of tolerance and respect to other religions. He writes that "there is no high ground 
in the pluralist position for in principle its logic is no different from the exclusivist 
position. "61 Those who fall outside the pluralistic truth criteria are excluded just as those 
who are excluded from an exclusivist truth criterion. Thus, the deceptive charm of 
55 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 151-152. 
56 D'Costa, G, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions, " JtcijgiQlls. cJie5 32,1996, 
225. 
57 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 223. 
58 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 225. 
59 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 225-26. 
60 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 226. 
61 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 225. 
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pluralism, D'Costa warns, should not deceive us into thinking that it is a better choice 
than its counterparts. I believe D'Costa is right in his insistence that the choices Race's 
typology offers always involve exclusive truth criteria; even though, as we shall soon see, 
Hick strongly objects to this assertion. However, some other pluralists, such as Keith 
Ward, are aware of the exclusivist truth claim pluralism puts forward. Hence in 
advocating his "convergent pluralism, " Ward confesses frankly: 
"most, and probably all, traditions will need to be revised to approximate more nearly to a 
fuller unitary truth which none of them yet fully encapsulates. Such a view will be exclusivist 
about truth; but add that no one tradition has a monopoly or a complete grasp of truth. The 
truth lies ahead and is always capable of fuller formulation. "62 
Throughout his paper, D'Costa concentrates on pluralism and gives several examples 
from Hick, 63 a philosophical pluralist, and Knitter, a pragmatic pluralist, in D'Costa's 
understanding, 64 to demonstrate his point. 
To illustrate in Hick's case, religions are true in as much as they direct believers to 
the Real by producing right changes in the believer and are false with regard to their 
claim to absolute truth. To support this conclusion, Hick uses the noumenal/phenomenal 
distinction of the Real (which I will examine extensively in the forthcoming chapters) and 
the distinction between "mythic" and "factual" truth, i. e. that the religious language does 
not apply to the noumenal Real and should be understood mythically. To find out Hick's 
truth criteria, D'Costa presses his usual two charges. The first is that "Hick's truth criteria 
are finally theistic, grounded in a philosophical cum cross revelatory conception of an all 
loving God who desires the salvation of all men and women and who creates the world so 
that this scenario is achieved, with the final result of eternal loving fellowship. "65 He 
points out that this was the theistic line Hick argued for in his earlier thesis (e. g. in God 
and the Universe of Faiths66) and can even be traced in his mature pluralism (e. g. in parts 
of An Interpretation of Religion67). By refusing the first claim, Hick faces the second 
62 Knight, C, "Psychology, Revelation and Interfaith Dialogue, " Jýlýt tjQ0a1. l0Atttäý. Xor.. th@ 
Rhi1QQophY. RL R Jlgion 40,1996,152 (cited from Ward, K, A Vision to Pursue, London: SCM Press, 
1991,175). 
63 Projecting implicit or explicit exclusivist tendencies is a charge often made against Hick by others 
as well. See for example, Surin, K, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech': "Religious Pluralism" in the 
Age of the McDonald's Hamburger, " Mxxcm. ThcJ. ogy 7: 1,1990,67-101; Apczynski, J V, "John 
Hick's Theocentrism: Revolutionary or Implicitly Exclusivist?, " MQder(l. T. hhQlogy., 8: 1,1992,39- 
52. 
64 D'Costa's labelling of Hick's theory as "philosophical" and Knitter's as "practical or pragmatic 
pluralism" seems to me inadequate. As we shall see in the discussion of Hick's pluralism, his 
soteriological criterion of "human transformation as salvation/liberation" is very pragmatic indeed in 
its handling of religions and religious truths for which he is usually criticised. Thus I would call 
Hick's theory a philosophical-pragmatic pluralism. As to Knitter, he combines pluralism with 
liberation theology, thus I describe his position as liberational pluralism. Hick makes similar 
remarks to Knitter's position without naming it. See Hick, J, "The Possibility of Religious 
Pluralism: A Reply to Gavin D'Costa, " RcUgiollS. StudiO; l 33,1997,163. 
65 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 228. 
66 London: Macmillan, 1973. 
67 London: Macmillan, 1989. In his reply to D'Costa, Hick rejects strongly this accusation and 
challenges D'Costa to show which parts carry "incipient" theistic features (Hick, "The Possibility, " 
163-164). So far, no reply yet. 
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charge, which is "transcendental agnosticism, " that is "one cannot know what truth is, 
except that there is a truth that is beyond us. "68 Hick's distinction between "the noumenal 
and the phenomenal, " D'Costa believes, forces him to declare that none of the images of 
the "noumenal is privileged. "69 The way out for Hick, D'Costa suggests, can be one of 
three choices. First, the Real "contains contradictions for contradictory things may be said 
of it, " with which Hick disagrees since the Real cannot "be contradictory. " Secondly, "the 
statements can be reconciled in a higher propositional synthesis which is able to render 
the partial truth of both statements in such a way that their contradictory nature is 
overcome. "70 This reconciliatory conclusion, D'Costa continues, results in such a 
statement that "has more appropriateness and validity about the Real than the previous 
two"71 statements that Hick began with. If this is correct, then we have truth criteria that 
privilege "some phenomenal images as compared to others, "72 which refers to D'Costa's 
earlier charge of theistic leanings even in Hick's mature philosophy. To avoid this, I 
believe, Hick supports the strong ineffability of the Real (that we do not even know 
whether it is good or bad, one or many; these conceptions just do not apply to it). Finally, 
we come to third solution, which is D'Costa's main charge: "transcendental agnosticism. " 
It could be that "the two initial statements have no cognitive purchase at all but are only 
useful in creating attitudes and dispositions which lead to salvation. "73 As far as 
"ontological claims" are concerned, this "leads to transcendental agnosticism" which has 
"very specific truth claims that are also exclusive truth claims. "74 He concludes that the 
pluralists just "skewed" the question from the focal point of revelation itself, its 
availability to us and its relation to other truth-claims encountered in the world, to the 
question of "how many are saved. "75 He believes that pluralism cannot even answer that 
question, as "one can find universalists in all three camps. "76 
Hick, as an eminent exponent of the typology, describes D'Costa's efforts as those 
which "obscure clear and useful distinctions by confused and confusing ones. " By way of 
"some further spring cleaning, " he asserts that D'Costa commits a logical error in 
claiming that to "use a criterion is to be an exclusivist, " in the sense of "accepting 
something and rejecting something else. "77 Exclusivism and pluralism are so different 
from each other that "even if we banished the word `pluralism' the two rival views would 
remain so manifestly different that we would still need different names for them. "78 Hick 
68 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 228. 
69 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 228. 
70 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
71 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
72 D'Costa. "The Impossibility, " 229. 
73 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
74 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
75 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 232, my italics. 
76 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 232. The natural conclusion which one can derive from D'Costa's 
confession is that, contrary to his previous advocacy of inclusivism, he must be an exclusivist now 
since there is no such thing as inclusivism. In his swift reply to D'Costa, Hick draws our attention to 
this change (Hick, "The Possibility, " 161, fn. 1). 
77 Hick, "The Possibility, " 161. 
78 Hick, "The Possibility, " 161. 
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contends that to use the word "exclusivism, " in this "purely notional and trivial sense" is, 
although "intelligible, " "much more misleading than helpful. " Thus following D'Costa's 
logic of exclusivism, one becomes an "exclusivist when one admires Mahatma Gandhi 
and the Dalai Lama but condemns Hitler and Stalin. "79 To express the arbitrariness of 
D'Costa's position, Hick writes: 
"For to make an assertion about anything is to deny its contrary, and to propose a theory or 
view about anything is to reject alternative views. But to label all judgments, all proposing of 
theories and hypotheses, all expressions of opinion, as exclusive would be to empty the term 
of any useful meaning. For there could then be no non-exclusivist statements, so that the term 
would cease to mark any distinction. "80 
Hick's supposition is that certainly D'Costa does not mean to "affirm the self-destructive 
principle that to use criteria is to be an exclusivist" in the widest possible sense of the 
word. Thus, he moves to the particular issue of religious studies where he stresses that his 
"main criterion is whether a movement is a context of human transformation from natural 
self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the Transcendent, this salvific 
transformation being expressed in an inner peace and joy and in compassionate love for 
others. "81 As the source of this criterion, Hick shows the Golden Rule, which is common 
to all great world religions, as the provider of a "basic moral insight. "82 
Hick also dismisses D'Costa's logical point that exclusivism and pluralism share 
the same logical structure. He believes that "religious exclusivism and religious pluralism 
are of different logical kinds, the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith and the 
other a philosophical hypothesis. "83 He further reaffirms that "pluralism" is a "meta- 
theory about the relation between the historical religions" but "not another historical 
religion making an exclusive religious claim. " Furthermore, it is a "second-order 
philosophical theory or hypothesis" not a "first-order religious creed or gospel. "84 But 
Hick does not seem to be addressing the point here. D'Costa's argument is not about the 
epistemic status of exclusivism and pluralism, it is about the way they operate logically, 
i. e. that they use the same logical structure of affirming something and rejecting another 
according to the truth criteria they are based on. It is difficult to understand why Hick 
does not want to concede the fact cited above from Ward: that "pluralism makes 
exclusive truth claims. " Towards the end of his essay, Hick comes close to 
acknowledging this when he finally deals with the usual charge that the pluralist 
interpretation of religion contradicts self-understanding of a faith as "having the only 
fully authentic revelation or enlightenment. " He points out that D'Costa also "contradicts 
the self-understanding of every religion except his own. " But this is D'Costa's point (that 
their logical structure is the same). Hick eventually concedes that while there is close 
79 Hick, "The Possibility, " 162. 
80 Hick, "The Possibility, " 162. 
81 Hick, "The Possibility, " 162. 
82 Hick, "The Possibility, " 164. 
83 Hick, "The Possibility, " 163. 
84 Hick, "The Possibility, " 163. 
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similarity in their logical structure, "there is still an important difference in their religious 
outlooks and practical outworkings. "85 
Another serious critique of pluralism is offered by Alvin Plantinga, who is 
primarily concerned with the epistemic issues related to the discussion. In response to 
some charges of the pluralists, he argues thoroughly and elaborately that to be an 
exclusivist is neither "arbitrary, " nor "irrational, " nor "unjustified, " nor "unwarranted, " 
nor "oppressive and imperialistic. "86 Just as D'Costa does, Plantinga also shows that the 
logic of pluralism is not very different from that of exclusivism. I can understand, respect 
and share most of Plantinga's arguments at the personal level. However, I have 
reservations about what he says on the "accident of birth" and its relation to one's beliefs. 
He cites Hick: 
"For it is evident that in some ninety-nine per cent of cases the religion which an individual 
professes and to which he or she adheres depends upon the accidents of birth. Someone born 
to Buddhist parents in Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone born to Muslim 
parents in Saudi Arabia to be a Muslim, someone born to Christian parents in Mexico to be a 
Christian and so on. "87 
Plantinga's inference from this "sociological fact" is that if he had been born, say, in 
Madagascar rather than Michigan, his "beliefs would have been quite different (e. g. he 
"probably wouldn't believe" that he was "born in Michigan"). "But of course, " he 
continues "the same goes for the pluralist. Pluralism isn't and hasn't been widely popular 
in the world at large; if the pluralist had been born in Madagascar, or medieval France, he 
probably wouldn't have been a pluralist. "88 The crux of Plantinga's argument is that (1) 
the "hermeneutic of suspicion" that Hick promotes89 is applicable to his own pluralistic 
arguments (i. e. that they are culturally and historically particular beliefs and in return 
vulnerable to a self-referentially corrosive effect). Furthermore, (2) being attached by 
birth to a place has no effect either on the epistemic value of our beliefs (i. e. it will not 
make them true or false) or on their reliability (whether they have warrant or not). Hick 
admits that "the relativity of religious belief to the circumstances of birth does not, of 
course show that claims to a monopoly of religious truth are unjustified. "9e But he still 
maintains that it warns us "to look critically at such claims. "91 Regarding Plantinga's first 
85 Hick, "The Possibility, " 165. 
96Plantinga, A, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exelusivism, " in 11 I Ra1jpn1Itty. Qf. ße(i@f an4 
P1yrAlýýj! Qý ýi(h; Re y inIjQnQf, Q(, Vyilli mP , 
ý1$lon, cd. TD Senor, Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1995,192. 
87 AIR, 2. 
88 Plantinga, "Pluralism, " 211-212. On another occasion, he writes "if Hick had been born 
elsewhere and elsewhen, he probably wouldn't have been a pluralist, so that by his own principle, he 
should think twice (or more) about his pluralism" (Plantinga, A. "Ad Hick, " Faith and Philosophy 
14, no. 3,1997,298). 
89 Hick believes that as a result of the relativity of religious allegiance to the "accident of birth, " a 
"hermeneutic of suspicion is appropriate in relation to beliefs that have been instilled into one by the 
surrounding religious culture. " Hick, J. "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism, " 
Faith_andPhilo ophy 14, no. 3,1997,281. 
90 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 281. 
91 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 281. 
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point, Hick contends that "one is not usually a religious pluralist as a result of having 
been raised from childhood to be one, as (in most cases) one is raised from childhood to 
be a Christian or a Muslim or a Hindu, etc. "92 Therefore, he concludes, "the cases are so 
different that the analogy fails. "93 
Certainly several conclusions can be drawn from a sociological fact. It is obvious 
that in his critique of Hick's "hermeneutic of suspicion, " Plantinga's singular aim is to 
provide epistemic justification for exclusivism, i. e. that it is neither "arbitrary" nor 
"arrogant, " contrary to the pluralists' claim. He is not concerned with the soteriological 
implications of this position, which is my primary concern in this dissertation. Plantinga, 
nonetheless, airs my main problem with the relativity of religious belief to the 
circumstance of birth while addressing the effect of the awareness of religious diversity 
on a believer. He points out that it "serves as a defeater" for religious convictions- "an 
undercutting defeater, as opposed to a rebutting defeater, " by directly reducing the "level 
of confidence or degree of belief in the proposition in question. "94 Despite my upbringing 
as a Muslim with the conviction that Islam is the final way of salvation for all human 
beings and Allah's mercy embraces everything, I see the fact that many are left out of 
salvation due to geographical coincidences. Taken to an Islamic context, neither 
D'Costa's nor Plantinga's responses to pluralism answer my existential dilemma95 that "if 
the way to salvation is exclusively held by one tradition, how an all-loving and 
compassionate God allows so many to remain outside of this path. Does not this 
effectively mean ascribing salvation to geographical luck, which we have no hand in? " 
D'Costa hinted earlier that all three camps in Christianity may agree that a Muslim in this 
life might ultimately be saved. In fact he said pluralism in this regard is no better than 
exclusivism and inclusivism, since both camps include universalists. At the academic and 
personal levels this may seem to be a sound way out; but when taken to communal level 
it will be problematic, since the universalism of the universalists is not always understood 
and accepted by the absolutists. This brings us to Hick's point about Plantinga's 
understanding of exclusivism. 
In his reply to Plantinga's defence of religious exclusivism, Hick seizes the 
opportunity to point out that his understanding of exclusivism96 is so narrow that: 
92 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 281. 
93 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 281. 
94 Plantinga, "Pluralism, " 214. 
95 I am aware that neither is probably concerned with the soteriological implications of exclusivism 
at this stage; but my point is that when soteriology is brought into the discussion, the "undercutting 
defeater" effect that Plantinga points out becomes ever stronger. This is the existential dilemma that 
I have in mind. 
96 Regarding his understanding of exclusivism, Plantinga writes: 
"I shall use the term 'exclusivism' in such a way that you don't count as an exclusivist unless 
you are rather fully aware of other faiths, have had their existence and their claims called to 
your attention with some force and perhaps fairly frequently, and have to some degree 
reflected on the problem of pluralism, asking yourself such questions as whether it is or could 
be really true that the Lord has revealed himself and his programs to us Christians, say, in a 
way in which he hasn't revealed himself to those of other faiths" (Plantinga, "Pluralism, " 
195). 
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`only people who are 'rather fully aware of other religions' and aware also `that there is much 
that at least looks like genuine piety and devoutness' within them are to be counted as 
exclusivists. He thus ignores by stipulative definition the aspect of the Church's stance 
through the centuries that has been expressed in the persecution and murder of Jews, in 
violent crusades against Muslims, in the validation of European imperialism, and the ignorant 
denigration of other religions. "97 
One is of course entitled to have one's beliefs, such as Plantinga, who is a 
"knowledgeable, thoughtful and ethically sensitive Christian exclusivist. "98 However, 
loaded with exclusivistic truth claims, when we move to the social level, then we face the 
difficult dilemma of religious wars, intolerances, discriminations, etc. that I point out in 
my introduction. That is to say, the ultimate hope of salvation offered by exclusivist or 
inclusivist universalists for a non-Christian will not be of much use in resolving the day- 
to-day problems caused particularly by religious differences. 99 As recent as a month ago, 
a newspaper article bears witness to this predicament. According to the article, the 
Southern Baptist Church, "the largest Protestant denomination" in the U S, launched a 
simultaneous campaign in its 40,000 congregations to "convert Jews to Christianity 
during the Jewish new year holiday" (Rosh Hashanah). Apparently, the Southern Baptist 
Church has similar programmes to convert Muslims (during Ramadhan, the holiest 
month), Hindus, and Buddhists. The US Jewish leaders responded furiously by saying 
that they would like "a little less love and a little more respect" and described the 
attempts as "being wrong headed, arrogant or even contributing to the spiritual and 
cultural equivalent of the Holocaust. " Their reaction becomes particularly more 
meaningful, given that the campaign came after a "number of attacks on Jewish sites" 
in 
the U S. 100 
97 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 280. 
98 Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge, " 280. 
99 I am not certainly arguing that Plantinga is not concerned with the social aspect of exclusivism. 
But his primary concern here is the epistemic justification of exclusivism against the charges 
levelled by pluralists. In fact a broader reading of his comments (especially in "Ad Hick, " 298) 
might suggest that he would argue for an exclusivism which fosters tolerance and respect for other 
religions against a pluralism, such as Hick's, which ends up preaching agnosticism and an "air of 
scepticism" towards all religions. In other words a tolerant exclusivism might be a better option for a 
committed Christian than a skeptic pluralism. As we shall see later in chapter four, this is a fair 
criticism of Hick's hypothesis, which I will take on board seriously and opt for a moderate 
soteriological pluralism in chapter five which centres around the moderate ineffability of the Real 
and soteriological efficacy of religions. I argue that a moderate pluralism will serve as a better 
alternative to facilitate tolerance, respect, understanding, etc. between religions and societies than a 
tolerant exclusivism. Indeed, Muslims (for most of their history) and the Roman Catholic Church 
(since the Vatican II), to take two examples, have been exercising some form of tolerant exclusivism 
but with little success in the way of either promoting positive attitudes towards other religions and 
religious communities or resolving many of the well-known religious conflicts. As I see it, the main 
problem with a tolerant exclusivism, even in its mildest form, is the expectancy or the belief that 
others are wrong and deluded and will be better off securing salvation/liberation if they believe in 
what we believe. Thus, I believe that unless we move towards an understanding that other religions 
are or might be as good ours soteriologically, we will see more of the similar instances of the 
Southern Baptist Church conversion campaigns, be it organised by Christians, Muslims or others, 
which worsen the fragile relations among religious communities, raise tensions and cause more 
problems. 
100 Borger, J, "Jews Reject Baptist Love Offensive, " The. Qva; di4p, 10 Sept. 1999. 
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D'Costa remarks about the "irony" of the tolerance of pluralism that "it is 
eventually intolerant towards most forms of orthodox religious belief, Christian or 
otherwise. " °' I cannot see clearly what he means by being `intolerant', but I will try to 
elaborate it in some more detail. (1) If he means that "pluralism is not and will not be 
tolerant towards orthodox ways of living a religion, " I dispute this since Hick always 
denies that pluralism ever advocates a single universal world religion. (2) If he means that 
"pluralism does not induce tolerance towards other ways of living, " I disagree with this, 
too. I believe, compared to exclusivism and inclusivism, pluralism induces more positive 
and peaceful behaviour among communities. (3) If he means that "pluralism claims that 
exclusivist and inclusivist practitioners' of a religion will not attain salvation/liberation, " 
he is probably mistaken, for I believe that pluralism does not make such a claim. (4) If, 
however, he means that it does not respect the self-understanding of a religious belief, I 
think he is right -as I just pointed out earlier, Hick concedes this as well. Where does the 
plurality of pluralism lie then and what are the costs and benefits involved in it? 
Pointing decisively to the relation between "revelation, truth and salvation" in 
Christian theology of religions, D'Costa accused pluralists, such as Hick and Knitter, of 
"skewing" the question to "how many are saved. " 102 But to me "how many are saved" is 
as important as revelation and truth. I believe this is the case with the Southern Baptist 
Church's conversion campaign, since, as devout Christians, they worry about those who 
have not received the message of Jesus Christ. I agree with D'Costa that this does not 
mean that we should automatically adopt a sceptical view of revelation and truth. But I do 
not think the Southern Baptist campaign is helpful either. Despite Plantinga's grim 
picture about the negative effects of religious diversity on believers (that it works as an 
"undercutting defeater"), his final answer to the problem is a positive one, as far as an 
exclusivist is concerned. He suggests that "a fresh or heightened awareness of the facts of 
religious pluralism could bring about a reappraisal of one's religious life, a reawakening, 
a new or renewed and deepened grasp and apprehension" 103 of one's religious beliefs. In 
a way Hick and Plantinga agree that the awareness of religious pluralism will make one 
reassess one's belief, but the end results are opposite of each other: While Hick widens 
the scope of salvation/liberation to other religions and limits Jesus' role as the only 
saviour to Christians, for Plantinga it means a reawakening and reaffirming of one's 
exclusivistic truth claims. 104 As I just stated, maybe my faith is not very strong or maybe 
I am too short-sighted, but Plantinga's positive "reawakening" of one's religious beliefs 
101 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
102 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 232, my italics. 
103 Plantinga, "Pluralism, " 215. 
104 In his article, Plantinga puts forward two Christian truth claims by way of exemplifying the issue 
and builds his argument primarily on these. They are: 
(1) "the world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing and perfectly good personal 
being (one that holds beliefs, has aims, plans and intentions, and can act to accomplish these 
aims) and (2) [h]uman beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way of 
salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death and resurrection of his divine son" 
("Pluralism, " 192). 
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through the encounter of the reality of religious diversity does not seem to work for me. 
As a Muslim, the question of "how many are saved, " or rather "how many are not saved, " 
is still an enormous task waiting to be resolved. 105 
One of the most important contributions to the discussion of D'Costa's article was 
his call for a "criteriological typology to analyse different approaches to religious 
pluralism" as a "more adequate and helpful typology" which will "isolate the questions of 
revelation and truth as the most fundamental from a Christian point of view. "106 Neither 
Hick picked up on the issue in his response to D'Costa, nor, to my knowledge, D'Costa 
wrote anything about it yet. I believe that a criteriological typology is the key issue in 
developing a pluralistic hypothesis. Certainly developing such a typology goes beyond 
the scope of this project. But, in order to clarify my position, I will look briefly at some of 
the possible problems and solutions, since a "soteriological pluralism" will be my main 
concern in this thesis. Hick did not respond to D'Costa's charge that, in Hick's mature 
theology, religious doctrines -truth claims- "have no cognitive purchase at all but are only 
useful in creating attitudes and dispositions which lead to salvation. "107 In fact, as will be 
seen later, Hick calls them "`secondary' packaging and labelling. " 08 So, he argues 
obviously for a "soteriological pluralism. " Now if we were to develop a criteriological 
typology and examine the widely used three stances -exclusivism, inclusivism and 
pluralism- from this aspect we would have a different picture. If we examine them from 
the normative truth criteria they use, as D'Costa has shown, we will realise that their 
logical structure is quite similar, in other words they all make exclusive truth claims with 
excluding results. 109 But when we look at the soteriological criteria that they employ, we 
will see a different picture, which is very close to the common perception of Race's 
typology. Exclusivism restricts salvation to one tradition, inclusivism primarily reserves 
it to one's own while accepting others as possible means as well, whereas pluralism 
views all religions as equally valid ways of achieving salvation/liberation. 
To sum up, I suppose one can say that there can be no epistemically non-exclusivist 
ways of establishing a pluralistic theory, if by exclusivism we mean accepting some and 
rejecting other truth claims. That is to say, an interpretation of religion -be it naturalistic 
or religious- will always involve truth criteria that accept some truth claims while 
rejecting others. In this respect, pluralism is no different from other hypotheses. However, 
I believe one can have a different evaluation of religions by focusing on the soteriological 
105 I am not suggesting, of course, that it is not a "vital question" for Plantinga. He might indeed 
hold a universalist view about the salvation of non-Christians, but as far as I can see he chooses not 
to address the issue in his defence of exclusivism. Thus I cannot conclusively say what he thinks 
about the salvation of non-Christians. 
106 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 226. 
107 D'Costa, "The Impossibility, " 229. 
108 PRP, 46. 
109 Christopher Partridge rightly states that as far as its epistemological status is concerned, "Hick's 
'Real-centric' philosophy of religion[s] is fundamentally another competing religious worldview 
with distinct ideas concerning the nature of ultimate reality, human existence and salvation" 
(Partridge, C, H. H. Farmer's Theological Interpretation of Religion: Towards a Personalist 
Theology of Religions, Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998,336). 
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criteria that a theory employs. Although my intention is not to restore or revive Race's 
typology, I suggest that it might still serve as a useful tool in understanding Muslim 
attitudes towards other religions. Therefore, despite all its deficiencies, and not because I 
agree with or seek to further it as such, but for the sake of clarity and of sticking to the 
structure of Hick's own arguments, I will now analyse and examine the Islamic attitudes 
to other religions within the boundary of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, 
respectively. 
I should also note that, at this stage, my examination will be limited only to Muslim 
attitudes to other religions without extending it to Christian attitudes, especially to well 
known names such as Kraemer (exclusivist), Rahner (inclusivist) and Troeltsch 
(pluralist), despite the fact that I use a typology developed for Christian attitudes. My 
reasons for this restriction are several. First, even if it is brief, I will examine Christian 
attitudes towards the end of chapter two through Hick's responses to them. Secondly, 
more extensive work on Christian responses can be found in works specifically devoted 
to this issue, i. e. it is well studied by Christian scholars. '10 Thirdly, as I made clear at the 
outset of my work, my concern in this project is Hick's pluralistic theory and Islam, not 
Christian attitudes to other religions in general. My final and more crucial aim in this 
section will be to test both Race and Hick's claim that the typology can be successfully 
applied to other religions as well as Christianity. As a first attempt by a Muslim, we shall 
see how far this claim can be verified within an Islamic context. 
Before beginning to study solutions offered within the framework of this three-fold 
typology, methodologically speaking, it certainly ought to be acknowledged that there are 
exclusivisms, inclusivisms and pluralisms rather than exclusivism, inclusivism and 
pluralism as a general understanding of other religions from both Christian and Islamic 
perspectives. Thus, though not frequently used, whenever the words exclusivism, 
inclusivism, pluralism and their derivatives appear in the following paragraphs, they are, 
generally speaking, meant to refer to some particular version of the paradigm represented 
by the specific scholar in question. 
1.3.2. Exclusivism: A Muslim Approach 
Exclusivism maintains that only one religion holds the absolute truth that leads to 
salvation, while others are considered to be in error in varying degrees and unfit as 
vehicles of salvation, despite the traces of truth they may contain. The exclusivist line 
finds its roots among Muslims from the belief that Islam is the final and full religion for 
humanity as put forward in the Qur'an as a way of life. This belief is expressed vividly, 
according to many orthodox Muslim scholars, in verses like these: 
110 See for instance: Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism and D'Costa, G, Theology and 
Religious Pluralism: The Challenge of Other Religions, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell: 
1986; Knitter, P, No Other Name? A Critical Study of Christian Attitudes Towards the World 
Religions, London: SCM Press, 1985. 
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"Whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted from him and in the 
Hereafter he will be one of the losers. " ttt 
"The [true] religion in the sight of Allah is Islam. " 112 
"Today, I have perfected your religion for you, completed my grace on you and approved 
Islam as a religion for you [all humankind]. " 113 
Just as Christianity was aware of Judaism from its start, so Islam was aware of 
Judaism and Christianity, a fact which resulted in Islam's recognition of the earlier divine 
books and the prophets and in the introduction of the notion of "the religion of 
Abraham"114 as well as "ahl al-Kitab" (people of the Book). Every Muslim has to believe 
in the continuity of revelation and of prophecy throughout history, but this did not mean 
Muslims accepting other religions as they are. In fact, in explaining why a new religion in 
the form of Islam was needed, Muslims usually appeal to the verses critical of the Jews 
and of Christians. The Jews were accused of "altering the scripture"115 and the doctrines 
of Trinity and Incarnation were the biggest fault of Christianity. 116 Thus the traditional 
Muslims believe that as far as they were aware, other religions were corrupt and there 
was a genuine need for a new universal religion. This was Islam, revealed in the Qur'an, 
as explained and lived by Muhammad and his closest companions. On the one hand, 
Muhammad was no different from other prophets in explaining the religion of 
Abraham, 117 but on the other hand everybody is expected to follow him since, as the last 
prophet, he was calling for the true religion of Abraham: Islam, which effectively 
abrogated and invalidated all religions before it. tts 
This was and still is the general assumption prevalent among many Muslim 
communities and scholars. I shall now try to exemplify it by focusing on the views of the 
classical Islamic scholar Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi119 (d. 333/944)120 This is 
important for two reasons: one is that even though al-Maturidi wrote more than a 
thousand years ago during Islam's glory days, his exclusivist views continue to find wide 
acceptance among Muslim communities, perhaps as high as ninety five percent. The other 
is that we can find many contemporary scholars who express more or less the same, or 
111 The Qur'an 3: 85. 
112 The Qur'an 3: 19. 
113 The Qur'an 5: 3. 
114 The Qur'an 2: 130,135; 3: 95; 4: 125; 6: 161; 12: 38; 19: 123; 22: 78 
115 The Qur'an 4: 46f.; 2: 75-, 5: 13,41. 
116 The Qur'an 5: 72,73; 4: 17 1. 
117 The Qur'an, 2: 285. 
118 This is the dividing line between exclusivist, inclusivist and pluralist advocates in Islam. Even 
though they all share the basic conviction of the "continuity of revelation, " they differ in their 
interpretation of it. Exclusivists claim that Islam invalidates all previous religions, whereas 
inclusivists say it does not do so but it is the best fitting Abrahamic religion for humanity's needs; 
while pluralists share inclusivists understanding of abrogation, they claim Islam is one way among 
many. This is a very tentative generalisation though, to which we shall return later. 
119 His full name is Abu Mansur Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Mahmud al-Samarkandi al- 
Maturidi. 
120 I will provide the Islamic dates as well as the conventional, respectively when a classical Islamic 
scholar is at issue. 
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more extreme views. Any book or article on Islamic theology will easily demonstrate 
this. '2' 
Al-Maturidi was considered to be the founder of the "doctrinal school" Maturdiyya, 
"one of the two orthodox Sunni schools of kalarn"122 (Islamic theology), which is still 
alive and followed by millions throughout the Muslim world. His most important book on 
kalam is Kitab al-Tawhidl23 (literally meaning "the Book of Unity"). My reason for 
choosing al-Maturidi as an example for exclusivism is a recent book on his theology by 
Hanifi Özcan. 124 Ozcan's title, Religious Pluralism in al-Maturidi, gives the impression 
that al-Maturidi was some form a pluralist, at least this was what I thought when I first 
saw the book. However, in the introduction it becomes apparent that Özcan in fact puts 
al-Maturidi among inclusivists, since Ozean believes that pluralism cannot be achieved 
between theistic and non-theistic religions. Özcan's proposal is that we should try and 
achieve a form of pluralism, i. e. inclusivism, among the Abrahamic religions which are 
all based on revelation. To this extent, Ozean suggests, al-Maturidi gave us a good 
example of pluralism (i. e. inclusivism) between theistic Abrahamic religions. ''-5 We shall 
see in the following paragraphs how true this assertion is. 
At this stage, I should perhaps make a point about Özcan's understanding of the 
three fold typology. Even though Özcan is aware of the works of pluralists like Hick, W 
Cantwell Smith and Paul Knitter, he seems to be mixing the two terms or using them in 
literal sense, without really making this clear, and not as understood by Race and others. I 
can only speculate that by the "pluralism of Abrahamic religions, " he is probably arguing 
for a pluralism which recognises the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions as effective 
salvific ways. But neither Race, nor Hick, nor many other pluralists would accept this as 
pluralism, since it will end up either as "theistic excltisivism, " or "theistic inclusivism, " 
depending on the treatment of non-theistic religions totally or partially false. Even to 
maintain this understanding is very difficult, since Ozean establishes a direct link 
between pluralism and inclusivism: that is one requires the other and one cannot talk of 
either of them without mentioning the other'26. As I see it, this certainly is not the case. It 
is like calling Hick a pluralist inclusivist or Rahner an inclusivist pluralist, which is not 
helpful at all. For the same reason, the book also should have been named "Religious 
Inclusivism in al-Maturidi, " though as we shall see this is not an accurate description of 
al-Maturidi's thought either. 
121 As an example I can cite Kocyigit, T, "Cennet Milminlerin Tekelindedir" (Muslims Have 
Monopoly over Paradise), Islami Arastirmalar Deraisi (Journal of Islamic Research} 3, no. 3,1989, 
85-94. 
122 Bosworth, CE ct al., cds., The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vv. 6, Leiden: EJ Brill, 1991,846. 
123 al-Maturidi, EMM, Kitab al-Tawhid, cd. F Kholcif, Beirut: Dar al-Mashrcq, 1970. 
124 Matilridi'de Dini co; ulculuk(Religious Pluralism in al-Maturidi), Istanbul: IFA V, 1995. In the 
subsequent references, I refer to the book as Maturidi not al-Maturidi, since I refer to the Turkish 
copy, which uses the Turkish spelling without the Arabic definite article "al. " 
12 Özcan, Maliiridi, 23. 
126 bican, Matiiridi, 23. 
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In examining al-Maturidi's thought about other religions, I centre my attention on 
three subjects. I will look, first, at his understanding of the concept of religion under 
which he distinguishes between religion as the generic faith in God, 127 i. e. Islam, and the 
institutionalised religions, shari'a, e. g. Islam. Secondly, the Qur'an's relation to other 
scriptures and the problem of abrogation, naskh, will be studied. Thirdly, the special case 
of (ahl al-kitab) the people of the Book, the Qur'anic phrase which was used by al- 
Maturidi to refer to Jews and Christians, 128 will be considered. 
According to al-Maturidi, true religion is based on the witness and the testimony of 
the prophets'29 and never changes, which he names din al-tawhid, the religion of unity. 
The basic requirement in this religion of unity, which is also called Islam, as distinct from 
the institutionalised Islam Muhammad preached, is "to believe in one God and worship 
none but him. " 130 To this extent Muhammad did not bring anything new, he simply 
reiterated what previous prophets had taught before him. 131 Indeed, Islam places great 
importance on the continuity of revelation throughout history. Thus the Qur'an states: 
"We, indeed, sent among every people an apostle" (16: 36). 
"There was never any people without a warner having lived among them" (35: 24). 132 
Al-Maturidi places great importance on reason in his theology. As in our sensory 
knowledge, reason plays a crucial role in either deciding to accept the religion taught by 
the prophets 133 or, if one is not aware of any divine revelation, finding out about the 
existence of one God. Thus Islam is also called "religio naturalis" or "Ur-Religion"134 
leaning on an authentic hadith135 by the Prophet Muhammad. 136 The hadith states that 
"Every child is born with an innate capacity to submission to God, i. e. islam; it is his/her 
parents that Christianise, Judaise or Magianise her/him, as an animal delivers a perfect 
baby animal. Do you find it mutilated? "137 This is what Hick calls the factor of the 
"accident of birth" in choosing one's religion. 138 
Once this given instinct to believe is established, al-Maturidi goes on to distinguish 
between this basic type of religion, i. e. faith in one God, and the institutionalised 
religions taught by different prophets at the different periods of time, shari'a. He argues 
that faith always comes before religion139 and while faith remains the same, religions 
127 This is very close to Wilfred Cantwell Smith's understanding of faith. See his: Faith and Belief: 
The Difference Between Them, Oxford: Oneworld, 1998, esp. Chp. 3,33-52. 
128 Özcan, Matüridi, 112. 
129 al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 8; Özcan, Matilridi, 46. 
1300zcan, Matüridi, 47. 
131 See the Qur an 10: 71-72; 2: 130-132; 12: 101; 5: 44; 3: 52-53. 
132 Cf. other verses in the Qur'an 4: 163-165; 6: 130-131; 13: 7; 23: 44. 
133 al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawhid, 9. 
134 al-Faruqi, I R, "Islam and Other Faiths, " in The,. Cbi 1Lcnge. nf. Ialam, ed. A Gaufar, London: 
Islamic Council of Europe, 1978,93-96. 
135 A hadith is an authentic saying of the Prophet Muhammad as reported and recorded in reliable 
books and is second most important authority after the Qur'an. 
136 scan, Matüridi, 47-48. 
137 Reported by all authentic hadith collections. This one is in al-Bukhari, MbI, Sahih al-Bukharl, 
Beirut: Dar al-Arabia, 1985, v. 2, hadith no. 467. 
138 GHMN, 44; GUF, 132; Cf. Özcan, Matüridi, 56,93-94. 
139 Ozcan, Matiiridi, 56. 
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change as different prophets emerge in different environments which have their unique 
tribal, linguistic and cultural features. '4° 
This distinction takes us to the core of al-Maturidi's thought, which is the second 
step in my analysis: the Qur'an's and Islam's relation to other religions as a shari'a, i. e. 
the issue of abrogation (naskh). Abrogation is both a very important and a contentious 
issue in Islam, which also marks the dividing line between exclusivists and inclusivists. 
The former believe that Islam abrogated all previous forms of religion, whereas the latter 
conditionally maintain the opposite view, as we shall see in detail in the forthcoming 
discussion of inclusivism. Therefore, it is no surprise that al-Maturidi holds that while the 
essence of religion, faith in the one unifying God, remains the same, a new religion, 
shari'a, abrogates the previous one. 141 In al-Maturidi's understanding abrogation means, 
Özcan suggests, the removal of the validity of a shari'a, which had a limited life time, 
and the replacement of it with a new one. 142 The implication of naskh is that one has to 
believe in and follow the new shari'a without hesitation, '43 if one wants to achieve 
salvation. However, a few paragraphs later, we learn from Özcan's exposition that, as al- 
Maturidi understands it, Allah's reason behind the principle of abrogation, which 
ostensibly produces several religions to choose from as we have today, is to test human 
beings to see if they will be able to choose the right, most up-to-date religion among 
many and in turn thereby to make them accountable for their choices. '44 The natural 
conclusion of this argument is that Islam is the final and full religion prescribed for all 
human beings'45 and everybody is expected to follow it. As far as I can see, far from 
being pluralistic or inclusivistic, this is plain Islamic orthodoxy and exclusivism as Race 
and Hick use it. 
To be able to prove the superiority of Islam, al-Maturidi starts naively from 
Muhammad as a superior prophet over others. He attempts to do this, despite the clear 
Qur'anic statements attesting, first, to the recognition of the equality of the prophets146 
and consequently declaring that "Muhammad is but a messenger, messengers (the like of 
whom) have passed away before him. "147 It also runs against the common perception that 
it is not the personhood of Muhammad that matters but his message, as explained in the 
Qur'an and in the prophetic tradition, sunna. 148 Nevertheless, al-Maturidi tries to 
establish the superiority of Muhammad over the others by using circumstantial evidence 
140 Despite the controversy about the sacred importance of Arabic for the Qur'an and Islam, al- 
Maturidi thinks that language is not that essential and even Arabic can be substituted with a different 
language during a worship (Özcan, Matiirldi, 63). 
141 Özcan, Matüridi, 65. 
142 This is abrogation in the wider sense. Actually, looked at from the Qur'anic perspective, this 
wider sense of abrogation can not be authenticated. The generally known type of abrogation in the 
Qur'an is the abrogation within a religion; that is the removal of the validity of a law or a command 
with a different one (The Qur'an 2: 106). 
143 Özcan, Matüridi, 66,101. 
144 Ozcan, Matüridi, 67. 
145 Özcan, Matüridi, 104. 
146 The Qur'an: 2: 285. 
147 The Qur'an 3: 144. 
148 Surprisingly, Özcan never draws attention to this important point. 
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such as the universality of his message, 149 the way his name is mentioned in the Qur'an'5° 
and more importantly the guarantee of continuity of his teachings till the end of this 
world, since he is the last prophet. 151 Muhammad's superiority in turn means the 
superiority of Islam and of its followers. 152 While he accuses ah! al-kitab of exclusivism, 
arrogance and ignorance in their denial of Islam, 153 he justifies Islam's superiority by 
relying on the process of the evolution of religions, with Islam at the peak. '54 
Now al-Maturidi has the criterion to judge other religions and beliefs. So far, he has 
demonstrated that, with its ever authentic holy scripture, the Qur'an, and Muhammad as 
the superior prophet over others, only Islam is the perfect religion for salvation, and as 
the followers of Islam, Muslims are also superior compared to the devotees of other 
religions. 
By "other religions, " al-Maturidi means three groups of people who rejected the 
message of Muhammad: (i) ahl al-kitab , the people of the book, whom he calls "the 
stubborn and arrogant people, " (ii) the people of Mecca and (iii) "Sabiun" (Sabaeans), '55 
with which we shall deal separately in examining inclusivism in Islam. Al-Maturidi 
divides ah! al-kitab into two groups. On the one hand, there were the followers of the true 
religion who recognised Muhammad as a prophet and accepted the Qur'an as an authentic 
holy scripture, but who nevertheless kept practising their religion. On the other hand, 
there were the stubborn infidels who refused to believe in Islam out of their arrogance 
and obstinacy. 156 As we shall soon see , this same artificial and problematic division 
exists in Muslim inclusivists as well. The apparent problem with this division is that 
historically speaking we do not have any knowledge or record of the first group, the good 
religious people of the book, in the eyes of al-Maturidi. We only know of converts to 
Islam who are called Muslim not ahl al-kitab after their conversion. Thus the naming 
does not apply to them and is therefore artificial. It is also problematic since, despite its 
pretension of good will towards ah! al-kitab, it does not address the real problem. We 
know that the majority of the people of the book did not and do not believe in either 
Muhammad's message or the Qur'an. In al-Maturidi's words, this rejection makes them 
unbelievers. 157 
Al-Maturidi focuses his criticism of ahl al-kitab on four points. The first and the 
second points are their failure to recognise Muhammad's prophethood and the Qur'an as 
the true revelation of God. He thinks that faith requires a whole acceptance of all the 
149 The Qur'an 34: 28. 
150 The Qur'an 33: 40; 47: 2 and 48: 29. 
151 The Qur'an 33: 40; Özcan, Mataridi, 104-106. 
152 Ozcan, Matilridi, 105-106. 
153 Özcan, Mataridi, 96-97,101-102. 
154 Ozcan, Matiiridi, 106-111. 
155 Özcan, Matiiridi, 112. 
156 Özcan, Matilridi, 112. 
157 Özcan, Matiiridi, 113. 
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revelation of God and of the prophets; one cannot accept some but refuse the rest. 158 In 
other words, "believing in one holy book sincerely necessitates believing in all the holy 
books and the prophets. " He even generalises the point as to claim that "rejecting one 
prophet means rejecting all of them"159 and rejecting a prophet and a holy book means 
rejecting "God. "16° 
The third point is related to the oneness of God, i. e. tawhid. Al-Maturidi accuses 
ahl al-kitab of failing to secure this core belief of primordial religion with the association 
of a sonship to God of Uzair (Ezra) by the Jews and that of Jesus by the Christians. 161 
The final point is about their belief in the hereafter. Al-Maturidi acknowledges that 
ahl al-kitab have the belief in "resurrection and life after death, " but he claims that ahl al- 
kitab do not believe in the judgement day, without which there can be no hereafter, since 
the components of the belief in the hereafter cannot be changed in any way. 162 
On all four counts, al-Maturidi contends that ahl al-kitab are deluded, in error and 
therefore unbelievers. Al-Maturidi's accusations towards ahl al-kitab are based on his 
conviction that all theistic religions share belief in the prophets and the books which puts 
one in an either-or position: this requires one either to believe everything or to believe 
nothing. Al-Maturidi believes that theistic religions reached their peak in Islam as the 
evolved religion of all, as explained in the Qur'an. 163 In conclusion, if one follows a 
religion, al-Maturidi asserts, it has to be none but Islam, because it is the only authentic 
and salvific/liberating religion humanity has at present. The rest are all in vain. 
As has already become clear, this conclusion makes al-Maturidi a hard-line 
exclusivist. Özcan's efforts to present him as an inclusivist do not add up to a coherent 
thesis. Özcan also concedes that by the "religious unity of humanity" al-Maturidi means 
the Islamisation of the world population, for he believes that all other religions, including 
Judaism and Christianity, are deluded. Thus Özcan's interpretation of al-Maturidi's 
philosophy as a good and workable project of toleration between Abrahamic religions 
due to their common beliefs164 is just as problematic as Hick's position which he 
criticises in his introduction and tries to replace. Özcan argues that Hick's proposal of the 
noumenal Real as the totally ineffable concept behind the phenomenon of religion is 
incoherent and leads to atheism. He also thinks that the incommensurability of 
experiences of God as personal and impersonal cannot be resolved. Thus, he concludes, 
we should instead try to reach a pluralistic understanding between theistic religions. 165 
158 This is a common line of thinking even among contemporary Muslims. Rahman, a modernist 
thinker, for instance, writes: "Prophethood, indeed, is an indivisible office; one cannot believe in 
some and not in others without 'giving the lie' to the very source of revelation" ( "! slam's Attitude 
toward Judaism, " Tb. MMMpgjj jRW. QTjd 72, no. 1,1982,3). 
159 Ozcan, Matüridi, 115-116. 
160 Özcan, Matiiridi, 115-116. 
161 The Qur'an 9: 30; Özcan, Matiiridi, 116. 
162 Ozcan, Matüridi, 116-118. 
163 The Qur'an 5: 3. 
164 Özcan, Maui ridi , 122. 165 Ozcan, Matüridi, 12-17. 
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As far as I can see, al-Maturidi's treatment of other religions contradicts the spirit 
of Islam. There are two important predicaments which al-Maturidi's theology does not 
answer. The first is that it neither addresses nor tries to solve the obvious declaration in 
the Qur'an according to which the plurality of the religions is desired and planned by God 
as the norm for humankind. 166 To this we will come back later when we discuss the 
problems of pluralism in an Islamic milieu in our final chapter. 
The second point is probably an illustration of the first: the case of the Sabiusn 
(Sabaeans). 167 The Qur'an declares in two clear verses (2: 62 and 5: 69, which I shall 
examine in detail in the final chapter) the possibility of attaining salvation for Sabaeans 
on certain conditions. Özcan, however, quotes al-Maturidi as holding the view that they 
are totally in the dark and do not possess any hope of salvation. 168 Al-Maturidi does not 
discuss Sabaeans separately, since he is more concerned about ahl al-kitab. In my 
opinion, it is very difficult to justify al-Maturidi's allocation of Sabaeans among the 
people in dark, contrary to the verses' clear meaning. In fact these are the only two places 
where Sabaeans are discussed in the whole of the Qur'an where there is clearly hope of 
their salvation. 169 To use the ambiguity of Sabaeans as a religious group against their case 
is, I would argue, totally unjustifiable and means losing touch with the spirit of the 
Qur'an. This reflects the typical attitude of Muslim scholars in their treatment of 
Sabaeans in that they are either totally ignored or considered among the perverted. 170 
Özcan believes that al-Maturidi is more sympathetic towards ah! al-kitab since they 
are familiar with the core belief of monotheist religions, belief in one God, and are 
expected to become Muslims, for their distorted holy book and religion are abrogated by 
the Qur'an and Islam. Al-Maturidi, though, emphatically maintains that the Qur'an has 
nothing to do with either the Torah or the Bible as Jews and Christians possessed them in 
the time of Muhammad. What the Qur'an confirmed was the original content and the 
message of these holy texts before they were distorted and changed. 171 
It is clear from the above discussion that al-Maturidi is not an inclusivist despite 
Özcan's efforts to portray him as one. Al-Maturidi's aim of uniting monotheistic religions 
166 The Qur'an 49: 13 also cf. 5: 48. 
167 As Jane D McAuliffe points out, Muslim exegetes cannot agree on the identity of the mysterious 
religious community Sabi'un (Sabaeans). Some hold that they are part of the people of the Book (p. 
96,101), others deny this, while others claim they are either "angel" or "sun" or "star-worshippers 
(p. 97-98). Some others believe that Sabaeans are those whom the message of a "prophet has not 
reached" (p. 100), i. e. they follow "an independent religion" (p. 101). This ambiguity, one may 
argue, led to a loose application of the term to those remain outside the Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
circle in the "easy, inexact fashion of those who despised such religions and thought of them 
unworthy of serious consideration" (p. 106) (See for more: McAuliffe, J D, "Exegetical 
Identification of the Sabi'un, " The Muslim World 72, no. 2,1982,95-106). In his translation of the 
Qur'an, A. Yusuf Ali also gives some valuable information in the light of latest archaeological 
research which links them to a religious group in Lower Iraq, near Basra, to a kingdom in the Yemen 
tract, and to the Queen of Sheba (The Holy Qur'an: English translation of the meanings and 
Commentary, trans. Ali, A Y. al-Madinah al-Munawarah: King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the 
Holy Qur'an, 1992,27, fn. 76). 
168 zcan, Matüridi, 112,116. 
169 They are also mentioned in the Qur'an 22: 17, but the context is slightly different. 
170 McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of the Sabi'un, " 96-97,106. 
171 Ozcan, Matilridi, 126. 
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under the roof of one unifying God initially sounds optimistic. However, seeing Islam as 
the only true representation of this one God and the Qur'an as the only true and authentic 
revelation puts him clearly in the exclusivist camp. It is obvious, in al-Maturidi's 
understanding, that as long as ahl al-kitab remain in their abrogated religion they will not 
be able to achieve salvation. The only way to salvation for them is to become Muslim and 
follow the lasting true message of Islam which contains the core of all revealed 
religions. '72 
Al-Maturidi does not discuss other theistic and non-theistic religions, Hinduism and 
Buddhism etc., which are not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an. However, from his 
treatment of ahl al-kitab, it is manifest that they, too, have to become Muslims in order to 
gain salvation. 
Even though al-Maturidi appears to be justifying the religious situation of his time 
rather than trying to establish a thoroughly studied analysis of other religions, the line he 
took is almost unanimously accepted by today's Muslims. I will give only two examples. 
The first one is a reworked doctoral thesis entitled The State of Being Astray and Guided 
in the Qur'an by Ramazan Altinta;. 173 In classifying the people who have gone astray 
according to the Qur'an, Altmta; automatically places ah! al-kilab in this group next to 
the infidels (al-mushrikun) and the hypocrites (al-ºnunaftgun). '74 He starts, by quoting al- 
Tabari (d. 310/923), with the assertion that ahl al-kitab have gone astray and therefore 
deserved the wrath of Allah. 175 To prove this premise, he then cites all the verses critical 
of ahl al-kitab. In the end, the reader is given a picture of the Jews and the Christians as 
the mob of people who not only have gone astray but also tried to take Muslims away 
from Islam. '76 Certainly for Altinta the question of salvation for ahl al-kilab does not 
exist unless they repent and become Muslims. 
My second contemporary example is a fervent article written as a protest to the 
inclusivistic arguments of Süleyman Ate;, to which I shall come shortly. It was written 
by Talat Kocyigit and entitled "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise. "177 Kocyigit 
proposes an argument almost identical to al-Maturidi's and Altmta, 's, which is that ahl 
al-kitab are in error and will not go to heaven unless they believe in Muhammad's 
message and follow it strictly. At one point, he stretches the limit to equate the obedience 
of Allah with obedience to Muhammad so that nobody can claim to obey Allah without 
obeying Muhammad and following Islam. 1713 Ko4yigit proves to be a hard-line 
cxclusivist, concluding with a verse to suggest that even the very thought of inclusivistic 
172 al-Tabcri, a classical Qur'an commentator, makes almost exactly the same comment with regard 
to the Sabacans verse mentioned above (McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of the Sabi'un, " 96- 
97). 
173 Alttnta§, R, Kur'an'da Hidayet ve Delalet, Konya: REV Yayinlari, 1997. I owe great debt to my 
dear friend Dr Mahmut Ya§ar for both bringing this book to my attention and providing me with it. 
174 Altinta§, The State, 291. 
175 Altmtaý, The State, 299. 
176 Altinta§, The State, 307. 
177 Kocyigit, T. "Muslims Have Monopoly over paradise, " 85-94. 
178 Kocyigit, "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise, " 91-92. 
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ideas means committing sin in the eyes of Allah. We shall come back to Kocyigit's 
argument in the following section on inclusivism. 
This negative line of thought has revealed itself in the history of Islam. As Wilfred 
C. Smith rightly remarks, the dependants of Islamic states were and are divided into two 
as Muslim and ghayr Muslim (non-Muslim). 179 Instead of upholding the Qur'anic 
classification of Muslim, ahl al-kitab and ghayr Muslim, the introduction of this dual 
classification affected grossly ahl al-kilab by portraying a negative and non-Qur'anic 
image of them. 
Exclusivist approaches to the problem of religious plurality do inevitably seem to 
be aiming at preserving the superiority of one religion over others. Islam in this sense 
claims, in its own way, to be the unique way to salvation. However, as I stated in the 
outset in my introduction, Islamic exclusivistic arguments do not answer my existential 
dilemma, though they may be logical and comforting to an insider. Without going deep 
into the history of religions, if one considers the present distribution of the followers of 
religions, one is faced with a bleak religious picture of humanity. That is, if one follows 
the exclusivistic claims at least two thirds of the devout believers would not be able to 
attain salvation through no fault of their own, since religious adherence is ninety percent 
of the time related directly to one's birth place. Thus one is consigned to heaven or hell in 
exclusivistic arguments by matters of geographical accident. When, as a Muslim, I 
consider the Qur'anic "principle of the plurality, " in religion as well as in other domains 
of life, 180 I immediately sense that this cannot be a solution desired by the merciful and 
compassionate Allah. This brings us to the softer approach to the problem of religious 
plurality: inclusivism. 
1.3.3. Inclusivism: A Muslim Approach 
Inclusivism holds that there is one surest way to salvation, which is Islam in 
Muslims' case, others may also lead to salvation but not as good as one's own, i. e. Islam. 
An inclusivistic approach could have been a common way of dealing with other religions 
from an Islamic perspective. Sociologically, Muslims set good examples of integration 
with other religions throughout history; 181 a good illustration of which was the Andalus 
Moorish Empire in Spain where Muslims, Christians and Jews produced a highly 
sophisticated, civilised and advanced society. However, as will be seen soon, 
theologically speaking, Muslims tended to remain exclusivist and claim to hold the 
absolute truth by developing the critical remarks of the Qur'an about the Jews and the 
Christians, supported with a firm belief in the oneness of God. Even the efforts of a mild- 
mannered inclusivist like Süleyman Ate; were confronted with fierce criticism. One 
179 Smith, W C, The Meaning and End of Religion, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991,299. 
1901 shall come back to this principle at the end of my thesis. For now though it is sufficient to say 
that according to the Qur'an plurality in every parts of life is "divinely organised and willed" (The 
Qur'an 5: 47, cf. 11: 118). 
181 Gi bb, Mohainmedanism, 3-5. 
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critic described his endeavour as "creating imaginary heavens for non-Muslims to enter. " 
Thus theologically speaking even inclusivism was not considered an option for non- 
Muslims, as far as orthodox Islam was concerned. I will deal with the theological 
exclusivism of Muslims in detail in the last chapter. For now though we move on to 
consider a Muslim inclusivist approach. 
Ate; is a renowned Qur'an scholar. Among other books, he is well known 
throughout the Islamic world for his modern exegesis of the Qur'an. Thus by training, he 
is an expert on the Qur'anic issues, a theologian one might call him, not a philosopher. 
Ate; therefore bases the hulk of his argument on the Qur'anic verses. He has written two 
articles on the subjcct; '82 the first contained his proposals and the second replied to 
criticisms, especially Kocyigit's. 
What are the signs that make Ate, an inclusivist as opposed to a pluralist even 
though he neither refers to nor seems to have any knowledge of inclusivism? There arc 
two definite signs as far as I can see. The first is his limited understanding of ahl al-kitah 
which excludes the great majority of Christians (e. g. those who believe in the Trinity) and 
Jews. The second is that his strict adherence to a monotheistic notion of God prevents 
him even mentioning non-theistic religions such as certain forms of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, let alone discussing them. Indeed both attitudes are related to his acceptance 
of the absolute oneness of God, that is, not to worship any god except Allah, tawhid. In 
essence, he is arguing for a small minority who acknowledge Muhammad as a prophet 
and the Qur'an as an authentic revelation but remain in their religion without converting 
to Islam. By doing so, they are following the core of the prophets' message, viz. to 
worship none but Allah. 183 He on the one hand accepts that there is salvation outside 
Islam (differing from exclusivists), but on the other hand holds that one has to be a 
monotheist and acknowledge the message of Islam in order to gain salvation. Ate; holds 
that Islam is the surest way to salvation and judges other religions from an Islamic 
perspective (as opposed to pluralists). Thus his proposal becomes a "monotheistic 
inclusivism" revolving around explicitly the God of Abrahamic religions, but implicitly 
the God of Islam. To me this is a very limited inclusivism, even narrower than the 
renowned Catholic theologian Karl Rahner's, whose name has almost become 
synonymous with "anonymous Christianity" and inclusivism. Let us proceed then with 
Ate; 's arguments to see if he can be considered a Muslim inclusivist. 
Ater starts with establishing the conditions of entering Paradise, namely attaining 
salvation, in the light of the Qur'anic message. They are only three: i) to believe in the 
absolute oneness of Allah (God), i. e. to worship none but Him, ii) to believe in the 
182 Atq, S, "Cennet Kimsenin Tekelinde Degildir" (Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise), tslami 
Ara tirmalar (Journal of Islamic Research) 3, no. 1,1989 and "Cennet Tekelcisi Mi? " (Can Anyone 
Monopolise Paradise? ), I sl ami Ara tirmalar (Journal of Islamic Research) 4, no. 1,1990. 
183 Ate§, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 14,23-24. 
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Hereafter without a doubt, iii) to do good dccds. 1 ' To rc-cmphasisc al-Maturidi's point, 
Ate also sees the gist of all prophetic revelations in these three points as the broader 
meaning of islam. He believes that all the prophets were trying to bring the same 
message, and therefore all were in effect muslims and their religion was islam. 185 He 
quotes several Qur'anic verses to bolster this idea. 186 
Having established his three basic principles, Ate, deals with the controversial 
problem of naskh: Qur'an's abrogation of previous holy scriptures. He thinks that this 
narrow-minded and inauthentic idea has been "injected to the Qur'anic interpretations" as 
a "result of the efforts of monopolising Allah's mercy upon one nation. "187 He, then, 
places the Qur'an in its right location by reclaiming its position as the confirmatory of the 
previous revelations188 not the abrogating. 189 He elaborates this thought by saying that the 
Qur'an confirms the Torah and the Gospels that were held by the people of the book 
when it was revealed, contrary to the traditionally held view, such as al-Maturidi's, that 
the confirmation relates to the original and authentic scriptures. This is one of the crucial 
points where Ate; departs from the Muslim exclusivists and he has been severely 
criticised for it. But he produces convincing Qur'anic verses clearly supporting his 
understanding 190 and verses asking ahl al-kitab to practice what is written in their 
scripture. 191 He also quotes Abdullah Draz's comparison between certain verses from 
Torah, Bible and the Qur'an, such as the ten commandments. Draz believes that all three 
confirm each other. 19' Finally, Ate, appeals to the Prophetic traditions (sunnah), as the 
second important source of knowledge in Islam, endorsing his viewpoint. It is 
unanimously accepted among the scholars of Islamic history that the Prophet has passed 
judgement according to Torah on the Jewish tribe of Banu Qurayzah in Madina when 
they broke the Charter of Madina by co-operating with the "hypocrites" (Munafrqun) and 
supporting the Meccans during the defensive Battle of Handaq (trench), fought against 
the Meccans. 193 The second example is related to the Najran Christians who visited 
184 The Qur'an 2: 62 and 5: 69. Both verses are almost identical. The first reads: "Verily! Those who 
believe and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last 
Day and do righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, 
nor shall they grieve. " The second: "Surely, those who believe [in the Oneness of Allah, in his 
messenger Muhammad and all that was revealed to him from Allah], those who are the Jews and the 
Sabians, and the Christians, -whosoever believed in Allah and the Last Day, and worked 
righteousness, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. " 
185 Ater, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 7. 
186 T lie Qur'an, 2: 285,131-133,136; 4: 163. 
187 Ate , "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 9. 188 77te Qur'an 2: 41; 5: 48. 
'H' As Mircea Eliadc nicely puts it: According to Muslims, the Qur'an is the "Newvcst Testament, ' 
not contradicting, but corroborating and surpassing the Jewish and the Christian bibles. Yet in 
another way it more approximate the role of Jesus, the Logos, as the eternal and divine Word of the 
creator God; for Muhammad, while spotless and elect, is entirely human" (Eliade, M and IP 
Couliano, The Eliade Guide to World Religions, San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991,147). 
19() The Qur'an 2: 41-, 3: 93; 5: 48. 
191 The Qur'an 5: 43,44-45,47,66-68. 
192 Ate§, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 18-20. 
193 Ater, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 22. It happened in the 6 year of the Hijri, the 
Muslim calendar, (628 C E), and according to the judgement of the Torah (Deuteronomy 20: 12), the 
"adult males" were executed and the rest was expelled (Rahman, F, "Islmn's Attitude toward 
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Muhammad in Madina, where he let them worship according to their belief in the only 
mosque there was during their stay for one month. 194 
With regard to the changes made in the holy books by ahl al-kitab, Ate; expresses 
mixed opinions. Initially he limits these to the interpretations of the holy books and their 
commentaries basically in understanding, particularly on the Jewish part. He even says 
they were not alone in this sort of distortion, Muslims were also guilty of the same 
charge. '95 However, when he is pressed harder, he accepts that changes were made to the 
original scriptures in time but these happened after the revelation of the Qur'an finished. 
To prove this claim, he leans on the differences in the stories in Torah, the Gospels and 
the Qur'an. Naturally, as an inclusivist, he believes that the Qur'anic ones are correct, 
others have been distorted. 196 It is worth noting that he does not bother to deal with the 
crucial issues like Incarnation and Trinity in Christianity. This relates to the first principle 
of salvation, i. e. belief in the oneness of God. Ate; believes that the doctrines of 
Incarnation and Trinity violate this principle, and therefore, as I said in the opening lines, 
the great majority of Christians cannot achieve salvation whatever they do. Because Allah 
can forgive any sin except shirk, worshipping others than him. '97 
Ate; was attacked by several scholars as soon as his article appeared. Despite the 
fact that he was not calling for a Copernican Revolution in Muslim theology, as Hick had 
done almost a decade earlier, 198 the tone of the replies was quite stern. As I indicated 
earlier, I will focus on Kocyigit's criticisms. 
The discussion mostly concentrates on the scope of Muhammad's message, which 
includes abrogation, and Trinity and Incarnation. Kogyigit maintains that believing in 
Muhammad's message brings with it the necessity to practice Islam in all aspects, 
whereas Ate; holds that the two faces of Muhammad's message are separable. That is, so 
long as one accepts Muhammad's message as true and is a good religionist in one's own 
religion, one will be saved, provided that one also meets the three basic criteria. Ko4yigit 
backs up his argument with the usual verses stating the need to obey the Prophet 
Muhammad and declaring Islam as the religion for all humankind. 199 He repeatedly says 
that one cannot obey Allah unless one obeys Muhammad and straightforwardly concludes 
Judaism, " The Muslim World72, no. 1,1982,6 and Farah, C E, Islant: Beliefs and Observances, 
New York: Barron's, 1994,52). 
t`m Atcý, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 22; Esack, F, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism: 
Aa Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997, 
151; Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, 176; al-Faruqi, "Islant and Other Faiths, " 102-103. Atc 
makes a good point by rightly highlighting this point. However, it has to be pointed out that Muslim 
scholars, like him, usually quote this example %%-hen they talk about the Muslim toleration of other 
religions without really thinking about its full implications for Islam itself. I shall explore this point 
further in the final chapter when discussing pluralism and Islam in detail. 
195Ate§, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 10-11; "Can Anyone Monopolise Paradise?, " 
34-35. 
196 Ater, "Can Anyone Monopolise Paradise?, " 34. 
197 The Qur'an, 4: 116; Atc 
, "Can Anyone 
Monopolise Paradise?, " 23. 
19GUF, 125. 
199 The Qur'an 5: 3; 3: 31-32,84-85; 24: 54,56; 4: 80,136. 
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that whoever does not obey Muhammad becomes a kafir, infidel, who deserves to go to 
Hell. 200 Relying on one verse in the whole Qur'an, 20' he even tries to justify this 
conclusion by claiming that "Allah promised to fill Hell in full but not Heaven. "202 
This surely is not an accurate picture of either the notion of Allah, or of Heaven and 
Hell or even Islam in general. Kogyigit, probably out of zeal, does not even address the 
basic legal issues: that ahl al-kitab has been given a special status in Islamic legal system 
from (bilateral) marital rights to Muslims7203 to dietary laws and from civic duties to 
financial rights, etc. None of these rights have been granted to a kafir; 20 indeed, a kafir 
does not have the basic right to live in an Islamic state (though as we shall see in the last 
chapter, "who is a kafir", too, is open to discussion). As Mohammad Talbi puts it, the 
people of the Book are considered to be "inside" the community, while infidels are 
"outside. "205 Clearly then, Ko4yigit's picture is neither an sound representation of the 
theory nor a correct account of the centuries of historical Islamic practice. 
Ate; 's first answer to the accusations is a verse from the Qur'an (2: 110-111) where 
the exclusivistic claims of the Jews and the Christians is negated: 
"They say: `None will enter Paradise except those who are Jews and Christians. ' Such are 
their vain wishes. Say [0 Muhammad]: 'Bring forth your proof if you are truthful. ' Indeed, 
those who submit themselves to Allah, while doing good, will have their reward with Allah. 
They will have nothing to fear and will not grieve. " 
He then produces verses which attest the vastness of the mercy of Allah and the 
reward for good deeds. 206 He reiterates his point that the verses clearly evince that the 
essence of religion does not consist of saying this and that but of doing good deeds. 
"Whoever believes in Allah and the Hereafter and does righteous deeds will enter 
Paradise. "207 In the mean time, he carefully avoids addressing the questions put forward 
by Kocyigit in the form of verses which clearly contradict his argument by their 
exclusivistic tones, especially this one in 3: 85: 
"And whosoever socks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him and in the 
Hereafter, he will be one of the losers. " 
200 Kogyigit, "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise, " 90-92. 
201 the Qur'an 50: 30 where the verse reads "On the day when we will say to Hell: 'Arc you filled? ' 
It will say: `Arc there any more [to come]? "' As Ate§ rightly points out, the verse does not, in any 
case, suggest that the people will go to Hell outnumber those who will go to Heaven (Ate, "Can 
Anyone Monopolise Paradise?, " 35). 
'-02 Kogyigit, "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise, " 90. 
203 That is Muslims and ahl al-kitab can marry each other, though historically speaking Muslims did 
not allow their daughters to marry non-Muslims because of its possible ill-effects on the children 
due to the father's authority in the family. Basically Islamic community did not want their children 
born of Muslim daughters to be brought up in religions other than Islam. 
204 See, for example, the Qur'an 2: 221 which clearly forbids any marriage contract between a 
Muslim and an unbeliever. (nushrikat and mushrikun). 
205 Talbi, M, "A Community of Comm: pities: The Right to Be Different and the Ways of Harmony, " 
in The Experience of Religious Diversity, cd. J Hick and H Askari, Hants, England and Brookficld, 
Vermont: Gower Publishing, 1985,80. 
206 The Qur'an 17: 54; 3: 74; 43: 32; 4: 53; 2: 25,177; 16: 97; 20: 45; 19: 60; 20: 82; 25: 70. 
207 Ater, "Call Anyone Monopolise Paradise?, " 30. 
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Ate; leaves himself open to criticism by not making a connection between this and 
2: 62 and 5: 69 verses, where Allah conditionally grants salvation to others besides 
Muslims, on which Ate; bases his argument. Kocyigit accuses Ate; of taking verses out 
of their context in order to prove his convictions. He believes that 3: 85 is the general rule, 
whereas 2: 62 and 5: 69 just posit a tactical missionary signal for Muslims in their dealing 
with other religions. Depending on a hadith reported by Ibn Abbas, some exclusivist 
scholars believe that 2: 62 and 5: 69 have been abrogated by 3: 85.208 This weakens Ate; 's 
argument. To make a full evaluation of this issue, I will come back to it later in the last 
chapter. 
As regards abrogation, Kocyigit believes that bits and pieces of coinciding truths 
between the Qur'an and the Old and New Testaments do not prove that abrogation did 
not take place. He seeks to sec the results and judges the belief of the people of the book 
according to the Islamic principles. He concludes that their holy books did not prevent 
them committing the gravest of all sins: the formulation of the doctrines of Incarnation 
and trinity which makes them infidels. 209 Furthermore, he reaffirms his basic conviction 
that faith in Muhammad's message requires total obedience to him and the Qur'an. If one 
follows what the Qur'an says, one does not need either the Old or the New Testament, 
because the Qur'an is better than them in all aspects. 21° 
A few comments are necessary here. Firstly, Kocyigit's example of incarnation 
does not help his argument, because Ate also agrees with him that those who believe in 
the incarnation or the Trinity will not be saved in the light of verses of the Qur'an 5: 72- 
73.211 Secondly, we witness that Ate§, for first time ever, approaches the issue more 
philosophically and existentially, as we shall see in Hick after his move to Birmingham. 
He makes the general point that Allah is the god of love, merciful and compassionate. 
Thus his "mercy embraces everything. "212 Ate§ considers the effects of environment on 
individuals in choosing what they choose, e. g. the accident of birth in being a follower of 
a religion. 213 If we take the exclusivist (or monopolist in Ateý's terms) argument and say 
that only Muslims will be saved, which is equivalent to approximately one billion out of 
five billion of the world population, we will be narrowing down the Qur'anic message to 
our local understanding. In fact, if we examine Islam carefully, he continues, even among 
Muslims certain denominations claim to have the key to Heaven and among a 
denomination certain groups believe only their brand of Islam will save people, and so 
on. The result might be, he suggests, only two million lucky jackpot winners who will be 
eligible to go to Heaven. He finishes first by asking how we can reconcile this idea with 
2208 The Noble Qur'an in the English Language, trans. AI-Hilali, M Taqi-ud-Din and MM Khan, 
Ri}adh: Dar'us-Salam Publications, 1996,34,231. 
20) Kocyigit, "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise, " 90. 
210 Kocyiiit, "Muslims Have Monopoly over Paradise, " 93-94. 
211 Ate "Can Anyone Monopolise Paradise?, " 32. 
212 The Qur'an 7: 156. 
213 GHMN, 44 and GUF, 132. 
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the verse "my mercy embraces everything, "21 and answers by quoting more positive and 
rewarding verses from the Qur'an for those who do righteous work regardless of which 
religion they belong to. 215 
This is all very well. As I indicated earlier, however, the whole argument does not 
take Ate; far away from where Ko4yigit stands. Since he, too, at the end, is a strict 
monotheist and despite his hopeful and seemingly pluralistic start, Atc; soon narrowed 
down his scale to remain absolutely committed to the first condition, that is total belief in 
one God. So his understanding of the term ahl al-kitab meant to include only the extinct 
Arian denomination and Unitarians from among Christians, i. e. the heretics of 
Christianity, and a few good Jews. The vast majority of Christians remain outside the 
scope of Ate, 's project. We also discover that he does not have a good impression of the 
Jews either. He thinks the majority of them are in error, except a few. 216 And he does not 
even mention non-theistic religions. Who are we left with, then, in addition to Muslims, 
who are the only ones saved in the stricter exclusivist argument? Very few indeed. Thus I 
argue that Ate; 's argument, despite its hopeful start, does fail to address the real problem. 
For me the real issue is how can we make sense of the religious disposition of the world 
regardless of how they see each other? Therefore I cannot understand either the logic of 
Ate; 's insistence on others' acceptance of Islam as a true path to salvation without the 
need to follow it, or his willingness to judge other religions from within an Islamic 
perspective. As far as the day to day relations of the religions is concerned, this is useful 
and meaningful. However, as to the ultimate salvation of a devout religionist, I do think 
one's attitude to other religions has much to do with one's gaining salvation. Similar to 
Rahner's "anonymous Christians, " Ate; seems to be struggling to make anonymous 
muslims out of Muslims and pseudo-Muslims, but to no avail. 
The main difficulty with Ate; 's inclusivism is that he never discusses non-theistic 
religions, which means he is not even inclusivistic in the real sense of the word. That is to 
say, he argues that people who do not have a belief in a transcendent God (i. e. non- 
theistic Hindus and Buddhists) cannot achieve salvation since the very core of their belief 
is wrong. This makes him even lesser an inclusivist than Rahner, since he even refuses to 
call the followers of the non-theistic religions, such as Hindus and Buddhists, 
"anonymous muslims. " I call Ate; a partial inclusivist. One might argue that he might 
even be considered as an exclusivist, because of the absolute connection he establishes 
between the belief in one transcendent God and salvation. But, in all fairness, I believe 
that he is an inclusivist, for he accepts that there is salvation outside Islam. Nevertheless, 
his inclusivism is unsatisfactory, since it leaves a considerable proportion of devout 
religionists outside the scheme of salvation. 
'-14 The Qur'an 7: 156. 
2 15 The Qur'an 13: 19-25 and 25: 63-77. 
216 Ater, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 12. 
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Ate, spent laudable efforts, especially with his encouraging start of three basic 
principles of salvation (believing in one God, the Last Day and doing good deeds). 
However, in the end he failed to develop this further and fell back to a position very close 
to exclusivism with his exclusion of not only non-theistic religions but also sincere 
Trinitarian Christians and orthodox Jews. The inadequacy of both the exclusivist al- 
Maturidi and the inclusivist Ate; 's solutions to religious diversity, I believe, demonstrate 
that traditional answers do not satisfactorily solve the problem. We may then turn to 
examine the claims of pluralism, which has radical solutions for the question of the 
plurality of religions. 
1.3.4. Pluralism: A Muslim Approach 
Pluralism, as advocated by its most prominent exponent Hick, relativises the 
salvific monopoly of any particular religion, declaring that no religion is either the only 
way of salvation/liberation (as the exclusivists would have us believe), or has any final 
superiority over other traditions (as the inclusivists imply). The pluralist doctrine holds 
that the great world religions are each equally efficient ways of perceiving the Real. As 
religious animals, we human beings manifest different responses to divine revelation, 
according to the way we were brought up. Thus different world religions are different 
ways of achieving "salvation/liberation" as "human transformation from self-centredness 
to Reality-centredness. " 
As an example of pluralism I shall consider Mohammed'-» Arkoun, a contemporary 
Muslim theologian and philosopher. Arkoun is a special case among contemporary 
Muslim thinkers. Born an Algerian Muslim, he grew up on the "fringes of the Arab, 
Islamic, and European worlds. "218 He is a "product of French schools and the French 
university system, "219 which, I think, had a profound effect on his thought. Thus one can 
observe strong connections in his writings with "structural linguistics, the post- 
structuralist writings of Paul Ricoeur and Michel Foucault, and the deconstructionism of 
Jacques Derrida. "220 
Even though Arkoun widened his scope of teaching by different activities in 
America, Africa and Asia, in addition to Europe, he does not get as much attention as he 
deserves. Robert D Lee ties this to several reasons, the most important of which is that 
Arkoun is decidedly a stern critic of orthodoxy and a "radical" liberalist which puts him 
into direct opposition to the "vision of Islam" "espoused officially in most of the Muslim 
217 The most widely used transliteration in academical circles in English for the name Muhammad is 
"Muhammad, " including the Prophet Muhammad's name, which I follow throughout the thesis. 
However, I depart from this general usage in Arkoun's name and follow his spelling as 
"Mohammed, " The difference probably arises because of the spelling differences of the foreign 
names between the French and the English languages. 
218 Lee, R D, "1 oreword, " in Rethinking Alain: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, by M 
Arkoun, San Francisco and Oxford: Wcstvicw Press, 1994, viii. 
219 He received his PhD from the Sorbonne, where he also teaches "Islamic history and philosophy. " 
(Lee, "Foreword. " viii). 
220 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 68. 
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world. "22' This critical radical liberalism towards "all religious traditions" and 
worldviews might be the crossing point between Hick and Arkoun, who first met in 1977 
in Birmingham222 and then came to know Hick personally when they were both teaching 
in Claremont Graduate School. When I interviewed Hick in November 1997 and asked 
him who was the most original Muslim thinker he had met so far, his answer without 
hesitation was Arkoun. Nevertheless, to my knowledge they do not refer directly to each 
other's works and their method is almost totally different. Arkoun belongs to the most 
recent continental philosophy by which he argues for a "historical-sociological- 
anthropological approach, " in addition to the more common "theological and 
philosophical. "223 Hick, on the other hand, belongs to the more traditionalist philosophy 
and heavily relies on Wittgenstein instead of continental hermeneutics headed by 
Derrida. 
In his book Qur'an, Liberation & Pluralism, Farid Esack examines Arkoun's 
thought and detects four key elements on which he bases his philosophy: 
1. Revelation and language: Arkoun begins with societies as the centre of the 
linguistic activity. Human beings become aware of themselves in "societies through 
various changing `uses' (activity, experience, sensation, observation etc. ). " Uses in 
societies, Arkoun believes, are transferred into "signs" which are used in expressing 
realities "`through languages as systems of signs. "1224 All of these happen before "any 
interpretation of revelation" takes place. We know that scripture is proclaimed by means 
of the "`natural languages"' comprised of "systems of signs" and "each sign is a `locus of 
convergent operations, ' i. e. perception, expression, interpretation, translation, 
communication, `which engages all of the relations between language and thought. ""225 
This approach engenders two significant bearings on "traditional thinking: " firstly, the 
importance of Arabic as a sacred language is "no longer tenable" and secondly, "the core 
of Islamic thought is represented as a linguistic and semantic issue. "226 
2. Historicity: "The semiotic productions" of a human being such as "signs and 
symbols" "in the process of his or her social and cultural emergence are inextricably 
bound to historicity. As a semiotic articulation of meaning for social and cultural uses, 
the Qur'an is subject to historicity. "227 Arkoun effectively argues that "there is no access 
to the absolute outside the phenomenal world of our historical terrestrial existence" 
which makes "historicity as a dimension of the truth" that is moulded by "changing tools, 
concepts, definitions and postulates. '1228 He furthermore raises more important questions 
as to how we should understand the Qur'an with its historicity. He asks: "How can we 
221 Lee, "Foreword, " xii. 
222 Arkoun, M, "Islaºn and the Hegemony of the {Vest, " in God, Truth and Reality: Essays in 
Honour of John Hick, ed. A Sharma, New York: St Martin's Press, 1993,86. 
223 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 69. 
"4 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 69. 
225 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 69. 
226 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 69. 
227 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 69. 
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deal with the sacred, the spiritual, the transcendent, the ontology, when we are obliged to 
recognise that all this vocabulary is supposed to refer to stable immaterial values, is 
submitted to the impact of historicity? "229 
3. Faith and discourse: Faith in religious discourse is neither an element 
"independent of human beings" nor is related to a "divine will or grace. " Instead it is 
"`shaped, expressed and actualised in and through discourse. `230 
4. Classical Islamic Studies: Arkoun is quite sure that as the tools of 
"legitimization" for the "traditional system" "classical Islamic theology and Islamic 
jurisprudence and their vocabulary" do not possess any "epistemological relevance"231 
for us today. The reason for this is, Arkoun claims, that their results and findings are 
severely damaged by the "biases imposed by the ruling class and its intellectual 
servants. "13' 
It appears that Arkoun's four cornerstones in building up his philosophy revolve 
around the problems of language and historicity, which have important bearings on 
revelation and the holy scriptures. To elaborate this further, I will examine his 
understanding of the process of revelation. Arkoun divides revelation into three levels. 233 
First comes the ultimate level where the Word of God is "transcendent, infinite, and 
unknown to humankind as a whole. " What we receive through prophets is only 
"fragments of it. "'234 Here Arkoun is referring to the Qur'anic notion of al-Lawh al- 
Mahfuz (the well-preserved tablet)235 and that of the Umm al-Kitab (the archetypal 
Book) 236 The second level is the prophetic "manifestations of the word of God" through 
prophets. The revelations carried out by the "Israelite prophets (in Hebrew), Jesus of 
Nazareth (in Aramaic) and Muhammad (in Arabic). This is the period of the mental 
preservation, e. g. memorisation, and of the oral transmission of the revelations. The third 
level is where the "textual objectification of the word of God takes place. "237 Thus we 
have the Old Testament, the New Testament and the "Arabic-language Qur'an, " which 
Arkoun calls the mushaf that contains "the book composed of pages where the Qur'anic 
discourse is transcribed. 11238 He describes each of these holy scriptures as a "Closed 
229 Arkoun, M, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought. " in Islam. State and Socicty, eds. K 
and MM Ferdinand, London: Curzon Press, 1988,70. For more on this see: Arkoun, M, Al-frkr al- 
Island: Qira'a Ilmiyye, trans. Salih, H, Beirut: Markaz al-Inma al-Qa«wmi, 1987,113-137. 
2; e Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 80. 
231 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 70. 
32 Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought, " 64. 
233 Arkoun heavily relics on Paul Ricoeur on this typology (Ricocur, P, Hermeneutics and the 
Human Sciences, trans. and cd., Thompson, John, Cambridge: CUP, 1981,15-16 and Essays on 
Biblical Interpretation, London: SPCK, 1981,15). 
234 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and I'luralistn, 70. 
235 The Qur'an 85: 22. 
236 The Qur'an 43: 4; Arkoun, M, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, trans. 
Lee, Robert D, San Francisco and Oxford: Wcstview Press, 1994,16,33. 
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Official Corpus: "239 "Official because they resulted from a set of decisions taken by 
`authorities' recognised by the community" and "closed" because nobody was permitted 
any longer to add or subtract a word, to modify a reading in the Corpus now declared 
authentic. "240 Up to now it was the "descending movement of the Word of God" and 
from here we see the "ascending movement of the interpreting community towards 
salvation. "241 
Following on from this, we may now look at what Arkoun means by revelation in a 
broader sense. He redefines revelation as: "the accession to the interior space of a human 
being... of some novel meaning that opens up unlimited opportunities or backcurrents of 
meaning for human existence. "242 It changes "man's view of his condition, his being-in- 
the-world, his participation in the production of meaning. "243 It also continually "feeds a 
living tradition that permits the community to resupply itself periodically with the radical 
novelty of the original message; all the while secularisation and transcendentalization are 
tending to pervert and freeze the liberating vista of revelation. '1244 
Two points are in order here. The first relates to the orthodox Muslims' 
understanding of revelation. They believe that revelation as the "`manifestations of the 
word of God through prophets" (that is, Arkoun's second level) came to an end by 
Muhammad, since he was the last of the prophets. 245 How can one, particularly a Muslim, 
understand Arkoun's definition within this context? Unfortunately, Arkoun does not 
touch on this issue. This brings us to my second point. That Arkoun's understanding of 
239 He also calls them "the official sacred Texts" (Arkoun, M, "Religion and Society: The Example 
of Islam, " in Islam in a World of Diverse Faiths, ed. Cohn-Sherbok, D, London: Macmillan, 1991, 
156). 
240 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 33. 
241 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 70; Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 37-38. Arkoun 
illustrates the revelatory process on the one hand and the interpretive community's relation to it on 
the other as follows: 
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revelation seems to be vague, since his definition mostly seems to relate to "inspiration, " 
rather than revelation. 
In explaining the advantages of this broader sense of revelation, Arkoun argues that 
it: 
"has the merit of making a place for the teachings of Buddha, Confucius, African elders, and 
all the great voices that recapitulate the collective experience of a group in order to project it 
toward new horizons and enrich the human experience of the divine. We manage thus to 
guide ourselves toward another variety of religious thought and go beyond all previous 
experience with the saercd., '246 
This is as much pluralist as one can be, certainly as broad as Hick's hypothesis. But it 
seems to me too theoretical, optimistic and romantic. It is not clear what Arkoun is 
arguing for. Is it a new universal religion of love stemming from all religions, carefully 
cleansed of their political or otherwise theories? If it is, then, as any critique of 
postmodernism will tell, this is another type of Western hegemony, to which Arkoun also 
sternly opposes. If not, how can one understand his belief that we might "guide ourselves 
toward another variety of religious thought and go beyond all previous experience with 
the sacred? "247 Or is it simply the enrichment of the followers of different religions 
through co-operation, toleration and respect for each other? Is this practically possible, 
can one describe this as romanticism? 
Arkoun concentrates his criticism on the three revealed Abrahamic religions, 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but this is purely "out of a desire for clarity and 
simplicity" not because of any "preference of any kind to the revealed religions. "248 I 
believe his broader sense of revelation I just quoted bears witness to this testimony. Thus 
his conclusions apply not only to Judeo-Christian-Islamic but also to other religions. 
Arkoun is well aware of the roots of the problem between the three revealed 
religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Speaking on behalf of classical Islam, he 
summarises the "perceptual framework" of dividing the world "theologically and 
juridically" into two: "the home of Islam (dar al-Islam), where the Divine Law applied, 
and the land of war (dar al-harb) where `infidels' always threatened to substitute `pagan' 
laws for the True Law, "=4' Islam. He also remarks that Christianity was also seeing the 
world in the same way before the Vatican Council II in 1965. In Islam, this dual division 
of the world gave a "special status for `protected peoples' (dhimmi), Jews and Christians 
as peoples of the Book (ahl al-kitab) but as theologically beyond the `community 
promised salvation' (al-firqa al-najiya). "250 He is quick to point out that "today's Jews 
and Christians are wrong to use this status as a theme of polemics against today's 
Muslims. " What they should rather do is, he continues, to "deal with this problem as 
246 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 34. 
247 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 34. 
248 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 21. 
249 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 10. 
250 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 10. 
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historians would, avoiding the anachronism of projecting the philosophy of human rights 
and religious liberty... onto a theological mentality common to the three revealed 
religions. "'51 Arkoun also believes that "the theological vision" dividing "time into 
before and after the founding moment of new salvation" is common to all three. "Jews, 
Christians and Muslims thus have their respective eras, and all face this question about 
the theological position of human beings who lived before the `final' revelation was 
manifest. "252 I am very curious to discover how someone like Arkoun makes such a 
category mistake, since, to my knowledge, Islam radically differs from Judaism and 
Christianity in its understanding regarding those "who lived before the `final' revelation 
was manifest. " Islam has neither a chosen nation nor a God incarnate. The problem just 
does not exist in Islam, simply because of the central belief in the universality and as well 
as continuity of revelation, as these verses attest: 
"We, indeed, sent among every people an apostle" (16: 36). 
"There was never any people without a warner having lived among them" (35: 24). 253 
It is also common knowledge that Muhammad did not bring anything new or different in 
terms of faith from the previous prophets. His message was the same as Adam's, 
Abraham's, Moses', etc.: to spread faith in one God. Thus the Qur'an refers to previous 
prophets as muslints, submitters to the will of Allah. 254 I do believe that Arkoun is 
seriously mistaken in this generalisation. 
Arkoun is a firm believer in historicism which runs through all his writings. Thus 
he admires the historicist methods of Max Weber and Troeltsch in examining religion, 
something which, he thinks, is lacking in the writings of the Nahdha and the Thawra 
movements'255 supporters by the beginning of this century in the Muslim-Arab world. 256 
In this respect, revelations also receive their share from `historicity. ' Arkoun sees 
revelations as historical materials, mostly manipulated by power seekers or their servants, 
though this does not stop them still being tools providing salvation. In Arkoun's world 
where historicity prevails, as Lee puts it nicely, "there would be no margins and no 
centre, no marginalized groups and no dominant ones, no inferior beliefs and no superior, 
truth-producing logic. "257 Thus Arkoun claims: 
"All `believers' whether they adhere to revealed religions or contemporary secular religions, 
would thus be equally constrained to envisage the question of meaning not from the angle of 
unchanging transcendence -that is of an ontology sheltered from all historicity- but in the 
light of historical forces that transmute the most sacred values, those regarded as most divine 
by virtue of their symbolic capital and as inseparable from necessarily mythical accounts of 
'251 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 10. 
252 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 10. 
253 Cf. other verses in the Qur'an 2: 115; 4: 163-165; 6: 130-131; 13: 7; 23: 44. 
254 The Qur'an 2: 128 and 3: 67, cf. 40: 78; 42: 13 
255 These arc movements produced in the Arab-Islamic world in order to combat modernism. The 
main advocates Arkoun mentions arc Taha Huscin, al-'Aqqad, H. Haykal and A. Abd al-Raziq 
(Arkoun, "Religion and Society, " 173). 
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the founding, and from which each cthnocultural group extracts and recognises what it calls 
identity or personal i ty. "258 
One of the most daring consequences of Arkoun's historicist approach is the case of the 
Qur'an, which, I believe, will irritate many Muslims, to say the least. He proposes a 
"progressive-regressive reading of the Qur'an" as to explain the relevance of the Holy 
Scriptures to us: 
"... We go back to the past not to project on fundamental texts the demands and the needs of 
the present Muslim societies -as the islalti rtlanta [reformist scholars] do- but to discover the 
historical mechanisms and factors which produced these texts and assigned them such 
functions (= regressive procedure). At the same we cannot forget that these texts are still 
alive, active as an ideological system of beliefs and knowledge shaping the future. We have, 
then, to examine the process of transformation of initial contents and functions into new ones 
(= progressive procedure). "'59 
Arkoun also calls this reading a "semiotic analysis" as opposed to the traditional reading 
of the Qur'an. 260 I concur on the whole with Arkoun's suggested reading of the Qur'an, 
which is the hermeneutical reading that I will argue for as a modification in Hick's thesis 
against his mythical/metaphorical reading. We shall see a good example of this 
hermeneutical reading by Farid Esack, in chapter five, on the concept of kufr (unbelief). 
However, my reservation lies in his vague balance between "historicity" on the one hand 
and "aliveness" on the other. We are not given any criterion according to which we can 
draw a line between the two. And what does Arkoun mean by "alive? " How different is it 
from or what assurances do we have that this aliveness is not like the life that Don Cupitt 
and D. Z. Philips find in their non-realist reading of the Bible? 
Arkoun's final solution lies in developing the Western liberal secularism which 
stems from and is enriched by the great world religions. It is worth quoting him once 
more: 
"The immense task of effectively secularising society will at last find adequate, direct, and 
critical expression in a discourse that is both scientific and secular. Secularism will cease 
being a scarecrow once citizens are freely able to choose their opinions, beliefs, and ways of 
religious expression without social pressure. Religion will then become, like Christianity in 
the West, a source of spiritual enrichment for the self-sufficient, private individual, rather 
than a civic duty that the citizen must comply with... This will be an essential step in the 
258 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 9. 
259 Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought, " 56. 
260 Arkoun, "Religion and Society, " 158-159. In another context, Arkoun expresses similar points: 
"Rather than pursuing its urgent responsibility of raising new questions about the function of 
religion in human existence, the philosophy underlying Islamic-Christian dialogue continues 
to propagate the fiction of an eternally unchanging Reason, which illuminated by revelation, 
rooted in the ontology of the holy scriptures, and consequently infallible in its dealings and 
statements. -For this reason I, for one, call for a new critical reading of the scriptures (Bible, 
Gospels, Qur'an) and a philosophical critique of exegetical and theological reason" (Kung, H 
and et at., Christianity and the World Religions: Paths of Dialogue with Islam, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism, trans. Heinegg, Peter, London: SCM, 1993,67, cited from Religion in Culture, 
Law and Politics, ed. Abdullah, M S, 1982, pp. 141 f). 
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sccularisation of reflection and culture, and will thus focus on man, society, history and the 
world... -261 
It is clear that Arkoun's understanding of secularity, society and religion carries strong 
flavours from John Locke's liberalism and the French philosopher Auguste Comte's 
positivism 262 One may even call Arkoun's understanding of Islam a Christianised Islam. 
That is, the important legal, social and political aspects are pruned and what is left is only 
a spiritual resource for those interested in religion. Islamically speaking, especially as far 
as the exclusivist and the inclusivist understandings are concerned, this is very repugnant 
interpretation of Islam. Arkoun is severely criticised for it. Mohammed Khan, for 
instance, detects "two basic enlightenment prejudices" prevalent in Arkoun's "entire 
work. " First, "unlike most Muslim scholars" who assert that "Islam is much much more 
than a religion, " Arkoun is satisfied with the "modern definition of religion. "263 
"Religion, as understood today, " Khan continues, "is a post-enlightenment concept that 
privileges the secular over sacred. It reduces the scope of religion to the private sphere by 
removing the public domain to a religion free autonomous sphere of politics. "264 The 
second deficiency Khan spots in Arkoun's work is that it also "carries pejorative 
connotations by placing religion in conflict with reason and science. Once we concede 
that Islam is a religion, then all the modern dichotomies which undermine religion such 
as science versus religion, reason versus revelation come into play. "265 Khan thinks that 
to use such categories is on Arkoun's part "indicative of inconsistency in reasoning" and 
that "he is a prisoner of modern categories, " despite his claim of rising "above the narrow 
confines of modernity. "266 I, however, strongly object to Khan's second point that 
Arkoun introduces "modern dichotomies" undermining religion. It is enough to look at 
the history of Islamic philosophy to realise that Khan's supposedly modern dichotomies 
such as "science versus religion, reason versus revelation" are not new, but they are age- 
long discussions that occupied Muslim minds. 
To those criticising Arkoun as advocating the universality of the "Western model, " 
he responds by making a call to move forward beyond the "dualist thought which for 
centuries has opposed the spiritual to the temporal, faith to reason, the soul to matter, "267 
"reason against imagination, history against myth, true against false, good against 
evil. "=68 In another context, as a feature of a newly emerging rationality, he calls for a 
"conflict of hermeneutics, " which instead of siding with one opponent against another, it 
261 Arkoun, "Islam and the Hegemony of the West, " 83-84. 
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tries to understand both, compares them and studies their successes and failures. 269 
Arkoun also acknowledges that the Western model is not complete as it is and needs to 
be improved. He thinks that scientific thought "has failed to objectify the nature of the 
religious"270 which has created a spiritual vacuum that is filled with the repetition of old 
cycles. In the Islamic world, it has resulted in movements calling for going back to 
religion with a political agenda and in the West271 it has resulted in the reaffirmation of 
"the untouchability and universality" of the Western model which Arkoun vehemently 
opposes as a form of hegemony and "the tyranny of reason. "272 In order to overcome the 
spiritual poverty in modern societies and enrich secularism, he appeals to the notion of 
"the ideal person, the perfect human being, al-insan al-kainil" from the Islamic world2273 
and more generally to a "nostalgia for being, inseparable from the `darr desir de darer' 
(the determination to live on) that grips every mind coming into contact with the promise 
of eternal life, "274 supported by the "Holy Scriptures" and common to the believers of 
the three revealed religions. As will be seen in Hick's pluralism, Arkoun also exemplifies 
this notion of being with the lives of "saints, mystics and thinkers. " Consequently, he 
argues that: 
"This irreducible fact about human beings from societies of the Book seeks expression and 
reincarnation in the multiple forms and types of existence proffered by modernity. Scientific 
thought tends to diminish this constitutive clement of the person rather than to integrate it into 
an effort to enhance human beings by means other than the rationalised imaginary, which all 
too often replaces the mythical imaginary. "275 
Arkoun's "historico-anthropological perspective" on revelation and its relation to 
the community of believers is also charged with reductionism; that is, it is a "scientific 
reduction of something essentially transcendental. "276 Another critique describes 
Arkoun's approach as "secularis(ing) the sacred by subjecting the Qur'an and revelation 
to scientific analysis. " 77 He refutes this charge on two bases. One is that his method 
contains the transcendental and does not place it "beyond the parameters of `the true 
rationality. "' The other is his distinction between the "theological reason" and "the 
critical reason. " He argues that the former belongs to "the collective imaginaire" which 
cannot realise that "it produces imaginaire rather than rationality, " whereas the latter, 
critical reason, not only recognises this difference but also includes "the theological 
269 Arkoun, M, "7emellendirme Afmazt Karcrsrnda Fundamentalism " (Fundamentalism Before the 
Dichotomy of Reorigination), Islamiyat, no. 4,1998,84. 
270 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 101. 
271 In Arkoun's understanding, the concept of the West is wider than usually understood. In addition 
to Europe, the USA, it also includes Japan, Korea and other developing "financial and industrial 
powers" (Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 130, fn.. 6). 
-r Lee, "Foreword, " ix. 
273 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 103. 
274 Arkoun, Rethinking Lslam, 103. 
275 Arkoun, Retliinking Islam, 103. 
276 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 70-71. 
277 Khan, "Episiemologicrrl Poverty, " 76. 
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reason. "278 Arkoun illustrates this dichotomy well by drawing a parallel between 
revolutions and revelations whereby the "social hierarchies and political, economic, and 
cultural inequalities" that they seek to eradicate are "reconstituted" through secularisation 
and transcendentalization in the absence of a critical reason. 279 But as will be seen in the 
following paragraph Arkoun's claim to have critical reason is refuted by the critiques of 
postmodernism. 
The criticisms levelled against postmodern thinking are also directed against 
Arkoun's proposal, which, as will be seen in the following chapters, are also directed 
against Hick. It is obvious that Arkoun establishes a link "between the formulation of 
ideas and our histories. " However, as Esack rightly stresses, everything goes into this 
basket which includes "scholars, their critiques of the theories of knowledge and the way 
it was produced, as well as the intellectualist solutions which they offer. "28° It is not 
possible for one to "view revelation and tradition historically and ideologically and then 
take an ahistorical or ideology-free view of oneself and one's own critique. '"291 Arkoun's 
claim about the autonomous reason freed from "outside authorities (revelation, church, 
shari'a, state)" as the only producer of ideology-free "knowledge as a sphere of authority 
to be accepted and respected unanimously"282 at best looks utopian. Thus Esack 
scrutinises Arkoun's "critique of the authority structures" for failing to recognise "other 
systems of meaning such as academicism" in addition to the well-known "formal 
institutions. " Esack also raises the problematic connection which exists between 
modernity and liberal ideology. He believes that "modernity" is an "appendage to liberal 
ideology" to which lots of "hegemonic interests" are attached. 283 I concur with Esack, 
especially when I consider "Foucault's work on the inter-relatedness of power and 
knowledge and Edward Said's use of Foucauldian methods to demonstrate the discursive 
violence that has been perpetrated on Islam by Western methods. "12 
Then there is the unanimous acceptance of the ideology-free "knowledge" as an 
authority. It becomes an ideology which may fall in the trap that poses a threat against 
the very project that Arkoun proposes, as happened in the revelations and revolution S. 2115 
Furthermore, Esack suggests that "knowledge, like any other social tool, while it can be 
critical, is never neutral" and "`every hermeneutic entails conscious or unconscious 
partisanship. "" 
Esack's last critique concerns a charge which is aimed at Hick as well, as we shall 
see later. The point is that Arkoun's thought implies that "there can be a class of `super 
readers, ' expert historians or linguists who will be able to access the true meaning of a 
278 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 71. 
279 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 59. 
280 Esack, Qur'an, liberation and Pluralism, 72. 
281 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 72. 
282 Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought, " 68. 
283 Esaek, Qur'an, Liberation and 1'luralism, 72. 
284 Khan, "Epistemological Poverty, " 76. 
285 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 59; Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 72-73. 
286 E. sack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 72. 
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text. "287 Esack claims that this creates different meanings for different groups: we have, 
on the one hand, the "`objective' intellectuals" who have "independent knowledge" and 
on the other, the ordinary believers "for whom the text is a living document. "288 While I 
sympathise with Esack's point about the "class of super readers, " I am not quite sure if 
this directly relates to the problem of different meanings for different groups. As long as 
there is a text to be interpreted, there will always be different meanings, as have 
happened in the past, whether we have super readers or not. Esack also believes that, 
effectively, Arkoun's method of gaining "independent knowledge" puts intellectuals 
"outside and above" the majority of "believers" by overlooking the contemporary 
relevance of the text for "people of faith. "289 But, here, Esack seems to be missing the 
important point that "independent knowledge" does not necessarily mean knowledge 
which is irrelevant to the contemporary situation of the people of faith. It is worth noting 
in this regard that the text is as much a "living document" for the scholars as it is for "the 
majority of the believers. " 
Despite the fact that Arkoun accepts and argues for pluralism, I find his over all 
argument unsuccessful and immature. Brendan Swcctman's critique of Derrida's 
postmodernism is equally applicable to Arkoun's arguments, that is, they are mostly 
asserted rather than argued "290 As I pointed out in several instances, such as `revelation', 
`historicism', `aliveness' are unclear and obscurely used, which is another charge 
Sweetman levels against Derrida. 291 I strongly disagree with his uncompromising 
historicity as the ultimate judge overarching everything in any assessment, especially its 
application to holy scriptures. 
I also have reservations about his understanding of secularism and religion. While I 
share his aspiration for mutual coexistence, including believers as well as non-believers, I 
object to his propagation of secularism as the only ideal, value-free and non-authoritarian 
solution. This, as one critique put it, is "secularis[ing] the sacred. "29' His total 
commitment to secularism blinds him to see the power struggle between different 
authorities in society and also the debilitating effects of secularism on individuals in 
general, religions and their followers in particular. It seems to me a contradiction to 
suggest on the one hand the Christianisation of Islam to move on to secularism as the 
ultimate model of living and on the other hand to appeal to the model of "perfect human 
being" (al-insan al-kamil) in Islam to correct the very product of the secularist model. 
Unlike Hick, he fails to recognise that "saints, " who are the role models whom Arkoun 
also aspires to, are the product of mostly religious rather than secular systems. His 
287 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 73. 
288 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 73. 
289 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 73. 
290 Swcctman, B, "Postmodernism. Derrida, and Diff rance: A Critique, " International 
Philosophical Quarterly 39,1999,12-14. 
291 Swcetman, B, "Postmodernism, " 18. 
29'- Khan, MAM, "Epistemological Poverty, " 76. 
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solution of moving beyond the dualistic conflict-based thinking, though consoling at first 
sight, at best sounds utopian to me. 
More specifically, Arkoun is concerned with the methodological issues in assessing 
cultures and civilisations. Apart from historicism, we have not been given any criterion as 
how to assess religions, their salvific efficacy, conflicting truth-claims, different 
conceptions of the Ultimate, etc. In conclusion, I suggest that we need a more 
comprehensive theory and move on to examine Hick's in the next chapter. 
1.4. Partial Conclusions 
Despite all prophecies about the eventual disappearance of God and religion from 
modern society, it seems that the concept of some kind of ultimate being and religious 
forms of life will continue in evidence for quite some time yet. What is more, as Arkoun 
rightly points out, the rapid developments in science and its implications for societies 
have not satisfied the spiritual needs of human beings. However, changes have occurred. 
Religions and societies grew ever more closer. This put the followers of different 
religions sometimes in the same city, or street, or neighbourhood, which made them 
aware of other ways of being religious. This inevitable coexistence of religions made the 
question of religious pluralism more and more an urgent problem to deal with for the 
scholars, especially of Christianity. 
In this chapter, I have tried to give an account of some Muslim approaches to the 
question of religious pluralism. In order to do this, as the first attempt in Islam of its kind, 
I successfully applied Race's three-fold typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and 
pluralism to an Islamic context. I have examined one scholar whose views approximate 
to each of these approaches. The exclusivist line does not answer the question of "how a 
compassionate God leaves so many good religionists outside the scheme of 
salvation/transformation just because they happened to be brought up in a different 
religious climate. " The inclusivist approach faces the same question on a different scale: 
"why should a just and loving God leave many either in partial darkness or place them in 
a disadvantaged position as far as salvation/transformation is concerned because of 
geographical differences which they have no hand in? " The pluralist line seems to me has 
a more satisfactory answer by portraying religions as different approaches to the same 
Ultimate Reality, offering effective ways of salvation/liberation. However, the particular 
pluralist example which I have discussed is not wholly satisfactory for the reasons given 
above. Thus I move on to examine Hick's hypothesis, which I argue is a better and more 
comprehensive explanation. 293 
293 ROF, 51. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE NEED FOR A PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS 
"Christ is the population of the world, 
and every object as well. There is no room 
for hypocrisy. Why use bitter soup for healing 
when sweet water is everywhere? " 
Rümil 
2.1. Introduction 
In chapter one, I presented three Muslim responses to the problem of religious 
diversity and expressed my discontent with them. I concluded there that we need a more 
comprehensive theory to explain religious diversity and Hick's might offer this for us. 
Thus in this chapter my task will be to examine his reasons why we need a pluralistic 
theory. Hick's theory is a total defence of the religious phenomena both against naturalistic 
claims and particularistic theories. The first section of the chapter, "why a pluralist theory, " 
focuses on his restatement of religious experience and the phenomenon of religion, while 
the second evaluates the other explanations for religious diversity. To achieve the first, 
Hick starts, at the ground level, with proving that experiencing the world religiously is as 
much justifiable as experiencing any other thing. In "the right to believe, " we will follow 
Hick's recast of religious experiences with anecdote drawn from several sources. One of 
the important developments in this section is that he extends Wittgenstein's "seeing-as" 
theory to include all our experience by coining "experiencing-as. " The natural consequence 
of religious experience is the phenomenon of religion. In "the directory of gods, " I explore 
Hick's understanding of religion. In this respect I should mention his refusal to accept a set 
definition of religion and adopt instead, again from Wittgenstein, the "family resemblance 
theory. " He also adopts the pre and post-axial periodical classification of religious 
experience of humankind from the history of religions and limits his survey to the great 
world religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam) of the post-axial 
period. Then he examines the naturalistic accounts of religion: Sigmund Freud's 
psychological theory and Emile Durkheim's sociological theory. We finish with his critique 
of and responses to the exclusivist and inclusivist Christian accounts of religious diversity. 
2.2. Why a Pluralistic Hypothesis 
In spite of the fact that there are other important pluralists, 2 John Hick is "the most 
provocative and bold, "3 "the most radical, the best-known, and therefore the most 
I Rumi, J, Unseen Rain, 57. 
2 For instance, early in this century, we see Ernst Troeltsch and Arnold Toynbee, and more recently 
W. Cantwell Smith, R Panikkar and Paul Knitter come to mind. 
3 Gillis, C, A Question of Final Belief: John Hick's Pluralistic Theory of Salvation, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989,1. 
controversial of the proponents"4 of a Real-centred philosophy of religions. Hence, I have 
decided to concentrate on his theory within the limited scope of this thesis. 
Hick summarises and restates almost all his theology and philosophy of religions 
under the light of criticisms in his major and mature work An Interpretation of Religion, on 
which this study will be heavily based. In this book, to explain the need for a pluralist 
theory, Hick uses a three-fold argument. He starts with the proposition that "it is rational 
on the part of those who experience religiously to believe and to live on this basis, "5 a 
notion which he borrows with slight modification from William James, as developed in his 
classic work The Will to Believe. 6 Hick then moves on to describe the variety displayed in 
humanity's experience of religious reality, introducing a peculiar name, "the directory of 
gods, "7 implying the theistic and non-theistic versions of them. Next he gives us the 
options for interpreting this variety of experiences of the ultimate; namely the naturalistic 
option, which claims that all are in toto delusory, and the full or partial exclusivist 
approach, which sees one form or the other as veridical whilst the rest are deemed to be 
either "false" or "confused and inferior versions of itself. "8 He devotes chapter seven of An 
Interpretation to the rejection of the naturalistic option, which we will be looking at in some 
detail. To the particularistic explanations, he objects on the grounds of logical inconsistency 
according to what he calls "the intellectual Golden Rule of granting to others a premise on 
which we rely ourselves. "9 It follows that "persons living within other traditions, then, are 
equally justified in trusting their own distinctive religious experience and in forming their 
beliefs on the basis of it. "10 Having established the logical flaw and discrepancy in this 
second option too, Hick suggests that we need a religious interpretation of religion which 
proves that "the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving 
and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of 
it. "11 
2.2.1. "The Right to Believe"12 
4 Knitter, P, No Other Name? A Critical Study of Christian Attitudes Towards the World Religions, 
London, SCM Press, 1985,147. 
s AIR, 233. 
6 James, W, The Will to Believe, New York, Dover Pub., 1956. 
7 AIR, 234. 
8 AIR, 235. 
9 AIR, 235. 
10 AIR, 235. 
11 AIR, 235-36. 
12 James plays with this idea early in his famous essay The Will to Believe, originally an address to 
Philosophy Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities, and later became the title of the collected essays, 
where he actually uses the phrase once (p. 29). He also wrote in a letter that the essay "should have 
been called by the less unlucky title the Right to Believe" (Hick quotes in FK, 40 from The Letters 
of William James, II, London, 1920,207). In one of last essays before his death, James uses the 
title and with a slight change, Faith and the Right to Believe, in which could be found his mature 
ideas on the issue. The latter has been published posthumously in Some Problems of Philosophy. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
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One thing should be pointed out before we start. Even though the line and the 
language of Hick's argument may seem to be more compatible with theistic belief than with 
non-theistic, Hick clearly states and applies the argument to both sorts of traditions-13 
Having concluded that none of the traditional arguments for the existence of the Real 
are conclusive (namely ontological, cosmological and design arguments and the argument 
from "the course of human experience") and therefore religious belief cannot properly be 
based on any of them, Hick embarks on a different basis for believing and acting 
religiously. Religious belief, he contends, rests upon "unconsciously interpreting the 
impacts of the environment in such a way that it is consciously experienced as having the 
kind of meaning articulated in religious language. "14 He also maintains that this is a 
"cognitive choice" which carries "the risk of being very importantly mistaken, " due to the 
fact that in this way of life "one is living `by faith' and not `by sight, "' a choice which in 
effect, in Hick's understanding, has some features of a wager. 15 
Hick uses Pascal's wager parable with a slight twist. He substitutes for the rationality 
of belief on the basis of risk to "the rationality, on the part of those who experience `the 
presence of God, ' of accepting that experience as basically veridical. " He also agrees with 
Pascal that "the justification for theistic belief" does not stem from presumptuous 
arguments about the existence of God, but rather from the argument for "the rationality of 
so believing despite the fact that this cannot be proved or shown to be in any objective 
sense more probable than not. "16 
Hick infers from all these arguments that "it is rational to believe in the reality of 
God. " In other words, "it has been rational for some people in the past, it is rational for 
some people now, and it will presumably in the future be rational for yet other people to 
believe in the reality of God. " The reasonableness in believing depends largely on one's 
"cognitive input" which, in this case, is religious experience. By religious experience, he 
means particularly people's reports "of being conscious of existing in God's presence and 
of living in a personal relationship of mutual awareness with God; and being conscious of 
their life as part of a vast teleological process whose character as a whole gives meaning to 
what is presently taking place. "17 What is characteristic in this specification are three main 
points: the existential status of human beings, personal (or impersonal, in broader sense) 
relationship with God and teleological meaning in the whole universe (process). Certainly 
one can question the appropriateness of these principles, especially the last one. 
Nevertheless, from the basic principle of justification as Hick understands it, one can 
proceed along Hick's lines in seeing and experiencing the world religiously. 
Hick is aware of the fact that this way of experiencing one's environment is not fault- 
free. He gives the examples of "misperceptions, " "illusions, " and "hallucinations" as 
13 AIR, 211,228. 
14 AIR, 210. 
15 AIR, 210. 
16 AIR, 211. 
17 A1R, 211. 
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mistaken experiences. For those who feel the presence of God in their lives, there could 
also be two interpretations: genuine and delusory. Due to this possible difficulty, Hick once 
more wishes to pose the question cautiously: the question is "whether it is rational for A to 
trust his or her experience as veridical and to behave on the basis of it; " and also "whether it 
is rational for others to believe in the reality of God on the basis of A's report. " In other 
words, "the reference is to the rationality of believing, not of what is believed. "18 Hick then 
moves on to establish the credibility of trusting in one's experience. 
In our daily life, we establish an experiential relationship with our environment which 
"presupposes a general trust in the veridical character of perceptual experience. "19 This is 
described as "the principle of credulity" in R Swinburne's theology. That is to say, "what 
one seems to perceive is probably so. How things seem to be is good grounds for a belief 
about how things are. "20 To be able to interact with the world, we have to rely on our 
perceptions and experiences since sensory perception is the only way in which the world is 
disclosed to us. In the mean time, we are aware of the fact that we are occasionally "subject 
to illusions, hallucinations and misperceptions of various kinds. " This alertness acts as a 
guarantee to check the correctness of our perceptions, in which case "they fail to cohere 
with the rest. " Thus we end up with "natural belief 121 or "framework beliefs", as Hick 
quotes from Kai Nielsen, in which "we cannot help believing and living in terms of the 
objective reality of the perceived world. "22 
Hick applies the basics of living under the perceived world to religious belief with an 
appeal to T Penelhum's Parity Argument. 23 The argument admits that "it is no more 
possible to prove the existence of God than the existence of a material world but claims that 
theistic belief arises like perceptual belief, from a natural response of the human mind to its 
experiences. "24 Hick exposes this more fully with a quotation from Faith and Knowledge: 
"We cannot explain how we are conscious of sensory phenomena as constituting an objective 
physical environment; we just find ourselves interpreting the data of our experience in this 
way. We are aware that we live in a real world, though we cannot prove by any logical 
formula that it is a real world... In each case we discover and live in terms of a particular 
aspect of our environment through an appropriate act of interpretation; and having come to 
live in terms of it we neither require nor can conceive of any further validation of its reality. 
The same is true of the apprehension of God. The theistic believer cannot explain how she 
knows the divine presence to be mediated through her human experience. She just finds 
1s AIR, 212. 
19 AIR, 213. 
20 Swinbume, R, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991,254; cf. his The Evolution 
of the Soul, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986,11-13. 
21 Hick borrows this notion from the late Humean reading by Norman Kemp Smith (AIR, 213). 
22 AIR, 213. 
23 Penelhum, T, God and Skepticism, Dordrecht: D Reidel, 1983. Hick summarises from Chs 6 and 
7 of this book. 
24 AIR, 214. 
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herself interpreting her experience in this way. She lives in the presence of God, though she 
is unable to prove by any dialectical process that God exists. "25 
Is the relationship between "perceptual and religious experience-and-belief' so 
simple? Besides the similarities, are there any dissimilarities? What are the possible 
obstacles confronting the supposedly friendly relationship between the two? Hick now 
turns to tackling these questions. 
To begin with, he reminds us of the general principle that "it is rational to regard our 
apparently perceptual experiences as veridical except when we have reason to doubt their 
veridicality. " The reasons to doubt may be of two sorts. First, there may be "positive 
circumstances which could well cause us to be deluded in this case. " Second, we might not 
be aware of such misleading causes, but still "the experience may be so fleeting and 
discontinuous with the rest of our experience, and /or its implications so dissonant with our 
existing body of belief, that it is reasonable for us to regard it as delusory, or at least to 
withhold positive acceptance of it as a genuine `experience of x. "126 For the first kind, he 
gives the example of someone who under the influence of alcohol sees the floor and the 
walls moving and for the second type, he mentions a person who observes a pan flying for 
no apparent reason. Hick concludes by adopting the general principle that "in the absence 
of adequate grounds for doubt it is rational to trust our putative experience of an external 
world that is apparently impinging upon us"; we are "in cognitive touch with our 
environment. "27 To exemplify this, Hick analyses Jesus' experience of existence in the 
presence of God from Jesus' perspective. For Jesus, "God, as personal loving will, was as 
real ... as his neighbours or as the 
hills and rivers and lake of Galilee. The heavenly father 
was not for him a mere concept or a hypothetical entity, but an experienced living reality. "28 
For him to suggest that "there is no heavenly father" would sound as meaningless as to say 
that someone to whom he had just spoken to did not exist. Hick infers that for such 
persons as Jesus, it would have been irrational not to believe in the reality of God. 
Moreover, he boldly states that unless we trust our experience, we cannot even believe that 
the universe exists which would mean committing "cognitive suicide. " The same applies to 
a religious person who "has a powerful and continuous sense of existing in the presence of 
God. " He or she is "rationally entitled to believe" that "God is real, or exists. "29 
Here Hick makes a few cautionary remarks about his conclusion. One is that despite 
all strong experience of existing in God's presence, if, alongside others, 30 we arrive "at the 
knowledge or the well-grounded belief that there is no God, " it would be the end of the 
matter. He illustrates this with "the concept of the deity" being "self-contradictory and thus 
incapable of being instantiated. "31 As is evident, Hick concedes, some people have surely 
25 AIR, 214 (cited from Faith and Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1987,132). 
26 AIR, 215. 
27 AIR, 215. 
28 AIR, 216. 
29 AIR, 216. 
30 Hick does not say clearly what he means by "some other route" (AIR, 217). 
31 AIR, 217. 
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asserted that this was the case. However, as will be seen in the next section, building on 
the premise that "the universe is religiously ambiguous, " that is it could be interpreted both 
from a naturalistic and a religious perspective, he rejects naturalistic explanations and still 
finds the religious interpretation "viable. 1132 
The second remark is the possibility of being mistaken in the experience. He admits 
that as happens in other areas of life, naturally, "there are errors and delusions" in religion 
too. This is indeed the way in which a sceptic sees religion, as totally delusory. Equally 
some believers argue that their beliefs are true while others' are false. He cites Jim Jones' 
religious cult, in which Jones caused the suicidal death of himself and some nine hundred 
members with him at Jonestown, Guyana, in 1978.33 What then do we do about the mixed 
experiences of other people, especially the great religious leaders such as Jesus, whom 
Hick focuses on? How and on what basis can we decide about the veridicality of the 
"paradigm cases of religious experience occurring within pre-scientific cultures? " Hick 
points out that Jesus, in addition to his strong experience of existing in the presence of 
God, has also "experienced certain diseases (such as, possibly, epilepsy) as cases of 
demon possession (Mark 1: 23-26). He may in addition have experienced temptation as the 
work of Satan. "34 His analogy is that while we accept the case for the existence of God in 
the light of Jesus' experience, we can reject his experience of disease causing demons 
because they do not support our mode of thinking about the "modern medical accounts of 
the aetiology of disease. "35 Hick believes that it was rational for them to hold such beliefs 
on the basis of their experience, whereas for us it is not. The general principle in this matter 
is that "it can only be rational for us to hold a belief on the basis of someone else's 
experience if the belief is compatible with our other beliefs, supported as they are by the 
general body of our own experience. "36 When we apply the rule to the religious case, we 
32 AIR, 217. 
33 The movement was known as People's Temple, founded by the Reverend Jim Jones, "a Christian 
socialist, in Indianapolis, " in the U. S. A. during 1950s. He moved to California in 1965 and 
established Jonestown, Guyana, in 1977, which was supposed to be "the promised land, allowing 
freedom from Satanic repression and racism. " Jones, becoming more and more "dictatorial and 
fundamentalist, " took world-renunciation to the extreme, which in a way demonstrates the logic 
behind the tragedy: "better die for heaven above than allow Satan to take over here. " The disaster 
occurred in November 1978 when Jones and 913 followers, who were mainly black, committed 
suicide by drinking "cyanide-laced, `Flavor-Aid'. " It is suggested that the tragedy was provoked by an 
inquiry about the cult, led by Congressman Les Ryan and a group of journalists, who were deemed 
to be "demonic agents" (Bowker, J, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford and New 
York: OUP, 1997,744-745). 
34 AIR, 217. 
35 One can question whether this is really a good example and projects the right analogical relation 
between the two. Coming from a long-term champion of diversity of opinion, this is a very 
surprising statement to make about epilepsy and other psychological and mental disorders, which 
sounds very Western-minded. For one thing, to my knowledge, there is no commonly shared 
explanation and cure of these types of disorders. One should especially remember the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault's views on madness. Secondly, due to this probably wrong diagnosis 
of the cause, other types of cures have been ignored in the West, such as faith healing. Thirdly, it is 
possible to have alternative explanations and cures for the disease, which is widely known and 
practised in the East. This points to the fact that Jesus and Muhammad and others might be right in 
their experience of demon caused diseases. Therefore, one can say that this might not be the perfect 
example to illustrate the point. 
36 AIR, 218-19. 
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reach the conclusion that one can only accept "others' religious experience reports as 
veridical, ... if the beliefs to which they point are such as one judges may be true. " The 
existence of God, Hick declares, is such an issue which one can establish by reason that 
"this is a genuinely important possibility, " meaning that "theistic religious experience has to 
be taken seriously, " and therefore, Jesus' experience marks a turning point for some, 
unlike the "reports of experiences of astrological influences. "37 
Can one raise a question about the consistency of Hick's argument in differentiating 
between the two experiences as veridical and non-veridical? He holds the "`experience of 
God's presence, "' as veridical, while the "`experience of disease-causing demons' -or 
indeed his `experience of the sun moving round the earth"' -as non-veridical. Hick replies 
that there is no difficulty in maintaining that one "may be correctly experiencing some 
aspects of reality whilst falsely experiencing others. " This brings us to the fact that the great 
religious figures were also human beings who, being "historically and culturally 
conditioned, " were no exception to this rule. Thus there is no inconsistency, Hick 
concludes in affirming one as true because it is compatible with our experience, and the 
other as inaccurate because it contradicts "our modern medical and astronomical 
knowledge. "39 
Hick emphasises the fact that this sort of interpretation of religious experience, that is 
the persistent sense of existence in the presence of God, is not an argument for the 
existence of God from the traditionally maintained religious experience. Hick admits that 
there could be several explanations for the cause of this sort of experience such as "super- 
ego, " or a "need for cosmic reassurance in face of danger or of the death of a loved one, " 
or "the pressure of one's group, " etc. Rather his point is that "we should turn from 
experiences... to consider the situation of the experiencer" and try to answer the question 
"what such a person should rationally think and believe on the basis of his or her own 
experience. " Hence he is concerned with "the rationality of believing in the existence of 
God on the basis of theistic religious experience, " not with a direct proof of God's 
existence. Hick's deduction is that "in the absence of any positive reason to distrust one's 
experience, " "it is rational, sane, reasonable for those whose religious experience strongly 
leads them to do so to believe wholeheartedly in the reality of God. " This is as rational, 
Hick asserts, as "our beliefs about `what there is and how things are' in our total 
environment, " which may be caused "directly, " such as the experience of a table, and 
"indirectly, " such as the experience of one's life as being lived in the presence of a 
transcendent God. To be able to reach to this inference, though, we should satisfy two 
requirements. Firstly, we must "responsibly judge" that it is "possible for such an entity to 
exist. " Secondly, this probability should be provided through "a powerful, persistent and 
intrusive way which demands belief in its reality. " Therefore, it was justified reasonably 
37 AIR, 219. 
38 AIR, 220. 
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for great spiritual leaders like Moses, Jesus, Martin Luther, Muhammad, al-Hallaj, 
Ramanuja and Guru Nanak to maintain that God exists. 39 
But what of lay people who have never had such experiences and were probably 
handed down their beliefs from their parents through generations; are they also entitled to 
hold the belief that God exists? Hick's thought offers them "a secondary kind of religious 
experience, " which comes out of the impression generated by the thought of "moral and 
spiritual fruits" in the lives of these great religious leaders. In other words, they witness 
these effects on the religious leaders which lead them to the belief in God. Hick, however, 
points out that their beliefs will not be as strong as a "first-hand believer, 40owing to the fact 
that they will be "vulnerable to the kind of sceptical challenge" directed from many aspects 
of modern life. 41 
However, this does not mean ordinary believers cannot have any religious 
experience. They do have, Hick contends, "some remote echo or analogue" "of the much 
more momentous experience of the great religious figures. This echo may not be at all 
dramatic or memorable. "42 Hick goes on: 
"It may merely be a moment of greatly intensified meaning in the midst of a church, 
synagogue or mosque service, or in private prayer, or when reading the scriptures or saying a 
rosary. Or, on a higher level of significance, it may be the sense of a transcendent reality and 
goodness being disclosed to us at one of the deep points of human experience, love or birth or 
death; or through the insistent pressure of an ideal, leading to practical commitment against 
some social evil or for the realisation of some communal good; or in an awareness, when 
gazing up into the starry night, of the mysterious immensity of space around us; or again, in 
the presence of mountain or lake, forest or ocean. "43 
Once this hierarchy between the experiences of the great religious figures and of the 
religious individual has been established, one can reasonably conclude one's experience is 
bolstered by the great experiences of awareness of God that have impressed one so much. 
This connection will provide "well enough" a ground for one to "proceed in faith in the 
footsteps of a great religious leader, " even if one's belief will not be "as deeply and solidly 
grounded as theirs. " One should hope that one day one will "ultimately receive" "the full 
confirmation" of one's faith 44 
In reply to William Rowe's criticism, Hick next deals with the issue of criteria in 
trusting one's experience. Rowe argues that the rationality of one's religious belief requires 
39 A1R, 220-21. 
40 Italics are mine. Even though Hick does not explicitly suggest, the implication is that he uses a 
two-staged category of believers: first-hand and second-hand believer. This very much echoes the 
division of Muslims in Islamic Sufism: awaam (ordinary believers) and hawaass (first-hand 
believers), which was later used widely in different branches of Islamic Thought as a proof of 
superiority on others. Philosophers, Mutakallimun (theologians) and Fuqaha (jurists) all have 
claimed that they are the hawaass, they have the most conclusive knowledge of Allah and their way 
of understanding and living Islam is superior on others. 
41 AIR, 221-22. 
42 AIR, 222. 
43 AIR, 222. 
44 AIR, 223. 
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that "A must know what sorts of circumstances would render the putative `experience of x' 
suspect and must also know that these circumstances do not in fact obtain. "45 Having 
elucidated a few points, Hick states that on the whole, when experiences are put to test 
within their tradition, they comply with the standards of truthfulness within that tradition or 
denomination. He furthermore gives two criteria. The first one is, quoting St Teresa of 
Avila, "conformity with the scriptures, " which is true of Islam too. ` The second one is 
what Hick calls "less-tradition specific, " the fruit of their experience in their life. For that, 
he quotes Jesus' saying about "false prophets: " "You will be able to tell them by their 
fruits. Can people pick grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles? " (Matthew 7: 16). Hick 
rightly suggests that this moral criterion, the effect of an inner religious experience on the 
outer part of the life of the experiencer, is applied "more or less universally" throughout the 
great world religions 47 
One can object to these criteria on the grounds that they were invented by human 
beings within different traditions in order to accept a religious experience as the "experience 
of the divine. " Hick accepts this challenge readily and says that it is in fact true that these 
experiences might be interpreted differently from different standpoints, such as psychology 
and sociology, besides religion. Basing the argument on "the religious ambiguity of the 
universe, " he nonetheless argues that "the acceptance of either" explanation "arises from a 
basic cognitive choice or act of faith. Once the choice has been made, and whilst it is 
operative, the alternative global view is reduced to a bare logical possibility. "48 This brings 
us to the title "the right to believe, " as examined by Hick. 
Before going any further it might be helpful to probe what James' essay is about, 
since the way it has been generally understood has been criticised recently by Ludwig F. 
Schlecht 49 James at the beginning of his address defines it as "an essay in justification of 
faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the 
fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. "50 Schlecht, by picking on 
Hick, argues that "Hick -and countless others- have read James' essay as an attempt to 
justify belief in the existence of God as affirmed in traditional theism, " which he thinks is 
wrong and far away from James' intent. 51 Two issues need to be dealt with here: one is 
whether Hick uses James' argument for the existence of the God of traditional theism and 
the other is Hick's criticism of James' argument as being an invitation to "wishful 
thinking. "52 
45 AIR, 223. 
46 This was and is a general principle in Islamic thought, especially in Sufism, where abnormalities 
occur: whatever one performs, even if one flies in the sky and walks freely on the river or sea, we 
should always look for the general principle which is that whether one and one's life is in line with 
the Qur'an and Sunnah; whether one is in as-siral al-muslagim (the true path). 
47 AIR, 224-25. 
48 AIR, 225-26. 
49 Schlecht, L F, "Re-reading 'The Will to Believe, "' Religio is_Studifs 33,1997,217-225. 
50 James, The Will, 1-2. 
51 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 217. 
52 POR, 56; AIR, 227. 
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We might perhaps start with the first point: that "Hick and countless others, "53 use 
James' argument to affirm the existence of the God of traditional theism. This also could be 
examined from two angles: firstly, we should establish whether Hick really uses the 
argument in the alleged form, and secondly what kind of God or religion James is in favour 
of, if not the traditional conceptions from which Schlecht is trying to disassociate James 
wholeheartedly. 
Methodologically, Schlecht's article lacks consistency in assessing Hick's position. 
This is because he bases his argument on the ideas found in Hick's Philosophy of 
Religion, an introductory book written in the early years of his career (1963, his second 
book). Even if one refers to a relatively updated imprint (1990), one cannot conclude on the 
basis of one book that, besides others, it voices the mature philosophy of the scholar in 
question. To be able to decide why Hick employs James' argument, one should perhaps go 
a little bit further and at least see his Interpretation so that one could have a comprehensive 
idea of on what grounds he uses it. Because of the context and the general assumption of 
what a philosophy of religion book is, I believe Schlecht assumes that Hick reads "James' 
essay as an attempt to justify the belief in the existence of" the God of traditional theism. 
However, it became apparent from the analysis given above, and as Hick's frequent 
warnings also evince, that since he wrote Philosophy of Religion many things have 
changed, including Hick's whole idea of God, never mind the traditionalist perspective. 
Therefore the claim that he utilises "The Will to Believe" in the affirmation of the theistic 
conception of God seems inadequate. 
Schlecht presses this idea because he holds that James' understanding of God and of 
religion is rather different from conventional theologians', which brings us to the second 
sub-point and also happens to be the reason behind Schlecht's essay. Quoting another book 
by James, A Pluralistic Universe, Schlecht attests that James finds the dualistic approach in 
traditional theism unsatisfactory: "`The theistic conception, picturing God and his creation 
as entities distinct from each other, still leaves the human subject outside of the deepest 
reality in the Universe. ' A pluralistic pantheism is there affirmed, a position distinct from 
both traditional theism and monistic pantheism (i. e. absolute idealism). "54 Schlecht clarifies 
further James' understanding of religion: 
"In `The Will to Believe' James offers us a `very generic and broad' concept of religion; he is 
concerned to identify a common core to various types of religious expression -not the 
`accidents' peculiar to any one religious position such as traditional theism. It is the 
affirmations of religion in this broadest sense that we have a right to believe. "55 
One cannot but agree that this is the religion which Hick is arguing for in his now 
almost two decade old theory of religious pluralism: to establish "a common core to various 
types of religious expression. "56 
53 Unfortunately, Schlecht does not give any elucidation regarding the others whom has in mind. Sa Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 218. 
55 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 218 (My italics). 
56 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 218. 
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As Schlecht furthers his investigation of James' understanding of religion, we 
discover that James explicitly rejects theism in "his later works" in favour of "pluralistic 
pantheism" as a more "intimate Weltanschauung. " This is because "pantheism gives us a 
`vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, and of human life 
as part and parcel of that deep reality. ' With such a view, rather than being wary and 
guarded, `we may give way, embrace, and keep no ultimate fear. "157 Summarising James' 
argument, Schlecht concludes that three conditions should be met for a hypothesis, which 
is religion in our case, to be embraced: 
"I. We are presented with a 'genuine option' (i. e., live, forced and momentous). 58 2. It is an 
issue that cannot be decided on `intellectual grounds' (i. e., it cannot be settled with reference 
to objective evidence) 59 3. The truth of the hypothesis is at least partially dependent upon the 
agent (i. e., it is a case where `faith in a fact can help curate the fact'60). "6t 
By "taking our life in our hands, "62 when we resolve that a "religious hypothesis" 
fulfils these conditions, Schlecht completes his exposition; "we have a `right to believe, ' to 
proceed `at our own risk' in living in accordance with what religion proclaims and 
promises in its broadest sense. It is not a proclamation regarding an external creator, but 
rather regarding life that is `worth living. "'63 What is not clear in this paragraph is the 
connection between the two sentences or rather the mentality behind Schlecht's specific 
inference from the general definition in the first sentence. 
To be able to demonstrate the problem more clearly we need to see two quotations 
from James: one is about our choices and the other is about his assessment of religion. 
James writes about the first one: 
"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the 
question open, ' is itself a passional decision, - just like deciding yes or no, - and is attended 
with the same risk. "64 
About religion: 
"Religion says essentially two things. First, she says that the best things are the more eternal 
things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to 
speak, and say the final word... The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off 
even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true. "65 
This may sound rather oversimplified, but for the sake of argument if we put the two 
together, we can hardly reach the same conclusion as Schlecht does. Some scholars also 
57 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 222. 
58 James, The Will, 3. 
59 James, The Will, 3,11. 
60 James, The Will, 25. 
61 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 224. 
62 James, The Will, 30. 
63 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 224-225. 
64 James, The Will, 11. 
65 James, The Will, 26. 
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disagree with what Schlecht suggests with regard to James' understanding of religion. 
Their argument is that "it is existing beliefs or propensities to believe which concern James 
above all in The Will to Believe, "66 which in a way explains the reason behind his 
consideration of the Mahdi choice as dead in a Christian society. 67 
By overemphasising James' pantheistic tendencies, Schlecht, as I see it, weakens 
James' main argument about choices. If, faced with such a choice under such and such 
circumstances, I make a choice and accept a religion, it is up to neither James nor Schlecht 
to decide which proclamations of it I should and should not follow. For me, the crux of the 
matter lies not in James' pantheistic understandings of religion, but in his defence of and 
respect for human being's right to choice and to believe. To be able to reach a rather secular 
meaning of religion and, especially, of life, to merge the two seems forcing the boundaries 
too much and puts Schlecht in the same position as "Hick and countless others, " which 
results in another misreading down the line. In other words, despite the apparent focus on 
personal relationship with the universe which anticipates the pantheistic claims in his later 
writings, James is not appealing to religion to make life more worthy of living, but simply 
saying that despite the lack of any compelling evidence one can opt for a different 
Weltanschauung which might have dramatic effects on one's worldly life as well as in the 
hereafter, if there will be one. This choice might be a theistic or a non-theistic religion, 
which does not make any difference in my reading of James, in terms of what can and 
cannot be followed, if we stick to the principle rightly and tightly. Thus even though 
Schlecht seemed to have achieved his aim by clarifying James' understanding of religion, 
his conclusion about limiting the application of a religious hypothesis to life or any other 
thing is far from being an agreeable one and in line with James'. This reductionist inference 
is, in fact, not very different from the alleged charge of distortion68 against Hick and others 
of using James' thesis where it is not intended to be. 
What of Hick's criticism of James as the authoriser of "wishful thinking? "69 Hick 
summarises James' right to believe thesis as `bur right to choose how to proceed within an 
ambiguous situation in which the choice is unavoidable and yet of momentous importance 
to ourselves. "70 Due to the religious neutrality of the universe, we can have no compelling 
argument in favour of either explanation, religious or naturalistic. Whichever way we 
choose to proceed, Hick argues, "we run an unavoidable risk. " Hick goes on to say: "What 
is at stake is our relationship to reality. The possible gain is that of living in terms of reality 
and the possible loss is that of living in delusion. "71 As a solution, in these sorts of 
situations we follow, Hick quotes James, "our `passional' or `willing nature', " which Hick 
66 Brown, H, "The Retrieval of 'Liven ess' in William James's Will to Believe, " Inwo. 4lli2n41 
ýOyTlläl.. l4i.. ý'hiýQgQghyq(, ýtýljgýpn 42,1997,115. Brown also vehemently opposes to the 
suggestion that James has favoured pantheism over theism (99). See for more: 97-118. 
67 James, The Will, 6. 
68 Schlecht, "Re-reading, " 217. 
69 AIR, 227; FK, 44; FOR, 56. 
70 AIR, 227. 
71 AIR, 227. 
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considers to be "wishful thinking" and naturally, "would authorise us to believe anything 
that we may have a strong enough propensity to believe, providing the evidence concerning 
it is inconclusive. "72 To prevent such undesirable results, James, as we presented above, 
introduces the liveness and genuineness of the option, which came under scrutiny from 
different points again. By "liveness, " Hick understands that "it is widely held in the society 
around us. "73 Thus for different people different options might be alive: for a European, 
Christianity; for a Chinese, Confucianism; for an Arab, Islam; for a Jew, Judaism. But 
Hick finds "absurd" the supposition that "the truth varies geographically with the liveliness 
of the local options. "74 He takes James' argument to an extreme and suggests that if, as 
rational beings, we are persuaded and accept James' The Will to Believe, it should in fact 
make dead options alive. Therefore, by taking James' Mahdi example, 75 Hick concludes 
that it is not consistent for James to refuse the Mahdi's invitation or accept Christianity on 
the grounds that "our minds are more accustomed to one claim than to another. "76 For 
Hick, this is simply irrelevant. Rather, for a purely rational mind liberated from all 
restrictions of geographical and other constraints, both assertions are equally important in 
terms of credibility. Hence Hick considers "James' theory as open to refutation by a 
reductio ad absurdum. "77 
James' genuineness condition and its application to a hypothesis is also attacked 
from the same angle on the grounds that the refusal of one option just because it is not 
initially attractive, or widely available, is unjustifiable. If that option, the Mahdi in James' 
example, offers the same expectations as, for instance, Christianity, James' proposition is 
to make "a leap of faith. "78 
The exposition cited above was Hick's earlier stance, written as far back as some 
forty years ago. 79 In his mature philosophy, however, rather than rejecting James' 
argument totally, he uses it with a slight change in the line of thought where he believes the 
72 AIR, 227. 
73 FK, 43. 
74 FK, 43. 
75 James, The Will, 6. The Mahdi was supposed to have written "I am the Expected One whom God 
has created in his effulgence. You shall be infinitely happy if you confess me; otherwise you shall 
be cut off from the light of the sun. Weigh, then, your infinite gain if I am genuine against your 
finite sacrifice if I am not? " (Ibid. ). 
76 FK, 43. 
77 FK, 43-44. 
78 Pojman, L P, Religious Belief and the Will, London and New York, RKP, 1986, p 82. It is also 
worth noting, Pojman states, that the "underlying" principle for James' pragmatist approach to belief 
is "a utilitarian assumption that we ought to satisfy in a manner that maximises happiness. " That is 
only possible with adopting the optimistic view that "goodness will win over evil. " Since there is 
no conclusive evidence towards this, "we have a right to believe in the enabling belief that good will 
win. " (Pojman, Religious Belief, 82. ) This may seem an unfriendly alliance but Hick's whole 
philosophy of religions does not seem to stand too far away from this utilitarian stance, especially 
from a naturalistic point of view, even though Hick claims that it is a religious interpretation of 
religion unlike others (AIR, 1-2). The reason for the resemblance is that if we accept his proposal to 
understand religions, we maximise our happiness, since it grants each of the great world religions the 
right to provide salvation to its followers. Therefore, it is good in maximising individuals' 
happiness and also good on the whole for the happiness of the world's population, because it would 
make more positive contributions to the world peace than its rivals owing to its basic premiss: that 
is there is no superior religion and all are equally true. 
79 FK was first published in 1957. 
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argument fails. He suggests that "... if we substitute compelling religious experience for 
the mere desire to believe an unproved and undisproved proposition, James' basic 
argument then becomes an argument for our right to trust our own religious experience and 
to be prompted by it to trust that of the great religious figures. "80 Therefore, Hick 
concludes, if, on the absence of compelling evidence, one experiences the world 
religiously, or takes part in a group which follows "this mode of experience, " one is 
"rationally entitled to trust that experience and to proceed to believe and to live on the basis 
of it. "81 
Hick turns at this stage to the point made at the beginning of the section: the 
applicability of his argument to both theistic and non-theistic experiences and beliefs. He 
says: "it is evident that essentially the same argument could be formulated for non-theistic 
experience and belief. Thus those who report the advaitic experience of oneness with 
Brahman, ... are entitled to 
base their belief-systems on those forms of experience. "82 
A complication, however, arises if one accepts Hick's conclusion, that is to trust 
one's own experience of sense in the presence of God. If everybody has a right to trust his 
or her experience, this will surely lead us to maintain "an equal justification for acceptance 
of a number of mutually contradictory propositions, " which in turn would threaten the 
validity of Hick's argument. 83 Hick here refers to Hume's criticism of miracles in Enquiries 
on the grounds that "in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is 
impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of 
them, be established on any sound foundation. "84 Hick substitutes miracles in Hume's 
argument with religion and tries, in the following chapters, to solve the problem of plurality 
in the experience of God, which sometimes leads to the acceptance of contradictory truth- 
claims believed to flow from the same source. 85 
Can one be totally persuaded by Hick's argument? Not entirely. I shall try to explain 
why. In the past, people also had experiences of their own with different results such as the 
belief that the earth was flat and in the centre of the universe. They were no less sure of the 
truthfulness of their experiences than us. Nevertheless, as Hick also points out frequently, 
it turned out that they were wrong in their perception of the world. The question, then, 
arises: could it be that, despite all our technological advances in observing our 
environment, by which I mean the universe in a broader sense, our perception, specifically 
80 A1R, 227-228. 
81 AIR, 228. 
82 AIR, 228. 
83 AIR, 228. 
84 Hume, D, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
PH Nidditch, ed. , 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, sect. x, part 2,121. 
85 When Hick criticises James' the right to believe argument in Faith and Knowledge, he starts with 
the idea that "this view of faith ... 
is not the view of the ordinary believer" (FK, 42). As a sporadic 
thought, it seems to me the same logic applies to Hume's argument. Many of the ordinary believers 
are not very much concerned with what others say or do. From their point of view, neither disproves 
either of them. So our problem here is rather more intellectual or philosophical than existential. 
Well, at least, this could be true for the holders of a Perennialist line, which argues the naturality of 
diversity while consistently declining to offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
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regarding the Real, after all proved wrong? Even though Hick might not agree with the 
distinction between perceptions of the material objects found in our surroundings in the 
world and of the Real, I would still like to stress the fact that there is a considerable 
difference between the two experiences. As happened in the past, if we had not had the 
chance of verifying our experiences concerning the material world, we would not have 
found out that Ptolemaic picture of the universe was in fact wrong. But in the case of 
religious experiences, there is no way of verifying the claims made by the religions 
concerning the Real. Hick would answer that it is a way of experiencing the universe or 
rather experience of it religiously. Hick maintains by the extension of Wittgenstein's 
seeing-as concept that all our experience is experiencing-as, whether it be a physical or a 
metaphysical one, such as table and God respectively. 86 He declares that "all experience 
embodies concept-laden forms of interpretation, "87 which means that there could be no 
direct experience of anything in the universe. 88 What this means is that whatever mode of 
knowing we are given by birth, by society, by geography, etc., we experience and interpret 
the universe accordingly. If we may restate it in cybernetic terms we interpret our 
surroundings as we are programmed. 89 This is how Hick puts it with a quotation from St 
Thomas Aquinas: "things known are in the knower according to the mode of the 
knower. "90 Therefore if we have different modes of knowing, or are programmed 
differently, we may even perceive a table differently, in Hick's controversial example, let 
alone God. A table, Hick argues, could be conceived as differently by a quantum physicist, 
a lay person and, say, a Martian. Thus is God. Since we have to trust our experiences in 
our daily perceptions of the world, so long as they conform to the common perceptions 
held by many, we also have to trust our compelling religious experiences in the presence of 
God. Here lies the crux of the matter: despite the different perceptions of the table by a 
quantum physicist and a lay person, they would agree on putting their coffee cups on the 
table, which refers to the solidity of the object as we normally perceive it. 91 Unfortunately, 
this is not the case in perceptions about God or the universe. The claims made by the 
different religions concerning the religious character of the universe do not conform with 
one another. To this objection, Hick would provide two answers. One is that there is a 
cumulative case for religions to be true since they are universal, and therefore correspond to 
each other at a phenomenological level. To those who hold a naturalistic way of 
86 AIR, 140-42. 
87 AIR, 142. 
88 Hick confirms this deduction in a tape, recorded during a discussion ("Religious Pluralism and 
Kantian Metaphysics, ") held in Lampeter University, Wales, U. K., in March 1997, between him and 
David Cockburn of Lampeter University, in front of a live audience. 
89 One wants to ask whether we are supposed to be programmed by the Real before we are born. 
Hick probably would respond that apart from the basic hardware, say mind or reason, we are born 
unprogrammed, with which many would agree. 
90 AIR, 153. 
91 When Hick was questioned about the appropriateness of this analogy in the Lampeter discussion, 
he agreed it is not a perfect example and suggested that we should leave the analogies behind, since 
they might one way or the other be misleading, and stick to the Kantian distinction of noumenon 
and phenomenon; in Hickian terms the Real in itself and as humanly experienced (The Lampeter 
Recordings). 
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understanding religions, the ostensible religiosity of the universe may mean two things: ill 
toto delusory or a sub-step before the evolution of the human mind in becoming free from 
all superstitious ties (atheism). Then comes Hick's second reply that the universe is 
religiously ambiguous, i. e. could be interpreted both religiously and naturalistically. As a 
"religious interpretation of religion"92, his hypothesis fits best with the data in hand in 
explaining pluralism. 93 Before examining which theory fits better with the plurality of 
religions, we can take a look at the phenomenon of religion, its development, what Hick 
means by religion and how widely he has engaged with it. 
Before we commence to examine Hick's thought on alternative explanations about the 
apparent plurality witnessed in the experience of God, following Hick's line, we might 
look into the different streams of experiences, beliefs and traditions of God or the Real. 
2.2.2. "The Directory of Gods" 
The aim here is to try to explore what Hick understands by the term religion , how he 
employs it and in what sense and on what scope. What are the cornerstones of his 
understanding of religion? 
Despite Hick's opposition to a definitive approach in examining religion that is 
derived from a certain definition of religion, to avoid confusion I shall first look at 
possibilities and give an approximate criterion to indicate what makes a tradition or system 
religious. While doing this, I would consider only religious definitions of religion rather 
than naturalistic ones, since my main concern in this chapter will be the religious 
understanding of religion. Even though Hick believes that religion "cannot be adequately 
defined but only described, "94 he provides us with a definition of religion to exemplify this 
inadequateness. To him, "religion ... centres upon an awareness of and response to a 
reality that transcends ourselves and our world, whether the `direction' of transcendence be 
beyond or within or both. "95 The key point for me in this definition is the belief in some 
92 AIR, 1-2. 
93 Hick is not alone in basing the justification of religious belief on experiencing the world 
religiously, i. e. our right to believe in the light of compelling religious experience. In his extensive 
work on religious experience, Perceiving God, WP Alston defends almost the same position at a 
greater length. Right at the beginning of the book, he writes: 
"I want to make explicit at the outset that my project here is to be distinguished from 
anything properly called an 'argument from religious experience" for the existence of God. 
The thesis defended here is not that the existence of God provides the best explanation for 
facts about religious experience or that it is possible to argue in any way from the latter to 
the former. It is rather that people sometimes do perceive God and thereby acquire justified 
beliefs about God. In the same way, if one is a direct realist about sense perception, as I am, 
one will be inclined to hold not that internal facts about sense experience provide one with 
premises for an effective argument to the existence of external physical objects, but rather that 
in enjoying sense experience one thereby perceives external physical objects and comes to 
have various justified beliefs about them, without the necessity of exhibiting those beliefs (or 
their propositional contents) as the conclusion of any sort of argument" (Alston, W P, 
Perceiving God: An Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London, Cornell UP, 
1993,3). 
94 A/R, 5. 
95 AIR, 3. On naturalistic definitions, he states that they consider religion "as a purely human 
activity or state of mind. " There have been "phenomenological, psychological and sociological" 
definitions of religion from a naturalistic stance (Ibid. ). Strangely enough, depending on this 
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sort of a Transcendent Being, whether conceived to be personal or impersonal or in some 
other way; it does not matter. What matters, in addition to other features such as rites and 
liturgy, is that a religion should accommodate the belief in the Transcendent. Hick also 
takes this as his primary "focus" in An Interpretation of Religion, but does not consider this 
as the essence of religion, since he does not believe that there can be one 96 However, this, 
for me, is the dividing line, since I take "the belief in the Transcendent" to be the "essence 
of religion. " Thus the amount of overlap with the values or practices of properly "religious 
traditions" at other levels will make a system religious only if it accommodates belief in the 
Transcendent. This is the line I follow throughout the chapter wherever I use the words 
religion, religious, etc. But I agree with Hick that not to have belief in the Transcendent 
does not rule out the possibility of salvation. Thus, as long as they meet the salvific 
criterion, the newer and primitive religions that do not have a concept of the Transcendent 
might also offer salvation 97 
Following the phenomenology of religions, right at the beginning of A it 
Interpretation of Religion, Hick identifies two concepts as the defining aspects of his view 
of religion. The first is "the virtual universality throughout human life of ideas and practices 
that are recognisably religious. "98 To bolster this view, he quotes Talcott Parsons' 
statement that modern anthropology has clearly established the validity of this premise, 99 
which is described in Mircea Eliade's words as "the `sacred' is an element in the structure 
of consciousness and not a stage in the history of consciousness. "100 Hick warns that this 
generalisation certainly does not entail the religiosity of every individual who has existed so 
far, but means that "all human societies have displayed some religious characteristics. "lot 
Following sociologists like Robert Bellah, Hick stretches the line so far as to include even 
systems of ideas like Marxism, Maoism and humanism, though they are seen as alternative 
ways of living to religion. Hick achieves this broad coverage with a concept adopted from 
Wittgenstein: "`religion' as a family-resemblance concept: referring to a network of partly 
overlapping and partly distinct phenomena. "102 
A "family-resemblance concept, " or "cluster, " as it is called, as Hick understands it, 
the idea that within the members of a family, "there are no characteristics that every member 
must have; but nevertheless there are characteristics distributed sporadically and in varying 
definition, Asian suggests that Hick "proposes" this to be a "working definition of religion" (Asian, 
A, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of John Hick and Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1998,30). This to me is totally mistaken, since Hick neither 
accepts a definition of religion, nor proposes one, nor believes that there is an "essence of religion" 
(AIR, 5-6). 
96 AIR, 6. 
97 AIR, 307-308. 
98 AIR, 21. 
99 A1R, 21. 
100 AIR, 22 (cited from Eliade, M, A History of Religious Ideas, trans. Trask, W R, Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1978, vol. I, xiii). 101 AIR, 21-22. 
102 AIR. 22 (my italics). 
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degrees which together distinguish this from a different family. "103 To elucidate this, 
Wittgenstein gives the instance of games. "Some are solitary, others competitive; some 
individual, others team activities; some depend on skill, others on chance, " etc. Even 
though they share "no common essence, " Wittgenstein argues, we consider them games 
because "each is similar in important respects to some others in the family, though not in all 
respects to any or in any respect to all. " "Instead of a set of defining characteristics there is 
a network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing like the resemblances and 
differences in build, features, eye colour, gait, temperament and so on among the members 
of a natural family. "104 Hick argues that certain definitions of religion, either religious or 
naturalistic, lack the capacity to contain all traditions and all "embody decisions and either 
reveal or conceal commitments. "los 
To avoid the problems created with a certain definition, Hick opts for an umbrella 
term and adopts the Wittgensteinian family-resemblance position as a starting point for his 
philosophy of religions. The reason for this is that Hick holds that religion "cannot be 
adequately defined but only described. "106 But what is the "pointer" for something to be 
counted as "religion' in this broad sense? Hick turns to P Tillich at this stage to borrow his 
idea of "ultimate concern. " It is the right indicator because, Hick suggests, "religious 
objects, practices and beliefs have a deep importance for those whom they count as 
religious: " "important in a more permanent and ultimate sense. "107 Thus Hick concludes 
that when we mention religion in a specific, narrower sense, we exclude Marxism and 
other secular faiths; but in case of the wider sense, we include them in the category, 
meaning probably as a way of living or human beings' response to their environment as a 
whole. Within this philosophy, the question whether Marxism is a religion "ceases to have 
a straightforwardly correct answer" for Hick; he tries rather to expose its relation to the 
complex phenomena of the family of religion. 108 
I concur with Hick that a certain definition would bring in difficulties, but to extend 
the definition thus far, and thereby to accommodate the secular faiths, is something which I 
would disagree with. Even if we employ a Wittgensteinian family-resemblance argument, it 
seems to me inappropriate, as N Smart also points out, to include them in this category and 
try to call them "religions or even `quasi-religions, "' since the very essence of these 
ideologies is in many respects "antireligious" and of course those who believe in and live 
by these philosophies would not wish to be put in the category of religion, or anything 
closer to that. 109 However, even Smart seems to share Hick's understanding, or vice versa, 
when he states, by way of underpinning the logic of categorisation, that "the various 
103 AIR, 3-4. 
104 AIR, 4. 
105 AIR, 3. 
106 AIR, 5. 
107 AIR, 4. 
108 AIR, 5. 
109 Smart, N, The World's Religion: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 1993,25. 
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systems of ideas and practices, whether religious or not, are competitors and mutual 
blenders, and can thus be said to play in the same league. They all help to express the 
various ways in which human beings conceive of themselves, and act in the world. "l lo One 
can appreciate the similarities, but the analogy, in my opinion, is still false. Similarities at 
one level do not justify the categorising at a wider level. The family-resemblance concept 
could be a useful tool to capture the broad range of religious experiences found across the 
globe, if we insist on "the ultimate concern" about the belief in the Transcendent as the 
indicator of a religion. Therefore, ideologies such as Marxism and humanism cannot be 
counted as religions in the proper sense since they lack the core of religion, i. e. belief in the 
Transcendent. I believe that considering them religions sounds like "God/the Real bless 
atheism. " 
Furthermore, it seems to me that Hick's argument about the religious ambiguity of 
the universe can be extended by implication to experience as well as interpretation of the 
universe. That is, it could be both experienced and interpreted either religiously or 
naturalistically. Now if a Marxist or a humanist experiences the universe irreligiously, that 
is living a good life without attaching to it any transcendental influence, there is no point in 
trying to put her or him under such a category however wide it is. In other words, we 
should accept the self-description of an ideology. To me, whichever way we look at it, 
their "ultimate concern" is very different from that of mainstream religions' followers. Both 
might share the problems of the world and "work against exploitation, against racism, 
against poverty and starvation, " and "for the creation of justice and peace on earth, "111 but 
the partnership in these issues does not mean going one step further to make them partners 
as religions. To me the term religion is not wide enough to accommodate ideologies like 
Marxism and humanism due to its affiliation with an idea of the transcendent. If we want to 
have a broader term to include both types of system, religious and antireligious, as Hick 
tries to, I propose it would be something like the German word, Weltanschauung, meaning 
philosophy of life, or world-view. ' 12 
To me, one question still remains unanswered: does Hick use this family- 
resemblance concept to overcome difficulties brought about by a certain definition, a mere 
intellectual philosophising activity, or to establish a wider framework for his philosophy of 
religions? In my opinion the latter is true even if he ends up ascribing salvific values to 
Marxism and humanism. 
One further problem arises if we take Hick's position seriously, i. e. admit that 
secular faiths could also offer salvation. Does this mean he accepts that one could achieve 
salvation outside religion? Apparently, it does. He negates D Forrester's early charge that 
110 Smart, The World's Religions, 25 (my italics). 
111 ROF, 80. 
112 One might suggest faith systems opting for faith instead of religion by taking WC Smith's 
line. But it still implies an idea of a transcendent and a response to it, and therefore seems inadequate 
for our purpose (Hughes, E J, Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Theology for the World, London: SCM 
Press: 1986,7-8). 
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his theory denotes "that there is no salvation outside religion. "113 He claims that, as some 
inclusivists do in case of Christianity, Marxists and humanists are unconsciously 
responding to the Real, when they participate in efforts for a "better human future" and "are 
undergoing the salvific transformation. " 4 What is the difference then between the secular 
religions and the traditional ones? During my meeting with him in Birmingham, I put this 
question to him. He replied that "their upper structure is wrong, " meaning that they are 
mistaken by denying the existence of an Ultimate Reality. A critic might still feel that for 
someone who set out to establish a better theory explaining the religious phenomena than, 
at least, the naturalistic ones, this is a rather untenable position. Is Hick not "wishfully" 
ascribing religious meaning to a merely human activity? Why do we need to call the system 
religious anyway or, to put it another way, why do we need to stay within the boundaries 
of religion at all? '15 
The second concept Hick draws our attention to about the religious character of the 
universe is the differentiation between pre-axial and post-axial religions, which he reckons 
is a "widely accepted large-scale interpretive concept. " The distinction states that pre-axial 
religion is "centrally (but not solely) concerned with the preservation of cosmic and social 
order" and post-axial religion is "centrally (but not solely) concerned with the quest for 
salvation or liberation. "' 16 Hick, following historians of religion such as Mircea Eliade and 
Karl Jaspers, defines pre-axial religions as "archaic, " meaning literally "the earliest 
times. "117 Elsewhere, Hick gives more explanation of what he means, or rather what he 
does not mean, by archaic. He stresses the fact that "no religious stigma should be attached 
to" it. "It is not implied that it is better, from a religious point of view, to be literate than 
pre-literate, or to live within a contemporary rather than a now extinct form of life. " Despite 
the benefits brought about by the "axial age, " we also, Hick argues, suffered losses, such 
as the maintenance of ecological equilibrium and an awareness of "the moral reality of 
community, " which we could "re-learn from the continuing precarious threads of primal 
religion in the modern world. "118 It is still not clear to my mind whether Hick is being 
consistent with his claim that he is not grading religions when he labels the pre-axial 
religion archaic. Surely, he does not consider them salvific in the sense that they do not 
offer a "radical human transformation, " due to their focus on "keeping the communal life 
on an even keel both in itself and in relation to the sacred. "119 Hick regards them as 
113 Forrester, D, "Professor Hick and the Universe of Faiths, ';. $FQltish. Jpprrnal. gf Thcplggy 29, no. 
1,1976,70. 
114 ROF, 80-81. 
115 The discussion has implications on the relationship between moral/ethical and religious. Hick 
agrees with the conclusion that one does not need to be religious to be ethical, which is the 
humanists' case. Nevertheless, his stress on the concept of a loving, compassionate God/the Real, 
who ultimately wills the salvation of all human beings, forces him to include secular systems in his 
philosophy of religions and to give them salvific meaning. ý16 
AIR, 22. 
117 AIR, 23. 
118 AIR, 28-29. 
119 ROF, 109: AIR, 23. 
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"communal rather than individual responses to the Real. "120 Two questions come to mind: 
firstly, since communal salvation or peace is also emphasised in the majority of the great 
world religions, why not widen the scope of salvation to contain both types of responses to 
the Real? Secondly, if we want to remain objective in our evaluation of religions, we 
should not make value judgements about communal and individual responses to the Real. It 
appears to me that Hick's philosophy implies this value judgement when he indirectly 
favours individual response to the Real against the communal one. 
The term pre-axial contains "both the `primal, ' `pre-literate, ' or `primitive' religions 
of stone-age humanity and the now extinct priestly and often national religions of the 
ancient Near East and Egypt, Greece and Rome, India and China. "121 This chronological 
classification of religion as pre and post-axial periods does not necessarily suggest the 
elimination of the first and a succession of it by the second. In fact "earlier forms of 
religion generally continue to some extent both alongside and also within the later ones. " It, 
therefore, "refers primarily to origins. "122 
Pre-axial religion offers "both psychological and sociological" comfort to its 
adherents. Hick observes: 
"Psychologically it is an attempt to make stable sense of life, and particularly of the basic 
realities of subsistence and propagation and the final boundaries of birth and death, within a 
meaning-bestowing framework of myth. This serves the social functions of preserving the 
unity of the tribe of people within a common world-view and at the same time of validating 
the community's claims upon the loyalty of its members. The underlying concern is 
conservative, a defence against chaos, meaninglessness and the breakdown of social cohesion. 
Religious activity is concerned to keep fragile human life on an even keel; but it is not 
concerned, as is post-axial religion, with its radical transformation. "123 
Hick notes that the main difference between pre and post-axial religions is the absence of 
hope for a "radically new, different and better existence, whether in this life or in a further 
life to come, "124 in the pre-axial religion. For them, "even the high God was creator and 
preserver but not saviour or liberator. "125 Religion has functioned "to prolong the existing" 
status quo rather than to point to any "basic transformation of the human situation. "126 
Thus he concludes that there was no eschatology in the pre-axial religion. 
As someone coming from a tradition which by default declares the universality of 
Allah's prophetic revelation to all humankind, 127 Hick's conclusion about the pre-axial 
religion being indifferent towards human transformation seems to me inadequate. Islam 
attests that the umbrella of religion revealed by Allah in different periods includes several 
120 ROF, 109. 
121 AIR, 23. 
122 AIR, 23. 
123 AIR, 23. 
124 AIR, 28. 
125 AIR, 28. 
126 AIR, 28. 
127 The Qur'an, 10: 47; 16: 36; 17: 15; 35: 24. 
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traditions differing from each other in practical principles (that is shari'a in al-Maturidi's 
understanding), but not in terms of transforming faith (islam in the wider sense). In that 
sense there is no difference between the religion preached by Adam, Noah, Jesus and 
Muhammad. All were proclaiming the same faith. Thus, as I see it, Islam would support an 
evolutionary development of religion in terms of rites, communal relations, etc., but not in 
terms of faith, i. e. the pre-axial religion was as much transformative as post-axial 
religions. 128 One might rightly ask what evidence Islam has to corroborate this claim. Not 
much, in fact, apart from its resemblances to Judeo-Christian traditions; this is more of a 
dogmatic principle rather than a scientific or a philosophical one. 129 One can still question 
the validity of so-called scientific findings, whether they be historical, anthropological or 
phenomenological about the primal/pre-axial religions. Compared to the whole history of 
human existence in the world, what we know of the primal religions may be insufficient to 
make justifiable judgements about the whole character of an era. I am rather sceptical of this 
sort of sweeping generalisation. For me the mystery still continues, a dilemma where 
religious dogma might offer some help. 130 
128 Thus the idea of a Supreme Being can be found among many of the primal religions. John S 
Mbiti, who conducted a study covering "nearly 300 peoples from all over Africa outside traditionally 
Christian and Muslim communities, suggests that "in all these societies, without a single exception, 
people have a notion of God as the Supreme Being" (African Religions and Philosophy, London: 
Heinemann, 1977,16,27-38, see also his: Concepts of God in Africa, London: SPCK, and New 
York: Praeger, 1969). Other studies on African religions support Mbiti's findings, though not as 
strong as he puts it. See: Parrinder, G, African Traditional Religion, London: SPCK, 1968,32-33; 
Smart, The World's Religions, 300; Ray, B C, "African Religions, " in 'j fae, laýycjppedi. ý pl 
, Rgligipn, ed. M Eliade, London and New York: Macmillan, 1987, v. 1,63; Ranger, T 0, "African 
Traditional Religion, " in jtlý ý'S! pjlý'eljg(pns, ed. S Sutherland, et al., London: Routledge, 1988, 
868-869; Shorter, A, "African Religions, " in, A, l`1eyyjan1}ýpgjý, ný, j, lvjpg n5, ed. JR 
Hinnells, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997,565. A similar pattern can be detected in other primal religions 
as well, even if it may not be very clearly identified, expressed or universally recognised. See for 
instance: Walls, A, "Primal Religious Traditions in Today's World, " in 
. 
RcJjgiQ n. T. 4ay: s. \yQT1 1, 
ed. F Whaling, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987,254-255; Brotherston, G, "Latin American 
Traditional Religion: Three Orders of Service, " in. The WQ 1ds. Re, 1igions, 899,904; Turner, H W. 
"New Religious Movements in Primal Societies, " in A. New. )Flandbnoý. of. 1ýýýcjtlg eljgi. ons. 585; 
Smart, The World's Religions, 106,165,227. 
129 For a treatment of the universality of revelation within the great world religions -Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, see: Ayoub, M, "The Word of God and the Voices of 
Humanity, " in ;ý jic pefjt nce, Qý, RC1igl0. US )). jyp i1y, ed. J Hick and H Askari, Hants, England and 
Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing: 1985,53-65. 
1300ne can disagree with Hick's conclusion when he differentiates between pre and post-axial 
religions, claiming that while the former aims at "keeping the communal life on an even keel both 
in itself and in relation to the sacred" (ROF, 109; AIR, 23), the latter centres on human 
transformation. Keeping in mind the role of religion in shaping society, this argument might work 
against Hick or one see that this is not such a neat distinction after all. In many cases, post-axial 
religion has served and still serves as much as or sometimes more than the pre-axial religions in 
"keeping the communal life on an even keel. " One can list their resistance to change and ex- 
communicating and heresizing the advocates of change, etc. Thus, as A Maclntyre says, "it 
buttresses the established order by sanctifying it and by suggesting that the political order is 
somehow ordained by divine authority (p. 80) and "remains irremediably tied to a social content it 
ought to disown" (p. 88). The charges levelled against pre-axial religion, chiefly the absence of hope 
for a "radically new, different and better existence, whether in this life or in a further life to come" 
(AIR, 28), by Hick is almost directed against Christianity in favour of Marxism as the champion of 
hope in this earthly world. Maclntyre concludes: "Marxism as historically embodied phenomenon 
may have been deformed in a large variety of ways. But the Marxist project remains the only one we 
have for re-establishing hope as a social virtue" (p. 88). Even though this essay was written long 
before the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European Block Communism, I think many of the 
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So much for pre-axial religion. It is time now to turn to post-axial religion, which is 
central for Hick's philosophy of religions. Hick explores the axial age briefly, as the period 
that witnessed the emergence of great religious leaders and has paved the way for the great 
world religions (which is what Hick is essentially concerned with). He mentions for 
instance, as the significant leaders of the axial age, Confucius and Lao Tzu (Confucianism 
and Taoism), Buddha and Mahavira (Buddhism and Jainism), Zoroaster (Zoroastrianism), 
the Hebrew prophets -Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah, the Isaiahs, Ezekiel, and the Greek 
philosophers Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The axial period thus marks the 
wane of the "tribal and national religions" and the beginning of "the world religions. "131 
Hick comments that "in this period all the major religious options, constituting the major 
possible ways of conceiving the ultimate, were identified and established and that nothing 
of comparably novel significance has happened in the religious life of humanity since. "132 
In this period also, the "human mind began to stand back from its encompassing 
environment to become conscious of itself as distinct reality with its own possibilities. " 
Therefore the religions which emerged in the following period or post-axial age all have a 
"clear soteriological pattern, " which is the transformation of human beings from self- 
centredness to Reality-centredness. By the religions, Hick has in mind "the Indian religions 
of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism" (Sikhism) and "the Semitic religions of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, as well as "their modern secular offspring, Marxism"133 and 
humanism. 
Despite the previous list, however, in a later work, The Rainbow of Faiths, Hick 
states that he is primarily concerned with "the great world religions, "134 with Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. 135 This does not suggest that other smaller and 
newer religions, "primal religion[s], " and "the great secular faiths of humanism and 
Marxism, " are trivial; Hick's only excuse is that "time is limited. " Another advantage of 
engaging with the great world religions is the widely accumulated knowledge about them 
throughout the centuries, which forms a useful background for the discussion. 136 But Hick 
still ascribes some sort of salvific value for those faiths remaining outside his immediate 
circle including Marxism and humanism. 137 
As explained in the closing lines of the previous section, every individual is rationally 
entitled to hold religious beliefs and to participate in a tradition in the light of his or her 
exponents of Marxism still believe this to be the case. Therefore, Hick's position on the roles of pre 
and post-axial religions seem to be a vague and untenable one. For more on post-axial religions and 
worldviews, see Maclntyre, Marxism and Christianity, Middlesex, Pelican/Penguin Books, 1971, 
especially chapter 7. 
131 AIR, 30. 
132 AIR, 31. 
133 AIR, 32. 
134 ROF, 11. 
135 ROF, 11. 
136ROF, 11-12. 
137 ROF, 80-81; 110-111. 
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compelling experience compatible with or supported by one of the great world traditions. 
This is "an affirmation about the nature of reality. "138 One is "thus making genuine 
assertions" and is "making them on appropriate and acceptable grounds. "139 Hick also 
agrees with the findings of the history of religions about the evolution of religion when he 
remarks that religious experience could be "developed, corrected and enlarged in the course 
of future experience. " 140 
We can now glance at the variety of god or goddesses which exist within these great 
world traditions. This will take the form of a report of gods and goddess known thus far, 
"often with different characteristics, " discovered by the history of religions. Hick's list is 
as follows for both the theistic and non-theistic range: 
"A collection of Mesopotamian gods made by A. Deinel in 1914 contains 3300 entries... In 
Hesiod's time there were said to be 30 000 deities. And if one could list all the past and 
present gods and goddesses of India, such as Agni, Vayu, Suray, Aryaman, Aditi, Mitra, 
Indra, Varuan, Brahma, Vishnu, Lakshmi, Shiva, Kali, Ganesh... and of the Near East, such 
as Osiris, Isis, Horus, Re, Yahweh, Baal, Moloch, An, Enlil, Ea, Tiamat, Enki, Marduk... 
and of southern Europe, such as Zeus, Kronos, Hera, Apollo, Dionysus, Hephaestus, 
Poseidon, Aphrodite, Hermes, Mars, Athena, Pan... and of northern Europe, such as, Thor, 
Balder, Vali, Freyr, Frigg, Woden, Rheda, Erce, Donar, Fosite... and of Africa, such as 
Nabongo, Luhanga, Ngai, Nyama, Amaomee, Lesa, Ruhanga, Kolo, Naymbe, Imana, 
Kimbumba, Molimo, Ohe... and also of the Americas. Australasia, northern Asia and the rest 
of the world they would probably form a list as bulky as the telephone directory of a large 
city... Brahman, the Dharmakaya, Nirvana, Sunyata, the Tao... "141 
Having set the limits and the scope of Hick's search, we may approach various 
hypothetical solutions accounting for this plurality of experiences of the Real, and the 
critique of them offered by Hick. 
2.3. The Interpretations 
As seen in the previous section, it is clear that there is a plurality in the experience and 
in the expression of that experience of the Real. There are several general interpretations to 
explain this plurality. At the outset of An Interpretation, Hick classifies these on the one 
hand "naturalistic, treating religion as a purely human phenomenon, " and on the other 
"religious, " "developed within the confines of a particular confessional conviction which 
construes all other traditions in its own terms. "142 The latter has also been named 
"confessional" and "particularistic. " Hick sets out his task as to develop a theory that is 
138 AIR, 233. 
139 AIR, 233. 
140 AIR, 233. I wonder whether Hick also agrees with Hume's claim about the gradual development 
of religions from polytheism to theism. For more information see: Hume, D, The Natural History 
of Religion, H. E. Root, ed., London, Adam & Charles Black, 1956. 
141 AIR, 233-34. 
142 AIR, 1. 
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"religious but not confessional" and interprets "religion in its plurality of forms. "143 Before 
moving on to Hick's theory, I shall now look briefly at these alternative explanations, 
namely naturalistic and particularistic theories of religion, following Hick's account. 
2.3.1. Naturalistic Theories 
Hick mentions two types of naturalistic explanation: one is negative and the other is 
positive in terms of overall attitude to religion. The negative one upholds the irrelevance of 
religious explanation of the universe because of the very fact that we can have a meaningful 
explanation for "all the phenomena known to us, including religion itself. "144 The positive 
one, however, stretches the boundaries beyond the negative interpretation, suggesting that 
"there is an aspect of the universe that is actually incompatible with a theistic, or a religious, 
world-view. "145 
The negative arguments are deduced from the ultimate unknowns in a theory. Many 
phenomena as we know them could be explained naturalistically without leaning on a 
"transcendent divine Reality. " Among them, in Hick's account, are "the evolution of the 
universe as a whole and of our ethical, cognitive, aesthetic and religious modes of 
experience. "146 The problem, however, the arguments face is to explain "the existence of 
the universe, " why there is something rather than nothing at all, why we are here. Surely, 
these are the puzzling questions which human beings have been wrestling with since the 
beginning of recorded history. The answer to these questions is that we should simply 
accept the existence of the universe "as the ultimate inexplicable fact. " This is not very 
different, they argue, from the religious case owing to the fact that it also has an "ultimate 
inexplicable fact in the form of God or a non-personal absolute. " Instead of going one step 
further to more slippery ground by ascribing an "invisible mystery" to God, they conclude, 
"the sceptical mind prefers to rest in the mystery of the visible world. "147 
Hick then starts to deal with the second option, the positive approach. He particularly 
intensifies his effort on the Freudian psychological analysis and the Durkheimian 
sociological analysis of religion, respectively. Both in effect claim that "the gods and 
absolutes are creations of the human mind, projected to reflect back a comforting warmth 
amidst the harsh pressures and perils of life. "148 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the father of psychoanalysis, proposed two theories 
regarding the origins of religion: one is about its origin in the individual, while the other is 
related to the historical level. 149 On the individual level, Freud examines religion in The 
Future of an Illusion, where he regards "religious belief as "illusions, fulfillments of the 
143 AIR, 1. 
144 AIR, 111. 
145 AIR, 111. 
146 AIR, 111. 
147 AIR, 111. 
148 AIR, 111-112. 
149 Even though Hick has dealt with the Freudian theory earlier in his career in the Philosophy of 
Religion, Chp. 3, there he does not make such a distinction. Rather, he summarises the theory as a 
whole. 
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oldest, strongest and the most urgent wishes of mankind. "'150 In this sense religious belief 
works as a defence mechanism against the destructive aspects of nature- "disease and 
earthquake, storm and flood, and death itself. "151 By personalising these powers, religious 
persons aim at taming the threatening aspects of nature. Hick quotes Freud: 
"Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they remain eternally remote. But if 
the elements have passions that rage as they do in our own souls, if death itself is not 
something spontaneous but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are 
Beings around us of a kind that we know in our society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at 
home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety. We are still 
defenceless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralysed; we can at least react. Perhaps, 
indeed, we are not even defenceless. We can apply the same methods against these violent 
supermen outside that we employ in our own society; we can try to adjure them, to appease 
them, to bribe them, and by so influencing them, we may rob them of a part of their 
power. " 152 
To illustrate his point, Freud examines the doctrine of God the Father in Christianity 
and claims that it is nothing other than the exalted "earthly father as the ultimate benign 
power and authority in our lives. "153 
Freud developed his historical theory in Totem and Taboo'54 and Moses and 
Monotheism. lss In both, the famous Oedipus complexl56 has an important role to play in 
explaining "the tremendous emotional intensity of man's religious life and the associated 
feelings of guilt and of obligation to obey the behests of the deity. "157 There, he based his 
theory on a supposedly pre-historic society where "the `primal horde"' was consisted of "a 
male and with a number of females and their offspring. "158 "The father, as the dominant 
male, retained to himself exclusive rights over the females and drove away or killed any of 
the sons who challenged his position. "159 In order to gain the right to lead, the sons decided 
to murder their father and, as cannibals, eat him afterwards. Totemism, morality and the 
150 AIR, 112, (quoted from The Future of an Illusion, 1961,30). 
151 AIR, 112, (quoted from The Future of an Illusion, 1961,30). 
152 AIR, 112, (cited from The Future of an Illusion, 16-17) 
153 AIR, 112. 
154 Freud, S, Totem and Taboo, trans. Strachey, J, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960. 
155 Freud, S, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Strachey, J, London: Hogarth Press and New York: 
Liveright Corp., 1939. 
156 Oedipus Rex is a character in Sophocles' play in Greek mythology. We learnt gradually from the 
play that he is the son of Laius, who was the king, and Jocasta, whom he is married after his father's 
death. The Freudian psychoanalysis of this figure, as a child's complex feelings towards his parents, 
love and hatred, has been criticised on the grounds that it is "a one-sided and too simple an account of 
the complex interactions in a family. " Unlike the Freudian projection of the son as "the 
transgressor, " the legend suggests that the father, having been told by an oracle that he would be 
killed by his own son, wanted his wife Jocasta "to destroy him (Oedipus) at birth. " She, however, 
deserted him instead of killing. The father later initiated "the quarrel, " which resulted in his death. In 
Shakespeare's play Hamlet, apparently regarded by psychoanalysts "similar to that of Oedipus, the 
stepfather, not the son, is the aggressor. " (Gregory, RL and 0L Zangwill, eds., The Oxford 
Companion to Mind, Oxford and New York, OUP, 570). 
157 POR, 35. 
158 AIR, 112; POR, 35. 
159 POR, 35. 
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religion, according to Freud, originated from this "primal patricide". However, the removal 
of the father did not prove to be an easy solution for the problem. For one thing, the sons 
were all in mourning and secondly, they could not all succeed to their father's position, 
which meant a "continuing need for restraint. "160 Thus "the dead father's prohibition took 
on the inner authority of a taboo. " The sense of enmity, together with "the guilt of Oedipus 
complex, " led to the sense of reverence and remorse towards the heavenly Father of 
Christianity, which, in turn, causes the acceptance of "authority of God" and submission to 
it. 
At this point, Hick starts his critique of Freudian theory of religion, which, he thinks, 
is nothing "other than a Freudian myth, " since, to start with, "`the primal horde' 
hypothesis" cannot be substantiated anthropologically, i. e. anthropologists generally 
repudiate the validity of the theory. 162 Secondly, the Oedipus complex only accounts, if at 
all, for the male side of the story within the limits of the theistic religions, 163 excluding non- 
theistic traditions. Thus, even if one considers it valid, it amounts at best to a "theory about 
the origin of the religion in males, " which illustrates "a limited part of the total religious 
spectrum. " Therefore it cannot be held as a "theory of religion as such. " Nevertheless, the 
theory sheds important light upon religion, especially about the effect of parents, 
particularly of the father, in the formation of deity in Semitic religions, and in its 
consideration of religion as a "psychological crutch, " on which we rest upon and derive 
strength from when we face difficulties, stresses and grief in life . In these areas, Freud's 
argument has a great deal of validity. However, it would be a great mistake, Hick warns 
us, to count religious claims about "the nature of the universe" as false, since they operate 
as psychological crutches. Just because they come as "good news does not entail" that they 
are not true. Another important point to be noted is that "religion does not always offer 
consolation. It also offers challenge. " The Holy scriptures of Semitic religions provide this 
sort of challenging test quite often. To quote but a few, Hick mentions Psalm 37: 39, 
160 POR, 35. 
161 AIR, 113; FOR, 35. 
162 AIR, 113; FOR, 35. 
163 It is said that Freud was not concerned with "religion or God in women. " Due to his starting 
point with the male dominant "the primal horde, " he must have believed, Hick suggests, that 
"religion is a male creation culturally imposed upon women" (AIR, 124). 
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Malachai 3: 2 and Hebrews 4: 12.164 I can also cite several verses from the Qur'an such as 
2: 214,165 2: 257166 and 29: 1-3.167 
There is one more point I should touch upon, before moving to sociological theory, 
where Hick agrees with the Freudian line of thinking. Drawing on his presuppositions, or 
rather on the suppositions of historians of religions, about the character of primal religions 
which lack eschatological beliefs, Hick admits that the belief in an after-life might be "a 
wish-fulfilment theory, " in other words a mere creation of human mind. Hick notes that 
even though "wish-fulfilment" has not played any role at the beginning of life after death, it 
certainly had a part to play in later developments as we now know them. Hick also refers to 
early conceptions of the hereafter. For example, there was no hope of social justice, or the 
"reversal of fortunes" in the hereafter. Kings were thought to be kings in the hereafter, 
while the underprivileged servants and slaves were supposed to be still in the same 
position. "The idea of a moral judgement" as we conceive of it today, Hick argues, came 
into existence quite late, "perhaps first in the highly sophisticated civilisation of ancient 
Egypti6s 
It is impossible not to disagree with Hick on this point. This is a sign of his naive 
realism. When he is confronted with serious doctrines like life after death, as expected from 
his realism, instead of accepting it in the light of scriptures, he rather chooses to loosen it 
up in a very specific way which carries in it significant Indian elements that inevitably gives 
us a quite agnostic understanding of the afterlife. When I met him in Birmingham in 
November 1997, I asked him about the interpretation of dogmas such as life after death. Do 
we interpret it, if we can, or drop it altogether? As I predicted, he did not give me a clear 
answer. Rather, he said there might be several lives after this one, but we cannot speculate 
about its defining circumstances like how, when, where and so forth. It is clear that since 
he wrote Death and Eternal Life, Hick has changed his views on this issue too to adjust it to 
his pluralistic hypothesis, to be able to accommodate both theistic and non-theistic 
religions' claim on the matter. Elsewhere, he evidences this shift. 169 On these disputed 
issues, he rather favours now the Buddha's doctrine of the "undetermined questions. " The 
implication is that trying to settle these questions now will not contribute to the salvations 
164 "God is not only `our strength in time of trouble' (Psalm 37: 39) but also "like a refiner's fire' 
(Malachai 3: 2), and `the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, 
piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a 
discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart' (Hebrews 4: 12)" (AIR, 113). 
165 "Or think ye that ye will enter Paradise while yet there has not come unto you the like of (that 
which came to) those who passed away before you? Affliction and adversity befell them, they were 
shaken as with earthquake, till the messenger (of Allah) and those who believed along with him said: 
When comes Allah's help? Now surely Allah's help is nigh. 
166 "Allah is the Protecting Friend of those who believe. He brings them out of darkness into light. 
As for those who disbelieve, their patrons are false deities. They bring them out of light into 
darkness. Such are rightful owners of the Fire. They will abide therein. " 167 "Alif. Lam. Mim. Do men imagine that they will be left (at ease) because they say, We believe, 
and will not be tested with affliction? Lo! We tested those who were before you. thus Allah knows 
those who are sincere, and knows those who feign. " 168 AIR, 113-14. 
169 ROF, 72. 
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of human beings. Thus we leave them for the time being and get on with our lives in order 
to achieve salvation/liberation, i. e. transformation from self-centredness to Reality- 
centredness. 170 
This also gives us another clue about Hick's evaluation of scripture and revelation, in 
which he puts too much emphasis on the human side of the scale. I, however, think that 
this is wrong. One would expect Hick's realism to leave these sorts of conflicting claims as 
they are in a tradition rather than siding with the Freudian claim which he elsewhere 
repudiates. This way we would have probably had a more balanced evaluation of the whole 
picture of afterlife within different traditions. What I am suggesting is that instead of adding 
new speculations to the existing phenomena, it would have been far less speculative if Hick 
had remained silent and left it as it was, which would have resulted in a fairer religious 
interpretation of religion. 
On the whole, Hick believes, "the existing reductionist psychological theories of 
religion are by no means compelling in their own right. " They imply prior naturalistic 
commitments. Thus for those who accept these convictions they might seem "plausible, " 
but for those who do not they cease to be plausible. 171 
The French, Jewish sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917)172, took a positivist 
attitude towards religion. He started off with totemism "as it still existed in Australian 
aboriginal societies at the end of nineteenth century. "173 However, he claimed that his 
conclusions were universal and hence, "applicable to every sort of society indifferently, 
and consequently to every sort of religion. "174 Basically it was the society in which we live 
that was shaping us and reasserting itself through religion. The theory argues that "the gods 
whom men worship are imaginary beings unconsciously fabricated by society as 
instruments whereby it exercises control over the thoughts and behaviour of the 
individual. " 175 Durkheim writes: "So if it is at once the symbol of the god and of society, is 
that not because the god and the society are only one?... The god of the clan, the totemic 
principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to 
the imagination under the visible foam of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem. "176 
Therefore, Hick cites Durkheim: 
"the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which 
he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is 
170 AIR, 343-346; DQ, 105-118. 
171 AIR, 114. 
172 Durkheim's definition of religion: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative 
to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -beliefs and practices which unite into 
one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element 
which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the 
idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an 
eminently collective thing. " (Durkheim, E, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. JW 
Swain, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1976,47). 
173 AIR, 115. 
174 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 214,415-416. 
175 POR, 31-32. 
176 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 206. 
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society. When the Australian is carried outside himself and feels a new life flowing within 
him whose intensity surprises him, he is not the dupe of an illusion; this exaltation is real 
and is really the effect of forces outside of and superior to the individual. It is true that he is 
wrong in thinking that this increase of vitality is the work of a power in the form of some 
animal or plant. But this error is merely in regard to the letter of the symbol by which this 
being is represented to the mind and the external appearance which the imagination has given 
it, and not in regard to the fact of its existence. Behind these figures and metaphors, be they 
gross or refined, there is a concrete and living reality... Before all, [religion] is a system of 
ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are 
members, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it. "177 
Regarding the relationship between the conception of god and society and how 
individuals relate themselves to them, Durkheim states: 
In a general way it is unquestionable that a society has all that is necessary to arouse the 
sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them; for to its 
members it is what a god is to his worshippers. In fact, a god is, first of all, a being whom 
men think of as superior to themselves, and upon whom they feel that they depend. Whether 
it be a conscious personality, such as Zeus or Jahweh, or merely abstract forces such as those 
in play in totemism, the worshiper, in the one case as in the other, believes himself held to 
certain manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle 
with which he feels that he is in communion. Now society also gives us the sensation of a 
perpetual dependence. Since it has a nature which is peculiar to itself and different from our 
individual nature, it pursues ends which are likewise special to it; but as it cannot attain them 
except through our intermediacy, it imperiously demands our aid. It requires that, forgetful of 
our own interests, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of 
inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible. It is 
because of this that at every instant we are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct and 
of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to 
our most fundamental inclinations and instincts. "178 
Durkheim, on the negative side of the argument, holds "the naturalistic conviction 
that religion cannot be, as religious persons suppose, their response to a transcendent 
divine reality, "179 but acknowledges, on the positive side, "its social power" and thus 
propounds that "the divine is a mythic symbolisation of the undoubted reality of the society 
of which the believer is a member. "180 In other words, "the god is only a figurative 
expression of the society. "181 
Starting from the positive remarks of Durkheim's study, Hick admits the fact that 
human beings are social animals and society, certainly, has effects on us. By casting 
177 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 225. 
178 Durk-heim, The Elementary Forms, 206-207. 
179 AIR, 116-117. 
180 AIR, 117. 
181 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 226. 
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important light on the development of pre-axial religions, it may also prove that it might be 
the case in aboriginal societies, "in which men and women were conscious of their 
existence as parts of a larger human organism rather than as separate self-directing 
individuals, "182 that society might indirectly represent religious phenomena. However, 
when it comes to applying the sociological perspective to all religions and societies as a 
perfect model explaining the whole puzzle, Hick strongly feels that it "lacks plausibility. " 
Durkheim's theory presupposes a society which is "religiously homogeneous and unified, " 
such as the ones which he examined. Actually, the prerequisite of his theory is "the human 
condition before the emergence of the autonomous individual exercising a moral and 
intellectual judgement which may diverge from that of society as a whole. "183 Thus it can 
only account for the primal religions which existed among aboriginal Australians and other 
indigenous communities of the world while leaving open many questions regarding the 
important "features of post-axial religion. ""84 
To list but a few, Durkheim's theory cannot explain the universal conception of God, 
at least within the theistic traditions, as the all loving, merciful and compassionate Creator, 
nor can it offer much about "the moral independence and creativity of some of the great 
religious figures who, so far from echoing the voice of their society, uttered a divine 
judgement upon it. "igs Another illustration of the limitedness of the sociological theory is 
the case of mysticism which is, contrary to what Durkheim suggests, generally "highly 
individualistic, " or in some denominations of certain traditions amounts to almost a total 
"detachment from society. " Hick mentions, for instance, some Hindu and Buddhist sects, 
to which I can add some of the Muslim sufi groups, too. Hence Hick concludes that even if 
sociological theories were to contribute heavily to the modem study of religion in general 
and to Hick's philosophy in particular, when it is applied to post-axial religions it loses 
"plausibility" and remains "unproven. "' 86 
2.3.2. Particularistic Theories'87 
I am aware of the danger of putting exclusivism and inclusivism together under this 
heading with which many inclusivists would probably disagree. I agree it might be 
misleading to put them next to each other. However, my aim here is not to make value 
judgements about the theories in question. It is quite obvious that Hick has already done 
that, even though many would disagree with him. The question arises as to why one might 
bracket them together? For one thing, they are religious interpretations of religion in 
contrast to the two naturalistic ones considered above. Secondly, both manifest a 
182 AIR, 117. 
183 AIR, 117. 
184 To develop the discussion Hick refers to his sometime teacher at Cambridge HH Farmer's 
Towards Belief in God, Chp. 9 (London, SCM Press, 1942) (AIR, 117,124; POR, 33). 
185 AIR, 117. 
186 AIR, 118; POR, 34. 
187 I describe them as particularist. Because, even though they are not the same in their dealing with 
other religions, they both stress the particularity of Christian message and of salvation through 
Jesus. 
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particularistic approach to the issue of salvation, even if they differ in propounding this. 
Thus they claim the superiority of one way of salvation, excluding others totally or 
partially. 188 What I shall try to do, then, is to highlight Hick's comments on both 
explanations as they appear sporadically throughout his writings. 
I will present Hick's objections in two groups. One is his earlier critique of the 
exclusivism and inclusivism, written in response to the traditional Christian doctrines such 
as the Incarnation. I will keep this very short though, since these criticisms can be found in 
other works either specifically on Hick's thought or Christianity and other religions. 189 
Instead I shall focus on more of an up-dating of Hick's position on the two stances written 
as a contribution to a recent book that examines all three solutions to the problem of 
religious plurality: pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism or particularism as the editors of 
the book choose to call it. 190 
Hick's critique of the exclusivist approach started with his Copernican revolution in 
theology in the early 1970s, which was firmly developed with the publication of God and 
the Universe of Faiths (1973). The book, which comprises a series of essays, accentuates 
the major shifts in Hick's theology with daring articles such as "The Copernican 
Revolution in Theology, "191 "Christ and Incarnation" 192 and "Incarnation and 
Mythology. "193 This was followed by the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate in 
1977, which, as the editor, brought Hick to the third major controversy194 of his career. 
The Myth propounds three points on Christology and incarnation: firstly, historically, there 
is nothing among the teachings of Jesus that suggests that he was God incarnate, the 
Second Person of a divine Trinity; secondly, the historical process of transformation from 
prophecy to the doctrine of incarnation, which was established officially within Christian 
Theology at the Councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon in the fourth and fifth centuries could be 
traced; thirdly, Hick's own thesis that incarnational language should be construed 
metaphorically rather than literally in order to understand the plurality of religions. 195 
188 In fact I am not the only one to use the term "particularism" to refer to exclusivism and 
inclusivism. Rose also make the same generalisation almost on the same grounds. He differentiates 
between exclusivism as "strong particularism, " and inclusivism as "weak particularism" (Rose, 
Knowing the Real: John Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious Pluralism, New York: 
Peter Lang, 1996,60,85). 
189 See for instance D'Costa, G, Theology and Religious Pluralism: The Challenge of Other 
Religions, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell: 1986; D'Costa, John flick's Theology of 
Religions: A Critical Evaluation, Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 
1987 and Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, London: SCM, 1993. 
190 Okholm, DL and TR Phillips, eds., More Than One Way?: Four Views on Salvation in a 
Pluralistic World, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995. Despite the fact 
that I do not have any particular objections, unlike Hick, to the phrase particularism, throughout the 
chapter I will continue using mostly exclusivism instead of particularism, since it is well-known and 
widely-used. But occasionally, I will employ both terms interchangeably. 
191 GUF, 120-132. 
192 GUF, 1148-164. 
193 GUF, 165-179. 
194 PRP, 11. The other two are the involvement in AFFOR, All Faiths for One Race, a voluntary 
organisation against discrimination, especially racism, and his agnostic stance regarding the virgin 
birth. 
195 PRP, 11-12. 
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What Hick means by the Copernican revolution in theology is this: Ptolemaic 
scholars set up the theory that the earth was the centre of the universe and the movements 
of the planets were explained by postulated "epicycles, " though this had no theoretical 
support. Developments in astronomy which increased the number of epicycles made the 
theory less and less convincing. Then Copernicus put forward his heliocentric theory of the 
Solar system which, unlike the old theory, declared that the Sun was at the centre of the 
universe rather than the earth. Hick analogously argues that the exclusivist Ptolemaic 
theology, both as represented by the Protestant theologian Kraemer and others196 and by 
the Catholic Church up to the Second Council of 1963-65, has lost its credibility. Thus the 
Second Vatican Council of 1963-65 had to produce "updated epicycles, " which meant 
acknowledging salvation outside the Church whilst retaining the superiority of the Christian 
way. Karl Rahner is the foremost advocate of this inclusivist stance. However, the 
inclusivism of the Vatican II and of Rahner, "though magnificently open and charitable, "' 97 
is problematic because of its assertions concerning Church-Christianity-Christ-centredness 
of the universe of faiths. Therefore, Hick believes that it is now time to establish the 
Copernican revolution in theology, which is the pluralist interpretation of religions. Put 
simply, the theory proposes that God, or the Real in Hick's lately redefined terms, should 
be taken as central and all other religions ought to be around God, as manifestations of the 
Real, not vice versa as claimed by the dogmas of different major world religions, such as 
Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. 198 This is very close to Smith's conclusion that "the end 
of religion" is "God, " and therefore we should drop the "concept of religion" in order to 
reach that 199 Naturally, we have different religions taking us to that end. 
Hick concentrates his attack mostly on inclusivism, as represented by Rahner. 
Picking on his anonymous Christianity, he develops two criticisms, which are both related 
to dialogue. Firstly, Hick points to the fact that the term "anonymous Christian" is an insult 
to the adherents of other religions and precludes true dialogue because of its chauvinist 
impression. It is an "honorary status, " Hick asserts, "granted unilaterally to people who 
have not expressed any desire for it. "200 D'Costa responds to Hick's argument by stating 
that this naming is not "meant to gain approval from, Hindus, Buddhists and others, " but 
only reflects a Christian's "own self-understanding" of others 20' This, however, does not 
seem to be convincing, for the term "anonymous Christian" projects the underlying 
importance of Jesus in gaining salvation and implies the need for conversion, which goes 
back to the exclusivist Catholic dogma of extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Rahner explicitly 
clarifies this point in the third thesis202 while explaining why he chooses "anonymous 
196 GUF, 124-25; D'Costa, Religious Pluralism, 23. 
197 GUF, 126. 
198 GUF, 131-32; Okholm and Phillips, More Than One Way?, 82-83. 
199 Smith, W C, The Meaning and End of Religion, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991,201. 
200 GHMN, 50. 
201 D'Costa, Religious Pluralism, 89. 
202 Rahner's third thesis reads as follows: 
"If the second thesis is correct, then Christianity does not simply confront the member of an 
extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone who can and must already be 
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Christian" instead of "anonymous theist, " which would mean degrading the important role 
of Christ as God Incarnate. In other words Rahner, unlike Hick, still considers the 
religious disposition of people within the framework of Christianity rather than that of the 
phenomenon of religion 203 
Secondly, Hick contends that it creates a deadlock in the dialogue, due to the fact that 
a "Ptolemaic theology can be developed not only from a Christian standpoint but equally 
from the standpoint of any other faith. "204 Thus, a Hindu may say that "devout Christians 
are implicit Hindus in virtue of their sincere desire for the truth even though they do not yet 
know what truth is. "205 Once again, D'Costa disagrees by claiming that the notion of 
"anonymous Christian" appeases rather than hinders the dialogue since it evinces the way 
grace works for non-Christians, and therefore is far better than the exclusivist labelling of 
others as erroneous and the pluralist flattening of differences. 206 This might sound true 
when D'Costa's explanation is compared to exclusivism. Hick, too, accepts that 
inclusivism is a better attitude than exclusivism. However, as far as dialogue is concerned, 
particularly if one conceives Rahner's full theory of inclusivism and mission, one would 
reckon that Hick has made a good case and his charge still stands. Certainly, the point is 
that an inclusivist will always expect others' conversion to her/his own religion. That is 
why similar charges are made by others too. 207 
This argument, however, takes us to a further criticism levelled against Rahner, that 
of how one comes to grasp that Christianity is the best way to achieve salvation. After all, 
what Rahner says about Christianity is also claimed for Islam, Hinduism, and so forth. 
How can one stand in judgement over all religions and resolve that such-and-such a creed 
is the best for salvation? What are the determiners or criteria for assessing religions? What 
is the model against which diverse creeds are to be assessed? Quis custodiet, ipsos 
custodes? 208 
regarded in this or that respect as an anonymous Christian" (Rahner, K, Theological 
Investigations, London: Darton, Longman & Todd and New York: Seabury Press, 1966, vol. 
5,131, my italics). 
In the third thesis, although Rahner brings the important expression into the understanding of non- 
Christian religions, namely anonymous Christian, he still emphasises the need for missionary work. 
Since God's salvation cannot be dissociated from Jesus, Rahner calls an adherent of other religions 
"anonymous Christian" instead of "anonymous theist. " With regard to mission, he demands 
anonymous Christians enter under the safe and relatively guaranteed umbrella of Christianity. 
Because "the individual who grasps Christianity in a clearer, purer and more reflective way has, other 
things being equal, a still greater chance of salvation than someone who is merely an anonymous 
Christian" (Rahner, Theological Investigations, v. 5,132). 
203 Rahner, Theological Investigations, v. 5,132; GUF, 127. 
204 GHMN, 52; cf. GUF, 131-132. 
205 GHMN, 52; cf. GUF, 131-132. 
206 D'Costa, Religious Pluralism, 90. 
207 See, Sharpe, E, Faith Meets Faith: Some Christian Attitudes to Hinduism in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, London, SCM Press, 1977,129; Kiing, H, On Being a Christian, New York: 
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Rahner's answer to this question is that God has spoken through Christ finally, but 
Muslims and others surely can make the same claim which might be as much true as 
Rahner's. One line, developed in the Qur'an for instance, goes as follows: the argument 
attests that all prophets -who are to be believed in by Muslims as a basic condition of Iman 
(faith)- were trying to accomplish the same goal, that is to explain the revelation of God to 
humanity. All else being equal, Muhammad, the seal of the Prophets, has a superior place 
in the sight of God. One could regard all believers since Adam as Muslims; by the same 
token one could also term all religions as islam, insofar as they expound the commands of 
God, Allah. 209 
For many, especially Hick and other pluralists, Rahner encompasses in a very 
tentative way the two opposite poles in his theory: (1) the unique message of Christ's 
revelation and (2) the universal salvific will of God. Since the first overrides the second, 
Rahner's whole position appears to reach the same place where Kraemer's began. An 
indication of this is that he still stresses the traditional claims of Christianity in matters of 
the Incarnation, mission and the role of Church. Despite its complex formula of the 
embrace of the universal salvific will of God, I reckon that the case for inclusivism is not 
very different from the case for exclusivism: to give the old dogma of extra ecclesiam nulla 
salus a radically reinterpreted form. 210 Therefore, somewhere down the line most 
inclusivists (e. g. D'Costa) have an expectation of conversion of others to Christianity. 211 
Hence, one cannot but agree with Küng's evaluation: 
"This is a pseudo-solution which offers slight consolation. Is it possible to cure a society 
suffering from a decline in membership by declaring that even non-members are 'hidden' 
members? "212 
Here Küng hints to his own solution to the problem: "open dialogue between traditions 
based on ethical considerations. "213 However, despite Küng's "best intentions, " Race 
thinks that Küng is drawn "into the inclusivist position" developed in his earlier book, On 
Being a Christian. 214 I will, however, leave inclusivism here and proceed to examine 
Hick's up-to-date critic of exclusivism and inclusivism. 
Four Ways 
In 1995, Hick engaged in fresh discussions with the representatives of the other two 
poles in an edited book, More Than One Way?: Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralist 
World. In preparing the book, the editors established good communications between the 
209 See, Chapter one: Exclusivism (al-Maturidi). 
210 For more information, see Hillman, E, The Wider Ecumenism: Anonymous Christianity and the 
Church, London, Bums & Oates; New York, Herder and Herder, 1968. 
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212Kiing, On Being, 98 
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Buddhism, trans. Heinegg, P, London: SCM, 1993 and Kung, Global Responsibility: In 
Search of a New World Ethic, trans. Bowden, J, London: SCM Press, 1991. 
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authors by requesting that every scholar presents his view first, asking others to respond 
and finally, giving the last word to the presenter to conclude the chapter by responding to 
the critics' points. Even though the title suggests four views, it offers in fact three options 
in terms of the three-fold typology; what we have here is, however, two different 
statements of the exclusivist approach: 215 "A Post-Enlightenment Approach" by Alister E 
McGrath and "An Evidentialist Approach" by R Douglas Geivett and W Gary Phillips. The 
former could be described as a "pessimistic agnostic" stance, while the latter is labelled 
"hard restrictivism. "216 A cautious inclusivism is, on the other hand, represented by CH 
Pinnock. We shall examine all three in turn, mainly by focusing on issues raised by Hick. I 
start, then, with McGrath's agnostic approach. 
Since McGrath remains agnostic towards the unevangelised, he rather focuses in his 
chapter on the critique of pluralism by picking up Hick's position. Heavily dependent upon 
the postmodern criticism of Enlightenment reason, McGrath launches a fierce attack on 
pluralism on the grounds that it does not respect particularity of religious traditions and has 
an arrogant, imperialist, and unifying attitude towards religions. The whole programme of 
religious pluralism in the eyes of McGrath is about Westernisation of other religious 
traditions in the light of Western terms like religion, religions and salvation 217 a charge 
often made against Hick's stance which will be dealt with in detail in the forthcoming 
chapters. 
Hick replies that pluralism fully does justice and equally respects all the particular 
ways of salvation, which is what the whole theory is about, while never intending to create 
a mega-religion project which would replace existing religions. Hick, furthermore, declares 
that his hypothesis "does not presuppose any privileged universal vision. " Conversely, he 
charges "Christian absolutism, in McGrath's as in other forms, " with claiming a 
"privileged position from which it is able to locate all non-Christian traditions as either 
errors or potential preparations for itself. "218 As to arrogance, Hick again returns the charge 
by saying that "If there is an "immensely arrogant claim of one who sees the full truth, " that 
"one" is not the pluralist but the Christian absolutist -a term for which "Christian 
particularist' 'is "a more reader-friendly synonym. '219 
McGrath devotes his whole conclusion to Hick's critical points leaving aside others, 
possibly due to the immense speculation Hick's description of his position as polemical has 
215 Although the editors deny that they would necessarily agree with the particularist/exclusivist 
approach, the emphasis given on this approach, both in the introduction and in arranging the 
contributors, in my opinion, attests that they favour exclusivism against the other two. In the 
introduction, they defend this biasness towards exclusivism as to balance the pendulum in favour of 
exclusivism. However, this to me is less than satisfactory. 
216 Okholm and Phillips, More Than One Way?, 19-20. 
217 See for more McGrath, A E, "A Particularist View: A Post-Enlightenment Approach, " in MQ« 
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spurred. 220 As if to prove Hick's point, McGrath unfortunately accuses pluralism of having 
roots in and sharing the same "oppressive" "modernist agenda" as "Nazism and 
Stalinism. "221 He claims to have offered an "informed and scholarly critique of the pluralist 
position, "222 namely that of Hick. He, in my view, commits the same fault which he levels 
against Hick earlier in the book when he responds to Hick's essay; that of being "tired, 
uninformed, and weary. "223 He does not seem to have read Hick's most important book on 
the issue: An Interpretation of Religion. Therefore, as Hick rightly points out, 224 he quotes 
Hick's critics rather than his writings or his responses to those writers. McGrath, for 
example, does not respond to or criticise Hick's important point about the definition of 
religion and the Wittgensteinian family resemblance theory. Rather he goes on saying that a 
"`theory of religion' is ... 
dependent on the prior definition of religion on which it is based, 
and there is no consensus on this notion. "225 As we have already seen extensively in the 
previous pages, Hick accepts neither a definition nor an essence of religion. He specifically 
does this to be able to include the different varieties of religions. 
With regard to Postmodernism, McGrath writes: 
"Postmodernity is the general intellectual outlook arising after the collapse of modernity. 
Modernity believed in a world that, in principle, could be understood and mastered. 
Postmodernity not only tends to regard the world as ultimately being beyond either 
comprehension or mastery; it regards such comprehension and mastery as being, in any case, 
immoral. "226 
If one considers the religious ambiguity of the universe principle in Hick's 
philosophy, one can see it is more closely akin to the postmodern outlook rather than to the 
modern. Certainly pluralism owes a lot to modernity, but in many respects it could well be 
regarded as a postmodern outlook which welcomes every religious tradition and nourishes 
tolerance more than the particularistic stance does. As A Race puts it baldly in his critique 
of exclusivist Leslie Newbigin: 
"With the relativizing of the Enlightenment relativizers, there can be no doubt that a space 
has been provided for religious belief to regain a measure of self-confidence. But this gain is 
in relation to secular ideology in so far as the latter has tried to eclipse the reality of God by 
the appeal to the constraints of reason alone. Newbigin goes further than this, however, by 
seizing an opportunity to reassert Christian exclusivism: 'To affirm the unique decisiveness 
of God's action in Jesus Christ is not arrogance; it is the enduring bulwark against the 
220 A cynic might also argue that this is because McGrath sees Hick's hypothesis as the greatest 
threat against Christian particularity compared to "hardline exclusivism" and inclusivism which in 
the end support Christian particularity in different degrees. In fact, after the demise of communism, 
Hick's pluralism with its relativising power has been described as "the next greatest threat" against 
Christian particularity by cardinal Ratzinger of the Catholic Church. See for more: Kerr, F, 
131agk1h&s 78,1997,154-155. "Comment: Ratzinger's Hick, " NP. 
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arrogance of every culture to be itself the criterion by which others are judged. The charge of 
arrogance which is levelled against those who speak of Jesus as unique Lord and Saviour must 
be thrown back at those who assume that `modern historical consciousness' has disposed of 
that faith. ' This strikes me as exaggerated a claim as the rigid view of the impact of the 
Enlightenment he seeks to dethrone. 227 
To rescue the transcendent heart of Christian faith from the inflated claims of certain western 
(secular) 'traditions of rationality' is reasonable apologetics; to think that this displaces the 
transcendent heart of other religious traditions is unreasonable dogmatics. 22 
So much for the McGrath-Hick debate. It is time now to examine Hick's response to 
the second form of exciusivism or as the editors name it "hard restrictivism. " : 229 the 
evidentialist approach of RD Geivett and W Gary Phillips? 3° 
In the first part of their article, Geivett & Phillips start with a survey of the human 
condition in relation to the universe and God to establish the possibility of a special 
revelation by using what they call "extrabiblical evidence. " In the second part, they go on to 
assert the particularity or distinctiveness of Christianity by using "the available biblical" 
evidence, an approach which makes them uniquely "evidentialist" in the exposition of the 
problem. They clearly state that their position, as with others presented in the book, is 
"defeasible"231 and "contrary to popular belief, particularism does not entail dogmatism. 11232 
Hick begins by attacking the softened replacement term particularism for exclusivism. 
He believes that it is "meaningless because everything is particular, so that to describe 
Christianity as particular is to say nothing particular about it! " However, he ironically takes 
this as a good sign suggesting that they cannot stomach the harshness of their position. 
This is because "they are conscious that a frank exclusivism, which accepts the implications 
of their view that `individual salvation depends on explicit personal faith in Jesus Christ' 
-namely that the large majority of the human race are condemned by God to eternal 
perdition- is so morally and religiously revolting that they cannot bring themselves to say it 
explicitly. "3 
Hick's first criticism runs against the natural theology of Geivett & Phillips. Hick 
finds their argument that "the universe must have a beginning and therefore a personal 
227 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 153-154. 
228 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 154-155. 
229 Okholm and Phillips, More Than One Way?, 19. The authors, however, would like to describe 
their line either "exclusivism or restrictivism, " even though they refrain from doing so due to the 
"misleading negative connotations -especially in suggesting a kind of unwarranted dogmatism-" of 
both terms and refer to their position simply as "particularism" (Geivett, RD and WG Phillips, "A 
Particularist View: An Evidentialist Approach. " igMQrC Thao. Ooc. Way?;. FQuw.. Y. iews. oA. SaJXation 
in. aýluralistic. . Qrld, ed. 
DL Okholm and TR Phillips, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan 
Publishing House: 1995,214). 
230 For more see Geivett & Phillips, "A Particularist View. " 213-45. For the sake of convenience, 
subsequently, I shall refer to them as Geivett & Phillips. Pinnock describes them as the students of 
Hick. 
231 They define defeasibility as a "position that may be true but is as yet neither decisively 
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Creator" inconclusive. He thinks that their arguments "convince only those who already 
believe their conclusion. They would never convince a thoughtful agnostic. " Hick suggests 
that philosophy can "open the door to religious belief; however, it is not philosophy but 
religious experience that propels anyone through the door. "24 
Secondly, Hick believes that their use of biblical evidence is "far removed from 
contemporary mainline biblical scholarship. "25 Hick then picks up his favourite example, 
the Incarnation, and by quoting New Testament scholars like CFD Moule, J Dunn and the 
late Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsay, suggests that Jesus never thought that he 
was God. 236 
Finally, Hick turns to the moral difficulties with particularism. He rightly exposes the 
implications of particularism, which are carefully avoided in both versions, for non- 
Christians. He points out that "the large majority of the human race thus far have, through 
no fault of their own, been consigned to eternal perdition, and that in the future an even 
larger proportion will meet this fate. " We then hear Hick's sharp criticism against 
exclusivism in the usual form: "This would not be the work of a God of limitless and 
universal love, who values all human beings equally, but of an arbitrary cosmic tyrant, 
more fit to be reviled as the devil than to be worshipped as God. "237 
As was the case in McGrath's reply, Geivett & Phillips spend most of their space to 
respond to Hick's criticisms in their conclusion. Regarding the first point, they respond 
that their hypothesis "that the universe had an absolute beginning" with a personal Creator 
is better supported "by the available evidence than any other cosmological theory. " They try 
to produce more evidence to bolster this view. 238 None, however, seems to me to be 
conclusive. This is a point, I believe, that can be solved neither philosophically nor 
scientifically since we will probably never have the chance to re-run the whole creation 
system. I am sure different parties in different discussion groups will be able to find data to 
support their argument depending on their commitments, which brings us back to Hick's 
point about the religious ambiguity of the universe. 
One further point should be made about the plausibility of arguments for religious 
belief. To support their argument from natural theology, Geivett & Phillips remark that they 
"know of individuals, including scientists and other mature intellectuals, who have been 
converted to theism in response to the sort of evidence"239 they have produced. I find this 
line of thinking totally unacceptable. For me, this is not the issue at stake at all. If an 
argument is right, it is right; if it is wrong, it is wrong, regardless of how many were or 
were not convinced or converted by it. To use one of Hick's examples, the Ptolemaic 
picture of the universe was believed and supported by many scientists and mature 
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intellectuals for centuries, but this did not make it true and eventually it had to be 
abandoned. 
To the second objection of Hick, as could be predicted, they enlist another set of 
scholars, such as P Lapide and W Pannenberg, who affirm that in the light of New 
Testament scholarship Jesus' deity could be established, especially by appealing to the 
Resurrection. 
On the final point concerning the moral impossibility of Christian exclusivism, they 
do not, once more, satisfactorily answer the charges. They do not, for instance, respond to 
the very, if not the most, important question about the relationship between accidental birth 
and religion. Rather they appear to take a pessimistic agnostic line, as did McGrath, by 
declaring that "the loving heavenly Father of Jesus' teaching is sovereign over all events in 
the lives of human persons, including the circumstances of their births. "240 To avoid the 
question, they also introduce free will into the issue, an important point with which many 
would agree, only to conclude that if one is determined, one is granted the right to go to 
hell. But we are left wondering about the fate of millions who responded to God in a 
different way through no fault of their own. It might seem reasonable to preach the 
superiority of one's own religion to comfort the audience, but to be able to figure out what 
it would be like to be condemned to hell, one ought to imagine oneself in others' shoes and 
think twice before granting the right to others to go to hell. I suppose what I am saying is 
that it is easy to say "the Truth is out there and everybody should follow it. " But if we 
consider what it would be like to step outside of our beloved religion and examine it 
carefully before accepting it, then one can understand how large an effect the society and 
the environment we live in have on us. Thus, to me, conversion is not a viable option to the 
problem of religious diversity and salvation, if we think of masses rather than individuals. 
They strangely restate the question and ask: "Is it possible for the loving heavenly 
Father of Jesus' teaching to allow that only that minority of men and women who hear and 
believe the gospel receive eternal life? " They answer positively and assert "certainly this 
seems possible. "241 To justify this conclusion, they appeal to the doctrine of middle 
knowledge, one possible answer commonly used in Islam too. They conclude with a hint 
from Geivett's study on Hick's theodicy: 242 "Christianity is for people who want to find 
out from God whether their intuitions about hell, for example, are correct; it is not for 
people who have made up their minds a priori that hell cannot be real. 'n43 
Having heard the hard restrictivism of Geivett & Phillips, we now deserve to hear 
some good news and turn to examine Pinnock's inclusivism and Hick's evaluation of it. 
Pinnock, siding with Vatican II, defines himself as a "cautious" inclusivist unlike the "less 
240 Geivett & Phillips, "A Particularist View, " 269. 
241 Geivett & Phillips, "A Particularist View, " 269. 
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cautious" Rahner, who, in Pinnock's opinion, "is very positive about other faiths and 
considers them to possess a salvific status. "244 His description of inclusivism is as follows: 
"Inclusivism believes that, because God is present in the whole world (premise), God's grace 
is also at work in some way among all people, possibly even in the sphere of religious life 
(inference). It entertains the possibility that religion may play a role in the salvation of the 
human race, a role preparatory to the gospel of Christ, in whom alone fullness of salvation is 
found. "245 
He also calls this cautious approach "`modal' inclusivism. " On this, he writes: 
"Modal inclusivism then holds that grace operates outside the church and may be encountered 
in the context of other religions. My version of it is oriented to the Spirit as graciously 
present in the world among all peoples, even in non-Christian religious contexts. I believe 
that the Spirit is present in advance of missions, preparing the way of the Lord. One could 
call it a pneumatological approach. Such inclusivism offers the reader an alternative to 
exclusivism, which is pessimistic about such possibilities, and to pluralism, which posits an 
unknown Reality everywhere present in religion. "2 
It is worth noting that since Pinnock is the closest to Hick in his approach to the 
problem of religious pluralism, in contrast to his previous responses Hick begins with 
enumerating the three agreed points between inclusivism and pluralism. These are (1) the 
rejection of damnation of the majority of the human race, (2) that religion is a "mixture of 
good and evil, " and (3) that "sanctity in persons and religions" exist outside Christianity. 247 
Hick firstly takes up the point about the shift in how Christianity has responded to the 
problem by using demographic calculations. He notes that the conversion of the non- 
Christian majority to Christianity "in this life is a fantasy, " owing to the demographic 
changes taking place right now, i. e. the rapid population increase in the Islamic world 
against the decrease in the Christian world, which might make Islam the biggest religion on 
earth in near future. Hick mentions the talk of possible postmortem salvations, a major shift 
for both Catholics and Protestants. Hick certainly thinks the shift falls short of solving the 
problem and questions Pinnock and other inclusivists: "The question is not whether change 
is needed, but whether it is sufficient simply to shift the problem in the unknown realm 
beyond the grave. "248 
The next point Hick takes up is "the distinctive religious lives of non-Christians, " 
which the theory does not do justice to. Hick reiterates his understanding of salvation: "In 
its most fundamental sense, salvation is not judicial transaction between the Father and the 
Son, or a future postmortem possibility, but a human transformation that begins in this life 
244 Pinnock, C H, "An Inclusivist View, " in. Mvxe,. jj1an. Qne Way?,, oA[. Y. iýYýS. A! 1. Sý1Yýti4A. lA ä 
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from natural self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the Divine, the Ultimate, the 
Real. "249 
As a postscript to this, Hick suggests that the religious life of the human race goes 
much deeper and longer than the almost two-thousand year old Christianity. The religious 
life of humanity indicates no special preparation towards Christianity. There has been, is 
and will always be an interchange between human beings and the Real. So far as we can 
tell, "the non-Christian religions are more than `pre-messianic' preparations for Christian 
conversion. They are different but ... equally authentic spheres of salvation/liberation. 
"250 
To Hick's first challenge, Pinnock responds with the analogy of Abraham, who is 
designated a "believer" (Hebrews 11: 6) and the "father of believers by Paul"; even though 
he was not a Christian. He must have had a postmortem encounter, in Pinnock's view, 
with the "triune God" as his saviour. The believers of other religions would naturally agree 
with him in that. 251 For someone like Pinnock who is fully committed to his belief, this 
may sound a reasonable solution. But it seems to me that Hick's challenge still stands and 
the whole solution looks too theoretical, forced out of difficult circumstances. 
In relation to the distinctiveness of religions, Pinnock shares the exclusivist solution 
in that the doctrinal differences between religions, such as Incarnation in the case of 
Christianity, may in fact boost dialogue rather than discourage it. In other words, he 
contends that we can have dialogue "not only in areas of practical co-operation, but in areas 
of theological and historical conviction as well. "252 I cannot see how one can have 
productive dialogue regarding crucial doctrines like Incarnation, a suggestion which may 
irritate not only many Christians but also others, including Muslims. Therefore, it is very 
likely that the dialogue Pinnock favours would end up stuck in the first phase rather than 
necessitating "interreligious apologetics. " The answer, I believe, does not meet the 
criticism. 
If we have reason to be dissatisfied with Pinnock's answers, then we can proceed to 
examine Hick's solution to the problem of religious diversity: pluralism. 
2.4. Partial Conclusions 
In this chapter I demonstrated first how Hick approaches religious experience and the 
phenomenon of religion and second how he responded to the well known accounts of 
religious diversity, namely naturalistic and particularistic. By drawing on the conclusions 
of several contemporary philosophers of religion, e. g. Richard Swinbume's "principle of 
credulity, " and by extending Wittgenstein's theory of "seeing-as" to "experiencing-as, " 
Hick proved the justifiability of religious experience. Hick argued that it was a cognitive 
experience, i. e. real as the believers take it to be, and not total delusion. Next we studied 
how he applied this, as a ubiquitous experience, to the phenomenon of religion. He 
249 Geivett & Phillips, "A Particularist View, " 127. 
250 Geivett & Phillips, "A Particularist View, " 128. 
251 Pinnock, "An Inclusivist View, " 148. 
252 Pinnock, "An Inclusivist View, " 147. 
Chapter 2 The Need for PH 96 
contended that religion "cannot be adequately defined but only described, "253 and that 
"family resemblance theory" could be a fitting model to approach religions. Even though he 
did not believe that there can be one single essence of religion, he took "the belief in the 
transcendent" as the main feature of the great world religions. He also divided religions into 
two: pre- and post-axial religions and focused his examination on five post-axial religions: 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. His next goal was to evaluate the 
available accounts of religion from naturalistic and particularistic perspectives. In this 
respect he engaged in discussions with Freud's psychological explanation, Durkheim's 
sociological explanation and particularistic Christian understandings. He concluded that 
none was satisfactory, thus we needed a new religious theory both respecting the 
cognitivity of religions, i. e. taking religions as religions not delusions, unlike the 
naturalistic theories, and also of their veridicality without branding them either totally or 
partially false, except one's own. Thus we arrive at Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, which 
will be examined thoroughly in the following chapter. 
253 AIR, 5. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
"Two hands, two feet, two eyes, good, 
as it should be, but no separation 
of the Friend and your loving. 
Any dividing there 
makes other untrue distinctions like `Jew, ' 
and `Christian, ' and `Muslim. "' 
Rümil 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I offered an account of Hick's defence of the veridicality of 
religious experience, not only one's own but other's as well. Then I examined his criticism 
and the eventual rejection of alternative interpretations of religious plurality, namely the 
naturalistic and particularist explanations. In what follows, I shall try to offer an extensive 
survey of Hick's version of the problem in order to see what he has to say about the 
evident plurality of religions. 
I present Hick's pluralist hypothesis in two parts. The first, a christian theology of 
religions, is his earlier stance starting from 1970s approximately lasting up to 1980s. In 
this period Hick's main aim is to locate Christianity's place within the universe of faiths 
revolving around God rather than one religion, which Hick named "the Copernican 
revolution in theology. " Theocentricism is the main characteristic of this period, for which 
Hick is still remembered in certain academic circles. As a result of Hick's Copernican 
outlook, he had to rethink some of the traditional Christian doctrines, namely incarnation. 
He developed criticisms from three aspects: world religions, philosophical or linguistic and 
finally biblical criticism. He tries to show that when we look at the world religions 
carefully, we find that some of the founders of those religions were also divinised because 
of the high status they had in the eyes of their followers. So the incarnation of Jesus Christ 
was not unique in this sense. Philosophically, Hick shows the impossibilities of explaining 
incarnation and concludes that since it is a myth, it should be construed metaphorically, not 
literally. Lastly, in this section, Hick appeals to modern biblical studies to show that the 
verses related to incarnation of Jesus Christ cannot be authenticated. 
In the second section, a philosophy of religions, I present Hick's up-to-date 
pluralistic hypothesis, which covers approximately from 1980s onwards. The most 
apparent feature of Hick's hypothesis in this model is that it is Kantian and Real-centred. 
The criticisms levelled at Hick's theology of religions made him rethink and develop his 
thesis further. Thus he replaces God with the ineffable Real and adopts the Kantian 
distinction of noumenon and phenomenon to distinguish between the traditional religions 
(the phenomenal Real) and the transcendent reality (the noumenal Real) as the ground of 
religious phenomena. We travel with Hick through Kantian categories to conceive of the 
1 Rumi, Unseen Rain, 21. 
gods and the absolutes of the religions, schematised as personae and impersonae 
manifestations of the Real "within actual religious experience. " Lastly, I examine Hick's 
suggestion of mythological truth to solve the conflicting truth-claims of religions and 
"human transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness" as soteriological 
criterion. 
3.2. An Interpretation: Religious Pluralism 
D'Costa points out that "three inter-connected problems" led Hick to develop his 
theology of religions: first was his Irenaean theodicy, i. e. the universal salvific will of 
God, second was his move to Birmingham and the third was his eschatology, as 
represented in Death and Eternal Life. ' His Irenaean theodicy required him to conclude that 
"any viable Christian theodicy must affirm the ultimate salvation of all God's creatures. "3 
The question for Hick then was "how... to reconcile the notion of there being one, and 
only one, true religion with a belief in God's universal saving activity? "4 Throughout his 
books this is an issue which crops up frequently .5 The second motive, his move to the 
multi-racial and multi-faith Birmingham environment, made the previous problem "a live 
and immediate one"6 through his involvement in community relations. 
I initially believed that Hick's epistemology in Faith and Knowledge would have 
eventually made him a pluralist, even if he had not come to Birmingham. His move to 
Birmingham, I thought then, must have only expedited the process, since he had to face the 
issues head on in a multi-faith and multi-cultural society. However, when I interviewed 
him in November `97, I found out that this assumption was wrong. When I tested my 
theory then, he contradicted me, suggesting that he could probably have remained an 
exclusivist throughout his career like so many of his colleagues? For him, the Birmingham 
experience was in fact the starting point which made him rethink the whole theological 
package which he as an adolescent accepted unquestionably. 8 
The third motive, the production of Death and Eternal Life, I believe, contrary to 
D'Costa, is a direct result and an experimental contribution in another area of the 
philosophy of religions, eschatology, rather than a cause for deepening religious pluralist 
arguments. To support this, one may cite Hick's description of his work as an exemplar of 
2 D'Costa, flick's, 12-13. 
3 GHMN, 4-5. 
4 GHMN, 4-5. 
5 In his book, Knowing the Real, Kenneth Rose does not mention this point at all. It might be that 
he considers it too obvious to be touched upon. But, in my opinion, this significant point cannot be 
put aside. D'Costa is quite right in emphasising this significant aspect of Hick's motivation (for 
more on this, see D'Costa, Hick's, 46-48). 
6 GHMN, 5. 
7 In fact even after one becomes aware of religious diversity, it might produce a reverse effect on a 
believer. This is the situation Plantinga describes when he suggests that "a fresh or heightened 
awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a reappraisal of one's religious life, a 
reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grasp and apprehension" of one's religious beliefs 
(Plantinga, A, "Pluralism, " 215). 
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a "global theology of death, exploring both differences and the deeper convergence of 
insight on this subject between Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. "8 
Once Hick empirically saw that the adherents of other religions, after all, were also 
good human beings, striving, in many cases, for similar goals to those advocated by 
Christianity, he acknowledged the fact that other religions were also appropriate ways of 
attaining salvation. Having established this, he had to find a philosophical explanation for 
the problem of religious plurality. He rejected the alternative explanations, namely the 
naturalistic and exclusivist ones, as noted earlier, on the grounds that the former did not 
explain the phenomenon of religion fully and the latter did not grant the full salvific right to 
other religions. 
The gradual development of Hick's religious pluralism could be examined in two 
stages. Firstly, as early as the 1970s, Hick proposed a Christian theology of religions, an 
approach initiated by an article written as a concluding remark to Truth and Dialogue: The 
Relationship Between World Religions, 9 of which he was the editor. This was followed by 
the publication of his controversial article "The Copernican Revolution in Theology. " 10 The 
criticisms levelled at his Christian theology of religions led him to consider more deeply the 
issues related to religious pluralism during 1980s and onwards. The result was his 
"philosophy of religions, " which was presented fully in his magnum opus, An 
Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, delivered at the 
University of Edinburgh as the Gifford Lectures of 1986-87 and published in 1989. This 
shift took place not solely in response to criticisms, but more importantly, one might claim, 
for intellectual reasons, because "what was originally a theological issue... has now 
become... a fundamentally philosophical issue. "" As a result, he moved from a 
"theocentric Christian theology of religions" to a "Real-centred, post-Christian theology of 
religions. "12 While doing this, we observe Hick using both his theological background as a 
major contemporary theologian, as his contributions to theodicy, Christology and other 
important issues bear witness, and his philosophical background as a leading figure in the 
philosophy of religion, as demonstrated in relation to issues like the nature of religious 
language and religious experience. 
This classification, to my knowledge, was first introduced by K Rose in his 
evaluation of Hick's religious pluralism, published under the title Knowing the Real: John 
Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious Pluralism. Despite the fact that one can 
trace a gradual development in Hick's ideas with regard to religious pluralism, it is not 
8 GIIMN, 8. 
9 Even though published in 1974, the book was the outcome of the Conference on the Philosophy 
of Religion, which took place in April 1970 at the University of Birmingham and chaired by Hick, 
to discuss the "apparently conflicting truth-claims" of the world religions (Hick, J, ed. Truth and 
Dialogue: The Relationship between World Religions, London: Sheldon Press and Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1974). In terms of actual production and of presentation, his first ideas appeared 
in that Birmingham conference in 1970. 
10 GUF, 120-132. 
11 Rose, Knowing the Real, 66. 
12 Rose, Knowing the Real, 89. 
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possible to identify a sharp dividing line in time between the two sections of theories 
(theological and philosophical level) within the boundaries of Hick's philosophy. In fact, 
there is none. Even then, one is tempted to divide the two before and after 1980. But this, 
too, will be seriously misleading, because Hick has never isolated himself from the 
Christological problems raised with his theology and philosophy of religions. As a case in 
point, one can take his article "The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity, "13 where he 
deliberately uses a theological, that is Christian, language (such as God not the Real) to set 
out his argument. 14 Another good example of this is The Metaphor of God Incarnate, 
which was written after the maturation of his philosophy of religions. Nevertheless, despite 
all its deficiencies, the typology serves as a useful tool to follow the chronological 
development within Hick's theory. 
3.3. A Christian Theology of Religions 
In 1970 in the concluding remarks of Truth and Dialogue, Hick identifies three major 
difficulties with constructing a theology of religions: 
"It is... possible to distinguish three aspects of this problem -differences in modes of 
experience of the divine reality; differences of philosophical and theological theory concerning 
that reality; and differences in the key, or revelatory, experiences that unify a stream of 
religious experience and thought. "15 
For the first, he gives the example of personal and non-personal experiences of God: 
as in Judaism, Christianity, Islam and some branches of Hinduism and as in Buddhism and 
Advaita Hinduism, respectively. He thinks at this stage these could be "understood as 
complementary rather than as rival truths. "16 
As to the second type, theological and philosophical differences in theory, he cites the 
different understanding of life between Christianity, where there is only one life in this 
world, and Indian religions, allowing for reincarnation. Hick considers these differences as 
belonging to the "historical, culturally conditioned aspect of religion, within which any 
degree of change is possible. "17 In other words, they are to be overcome in time. 
Finally comes the most difficult part of all: the holy scriptures, "the Vedas, the Torah, 
the Buddha, Christ and the Bible, the Qur'an, " each of which claims to be the unique and 
absolute revelation. As a case in point, he mentions the doctrine of Incarnation in 
13 MCU, 16-36. 
14 It is worth quoting extensively what Hick says about the interchange between his theology and 
philosophy of religions: 
"In this [essay] I have been treating the question of the place of Christianity within the wider 
religious life of humanity as a topic in Christian theology. I have accordingly used our 
Christian term, God, to refer to the ultimate Reality to which, as I conceive, the great 
religious traditions constitute different human response. But when one stands back from one's 
own tradition to attempt a philosophical interpretation of the fact of religious plurality one 
has to take full account of nonpersonal as well as of personal awareness of the Ultimate. I 
have tried to do this elsewhere; but it was not necessary to complicate this study, as an intra- 
Christian discussion, in that way" (MCU, 34). 
15 TD, 152; GUF, 148-49. 
16 TD, 152. 
17 TD, 152-53. 
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Christianity and quotes some of the solutions, presented by some of the contributors, as 
hopeful efforts for the future. 18 But he thinks none offers the final solution, if there could 
be any. 19 
Then he puts forward his general theory: 
"It is... possible to consider the hypothesis that the great religions are all, at their experiential 
roots, in contact with the same ultimate divine reality, but that their differing experiences of 
that reality, interacting over the centuries with the different thought forms of different 
cultures, have led to increasing differentiation and contrasting elaboration- so that Hinduism, 
for example, is a very different phenomenon from Christianity, and very different ways of 
conceiving and experiencing the divine occur within them. "20 
The quotation gives us one of the fundamental features of Hick's understanding of 
religion which prevails throughout his philosophy: a transcendent divine reality and 
different responses to this reality by human beings. In his recent article "Perils of 
Pluralism, "21 Kelly James Clark, having cited the same distinction from Hick, comments 
on the taxonomy by way of elaboration: "This divine Reality is one yet capable of being 
experienced in a multitude of ways. "22 He, however, points out in the footnote that this is 
true only of Hick's earlier writings and in his later works, Hick "rejects this view. "23 
Unfortunately, he does not give any reference for this claim. Therefore we cannot test the 
reliability of this contention; but it is highly likely that it is not accurate. For one thing, 
although he bases this claim on Hick's earlier writings, he never actually uses Hick's 
earlier writings, but relies only on two late works, Problems of Religious Pluralism and An 
Interpretation of Religion. Nevertheless, he borrows one thing from Hick's earlier 
writings: without any given reason, he replaces the Real by God, which is very unlike 
Hick. There is no such thing as God as a generic name for the Ultimate Reality in the late 
Hick's writings. As is well known, because of its inappropriateness and narrowness, Hick 
replaced God with "the Real. " Contrary to Clark's claim, "God" is one way of 
experiencing or describing the Ultimate Reality. There are certainly other ways of 
experiencing the Real too. What could be the reason for this apparent confusion or 
misunderstanding? There might be two possible answers. 
18 TD, 154-55. 
19 By the time the book was published, he had offered his solution, the metaphorical understanding 
of the doctrine in God and the Universe of Faiths, a point which he also touched upon in the book. 
20 TD, 151. 
21 Clark, K J, "Perils of Pluralism, " kaithatld.. philoso. phy 14, no. 3,1997,303-320. Clark's 
article is unique in two ways: one is in its evaluation of religious pluralism by using the Bayesian 
Theorem of Probability, an application of Swinbume's argument for the existence of God to Hick's 
hypothesis. The other unique element of Clark's article is in its introduction of a four-fold taxonomy 
for examining religious plurality: i. The Kantian Explanation, ii. The Cultural Filter Explanation, 
iii. The Perversity Explanation and iv. The Epistemically Privileged Explanation. 
To my knowledge, this is one of two articles which apply probability theory to religious pluralism. 
The other is by Schellenberg, J L, "Pluralism and Probability, ". &Jigious. Stufts 33,1997. 
n Clark, "Perils, " 304. 
23 Clark, "Perils, " 319. 
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The first one is a common misperception among some scholars of Hick's work 
between two positions. Rose thinks that despite the fact that Hick took his hypothesis 
beyond the boundaries of Christological and theological debates and moved on from a 
theology of religions to a philosophy of religions, some scholars still consider his position 
as "theocentric. "24 Paul Knitter's classification of Hick's work as a "theocentric model" of 
religious pluralism25 had a big part to play in this misperception, especially for those who 
are not very familiar with Hick's works. 26 Following one of these authors, Clark also 
might have been mistaken in identifying Hick's latest position. Despite Clarks' knowledge 
of Hick's An Interpretation, which does not mention much of theocentrism and Copernican 
revolution in theology, in his reading of Hick, the substitution of the Real by God makes 
this more likely to be the case. 
Another possibility is that Clark might be pointing at Hick's distinction of the Real as 
noumenon and phenomenon. Since the noumenal Real is totally ineffable and beyond the 
scope of human conception, obviously it cannot be experienced directly either, which runs 
against Hick's abandoned earlier position that Clark cites. 
In any case, Hick's distinction is in line with at least the Abrahamic, that is Judeo- 
Christian and Islamic, revelation-traditions. From an Islamic perspective, for example, 
Muslims believe that the first man, Adam, was also a prophet, and acknowledge that 
different eras and/or nations required different prophets. The main principle here is that 
there has never been and never will be a punishment without the prior warning of the 
prophets. 27 The warning process continued until the arrival of the seal of the Prophets, 
Muhammad, who, according to Muslims, completed the circle and was the last prophet. 2 
24 Rose cites, for instance: Carruthers, G H, Christian Theology of World Religions: An 
Elaboration and Evaluation of the Position of John Hick, Lanham, New York and London: 
University Press of America, 1990; Pinnock, C H, A Wideness in God's Mercy: The Finality of 
Jesus Christ in a World of Religions, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992; 
Sanders, J, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized, Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992 and Nash, R H, Is Jesus the Only Saviour?, Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994. 
25 Knitter, P, No Other Name? A Critical Study of Christian Attitudes Towards the World 
Religions, London: SCM: 1985,146-152. 
26 Indeed, even those who seem to be familiar with Hick's latest work commit the same mistake of 
labelling Hick's work as a theocentric Copernican model. The case of the Harvard professor Diana L 
Eck probably illustrates this point best. She is aware of An Interpretation but assesses Hick's 
philosophy according to God and the Universe of Faiths (189-190) and leaves the exploration of An 
Interpretation for her readers by including it in the "selected readings" list (248). Unaware that Hick 
has already moved beyond the "Copernican revolution in theology, " she, then, points out its limits 
(on the basis that, contrary to that Copernican revolution, we now know that there are several solar 
systems in the universe) and proposes to move beyond it (Eck, D L, Encountering God: A Spiritual 
Journey from Bozeman to Banaras, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993,190). 
27 The Qur'an declares: "We, indeed, sent among every people an apostle" (16: 36) and "There was 
never any people without a warner having lived among them" (35: 24). Cf. other verses in the Qur'an 
2: 115; 4: 163-165; 6: 130-131; 13: 7; 23: 44. 
28 Islam, in this respect, faces the same challenge as Christianity did some hundred years ago from 
historical critics like Troeltsch, which cannot be easily fended off. The argument, mainly, is that 
there cannot be a final and full revelation so long as history continues. In the last chapter, we shall 
look at the Islamic responses to the problem in Islam's response to religious pluralism. 
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Two years later, in 1972, we observe Hick presenting three lectures29 which delve 
into the problem more deeply, from which came the famous title "The Copernican 
Revolution in Theology. " To expand the above-mentioned general principle, i. e. one divine 
reality and different approaches to it, then, he was saying in "The New Map of the 
Universe of Faiths: " 
Let us begin with the recognition, which is made in all the main religious traditions, that the 
ultimate divine reality is infinite and as such transcends the grasp of human mind. God, to use 
our Christian term, is infinite. He is not a thing, a part of the universe, existing alongside 
other things; nor is he a being falling under a certain kind. And therefore he cannot be defined 
or encompassed by human thought... From this it follows that the different encounters with 
the transcendent within the different religious traditions may all be encounters with the one 
infinite reality, though with partially different and overlapping aspects of that reality. "30 
To illustrate his point, Hick usually quotes the familiar examples. Among them are 
the distinctions between nirguna Brahman ("the eternal self-existent divine reality, beyond 
the scope of all human categories, including personality") and saguna Brahman ("God in 
relation to his creation and with the attributes which express this relationship")31 in 
Hinduism; the ultimate, formless Dharmakaya and Sambhogakaya, which appears to 
devotees as concrete Buddha through meditation, and the Nirmanakaya, the body of the 
historical Buddha, in Mahayana Buddhism; dharmata dharmakaya, the Dharmakaya 
(nirvana) an sich, and the upaya dharmakaya, nirvana manifesting as Amida, the Buddha of 
infinite compassion, in the Pure Land Buddhist tradition; the Jewish scholar Maimonides' 
distinction between "the essence and the manifestations of God; " the Muslim Sufis' 
distinction between al-Haqq, "the abyss of Godhead, " and Allah, revealed out of abyss in 
the Qur'an; Meister Eckhart's distinction between the Godhead (Gottheit/deitas) and God 
(Gottldeus); and finally, from two contemporary Christian scholars, Paul Tillich's 
distinction between "the God above" and "the God of theism"32 and Gordon Kaufman's 
distinction between the "real God" and the "available God. "33 
Hick acknowledges his debt to Indian thought for this principle. He cites from Rig- 
Vedas: 
"They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and Agni 
And also heavenly, beautiful Garutman: 
The real one is one, though sages name it variously. "34 
Within the contemporary British context, Hick reads the Vedas as follows: 
"They call it Jahweh, Allah, Krishna, Param Alma, 
29 The titles for the lectures were "The Essence of Christianity, " "The Copernican Revolution in 
Theology" and "The New Map of the Universe of Faiths; " and they were delivered in Carrs Lane 
Church Centre, Birmingham, in February and March 1972. Hick welcomes "the high degree of 
theological interest" from the audiences (GUF, xvi). 
30 GUF, 139. 
31 GUF, 144; AIR, 236. 
32 AIR, 236-37. 
33 Kaufman, G, God the Problem, Cambridge, MA., Harvard UP, 1973,85-86,95-100. 
34 GUF, 140. 
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And also holy, blessed Trinity 
The real is one, though sages name it differently. "35 
Another quotation comes from the Bhagavad Gita. The Lord Krishna, the personal God of 
love, states: "Howsoever men approach me, even so do I accept them; of, on all sides, 
whatever path they may choose is mine. "36 
He also mentions, at this stage, the Indian parable, which would become more 
troublesome than Hick probably anticipated as the discussions progressed: the blind man 
and the elephant, ascribed to the Buddha. 37 According to the parable, a group of blind men, 
who did not know what an elephant was, were presented with an elephant. Each described 
an elephant in terms of his experience of a part of the animal. Therefore one said it was a 
"living pillar", reasoning from its leg, another said it was a "great snake", because of his 
experience of its trunk, and so on. 38 The parable elicited much criticism from Hick's 
opponents, who pointed out that in the elephant example there was the third party, the story 
teller or observer, who knew what an elephant was. In the case of religions, however, 
there is no observer above the Real, then still God, who can evaluate the reports of the 
prophets or followers. In other words, nobody can claim to have a "God's eye view" of the 
religions. 39 More importantly, none of the blind examiners was correct in their descriptions 
of the elephant, which supports the naturalistic claims that religion is toto illusory against 
Hick's claim of cognitivity. Hick eventually admitted the inadequacies associated with the 
parable and dropped it from his later writings. 40 
We may now proceed to examine Hick's more pompous title, the so-called 
"Copernican Revolution in Theology. " In this 1972 essay, Hick argued for a radical shift in 
Christian thinking which suggested that Christianity should drop its historical claim of 
offering the best way for salvation; rather it should regard itself as one of the equal ways 
for salvation. Christianity ought to stop expecting other religions to revolve around it and 
take its appropriate place among other world religions and let everything revolve around 
God. The analogy was to Copernicus' revolutionary heliocentric cosmological model in 
astronomy, which replaced Ptolemy's geocentric model, by putting the sun rather than the 
earth in the centre. 
In this essay, Hick starts by giving a detailed history of the attitudes developed within 
Christianity towards the salvation of others, i. e. the interpretations of the Roman Catholic 
principle of "extra ecclesiam nulla salus: outside the church there is no salvation"41 or in the 
35 GUF, 140. 
36 GUF, 140 (Bhagavad Gita IV, 11). 
37 The traces of the parable can be found in Islamic Sufi writings (Schimmel, A, "The Muslim 
Tradition, " in 7hß yVOr1. d: RýýlgýoUS. TI"Adit Qil$, ed. F Whaling, Edinburgh: T&T Clark: 1984, 
140). 
38 GUF, 140. 
39 Heim, S M, "Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis, " M.. QSjpy_7heglQgy 10, no. 4,1994, 
355. 
40 As a result of this inadequacy, we cannot find any trace of the parable in An Interpretation of 
Religion and The Rainbow of Faiths. Probably because of this shift, we cannot find any mention of 
the parable in Rose's book, Knowing the Real, either, as one of the latest studies on Hick. 
41 GUF, 120. 
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Protestant version: "outside Christianity there is no salvation. "42 Not surprisingly, Hick 
names the whole movement as "Ptolemaic theology, " however brave the efforts might 
appear. 43 
Compared to its predecessors, Hick believes that the efforts of the Second Vatican 
Council of 1963-65 are "magnificently open and charitable. "44 He also examines Rahner's 
solution of "anonymous Christianity, " proposed in 1961, just before Vatican II, and then 
the younger Hans Ming's proposal regarding the Catholic Church as the "extra-ordinary 
way, " while others are the "ordinary way" to salvation. Hick acknowledges the fact that 
both are important endeavours, but nevertheless new epicycles in the old Ptolemaic 
theology. Neither, in Hick's opinion, has the courage to face the bold perspective of the 
Copernican revolution in theology. He further suggests that every religion could develop its 
own Ptolemaic theology and, if need be, new epicycles around it. 
Hick summarises his Copernican revolution: 
"It involves a shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the realisation that it 
is God who is at the centre, and that all the religions of mankind, including our own, serve 
and revolve around him: "45 
He finishes his paper with some disturbing questions: 
"Can we be so entirely confident that to have been born in our particular part of the world 
carries with it the privilege of knowing the full religious truth, whereas to be born elsewhere 
involves the likelihood of having only partial and inferior truth? Is there, one asks oneself, 
some vestige here of the imperialism of the christian west in relation to 'lesser breeds without 
the law'? "46 
The main criticism of Hick's Copernican revolution centred around his usage of 
God. If by God, it is argued, he means a notion of personal God as understood in theistic 
religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and theistic Hinduism, then he was producing 
another epicycle in the Ptolemaic theology by using a theistic notion to evaluate non-theistic 
religions 47 If, on the other hand, he uses it in such a broad sense that it has no resemblance 
42 GUF, 121. 
43 GUF, 125 ff. 
44 In fact, Hick cites a long excerpt from the Council's 1964 constitution: 
"Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who through no fault of their own do not 
know the gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely see God and moved by grace, strive 
by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience. Nor 
does divine Providence deny the help necessary for salvation to those who, without blame on 
their part, have not yet arrived at an explicit knowledge of God, but who strive to live a good 
life, thanks to His grace. Whatever goodness or truth is found among them is looked upon by 
the Church as a preparation for the Gospel" (Ch. ii, par. 16). 
And another one from the closing Declaration in 1965: 
"The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is true and holy in these religions. She looks 
with sincere respect upon those ways of conduct and of life, those rules and teachings which, 
though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets froth, nevertheless often 
reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men" (Par. 2) (Both cited in GUF, 125-26). 
45 GUF, 131. 
46 GUF, 132. 
47 Lipner, J, "Does Copernicus Help? Reflections for a Christian Theology of Religions, "'eIigOms 
$li¢ie$ 13,1977,253. 
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to any of the common notions of God in the world religions, then he is charged by D'Costa 
with arguing for "transcendental agnosticism. "48 
As another deficiency, Rose points out that Hick's theory "excludes nontheistic 
religions, such as many schools of Buddhism and Hinduism, " and secular ideologies 
including Marxism, which according to D Forrester is closer to Christianity in its concerns 
than nontheistic Hinduism. 
One can nevertheless argue that all of the critics miss one crucial point. Hick's point 
at this juncture was not the problem of inter-religious language49 though that would be dealt 
with at a later stage. His main problem was to produce a sound theory to explain the 
apparent plurality of religions, which he seemed to have achieved. 
Unlike non-realists such as Don Cupitt and D. Z. Phillips, despite his radical views, 
Hick has always wanted to and still does insist on remaining within the Christian circle, 
which poses an immense problem for liberal minded-philosophers of religion like Hick. As 
we have noted earlier, Hick believed that the most difficult problem against a possible 
theory of religious pluralism would come from the holy scriptures of the world religions. 
In the case of Christianity, one might suggest, the problem becomes more complex because 
of the unique position and role of Jesus, i. e. the doctrine of Incarnation, "whereby God is 
said to have been utterly and uniquely revealed in Jesus of Nazareth who was fully God 
and fully man. "50 Hick restates the problem in the introduction to God and the Universe of 
Faiths: 
"In this field the most difficult problem for the Christian is to reconcile his allegiance to the 
person of Christ, by whom he is irrevocably grasped, with his awareness of God's saving 
activity outside the borders of Christianity. "51 
Hick ironically remarked elsewhere that, like many others, he, too, started with a 
high Christology in 1958, when he scrutinised DM Baillie for "failing to express the full 
orthodox faith. "52 However, after fifteen years in academia, he went beyond Baillie, and 
adopted a low Christology. Regarding the potential problem with traditional Christianity, 
Hick states his argument as follows: 
"There is a direct line of logical entailment from the premise that Jesus was God, in the sense 
that he was God the Son, the Second Person of the Divine Trinity, living in a human life, to 
the conclusion that Christianity, and Christianity alone, was founded by God in person; and 
from this to the further conclusion that God must want all his human children to be related to 
him through this religion which he has himself founded for us; and then to the final 
48 D'Costa, John Iiick's, 170 ff., 184. 
49 By this, I mean the possibility of the great world religions sharing a common language, like that 
of the Real instead of God, as preferred by Hick in his mature work. 
50 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 89. 
51 GUF, xix. 
52 GIIMN, 3 (See Hick, "The Christology of D. M. Baillie, " . 
$. Qgtti. sh J ivjnal. of Theplggy 11, no. 
1,1958,1-12, which was one of the first articles Hick published). 
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conclusion, drawn in the Roman Catholic dogma `Outside the Church, no salvation' and its 
Protestant missionary equivalent `Outside Christianity, no salvation. "'53 
To resolve the incompatibility between Incarnation and the Copernican revolution, 
Hick proposes a reconsideration of the traditional Christology from three perspectives: the 
world religions, philosophical criticisms and modern biblical scholarship. Hick has written 
three major articles on Incarnation. The first two have appeared as chapters 11 and 12 of 
God and the Universe of Faiths, "Christ and Incarnation"54 and "Incarnation and 
Mythology. "55 The third, "Jesus and the World Religions, " has come in one of his most 
controversial books, The Myth of God Incarnate. 56 Hick remains best-known in many 
academic circles as the editor of this book, which was taken as an offence against Christian 
orthodoxy. 
In what follows, I shall try to summarise, without going into much detail, Hick's 
argument against the traditional Christology from three aspects. Since the critique of Hick's 
proposal will follow in the forthcoming chapter, I shall not attempt much criticism here. 
3.3.1. The World Religions and the Incarnation 
Deriving from Feuerbach's explanation of the notion of God as a "projection of 
human ideals, " Hick points out the religious tendency to exalt a "human teacher into a 
divine figure of universal power. "57 The important objective here is drawn from a branch 
of Buddhism (Mahayana) and the religious mind, which Hick calls "subjective 
intentionality. " Hick writes that despite the fact that the founder of Buddhism, Guatama (or 
Sakyamuni), was a historical being, who "made no claim to be divine" and only had 
"attained to nirvana- complete transcendence of egoism, and oneness with eternal trans- 
personal Reality, " in Mahayana Buddhism, which was a contemporary development with 
Christianity, he "came to be revered as much more than an outstanding human 
individual. "58 They developed the doctrine of Three Bodies (Trikaya) of the Buddha: (1) 
"the earthly or incarnate body (Nirmanakaya), " (2) "the Body of Bliss (Sambhogakaya), a 
transcendent or heavenly Buddha" and (3) "the Dharma Body (Dharmakaya) which is 
Absolute Reality. " Consequently, Hick talks of "Buddhology" as opposed to 
"Christology. "59 The similarity between the two, Hick contends, is that "in each case it led 
the developing tradition to speak of him in terms which he himself did not use, and to 
understand him by means of a complex of beliefs which was only gradually formed by later 
generations of his followers. "60 
53 D'Costa, Hick's, 49, (cited from GHMN, US edition, 58). 
54 GUF, 148-164. 
55 GUF, 165-179. 
56 For the controversy surrounding the book, including its provocative title, and the reactions it 
elicited, see PRP, 12-13. 
57 MYG!, 168; GHMN, 60. 
58 MYG!, 168-69; GHMN, 60-61. 
59 MYGI, 169; GHMN, 61. 
60 MYGI, 170; GHMN, 62. 
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At this stage, Hick also responds to a possible objection: the Resurrection, as the 
separating line between Jesus and the rest of humanity from a Christian perspective. 
Having dealt with several probabilities, Hick concludes that in the modern world of the 
twentieth century "it is less easy to accept stories of a physical resurrection, particularly 
when they refer to an event nearly twenty centuries ago and when the written evidence is in 
detail so conflicting and so hard to interpret. "61 He goes on to reason that even if a physical 
resurrection were to take place, it is highly unlikely that we should necessarily "regard it as 
a proof of divinity. "62 
Hick stretches his argument further with regard to "subjective intentionality, " in 
stating that there is understandably a strong urge within the followers' psyche to transpose 
"psychological absolutes into ontological absolutes. "63 The momentous event of salvation 
sometimes forces the believer to doctrinise the exclusive validity of one's own experience. 
To illustrate his point, he gives the example of falling in love, of loyalty to a monarch or to 
one's country at a "non-religious" level, which are all genuine and may seem exclusive to 
the subject; however, this does not suggest that others' experiences are less genuine or that 
there cannot be other genuine experiences of the same sort. The case for any religion, 
Christianity in Hick's argument, is also clear. The overwhelming experience of being saved 
by Jesus does not entail that there cannot be other ways of salvation. Incarnation, thus, is a 
statement expressing the importance of Jesus for Christians only, not more than that. 64 
3.3.2. Philosophical Objections to the Incarnation 
These objections mostly result from the critique of Incarnational language, which 
give us Hick's first move towards a mythological/metaphorical understanding of religious 
language. In the early stages of "Incarnation and Mythology, " Hick asks: 
"What sort of language are we speaking when we affirm divine incarnation in Jesus of 
Nazareth? What is the logical character of such a proclamation? "65 
He then bluntly answers the question that "the language is mythological, " by which he 
emphasises the difference between "the language of theory or hypothesis" and of myth. "A 
theory, whether theological or scientific, " Hick argues, is a "spelling out of a possible state 
of affairs such that if this state of affairs obtains some otherwise puzzling phenomenon 
61 MYGJ, 170-71; GHMN, 62-63. 
62 MYGI, 171; GHMN, 63. To bolster his argument, Hick quotes from George Caird: 
"Let us suppose that tomorrow you were confronted with irrefutable evidence that an 
acquaintance whom you had good reason to believe dead had been seen alive by reliable 
witnesses. You would certainly feel compelled to revise some of your ideas about science, but 
I doubt whether you would feel compelled to revise your ideas about God. I doubt whether 
you would conclude that your acquaintance was divine, or that a stamp of authenticity had 
been placed on all he ever said or did... " (Caird, G B, "The Christological Basis of Christian 
Hope, " in The Christian Hope, London: SPCK, 1970,10). 
63 D'Costa, Hick's, 50. 
64 GUF, 173-74. Hick also appeals to E Troeltsch's theory, which asserts the psychological and 
cultural relativity of religions. 
65 GUF, 165. 
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ceases to be puzzling. "66 In order to be useful or serve any purpose, Hick demands the 
possibility of falsification and verifiability of theories or hypotheses "within human 
experience. " Otherwise they are "meaningless, " or "pointless. "67 
A myth, on the other hand, according to Hick's definition is a "story which is told 
which is not literally true, or an idea or image which is applied to something or someone 
but which does not literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers. "68 
The criteria for the truthfulness of a myth lies at the practical level, that is "the 
appropriateness of the attitude which it evokes. "69 Through myths, we relate ourselves to 
any puzzling phenomena or situation "without being able to explain it, "7° i. e. falsification 
does not apply to myths. 
Hick uses this understanding of myth to establish an analogy between the story of the 
fall of Adam and Eve and the Incarnation. He maintains that the Fall story is not literally 
true and therefore not intended to account for the beginning of life on earth, but serves to 
remind us that "our `true' nature is good even though our actual state is bad, and may 
prompt us to seek to realise our `true' nature. Thus the myth functions in a way close to 
that of moral exhortation. "71 Hick implies that incarnational language also should be 
construed in this analogous manner. 
Hick tries to explain what has happened and might happen if the incarnational 
language is taken literally. He attempts to do this by the philosophical analysis of the 
incarnational language. He writes of the past: 
"Every attempt to specify further the idea that Jesus was both God and man has broken down. 
It seems impossible to take the thought of the God-Man beyond the phrase `God-Man' and 
find any definite meaning or content to it. But this need not surprise us; for Incarnation is a 
mystery. "72 
Both the early (the Arian, Eutychian, Nestorian and Apollinarian) and modern (D M 
Baillie's `paradox of grace' theory) attempts have made the mistake of treating a "religious 
myth" as a "theological theory" "by failing to take Christ's humanity, or his deity, 
seriously. "73 When both are taken seriously, he suggests, "we have a mystery instead of an 
explanation. " Since there is no Kantian distinction at this stage, Hick had to be content with 
the "orthodox formulae" of Nicea and Chalcedon that "the idea of divine incarnation in 
Jesus of Nazareth is a mystery lying beyond human and not a concept that can be given a 
precise meaning. "74 In this wrong turn (from myth to theory or doctrine), he also blames 
66 GUF, 165-66. 
67 GUF. 166. D'Costa thinks that by accepting this position, Hick assimilates theology to science 
(D'Costa, Hick's, 52). 
68 GUF, 166-67; MYGI, 178; cf. AIR, 248. 
69 GUF, 167. 
70 GUF, 166. 
71 GUF, 168. 
72 GUF, 170. 
73 GUF, 170-171. 
74 GUF, 171-172. D'Costa detects an ambiguity in Hick's attitude towards orthodoxy at this stage: 
See D'Costa, Hick's, 55. 
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the influence of Graeco-Roman culture on the early Christianity, because of its "static, all- 
or-nothing model; for something either is or is not composed of a given substance. "75 This 
static model produced the move "from a metaphorical son of God to a metaphysical 
God 
the Son, of the same substance as the Father within the triune Godhead. "76 
3.3.3. Biblical Criticism and the Incarnation 
D'Costa rightly observes that before the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, 
Hick paid little attention to biblical studies to support his arguments against the traditional 
understanding of Incarnation. He goes on to claim that Hick's use of biblical criticism 
is 
supplementary, "for the first two arguments, (world religions and philosophical), are 
decisive whatever the results of biblical criticism. "77 
Taking on board the "historical scepticism" initiated by Bultmann and others like him, 
Hick draws our attention to the following points: firstly the availability and viability of the 
first-hand information about Jesus' life and teaching is almost non-existent. Secondly it is 
very difficult to establish a tenable traditional Christology at a time when we "come to 
acknowledge our ignorance of his inner life and thoughts. "78 We observe Hick refusing to 
give in to a "Bultmannian exit"79 and taking his scepticism a step further. Thus he 
vehemently opposes the doctrine of Incarnation at the personal level of Jesus and of his 
early disciples when he states that "it is extremely unlikely that Jesus thought of himself, or 
that his first disciples thought of him, as God incarnate. He used the mysterious title Son of 
Man, the meaning of which to this day is uncertain. "80 As D'Costa puts it, "the titles 
ascribed to Jesus cannot carry the weight of later `traditional' interpretation. "81 As to the 
Trinitarian theology of the New Testament and especially of St John's high Christology, 
Hick once again leans on some New Testament scholars' findings. To them, these 
absolutist passages are to be considered a "profound theological meditation in dramatic 
form, expressing a Christian interpretation of Jesus which was formed... fairly late in the 
first century. "82 Therefore, the Christological sayings such as "I and the Father are one, 
No one comes to the Father but by me, He who has seen me has seen the Father"83 could 
not be properly ascribed to Jesus himself. 
Hick's aim from this historical clarification and elaboration was to put a clear-cut line 
between "the Christ event" and "the (early? ) church. " What was happening was then an 
interpretation of the event by the Church which was not "part of that event itself. " As a 
consequence, the whole exclusivist theological package as it is known to Christians now 
75 GUF, 116. 
76 MYGI, 176. 
77 GUF, 57. 
78 GUF, 114. 
79 D'Costa, Hick's, 58. 
80 G UF, 114. 
81 D'Costa, Hick's, 58. 
82 MYGI. 171. 
83 MYGI, 171. 
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was not taught by Jesus, but was rather a product deduced from the Christ-event under 
certain geographical, sociological and psychological conditions by the early Church. Once 
the climate of the early Christianity was cleared up, Hick drew the early picture: 
"What seems to have happened during the hundred years or so following Jesus' death was that 
the language of divine sonship floated loose from the original ground of Jewish thought and 
developed a new meaning as it took root again in Graeco-Roman culture: '84 
If Jesus' role is relativised drastically as one of the central tenets of Christianity, then the 
question arises: what remains? Hick outlines his understanding of "the essence of 
Christianity": 
"Christianity is an ongoing movement of life and thought, defined by its origin in the Christ- 
event and by its consciousness of that origin. It cannot be defined in terms of adherence to any 
doctrinal standard, for its doctrines are historically and culturally conditioned and have changed 
as the church has entered new historical and cultural situations... Christian belief consists in 
the beliefs of Christians, and the Christians of one age cannot legislate for the Christians of 
another age, either past or future. Christianity then is an open-ended history which has taken 
varying forms in varying circumstances, and which has as its essence the way of salvation 
that was initiated by the Christ-event. "85 
The gist of Hick's argument is that as far as Christianity's relation to other religions is 
concerned, we have witnessed a journey from exclusivism to inclusivism through new 
interpretations of the doctrines. Now is the time for a new consideration and for pluralism. 
Hick's liberal approach even to the central doctrines of Christianity and his attitude of 
not recognising any sort of authority drew fierce criticism from different angles. However, 
the criticism, as expected, has led Hick to develop his theory further and refine his ideas 
elegantly within a philosophical framework. This meant that he had to delve into the 
problems deeper throughout the 80s. The result was his Philosophy of Religions. 
3.4. A Philosophy of Religions 
Hick's first response to criticisms came in 1980 with the publication of "Toward a 
Philosophy of Religious Pluralism, "86 in which he showed the first signs of his Kantian 
tendency and attempted to form a philosophy in contrast to a theology of religions. Hick's 
first concern in this article was to clarify his usage of the term God. He willingly concedes 
that it is inadequate as a generic term to embrace the religious experiences of all the great 
world religions, but nevertheless he goes on stating that the seemingly less limiting terms 
such as the Transcendent, the Absolute, Brahman, etc. are not "fully tradition-neutral or 
tradition-transcending. " Therefore, if one wishes to use a term to refer to the divine reality, 
one has to "use a term provided by a particular tradition. " Hence, he explains that 
84 GUF, 116. 
85 GUF, 119. 
86 The article appeared first in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie 22, no. 2,1980,131-149 and reprinted in 1982 as a separate chapter (6) in the 
American edition of GHMN. 
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"as a Christian I shall accordingly use the word `god, ' but I shall not use it in a 
straightforwardly theistic sense. There is of course the danger that either the writer or the 
reader may slip back, without noticing it, into the standard [theistic] use of the term; and both 
must be vigilant against this. I shall ... speak of 
God, but with the important proviso that it 
is an open question at this stage whether, and if so in what sense, God is personal... God is 
neither a person or a thing, but is the transcendent reality which is conceived and experienced 
by different human mentalities in both personal and impersonal ways. "87 
This revised use of the term God was not enough for critics. Consequently, by 1981 
with a new article, entitled "Religious Pluralism and Absolute Claims, "88 Hick moved 
beyond the conventional Christian language and furthered his Copernican revolution by 
shifting from a theocentric model to a Reality-centred model, which "centres upon the 
divine Reality; and Christianity is seen as one of a number of worlds of faith which circle 
around and reflect that Reality. "89 
From then on, Hick tried to find a neutral term to replace God. Among the available 
terms like "the Transcendent, the Ultimate, Ultimate Reality, the Supreme Principle, the 
Divine, the One, the Eternal, the Eternal One, the Real, " he seemed to have favoured "the 
Transcendent, the Divine, and the Eternal One. " However, he thought that the latter two 
were "too theistically coloured, " and as a result rejected them. Despite the fact that the 
former, "the Transcendent, " remained a possible option, he preferred to use "the Real" and, 
for "stylistic" purposes, synonymously "`the ultimately Real' and `ultimate Reality' or even 
simply `the Ultimate' or 'Reality. `90 
To bolster this choice of "the Real, " Hick contends that it has the double advantage of 
both objectivity, i. e. not being possessed exclusively by any tradition, and of familiarity 
within all traditions. He asserts that from a Christian perspective, the Real is synonymous 
with God as the "sole self-existent reality. " Within Islam, he appeals to al-Haqq as one of 
the names of Allah, which literally means the real though not within as broad a context as 
Hick uses it; within Hinduism, to "Brahman, as sat or satya, the Real"; within Mahayana 
Buddhism to "Dharmakaya or sunyata" as "tattva, the Real" and finally, within Chinese 
religious tradition, to zhen as the "ultimate, the Real. " He concludes that the Real is "as 
good a generic name as we have for that which is affirmed in the varying forms of 
transcendent religious belief. "91 
Does this go far enough though to meet the objections? Apparently not; even this 
would neither silence the critics nor resolve the fundamental question at the heart of the 
87 GHMN (US edition), 91. 
88 It was presented first in 1981 in series of colloquia on cultural pluralism and religious belief held 
by the Boston University Institute for Philosophy and Religion and printed in 1984 in the collection 
of essays in Religious Pluralism, edited by L Rouner, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1984), as volume 5 of the Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion. Rose 
(Knowing the Real, 70) is mistaken in taking the publication date of the book (1984) as the first 
appearance of the article in academia (1981), which contradicts the statement by Hick in the preface 
of Problems of Religious Pluralism (PRP, x), of which the article constituted the 6th chapter. 
89 PRP, 53. 
90 AIR, 10-11. 
91 A1R, 11. 
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Copernican revolution- "that of determining the nature of the postulated centre of the 
universe of faiths. "92 This move was already well anticipated by Julius Lipner in his 1984 
essay, "Does Copernicus Help? " He wrote then: 
"And even if Hick extends the notion of God to embrace such concepts as `Absolute, ' 
Transcendent, ' etc. the force of the preceding objections is not met. He will still either have 
to reckon with the vagueness of such a comprehensive notion, or pack it with the flesh and 
blood of particular and mutually divergent religious conceptions. The process will still imply 
a contradiction between the approach employed and the objective sought; and some important 
religious traditions will just not fit into the picture... Nor will it do, of course, to insist that 
it is not intended to stress any concept of `God' or `The Absolute' or whatever in this 
reconstructed theology, but the reality underlying this concept. For all the old objections crop 
up again. "93 
We have briefly mentioned these objections in the closing lines of the previous section. To 
emphasise it once more: the problems with God remain with the Absolute or the Real, i. e. 
"either the understanding of these terms will be too broad (indeterminate with respect to 
theistic and nontheistic conceptions) or too narrow (asserting a specific theistic or 
nontheistic conception). "94 
Can Hick fully answer these terminological charges? He tries to do so in the complete 
version of his philosophy of religions, though that solution brings further criticisms which 
we shall deal with at length in the forthcoming chapter. In short, Hick's response to these 
objections is the ineffability of the Real an sich, the noumenal Real. He defines ineffable as 
"having a nature that is beyond the scope of our networks of human concepts. "95 Thus the 
Real in itself, Hick writes,: 
"cannot properly be said to be personal or impersonal, purposive or non-purposive, good or 
evil, substance or process, even one or many. However, in denying, for example, that the 
Real is personal one is not thereby saying that it is impersonal, but rather that this 
conceptual polarity or dualism does not apply. And the same with the other dualisms. This 
does not, however, mean that the Real is to be postulated as nothing, or a blank, but rather as 
a reality lying outside the scope of our human conceptual systems. "96 
Here, Hick quickly addresses two possible objections. He firstly warns the reader 
that the ineffability of the Real in itself does not entail the conclusion that "we cannot 
characterise it at all, even in purely formal ways; "97 for the very claim of ineffability already 
makes a characteristic statement, i. e. the Real is ineffable. Rather it means, Hick avers, that 
"we cannot properly attribute intrinsic qualities to it. "98 However, this does not suggest that 
it is an "empty blank; it means that its nature, infinitely rich in itself, cannot be expressed in 
92 Rose, Knowing the Real, 71. 
93 Lipner, "Does Copernicus Help? ", 254. 
94 Rose, Knowing the Real, 71. 
95 ROF, 27. 
96 ROF, 27-28. 
97 ROF, 28. 
98 ROF, 28. 
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our human concepts. "99 Secondly, it cannot be construed from the ineffability of the Real in 
itself that "we can say nothing significant about it. " For, in contrast to naturalistic 
explanations, we claim that there must be a "transcendent Reality, " "if human religious 
experience is not purely human projection but, whilst involving projection, is at the same 
time a response to a transcendent Reality. " 00 For Hick, this constitutes the crucial 
distinction between a naturalistic and a religious interpretation of religion. If there were 
only one religion in the world, say Buddhism, it would be possible to identify the Real, 
without the distinction of in itself and as humanly experienced, with the theology of 
Buddhism. But since there are "several world religions which seem to be soteriologically 
more or less on a par, " it would be wrong methodologically, in a religious interpretation of 
religion, to identify the Real with the "intentional object of any one of them to the exclusion 
of the others. " 0' Hence it is necessary to make a distinction between "the Real as it is in 
itself and the Real as variously thought and experienced within the different major 
traditions. "1°2 
Before examining how Hick utilises Kantian philosophical terms, I would like to deal 
with a possible problem Hick faces. He makes the hypothetical suggestion that if there 
were one religion in the world, it would be possible to identify the Real with the theology 
of that religion. If one takes this further, it becomes quite problematic from several aspects. 
One is the Kantian dimension according to which even though, for example, there is one 
moon, the Kantian distinction still applies, as the moon in itself and as perceived by the 
human thought, i. e. these two will be radically different. The second point goes against 
Hick's understanding of religious language, which, he claims, is mythical and does not 
represent the Real in itself. But in his hypothetical suggestion, he appears to be saying that 
the Real can be described in our terms, human language. The third problem is the fact that 
Hick uses the distinction not as a necessity of his concept of Real, or of religious language 
or of religious experience, but because of the apparent plurality of human religious 
experience. '03 This makes his hypothesis more vulnerable to criticism than otherwise. It 
seems to me that his understanding of religious language and of religious experience should 
have led him to declare the necessary distinction between the Real in itself and as humanly 
experienced and thought even if there were one religion in the world. 
Having made this preliminary note, we can proceed to study one of the most 
controversial and hotly-debated parts of the pluralistic hypothesis: its use of Kant's First 
Critique as a basic epistemological model for the distinction, i. e. the noumenal world and 
the phenomenal world. The underlying assumption in Hick's hypothesis is the view that 
99 ROF, 28. 
1()0 ROF, 28. 
101 ROF, 28. 
102 ROF, 28. 
103 Another dimension to this discussion is the differences of both opinions and experiences 
regarding the Real even in one religion, as happens in Islam, to my knowledge. So, the very 
otherness of the Real would necessitate such a distinction: the Real in itself and as humanly 
experienced and thought. 
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"what is perceived is always partly constructed by the perceiver. "104 In other words, "the 
mind actively interprets sensory information in terms of concepts, so that the environment 
as we consciously perceive and inhabit it is our familiar three-dimensional world of objects 
interacting in space. "1°5 
As we have noted earlier, while developing his philosophy of religions throughout 
the 1980s, Hick has undergone substantial changes from being a Christian theologian, 
trying to determine the place of Christianity in the universe of faiths, to becoming a 
philosopher of religion, trying to understand the relationship between religions and their 
postulated ground by using an analogy from Kantian epistemology. 
Before going on to explore the Kantian connotations related to his philosophy of 
religions, Hick draws our attention to a similar principle stated by Thomas Aquinas long 
before Kant: "Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower" (S. 
T. II/H, Q 1. art. 2). 106 Aquinas applies this principle to show that even though "God a se 
is simple and undifferentiated, God can only be known by human beings through complex 
propositions. "107 Hick applies the same principle to the epistemology of religion to argue 
that, given that faith acts as an interpretive element in our relation to our awareness of the 
environment we live in, with regard to the divine, the difference, constituted within 
different "religio-cultural" frameworks, in the "mode of the knower" results in the thought 
and experience of the Real in a variety of ways in different cultures. 108 He also quotes the 
Muslim Sufi thinker Junaid al-Baghdadi to exemplify the polarity of perceiving the Real: 
"The water takes its colour from the vessel containing it. "109 
Hick suggests that although the Thomist maxim makes a good start in establishing a 
"pluralistic epistemology of religion", the Kantian distinction of noumenon and 
104 ROF, 29. 
105 AIR, 240. In another context, Hick writes of Kant and his epistemology highly appreciatively: 
"It was above all Immanuel Kant who brought this realisation into the stream of modern reflection, 
and it has since been confirmed and amplified by innumerable studies, not only in general 
epistemology but also in cognitive psychology, in the sociology of knowledge, and in the 
philosophy of science. The central fact, of which the epistemology of religion also has to take 
account, is that our environment is not reflected in our consciousness in a simple and straightforward 
ways, just as it is, independently of our perceiving it" (PRP, 40). 
106AIR, 240-41; ROF, 29. 
107 AIR, 241. 
108 AIR, 241; ROF, 29. 
109 AIR, 241; Nicholson, R A, The Mystics of ! slam, London: Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1963,88. 
The quotation actually forms part of a longer extract from Ibn Arabi, another Sufi-scholar, which 
advocates more freely for religious pluralism. Ibn Arabi states: 
"Those who adore God in the sun behold the sun, and those who adore Him in living things 
see a living thing, and those who adore Him in lifeless thing, and those who adore Him as a 
Being unique and unparalleled see that which has no like. Do not attach yourself to any 
particular creed exclusively, so that you disbelieve all the rest; otherwise, you will lose much 
good, nay, you will fail to recognise the real truth of the matter. God, the omnipresent and 
omnipotent, is not limited by any one creed, for He says 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the 
face of Allah' (The Qur'an, 2: 109). Every one praises what he believes; his god is his own 
creature, and in praising it he praises himself. Consequently he blames the beliefs of others, 
which he would not do if he were just, but his dislike is based on ignorance. If he knew 
Junayd's saying, 'The water takes its colour from the vessel containing it, ' he would not 
interfere with other men's beliefs, but would perceive God in every form of belief' 
(Nicholson, 87-88. Unfortunately, Nicholson does not give the original source from which he 
quotes Ibn Arabi). 
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phenomenon in the analysis of the perception of sense objects could serve as a better 
philosophical basis for a religious theory explaining the different perceptions of the Real 
throughout the world religions. "0 However, he tries to do this in an area totally alien to the 
Kantian epistemology: the epistemology of religion. " Because of this remoteness between 
the two epistemologies, Rose characterises Hick's model as "quasi-Kantian. "112 In addition 
to the distinction of noumenon and phenomenon, Hick also uses other Kantian conceptions 
such as "experience-constituting categories and temporal schematization of these 
categories. "' 13 With all this help from the Kantian epistemology, Hick offers a hypothesis 
that accounts both for the "cognitivity and the diversity of religious claims and 
worldviews, " 4 while avoiding both scepticism and particularism. 
3.4.1. The Noumenon/Phenomenon Distinction 
The basic assumption underlying Hick's pluralist hypothesis is that the Real an sich, 
the noumenal Real, is thought and experienced differently in different religious traditions, 
the phenomenal Real. Hick argues: 
"Thus, we must distinguish between the world as it is in itself, unperceived, and that same 
world as humanly perceived. For example, what I am conscious of as the continuous, brown, 
hard, heavy surface of my desk, which makes a sound when I bang it, is, according to 
physicists, a region of mostly empty space within which infinitesimally minute packets of 
discharging energy are moving about at immense speed. These 'particles' -currently identified 
as 'quarks'- do not have colour, weight, hardness, sound, or fixed position. But for a human 
perceiver, located where we are on the macro-micro scale and endowed with our particular kind 
of perceptual machinery and conceptual systems, the physical world appears as it does. It 
must be something very different for a microbe, or a horse, or a bird, or a fish. We therefore 
have to distinguish, as Immanuel Kant did, between a thing as it is in itself [noumenon] and 
that thing as humanly perceived -that is, as phenomenon... If, then, it is a general truth about 
the human mind that we become aware of our environment and are able to act and react 
appropriately within it through a continuous interpretive activity, this will also be true of 
religious awareness. "t 15 
110 One can surely question Hick's evaluation of both the Thomist and the Kantian principles. Even 
though Hick represents them as sort of quasi-pluralists, neither was in fact pluralist in anything like 
Hick's sense. As we shall see in the following chapter, when this is pointed out by several critics 
Hick immediately goes out of the Kantian circle to suggest that: i. he is aware that this is an 
extension to which Kant would have objected (AIR, 242-244), ii. he takes only one part of the 
Kantian philosophy and applies it to religious epistemology not the whole of it, and iii. one is 
entitled to do these type of moves within one's own philosophy. 
111 Hick is, nevertheless, not the first scholar to apply the Kantian epistemology to the philosophy 
of religion. As a well-known early case in point, he speaks of Rudolf Otto in the way Otto explains 
the concept of the holy as an a priori category of human mind (See for more, Otto, R, The Idea of 
the Holy, trans. Harvey, J H, London, Oxford and New York: OUP, 1981, p. 144-45). As a more 
recent example and a closer one to Hick's usage, he quotes Robert Oakes' article: "Noumena, 
Phenomena, and God, ", ýnlernatýonaý. J w. wll. for. P. hilo Phy. a(Religion 14, no. 1,1973. 
112 Rose, Knowing the Real, 72. 
113 Rose, Knowing the Real, 72; AIR, 245-49. 
114 Rose, Knowing the Real, 72. 
115 Hick, "A Pluralist View, " 46-47. 
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The Kantian resemblance is obvious from the concepts. To be able to understand fully what 
is meant by the terms, it is worth considering in what context Kant uses these two terms, 
noumenon and phenomenon. Kant states in his First Critique: 
"If we entitle certain objects, as appearances, sensible entities (phenomena), then since we 
thus distinguish the mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in 
themselves, it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter, considered in their own 
nature, although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other possible things, which are 
not objects of our sense but are thought as objects merely through the understanding, 
in 
opposition to the former, and that in so doing we entitle the intelligible entities 
(noumena). "116 
In other words, Kant contends that "by `noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an 
object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it. "117 
Relying on the Kantian concepts, Hick contends that despite the fact that "we cannot 
speak of the Real an sich in literal terms, "118 on a relational level we "inescapably" live 
quite close to it. Therefore, our senses and the mind/brain are affected by this "environing 
reality, " though it can never be "known, experienced, or described in itself. "' 19 For Hick, 
this environing reality is the Real an sich (or the noumenal Real) and the different ways in 
which it is thought and experienced is in phenomena (or the phenomenal Real). In Hick's 
words, the Real is 
"experienced by human beings, but experienced in a manner analogous to that in which, 
according to Kant, we experience the world: namely by informational input from external 
reality being interpreted by the mind in terms of its own categorical scheme and thus coming 
to consciousness as meaningful phenomenal experiences. All that we are entitled to say about 
the noumenal source of this information is that it is the reality whose influence produces, in 
collaboration with the human mind, the phenomenal world of our experience. "120 
The strikingly radical difference between the Kantian epistemology and Hick's 
adaptation of it is that Hick extends its usage beyond sensory experience to analyse 
religious experience or our religious awareness of the Real; this is an extension which Hick 
is aware Kant would have objected to. 121 Hick justifies his position by emphasising that 
Kant: 
"was solely concerned, in his discussion of the categories, with the construction of the 
physical world in sense perception. One who is concerned with the construction of the divine 
within religious experience has the option of accepting or rejecting Kant's view of sense 
perception. One theory neither requires nor is incompatible with the other. We have already 
noted that Kant's own epistemology of religion was quite unrelated to his understanding of 
sense perception. But this fact does not bar others, inspired by his basic insights, from seeing 
116 Kant, I, Critique of Pure Reason, B306 (Smith, 267). 
117 Kant, I, Critique of Pure Reason, B307 (Smith, 268). 
118 AIR, 351. 
119 Rose, Knowing the Real, 73. 
120 AIR, 243. 
121 AIR, 242-44. 
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religious and sense experience as continuous in kind, thereby extending Kant's analysis of the 
one, in an appropriately adapted form, to the other. "122 
Although, I shall be engaging in a detailed criticism of Hick's proposal in the 
following chapter, let me highlight a few preliminary difficulties about this distinction. It 
seems to me that there is a puzzling link between the God of Kant and the noumenal Real of 
Hick: both are postulated, the former as a presupposition of moral life and the latter as a 
presupposition of religious life. Hick's claim that the Real is experienced phenomenally by 
different human beings through different categories on different levels may seem to be 
plausible. But when taken to the noumenal level and pressed hard, Hick's argument may be 
shown to be self-defeating. To put it bluntly, Hick acknowledges that the Real is ineffable 
and cannot be spoken of as having any attributes apart from formal ones such as that it 
exists. However, how can one be sure, in the first place, that it exists if it is unknowable? 
This is self-defeating. Furthermore, Hick also admits that he postulates the Real to differ 
from naturalistic explanations that religious experiences are not in toto delusory. But, once 
again, how does one know for sure that the religious experiences of human beings refer to 
the Real that Hick postulates? Lastly, if it is a postulated Real, how different is it from 
Kant's postulated God? Hick responds to this question by saying that it is postulated "as a 
pre-supposition, not of the moral life, but of religious experience and religious life. "123 
Hick takes the argument one step further to suggest that, considering his position in his 
three Critiques, Kant would not have rejected the idea that we can experience God as 
phenomenon different from divine noumenon. There are two dimensions of this problem. 
One is whether Kant would have accepted the noumenal / phenomenal concept of 
God/Real. It seems to me that he would not have. 124 The other is a point we discussed 
earlier when examining Hick's theory of religion as family-resemblance where he included 
Marxists and Humanists within the framework of religion despite their very opposition to 
the phenomenon of religion. There I argued that Hick's claim for their actions as being 
religious was "wishful thinking, " in his terms. Here too the same charge may be applied to 
Hick. This is because Kant's God is not a "reality, " Hick concedes, "encountered in 
religious experience but an object postulated by reason on the basis of its own practical 
functioning in moral agency. "125 It does not seem to me plausible, then, to claim that 
religious experience represents the phenomenal Real on the human level. Therefore Hick's 
122 AIR, 244. 
123 AIR, 243. 
124 However, one should bear in mind that, probably, because of the obscurity of Kant's philosophy, 
there can be found contradicting materials on this issue. On the one hand. A Race, for example, 
suggests that Kant did not believe that "God could be experienced, even as divine phenomenon" 
(Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 86). Beryl Logan, on the other hand, uses a distinction 
very similar to Hick's, though not to support the conclusion of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, which 
seems to contradict Race's conclusion. She maintains that "God as a thing-in-itself is unknowable" 
and what we do is think and talk about God in our own terms. But our language does not apply to 
God as a thing-in-itself (p. 138-39). This is as far as Logan takes the distinction, which we shall 
return shortly at more length. See for more: Logan, "flume and Kant on knowing the deity, 
" 
Intt<rnýýipnýI.., 1pu[flý(. fqr, PýjlpsQphyQ(RQJjgjqrl 43,1998,133-148. 
125 AIR, 242. 
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argument fails. We shall come back to this issue in the next chapter where an extended 
critique of religious pluralism will be offered. 126 
There can, however, be found an intersection line between Hick's philosophy of 
religions and the Kantian epistemology, that is the way in which the link is established 
between noumenon and phenomenon. Both share a relational attitude in proving the 
probability of God as a thing-in-itself / the noumenal Real. I shall start with the Kantian 
concept. In Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction, FC White argues that: 
"Kant is not a subjective idealist or pure phenomenalist. For, although he holds that 
knowledge of reality in itself is impossible, he asserts that the world as it appears cannot be 
all there is; it must be the appearance of something beyond it. In other words, there must be a 
thing in itself, a Ding an sich. "127 
For the following lines in examining the Kantian position, I shall mostly rely on an 
article, "Hume and Kant on Knowing the Deity, " by Beryl Logan. In a preface to the 
second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, CPR, 129 Kant makes a distinction between 
"thinking an object and knowing an object. " He asserts that although "we cannot know 
these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as 
things in themselves. "129 If this were not the case, i. e. we were unable to think of things in 
themselves as things in themselves, "`we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that 
there can be appearances [phenomena] without anything that appears [noumena]'. "130 
Logan quotes Kant from CPR: 
"To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality as 
attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think whatever I please, 
provided ... my concept 
is a possible thought. ' (That is, it contains no contradictions. ) 
Thinking an object `does not answer for there being ... an object corresponding to 
it' (CPR, B 
xxvii)... While we think the possibility of such a Being, we are not `merely inventing' it, as 
it would be absurd to claim that there are connections in the world of the senses without there 
being a cause of those connections. So we look 'beyond the boundary' of what we can know 
(the objects of possible experience), to think the idea of a Supreme Being, but anything we 
may say about that Being can only be accomplished by analogy. "131 
The analogy is what Kant calls, "symbolic anthropomorphism, " which "`concerns 
language only and not the object itself. ' It is a way of thinking and talking about the Deity 
that reflects the relationship between the sensible world and the Deity without purporting to 
describe the Deity. "132 Logan continues: 
126 For more on Kant's distinction of noumenal and phenomenal worlds and how that relates to his 
concept of God, see: Smith, N K, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', London: 
Macmillan, 1930; White, F C, Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction, Aldershot- 
Brookfield, USA: Avebury, 1996. 
127 White, Kant's First Critique, 4. 
128 Subsequently, I will use this abbreviation for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
129 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138, White, Kant's First Critique, 5. 
130 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138. 
131 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138. 
132 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138. 
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"This symbolic anthropomorphism is established by an analogical argument that is relational 
rather than descriptive, i. e. it intends to establish similar relations between items, not to 
describe the items. It does not allow us to have knowledge of a thing-in-itself, something 
which Kant believes we are unable to do, but it does allow us to think and talk about the 
Deity through terms and relations that are within the scope of our knowledge; we are 
describing what our experience is like for us and speaking about God in those terms that are 
knowable by us. When we speak of, and reason about, God in these terms, we are not 
describing what God is like nor are we drawing any conclusions about God as God as a thing- 
in-itself. God as a thing-in-itself is unknowable as a thing-in-itself... 
Making this relational claim does not infer that the Deity is or is not intelligent, or if it is 
intelligent that the Deity's intelligence is anything like human intelligence. It only 
'determine[s] it as regards the [sensible] world and therefore as regard ourselves. ' When we 
speak of the world as being intelligently ordered, we say much about ourselves in the world of 
phenomena when we speak of God being in a relation (one we can understand) to us like the 
relation of parent and child, but we say nothing of God. The 'predicates' that we attribute to 
God in this way are thus determined subjectively - for us and by us. They are not determined 
objectively -this is what God is like- as is the case in the 'standard' argument. "133 
When one reads these lines, one can easily recognise the similarities between Hick and 
Kant. Even though Logan does not seem to be aware of Hick's application of Kantian 
epistemology to his philosophy of religions, Kant's God as a thing-in-itself and Hick's 
noumenal Real look very similar in that i) both are ineffable and ii) in both the Kantian and 
the Hickian conceptions of the Real, religious language is not descriptive but expresses our 
understanding in our own terms. 134 
Then comes the important agreement: despite the unknowability of Kant's God as a 
thing-in-itself and Hick's noumenal Real, they both agree that it could be thought of 
relationally. To Kant, "though, while reason is limited to objects of possible experience, its 
limits are only boundaries beyond which lie things in themselves, " where, he thinks, we 
can establish a connection "between possible experience and the Deity as a thing in itself. " 
This relation must exist, Kant insists, to avoid the absurd conclusion that "there can be 
appearances [phenomena] without anything that appears [noumena]. "135 But this relation 
stays always at the thought level of human beings, in Kant's understanding, which means 
that our thought of a being does not always guarantee that there exists a being to 
correspond to it. Hick, agreeing with Kant, as a critical realist, takes the matter one step 
further, to suggest that although at the noumenal level the Real cannot be known and 
experienced, it is capable of being experienced and thought at the phenomenal level, which 
is what we can see throughout the great world religions. Hick replaces Kant's absurdity 
claim by the suggestion that religious experiences of human beings cannot be `in toto 
133 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138-139. 
134 AIR, 244-49. 
135 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 138. 
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illusory. ' What, then, is the guarantee that the supposedly religious experiences might be 
related to the Kantian God as a thing-in-itself and Hick's noumenal Real? I would say it is 
not very strong. That is why we see Kant proposing autonomous morality , duty for the 
sake of duty, 136 and Hick suggesting the religious neutrality of the universe, which means 
our experiences of the Real could be interpreted either way: religiously and non- 
religiously. 137 
The discussion gives us the following diagram, which operates horizontally: 
The, Iýpntian ýiýjttre 
God as a thing-in-itself 
Human beings' experiences (God talk) 
The Hickzan. /? clyre 
------> The noumenal Real 
------> Religious experiences 
and their expression 
God as a religious phenomenon -----> The phenomenal 
Real138 
3.4.2. Categories: God and the Absolute 
How, then, do we receive the information and form our picture of the physical and 
religious worlds? In his summary of Kant's proposal, Hick suggest that "informational 
input from external reality, " the noumenal world, is "interpreted by the mind in terms of its 
own categorical scheme and thus coming to consciousness and meaningful phenomena1139 
experience. " 40 Kant calls the medium used in the emergence of phenomenal experience 
"categories of understanding" which are "a priori and hence universal and invariable. " 41 
Hick writes: 
"The pure categories or pure concepts of the understanding (for example, substance) are 
schematised in terms of temporality to produce the more concrete categories which are 
exhibited in our actual experience of the world. (Thus, for example, the pure concept of 
substance is schematised as the more concrete idea of an object enduring through time). The 
impact of our environment upon our sensory equipment then comes to consciousness in 
forms prescribed by these schematised categories.,, 142 
136 Logan, "Hume and Kant, " 145. 
137 Thus, we frequently come across passages like this: "not that we believe in God because He 
exists, but rather that He exists because we believe in Him" which, following Karl Popper's 
analysis, suggests that among other things, God is also a creation of human mind and belongs to 
world 3, being the "world of actual or possible objects of thought" (Medawar, P. The Limits of 
Science, Oxford and New York: OUP, 1996,94-95). 
139 Rose offers a slightly different diagram: 
"The Noumenal Divine Real ---> Independent of Religious Experience 
Categories: God, the Absolute ----> General Structure of Religious Experience 
Schematization: (Im)Personae ----> Religious Experience in the Traditions" 
Rose points out that the relationship between the first, the noumenal Real, and the second, 
categories, stages of the diagram is "obscure" and describes it as an "illusory solution" (Knowing the 
Real, 76-77). D'Costa also gives a similar diagram of Hick's philosophy of religions. See, D'Costa, 
Hick's, 160. 
139 Italics are mine. 
140 AIR, 243. 
141 AIR, 243. 
142 AIR, 243. 
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Hick asserts that the same principle applies to "our awareness of the Real, " though 
with striking differences. Hick's "hyper-Kantianism"143 proposes, by going beyond the 
Kantian borders, that "the categories of religious experience144 are not universal and 
invariable but are on the contrary culture-relative. " More surprisingly, "it is possible to live 
without employing them; and when they are employed they tend to affect the development 
of human consciousness. "las What is left of Kantian epistemology in Hick's hyper-Kantian 
system? To my mind very little and this makes Hick's job difficult. If we had put this to 
Kant, he would definitely have objected to the idea, something which Hick also admits. 
How can Hick still adhere to this idea, if it is neither universal, nor invariable, nor 
indispensable or inescapable, and moreover, culturally relative contrary to Kantian 
universality? As we have seen earlier, Hick basically responds that his and Kant's agendas 
were different and, therefore, he had "the option of accepting or rejecting Kant's view of 
sense perception. "lab 
Having established this, Hick deals with two questions: i) "the postulated presence of 
the Real to the human life" and ii) "the cognitive structure of our consciousness. "147 With 
regard to the first, he brings in different proposals from recent information theory. Among 
them are the transformation of information from a "transcendent source to the human 
mind/brain and its transformation by the mind/brain into conscious experience" and of 
"mind-to-mind and matter-to-mind. " Hick maintains that "the presence of the Real consists 
in the availability, from a transcendent source, of information that the human mind/brain is 
capable of transforming into what we call religious experience. "148 As to the structure of 
our awareness of the Real, Hick suggests analogously that in the physical world we use 
two categories. One is the "concept of God, or of the Real as personal, " which we witness 
in various theistic religions and the other is "the concept of the Absolute, or of the Real as 
non-personal, " which is represented in various ways in non-theistic forms. '49 
Since the categories are universal in Kant's understanding, we do not seem to face 
the problem of diversity which Hick is trying to resolve. Hick's theory lacks the very 
guarantee of Kant's: the universality (and hence `objectivity) of the knowledge or of our 
perception of the world. One can always ask: which comes first or which determines 
which? Is it the categories that determine our understanding of the world and of the 
religious phenomena or vice versa? Kant thinks that despite the fact we cannot know things 
143 This is the name given by J William Forgie to describe the position of Hick's and the like- 
minded thinkers K Garside and S Katz. Forgie defines "hyper-Kantianism" as a "view which, though 
broadly Kantian in inspiration, goes beyond Kant and assigns to non-categories, e. g. non-universally 
shared beliefs and concepts, a casual role in determining the phenomenological content of 
experience. " (Forgie, J W, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Experience, " 
RýIISiQAS. ludýe$ 21, no 2,1985,208). 
144 Forgie calls them "category-analogues" since he does not reckon them as categories in the 
Kantian sense (Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism, " 208). 
145 AIR, 243-44. 
146 AIR, 244. 
147 AIR, 244. 
148 AIR, 244. 
149 AIR, 245. 
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in themselves as they are, since the categories are universal, such is our knowledge or 
perception of the world. In other words, because the input and the structure of our minds 
are the same, we all have the same output of universal knowledge. Hick and some other 
like-minded constructivists, such as S Katz, put more emphasis on categories; couched in 
computing language, we perform, perceive, categorise and schematise the input according 
to the way we are programmed by culture and society. Hence the different conceptions of 
the noumenal Real exist at the phenomenal level. Put another way, is it the Real that causes 
diversity in religious traditions, or our religio-cultural programmes? Hick would suggest 
that our programmes, categories, etc. are the causes of diversity, because the categories are 
not universal and invariable and culture-relative. To me, the matter could be witnessed not 
only at a religious level but also at a physical level, which gives the Kantian epistemology a 
further twist. A typical example of this sort could be found among some Sufi groups in the 
Islamic world. '50 These are well established and still popular mystics who, during some 
divine ecstatic experience, experiment with lethal objects like knives and skewers 
(sometimes on live television programmes) and even though they cut themselves, they 
neither bleed nor need stitches for the wounds. As soon as they are finished, they act as if 
nothing has happened. How are we to understand these sorts of phenomena? It is a well- 
known fact that when one is cut, one bleeds from the wound and it needs to be taken care 
of immediately to prevent death due to loss of blood. These simple facts do not seem to 
apply to the Sufis. William J Forgie asserts that the Kantian categories are "inescapable" 
and we can only "experience the world in terms of cause and effect, and substance and 
attribute, " if we can experience it at all. 151 Why does the cause-effect relationship not 
appear to work in case of the Sufis? Two answers come immediately to mind: one is that 
one of the parties, either the Sufis or the observers, could be mistaken in witnessing the 
event or some say it could be magic, etc. Since neither of these could be a viable 
explanation due to the number of the observers and of the frequency of the practices taking 
place, there follows the second option. This is that different categories can cause different 
causal relationships and result in different perceptions of the same phenomenon, even 
though Kant might not have accepted this explanation. Hence it is possible in the case of 
religious experience that different mind-sets cause or result in different perceptions of the 
same noumenal Real. 152 
What justifies the universality of our knowledge of the world? In Kantian terms, do 
we say the categories are the same because the knowledge, the end result, is the same or the 
end result is the same because the categories are the same? Which is the cause and which 
the effect? To me, categories are the causes and our universal knowledge of the world is the 
effect, if such a distinction can be made in the first place. 153 In other words, could it be 
150 They may exist in other traditions too, but at present I am not in a position to verify this. 
151 Forgie, "Hyper-Kantranism, " 208. 
152 AIR, 243-45. 
153 I should tentatively point out here that I am aware that the distinction cannot be drawn with 
absolute clarity. One can always object to this conclusion owing to the fact that, as we shall later in 
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possible to reach different results, if we change the causes, the categories? The answer is 
yes, as seen in the example of the Sufis. Hick would not hesitate to share this conclusion, 
especially at the level of religious experience; in fact, that is what he has been advocating 
since the early 1980s. 
In relation to the Sufis' experience, the application of modem computing methods to 
the creation of art objects'54 might offer some insight into our perception of things. The 
relevant method is called 3D-Imaging. '55 In this method, a picture is hidden behind other 
small fragments of images which initially seem to be a composite of meaningless objects. 
But when one concentrates on the picture, one can see a hidden three-dimensional image 
behind all the puzzling small pictures. The same picture can also be seen from reverse 
angles (see figure 3.1. ). 156 
the seeing-as and experiencing-as discussion, there is the "duck-rabbit" dilemma which Hick, 
following Wittgenstein, examines to prove his point about experiencing-as. 
154 One cannot really ascribe 3D-Imaging's invention solely to the rapid development in the 
computing sciences, because the original method was invented in 1938 by Sir Charles Wheatstone. 
independently of computer-aided material, had become popular among photographers during 1950. 
However, it became commonly available and furthered since 1983 through the introduction of 
computing methods (Dyckman, D, Hidden Dimensions: Use Your Deep Vision to Solve Mazes. 
Riddles, and Other Perplexing Puzzles, London: Limited Editions, 1994,9-15). 
155 3D stands for three-dimensional. 
156 Dyckman, D, Hidden Dimensions, 61. 
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The interesting thing about the 3Ds is that, as in the case of the Sufis, the ordinary 
eye needs some training to be able to spot the hidden image, and even after training it 
cannot immediately recognise the hidden object, contrary to our perception of things in 
daily life. Such is also the case with the Sufis. The point is that contrary to what Kant 
states, there may be other ways of perceiving objects which are alternative to how we 
perceive them in daily life. In line with the Kantian epistemology, however, the difference 
in perception does not occur because of a change in the nature of the things-in-themselves; 
it occurs because of the way we perceive them. 
We can now proceed from the particular to the general. At this stage, I think, it is 
worth bringing another borrowed term into the discussion from the Hickian epistemology 
of religion: experiencing-as. Hick adopts Wittgenstein's term "seeing-as"157 in fact by 
taking it one step further to form experiencing-as. In Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein gives the example of the psychologist Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure and tries to 
settle the issue of ambiguous pictures. The duck-rabbit figure could be perceived either as a 
duck or as a rabbit (see figure 3.2. ). 158 
To explore the difference in the two perceptions, let us follow Marie McGinn: 
"The difference in the two visual experiences does not arise from an objective alteration in the 
object itself, but from a difference in how the subject places the picture in two different 
contexts... The difference between the two experiences cannot be recorded by pointing to two 
different objects, but only by reference to the subject's way of responding to the picture, by 
putting it now in relation to these objects, now in relation to those... [and she concludes] The 
difference, moreover, provides a corrective to our temptation to think of visual perception 
purely introspectively, and prompts us to recognise the internal link that exists between what 
is seen and the subject's way of responding. In this way, the case of seeing-as works against 
our inclination to think of perception in terms of the influence of objects on a receptive 
faulty, and draws our attention to the role of an active, responding subject in determining the 
nature of visual experience, or in fixing what is seen "159 
Wittgenstein holds that "`Seeing as... ' is not part of perception. And for that reason 
it is like seeing and again not like. "160 Hick acknowledges that Wittgenstein restricts the 
notion of seeing-as only to "those exceptional moments when we are confronted by 
157 Wittgenstein, L, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, GEM, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1972, p. 193e-229e (Tile letter "e" next to the page numbers indicates the English edition 
of Philosophical Investigations). 
158 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 194e. 
159 McGinn, M, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997,195. 
160 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 197e. 
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ambiguous pictures and objects"161 like the duck-rabbit picture. He, on the other hand, 
takes the notion one step further and argues that "all our seeing is seeing-as; or rather that 
all conscious experiencing, including seeing, is experiencing-as, " which includes 
perception and misperception of anything, e. g. "seeing the protuberance -erroneously- as a 
squirrel, but also seeing it correctly as knobble on the branch. "162 To illustrate his extension 
of the notion, Hick takes the instance of a fork. He suggests that even though we always 
recognise it without any difficulty, a person who had never seen it before, such as a Stone 
Age man or woman, would not be able to recognise it as a fork. "They might identify it 
instead as a marvellously shining object which must be full of mana and must not be 
touched; or as a small but deadly weapon; or as a tool for digging; or just as something 
utterly baffling and unidentifiable. " 163 This is because "they would not have the concept of 
a fork with which to identify it as a fork. "164 In short, if there is not a "given cultural 
context" which shapes and allows for the formation of concepts165 through linguistic 
means, there will be no recognition and experiencing-as. Hick draws attention, at this 
stage, to the role language plays in creating our "conceptual superstructures" through which 
we relate ourselves to our environment, organise our everyday life, and appreciate "arts and 
sciences, philosophies and religions. "166 Conceptual creations form "the inner skeletons 
structuring the various forms of life, or ways of being human, that constitutes the different 
cultures of the earth. "167 Hick concludes that "all experience embodies concept-laden forms 
of interpretation. "168 
Hick's notion of "experiencing-as" would neatly fit within the framework of his 
philosophy of religions, and may even explain the Sufis' example we quoted above. 
Because we use different languages, which include not only the communicative medium 
but also the whole culture, we form different conceptual superstructures. Therefore, 
according to Hick's experiencing-as notion, different people experience the phenomenal 
Real through its personae and impersonae concepts as God, Allah, Jahweh, Brahman, etc. 
3.4.3. Schematisation: Personae and Impersonae 
Following in Kant's footsteps, Hick furthers his analysis of religions by stating that 
the two basic categories, God and the Absolute, are "schematised or made concrete within 
actual religious experience as a range of particular gods or absolutes. "169 Hick calls these 
161 AIR, 140. 
162 A1R, 140. 
163 AIR, 141. 
164 AIR, 141. 
165 Hick defines concepts as "recognitional capacities which have been focused, abstracted and fixed 
by language" (AIR, 142). 
166 AIR, 141-42. 
167 AIR, 142. 
168 AIR, 142. 
169 AIR, 245. 
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concretisations personae and impersonae of the phenomenal Real as humanly experienced 
and thought. 170 
The culture-relative filter, which Hick names "the particularising factor" and operates 
like time in the Kantian categories, actualises our human potential for the awareness of the 
Real. This results in "different ways of being human, developed within the civilisations and 
cultures of the world. "171 The noumenal Real is neutral in being able to be schematised in 
both ways, divine personae and impersonae. Those who "relate themselves" to the Real in 
the "mode of I-Thou encounter" experience it as "personal, " while those who "relate 
themselves to the Real" in the "mode of non-personal awareness" experience it as "non- 
personal. "172 Thus, some encounter the Real, through the concept of God, as "the God of 
Israel, or as the Holy Trinity, or as Shiva, or as Allah or as Vishnu..., " while others 
experience it, according to the other category, the Absolute, as "Brahman, or as Nirvana, 
or as Being, or as Sunyata... "173 
The main problem with this vision is the leap from the noumenal Real, which we can 
neither know nor talk about nor experience directly except in holding that it exists, to the 
phenomenal Real, which we categorise and schematise. As Rose puts it, the noumenal Real 
is "merely the formal occasion but not the substantive cause of the varieties of religious 
experience. " 174 He also thinks that with this understanding of the noumenal Real, Hick's 
understanding of religion would immediately "collapse into a noncognitivist functionalism 
or phenomenology. "175 To this criticism Kant's "symbolic anthropomorphism" might offer 
a partial solution, to which I shall return in the following chapter. 
3.4.4. Mythological Truth and the Soteriological Criterion 
As can be recalled from one of Hick's earlier articles, he describes the differences in 
the "revelatory" experiences of the religious traditions as constituting "the largest difficulty 
in the way of religious agreement. "176 Even though the scale of the problem has since 
changed, when it moved from being a theology of religions177 to being a philosophy of 
religions, Hick still faces the most difficult problem: religious language. To resolve the 
tension, Hick first introduced the Kantian distinction of the noumenal and the phenomenal 
Real, whereby he restricted religious language to the phenomenal Real only, since the 
noumenal is totally ineffable. As the second solution, Hick appeals to mythological truth. 
In his editorship of The Myth of God Incarnate, the deliberately chosen provocative 
title was among the first signs of Hick's mythological attitude towards Christian 
170 AIR. 245. 
171 AIR, 245. 
172 AIR, 245. 
173 AIR, 245. 
174 Rose, Knowing the Real, 79. 
175 Rose, Knowing the Real, 80. 
176 TD, 152,154. 
177 COC, 72. 
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narrative. 178 In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick finalises his thoughts on mythological 
religious language and how it relates to the two ends of the Real, noumenon and 
phenomenon. He affirms that the: 
"relationship between the ultimate noumenon and its multiple phenomenal appearances, or 
between the limitless transcendent reality and our many partial human images of it, makes 
possible mythological speech about the Real. I define a myth as a story or statement which is 
not literally true but which tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject- 
matter. Thus the truth of a myth is a practical truthfulness: a true myth is one which rightly 
relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological terms... Our attitudes 
and actions are accordingly appropriate or inappropriate not only in relation to our physical 
and social environments but also in relation to our ultimate environment. And true religious 
myths are accordingly those that evoke in us attitudes and modes of behaviour which are 
appropriate to our situation in relation to the Real. "179 
Rose brings our attention to the shift in Hick's thought over the years, as a result of 
his pluralist hypothesis, from maintaining "the fact-asserting character of particular 
religious doctrines, " to a "pragmatic criterion of religious cognitivity: the soteriological 
orientation of schematization of the noumenal Real. "180 It is clear that Hick is not focused 
on "the truth-values of specific truth-claims but only with the judgement whether a 
particular doctrine, regardless of specific content, orients the religious practitioner to the ... 
Real. "ist 
My immediate concern with this approach is the applicability of the placebo effect to 
religious language and experience. As known in modern medicine, it is the psychological 
cure of a simple disease, such as headache and stomach ache, with a pseudo-medicine. I 
am told by a doctor friend that it is a quite common practice in some European countries. In 
a nutshell, the patient is prescribed a "pseudo-drug" and is instructed that this is the 
appropriate medicine for this illness. After a certain period, tests confirm that the patient is 
cured. We witness the same practice at a more common level in our daily lives in children's 
case with mummy or daddy's "magic kiss. " In fact, doctors say that placebo does not work 
in children, because they are yet to form the notion of "doctor" as "cure bearer. " When we 
move to the religious sphere, a sceptic might argue that, firstly, anything can produce this 
sort of effect on anybody. Secondly, how can Hick be sure what an appropriate response 
178 As his contribution to the book, in "Jesus and the World Religions, " he argues for a mythical 
understanding of Incarnation against the traditionally held literal meaning, where he declares: 
"That Jesus was God the Son incarnate is not literally true, since it has no literal meaning, 
but it is an application to Jesus of a mythical concept whose function is analogous to that of 
the notion of divine sonship ascribed in the ancient world to a king. In the case of Jesus it 
gives definitive expression to his efficacy as saviour from sin and ignorance and as giver of 
new life; it offers a way of expressing his significance to the world: and it expresses a 
disciple's commitment to Jesus as his personal Lord" (MYGI, 178). Hick's latest fully 
developed argument can be found in The Metaphor of God Incarnate, which he dedicated 
exclusively to the issue of Incarnation. 
179 AIR, 248 (My italics); cf. GUF, 166-67; MYGI, 178. 
180 Rose, Knowing the Real, 80. 
181 Rose, Knowing the Real, 80. 
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towards the Real is? In fact, as we have discussed at several points, his ascription of 
religious value to the lives of good Maoist or Marxist citizens might be a good example of 
this. Their case can be interpreted from several angles, not just from one angle. This brings 
us to the second topic of this section: the soteriological criterion. 
Regarding the question of appropriate or inappropriate modes of behaviour vis-a-vis 
the Real, Hick writes: 
"It is for the persona or impersona in relation to which we live to be an authentic 
manifestation of the Real and for our practical response to be appropriate to that 
manifestation. To the extent that a persona or impersona is in soteriological alignment with 
the Real, an appropriate response to that deity or absolute is an appropriate response to the 
Real. "182 
To summarise Hick's argument so far: we saw that Hick interpreted the plurality of 
religions as different approaches to the personae or impersonae of the phenomenal Real, 
which in turn relates to the noumenal Real. What allows Hick to declare that great world 
religions are equal in attaining salvation when responding appropriately to different 
manifestations of the phenomenal Real? How can he be so sure that the great world 
religions are offering different ways to the same Real? What is his evidence and where is 
his proof? Hick responds to these questions by referring to the hybrid term 
"salvation/liberation" as human transformation from "self-centredness to the Reality- 
centredness. "183 Despite the fact that salvation is a Christian concept and liberation a Hindu 
term, Hick tries to prove that the notion exists throughout the great traditions184 that he 
focuses on (Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist). To be able to refer to both 
theistic and non-theistic understandings of transformation, he always uses them together as 
a concept of ego-transcending in which "a limitlessly better quality of existence is 
possible. "185 This, Hick alleges, could be 
"by self-committing faith in Christ as one's lord and saviour; or by the total submission to 
God which is Islam; or by faithful obedience to the Torah; or by transcendence of the ego, 
with its self-centred desires and cravings, to attain moksa or Nirvana... These are variations 
within different conceptual schemes on a single fundamental theme: the sudden or gradual 
change of the individual from an absorbing self-concern to a new centring in the supposed 
unity-of-reality-and-value that is thought of as God, Brahman, the Dharma, Sunyata or the 
182 AIR, 248. 
183 AIR, 36. The early forms of this thought in Hick's philosophy could be traced back to Evil and 
the God of Love, where he proposes his Irenaean theodicy, which declared that one of the main 
aspects of Christianity was to produce perfect human beings and evil was a necessary ingredient in 
this "soul-making theodicy. " See Hick, J, Evil and the God of Love, esp. part IV. 
184 In her article, "Hick and Saints: Is Saint-Production a Valid Test?, " Rebecca Pentz criticises 
Hick's imaginative relationship between the soteriological efficacy of the religions and the Real as 
the source of these transformations or fruits witnessed in the lives of human beings. Contrary to the 
postulated assumption of Hick, she suggests that each religion "can be soteriologically effective and 
point toward separate Realities. " To corroborate this claim, she quotes J Cobb's example, who 
thinks that every religion leads to a different transcendent Reality (p. 98). See for more Pcntz, R, 
"Hick and Saints: Is Saint production a Valid Test?, ". EEth 4nd. P. hik p. hy 8, no. 1,1991,96-103. 
185 AIR, 36. 
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Tao. Thus the generic concept of salvation/liberation, which takes a different specific form in 
each of the great traditions, is that of the transformation of human existence from self- 
centredness to Real ity-centredness. "t86 
Hick believes that all great world religions share the "soteriological concern, " "for the 
function of post-axial religion is to create contexts within which the transformation of 
human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness can take place. Accordingly 
the basic criterion must be soteriological. "187 The reason for this is that "religious traditions 
and their various components -beliefs, modes of experience, scriptures, rituals, disciplines, 
ethics and lifestyles, social rules and organizations- have greater or less value according as 
they promote or hinder the salvific transformation. " 88 As an indication of whether or not 
salvific transformation takes place within a religion, Hick appeals, according to his 
principles, to the less "tradition-specific" idea of "the spiritual and moral fruits" of a true 
religion, as opposed to the "value of credal and communal loyalty, " which assumes "the 
accident of birth at some one particular time and place. "189 Hick takes "the production of 
saints, 190 both contemplative and practical, individualistic and political, " as a valid 
indicative criterion'91 by which we can recognise a true religion in which "salvific human 
response" can take place. Hick defends his choice of saints rather than the ordinary 
followers as an indication of the right criterion by arguing that "saints... are simply persons 
who are further ahead than the rest of us on the same road. "192 
To me, however, this is not a satisfactory justification; it is in fact more of an excuse 
rather than a justification. I regard saints as exceptions in any given religion, rather than the 
norm, 193 since the ordinary followers, who always form the majority, are very different 
from saints, who are always the minority, in practising a religion and being transformed. If 
we want to have a balanced evaluation of religions, it should be based not on the minority 
but on the majority of believers. Nevertheless, one could justify Hick's position because of 
the impracticality of evaluating all followers of great world religions, even if one were to 
conduct large scale opinion polls or surveys. Thus it might be justifiable for someone like 
Hick, who is examining religions specifically from a philosophical perspective and forming 
a philosophical hypothesis, to prefer a readily available source like saints on which to base 
his argument. 
186 AIR, 36. 
187 AIR, 300. 
188 AIR, 300. 
189 A1R, 300-301. 
190 Hick defines a saint as "one in whom the transformation of human existence from self- 
centredness to Reality-centredness is so much more advanced than in the generality of us that it is 
readily noticed and acknowledged" (AIR, 301). Hick also argues that we can rind an "all-important 
common feature" in the particular programmes of all great religions, which is that "a transcendence 
of the ego point of view and its replacement by devotion to or centred concentration upon some 
manifestation of the Real, response to which produces compassion/love towards other human beings 
or towards life all" (AIR, 301). 
191 AIR, 307. 
192 AIR, 307. 
193 Rebecca Pentz makes this point well from a Christian perspective: "The church is not `a 
museum of saints, but a school for sinners"' ("flick and Saints, " 96). 
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Hick has, in fact, another justification for his heavy reliance on mystical elements in 
the great world religions. Acknowledging the possible objections to the "theme of 
salvation/liberation as the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness" as a "conception of mystical rather than mainstream religion, "194 he 
tries to address the issue by remarking that to be able to comprehend the "transforming 
power of religion, " we need to recognise "the experiential spectrum as a whole, both 
mystical and mediated. "195 He further states that "despite this difference between the highly 
institutionalised and the less institutional traditions, religious experience is the vital life- 
blood flowing within each. "196 As if in an attempt to create another Copernican revolution 
in the philosophy of religions to counter-balance the argument in favour of mystical 
experience, he comments that "when we recognise the essential role of the experiential 
aspect of religion in all its forms we are no longer tempted to think that the human 
transformation which it can effect is in any way secondary or peripheral. " 197 
It should be pointed out here that Hick does not appeal to the "production of saints" 
criterion in order to enable us to make a decision between religions or compare them in 
terms of success or failure, i. e. the more saints it produces, the better it provides 
salvation/liberation, as some hold. 198 According to Hick, we do not have enough data to 
make value judgements about religions as totalities. 199 Rather Hick uses the production of 
saints to establish the validity of salvation/liberation criterion and test it against all religions. 
To this end, so far as we can tell, Hick concludes that all have been producing saints and 
continue to do so and therefore are equally valid and good ways of offering 
salvation/liberation? 00 
Because of this commitment, Hick speaks of the "lesser traditions, the new religious 
movements" such as Baha'i, Christian Science and Spiritualism as the "contexts of 
salvation/liberation. " He maintains that the same "soteriological criterion and the same 
index of saintliness"201 apply to them too, even though it is harder to do so due to the 
availability of insufficient information in such a short period of time. He affirms that the 
"pluralistic hypothesis does not entail any a priori judgement concerning the salvific value 
of these new movements. " 02 The possibilities of either living long enough to be compared 
194 AIR, 51. 
195 AIR, 51. 
196 AIR, 51-52. 
197 AIR, 51-52. 
198 See article by Pentz, "Hick and Saints, " 96-103. 
199 Hick writes: 
"But if we now attempt comparative judgements, asking whether tradition A has produced 
more, or better, saints per million of population than tradition B, we quickly discover that we 
do not have sufficient information for an answer. All that I myself feel able to venture at 
present is the impressionistic judgement that no one tradition stands out as more productive 
of sainthood than another... The criterion of saintliness, then, enables us to recognise the 
great traditions as areas of salvation/liberation, but does not enable us to go on to grade them 
comparatively" (AIR, 307). 
200 AIR, 307. 
201 AIR, 307. 
202 AIR, 307-08. 
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with great world faiths or dying out soon after their birth and forgotten are open for the 
new religious movements. Time will tell us the result. 
Again without going into much detail, a few comments are necessary here. Hick 
claims that since a comparative study of religions by using rational methodologies would 
prove to be inadequate in assessing the true nature of any religion, we should opt for a 
pragmatic, moral criterion, which takes the moral outcome of any religion into account, i. e. 
the number of saints it can produce, rather than what it teaches. 203 The problem to my mind 
is that in order to prove the insuperiority of any religion, Hick uses the argument that, 
nowadays, it is a commonly held belief that morality is not based on religious convictions; 
in other words, anybody can be moral without following any set of religious beliefs. 
However, when it comes to the soteriological criterion, he takes the morally good believers 
as an indication of any religion both to evaluate that religion and to test his theory; despite 
the lack of clear evidence to support the idea that they act because of what they believe 
rather than for the sake of following the universally accepted righteous principles of 
humanity. This seems to me a circular argument, which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
3.5. Partial Conclusions 
In this chapter I tried to give an extensive account of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. I 
started with his early attempt to form a "Christian theology of religions, " as early as 1970s 
in which he wanted to locate God at the centre of the universe of faiths instead of 
Christianity. He called it the "Copernican revolution in theology. " He supported this theory 
from three angles. Epistemologically, he appealed to the "world religions" to back up the 
idea that Jesus' divinity was not unique in the sense that it was natural to the followers of a 
religion to employ incarnational language about the founder of their religion. 
Philosophically, he showed the difficulties associated with understanding the incarnation as 
a theological theory and advocated, instead, that it should be interpreted metaphorically; 
because it was not a theory but a myth. To corroborate this assertion, he also appealed to 
the modern biblical studies, which doubts the authenticity of the incamational verses. 
Because of its controversial and provocative character, Hick's theory attracted many 
critics. This meant that Hick had to polish and develop his theory further, which lasted 
throughout the 1980s and reached its crescendo in 1989 with the publication of An 
Interpretation of Religion. I presented Hick's mature "philosophy of religions" as he put 
forward in this book. In response to the charges of "theocentricism, " Hick adopted the 
Kantian distinction of noumenon and phenomenon and replaced God with the Real at the 
centre. Although the noumenal Real, the Real an sich, is the ground of all religious 
experience, Hick holds that it is totally ineffable. What we have as religions are the 
phenomenal manifestations of the noumenal Real in the categories of different gods and 
absolutes which are schematised either as personal or impersonal. As its totally ineffable, 
203 PRP, 79-81. 
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religious language does not apply to the noumenal Real, thus it has to be interpreted as 
mythical and metaphorical. Hick also introduced the soteriological criterion as "human 
transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness, " which can be detected in the 
daily lives of human beings with its fruits, such as striving for justice, equality, the 
betterment of humankind, etc. Saints in the great world religions are good illustrations of 
this criterion. In short, Hick concluded that, as in the words of the 13th century Muslim 
Sufi poet-scholar Jalal al-Din Rumi, "the Lamps are different, but the Light is the same. "204 
As with many other new theories, especially one that is as daring as Hick's, the 
pluralistic hypothesis drew more critics than ädvocates. 205 To be able to assess its full 
strengths and weaknesses, I shall consider, at length, the criticisms directed against the 
pluralistic hypothesis in the next chapter. 
204 Nicholson, R A, Rumi: Poet and Mystic, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978,166. 
205 It is no surprise, however, to see more resistance to Hick's theory rather than acceptance. I 
imagine this must have been the case for other theories too, particularly Rahner's anonymous 
Christianity. Even today, we see the Pope John Paul II trying to reverse Rahner's process by issuing 
more particularistic declarations. Supporting this, Mahmut Aydin observes that: 
"in recent statements of Pope Paul II and the documents of the Pontifical Council there are 
implications that some of the Catholic authorities want to go back to the pre-Vatican II 
period in which good Muslims were regarded as anonymous Christians or as those who had an 
implicit faith in the Church" (p. 320). 
See for more: Aydin, M, Modern Western Christian Theological Understandings of Muslims Since 
the Second Vatican Council, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, PhD, 1998. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. A CRITIQUE OF THE PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS 
"The Friend comes into my body 
looking for the centre, unable 
to find it, draws a blade, 
strikes anywhere. " 
Rümi 1 
4.1. Introduction 
So far we have considered two sides of the problem in hand. To begin with, in order 
to have a balanced argument and also to pave the way for the pluralistic hypothesis, we 
have followed Hick's critique of other solutions, i. e. naturalistic, exclusivistic and 
inclusivistic explanations. Then we have presented Hick's pluralistic hypothesis 
extensively. Within that presentation, we have dealt with some of the important problems 
inherent in Hick's hypothesis, though these have been handled quite briefly. Now is the 
time to judge the weight of religious pluralism; in other words, to listen at length to what 
the critics have to say about Hick's hypothesis. 
We pointed out in the closing lines of the previous chapter that a theory as 
controversial as Hick's has certainly drawn more critics than allies. Consequently, there 
are many articles and books criticising the pluralistic hypothesis to choose from. 
However, despite the abundance of critical material, the points that are criticised are more 
or less the same. The two central charges are: the problems associated with the noumenal 
Real and the problem of criterion. There are also the minor charges, which Hick calls the 
"Post-modernist and other critiques, "2 such as the "theological arrogance, " 
"reductionism"3 and the globalisation of religions through Western intellectual 
imperialism. 4 I shall open the chapter by examining these charges. I will not, however, be 
going into detailed discussion of specifically Christian issues. I shall briefly mention 
them as they arise while discussing other issues. For instance, when I discuss the problem 
of reductionism, I shall follow Hick in using the doctrine of Incarnation as a case in point. 
Regarding the noumenal Real, I will be looking at mostly theoretical problems like 
ineffability, necessity or redundancy, postulation and the number of the Real. This will be 
followed by the practical question of criterion and salvation/liberation. I shall finish with 
a conclusion on whether Hick's thesis is tenable as it stands or needs some revision. 
A final word on the Hickian material I shall use throughout this chapter. Despite 
Hick's efforts to respond to many of his critics, he could not respond to all because of the 
sheer mass of criticism that the hypothesis generated. However, one of his latest books, 
1 Rumi, J, Unseen Rain, 16. 
2 ROF, 31-56. 
3 Rose, Knowing the Real, 99-106. 
4 To my knowledge, one of the best critical pieces on this aspect has been produced by Kenneth 
Surin, which I will be examining in the course of our discussion. See his "A Certain 'Politics of 
Speech' : 'Religious Pluralism' in the Age of the McDonald's Hamburger, " Mpdgm. j hgplpgy 7, no. 
1, Oct. 1990. 
the Rainbow of Faiths, 5 deals at some length with the matters that the critics have raised. 
The book is an "expanded version of the Auburn Lectures delivered in April 1994 at the 
Union Theological Seminary, New York. "6 Lectures were followed by responses from 
several distinguished theologians. Later, a discussion was organised, in which two 
postgraduates presented criticisms of Hick individually and Hick responded to them in 
turn. Set in a dialogue form, the book, to which I will be referring frequently in addition 
to other sources, will serve as a useful tool to stimulate the discussion. 
4.2. Theological Arrogance 
In the previous chapters, we saw that in his earlier attempts at theorising religious 
pluralism, Hick used the Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant to illustrate 
different approaches to the Transcendent and our perception of it. ' Gavin D'Costa and 
other eminent critics have objected to the example because the analogy is misleading. 8 
Unlike the parable, in which there is supposed to be a sighted person who can observe 
and say that none of the descriptions was in fact correct, in the case of religions there can 
be no such observer who can evaluate and judge religions either in terms of salvific 
effectiveness or from any other aspect. Hick's hypothesis seems to presuppose, in one 
critic's phrase, "the myth of the neutral observer, "9 or in another's, "a timeless logos 
enjoying time-transcending encounters with an unchanging reality. "10 In other words, as 
Kathryn Tanner rightly stresses, "beliefs from a particular point of view are elevated to 
the truth pure and simple by way of a claim that the standpoint from which such beliefs 
are formulated is not one standpoint among others. " 11 Surely only the Supreme Being can 
make such judgements. Rather than arrogance, Hick prefers to call this the "claim to have 
a privileged vantage point. "12 
5 London, SCM, 1995. 
6 ROF, 148. 
7GUF, 140. 
8 Hick believes that the furore over the blind-men-elephant parable is based on exaggeration. 
D'Costa calls him a "leading blind-men-elephant parable spokesman" ("Elephants, Ropes and a 
Christian Theology of Religions, " Reßjpgy 88, no. 724, July 1985,260) and describes God and the 
Universe of Faiths as "propounding the blind-men-elephant thesis" (265). Peter Byrne ("John 
Hick's Philosophy of World Religions, " ýo! l1Sh.. Iournal. o Itlen10ý, 1ý' 35, no. 4,1982), Philip 
Almond ("John Hick's Copernican Theology, " TheQIQgy 86,1983) and Michael Barnes (Religions 
in Conversation, London: SPCK, 1989,78) also criticise him severely for his use of this parable. 
Hick claims to have used the example only once in GUF (140), where he pointed out its limitations. 
In other words, it was never meant to be a perfect analogy. One can hardly agree with the misleading 
generalisations made by D'Costa and others. Nevertheless, they have a point: it is a very misleading 
example, as Hick also acknowledges. However, the same argument can be applied to exclusivism 
and inclusivism, as Hick does, since they too also claim to have God's eye view of human religious 
situation. That is to say, even though they do not use the parable, they end up with a worse 
conclusion than Hick's: restricting salvation to one path or giving one privilege over others. 
9 Springsted, E 0, "Conditions of Dialogue: John Hick and Simone Weil, " JoJunJ. Qf. Rt=. 11giQ 72, 
1992,19. 
10 Milbank, J, "The End of Dialogue, " in ýh t! (1. U41güC(1C S. RtrýOASlýýýýt)ý. Thý. N(ylh. Qf. ý 
Plpr li tic TheglQgyQfAPligjpn5, ed. D'Costa, G, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books: 1990,174. 
ti Tanner, K, "Respect for Other Religions: A Christian Antidote to Colonialist Discourse, " MQtigm 
t1ý4]pgy 9, no. 1,1993,2. 
12 ROF, 49. 
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Annemarie Schimmel points out that two sufi poets, Sana'i and Rumi, also refer to 
the blind-men-elephant parable -most likely transferred from India. She cites Shah 
Waliullah's comment on the parable in which "the Divine Truth" was described "as a tree 
of which one can touch only a certain part, be it branch or leaf, trunk or fruit. "13 She then 
extends it to make every religion as a "tree, growing, taking nourishment from the soil, 
the wind, and the water, and accordingly developing its branches, twigs, and blossoms. "14 
I think this might be a better example in explaining Hick's theory in that it respects 
religions as separate entities whose existence depend on certain elements (the Real, 
religious experience, etc. ), with similar structures (ethics, eschatology, etc. ), doing similar 
functions (salvifically effective). Yet, it has also a limited function, for one can easily 
object that different trees have different functions, especially some bear fruits (salvifically 
effective) and some do not (delusory). Thus we leave the metaphors here and return to 
Hick's responses to theological arrogance charges. 
Hick denies the charge and asserts that the hypothesis makes no claim of God's eye 
view of religions. Hence the charge is unfair. He states rather that his theory has been 
"arrived at inductively. "15 He starts with the assumption that religious experience is not in 
toto delusory. It does correspond to a transcendent reality and we can witness its fruits in 
the lives of many ordinary Christians. 16 When this conclusion is extended beyond the 
Christian experience due to the apparent fruits also observed in other great religions, one 
faces the conflicting truth-claims of the religions. Hick draws two conclusions from this 
observation. One is that religions should be judged according to their "salvific efficacy" 17 
and the second is his "rejection of any `universal viewpoint' from which we would be 
able to judge one religion superior to another. "18 One can immediately question these 
conclusions by asking, "if it is impossible in our `partial and fallible human view' of 
things to say that one religion is unique, do we not also lack `the eye of omniscience' to 
see that they are all equal? " 19 Verkamp, in defence of Hick, replies to this question 
positively: "The evidence certainly does seem to suggest that the religions are basically 
equal, and the burden of proof would seem to lie, therefore, with those who would assert 
the contrary. "20 
If this is the case, one might wonder where Hick's project fits within the general 
framework of things: apparently at a very respectable place, at least in Hick's 
understanding. Hick views his hypothesis as the best explanation of the "facts described 
13 Schimmel, "The Muslim Tradition, " 140. 
14 Schimmel, "The Muslim Tradition, " 140. 
15 ROF, 50; PRP, 97. 
16 Nevertheless, I should point out that, as will be seen in the forthcoming section on criterion, this 
contradicts Hick's choice of saintliness as the indication of a true religion. 
17 Hick and Knitter, MCU, 30. 
18 Verkamp, B J, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " ýnlýmatiatýal. J. ournaý. far 
]' hiloýiophy. QLR Jigion 30,1991,113. 
19 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 113. 
20 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 113. 
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by the historians of religion. " Hick also thinks that "it is an explanatory theory"21 which 
fits best the data in hand. Thus the theory was not constructed theoretically from a grand 
transcendental observation tower. Rather it started from the ground level religious 
experience of human beings and is "the best explanation, i. e. the most comprehensive and 
economical explanation, from a religious point of view, of the facts of the history of 
religions. "22 
Is Hick's theory really as simple as it sounds? Is it really as inductive as Hick 
suggests? It does not appear to me so. Firstly, it starts with a theory about religious 
experience -that it is not in toto delusory. It further depends on other theories about what 
a "fruit" is in respect of religion and how it should be evaluated. It seems to me that the 
theory is not, after all, purely inductively reached, owing to the fact that it imposes certain 
ideas about religious experience and its focus, the effects of religion and the way we 
understand and interpret human behaviour. Hick is right to the extent that, initially, it 
does not claim to have a privileged vantage point. But when the final theory takes shape 
and claims to be the most sound accommodation of the facts presented by the historians 
of religion, then, in my opinion, the objections still stand. If one does not accept Hick's 
premises, then it cannot be an inductively constructed theory. The point I am trying to 
make is that there is more than one way of seeing Hick's theory. One is through his eyes 
and the other may be called a cynic's way, which takes account of Hick's selective 
attitude towards world religions. One can claim that Hick selects his materials from world 
religions carefully in order that they fit neatly with his theory, which is not as tolerant as 
it is claimed to be. Let us listen to Kenneth Surin: 
"But Hick leaves his readers with very little doubt that his 'hypothesis' is the only one that is 
adequate to this task - the discussion is always conducted as if no other thoroughly plausible 
'hypothesis' were in sight, and indeed none can really be, because the 'data' are always 
specified in such a way that `pluralism' is virtually guaranteed from the outset to be the only 
`hypothesis' that is seriously in the running when it comes to accounting for `the data. -23 
Last but not least, without the initial general premises surrounding Hick's theory, such as 
seeing-as and experiencing as, the principle of credulity etc., it would have never 
survived to become an inductive theory, as Verkamp pointedly suggests: 
"There is no question that Hick's theory rests upon multiple assumptions about a singular, 
transcendental grounding and the fundamental equality of the various religions that cannot be 
inductively verified beyond all doubt. "24 
21 ROF, 50. 
22 ROF, 51. 
23 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 78. 
24 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 116. 
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In Religion and Revelation, 25 K Ward examines Hick's theory and concludes that it 
is not a logically sound argument. 26 Hick responds in turn that he has never attempted to 
produce a "logically irresistible argument. " All he was trying to do was to produce the 
"best explanation. " To illustrate this point, one can cite the issue of one Real instead of 
many. He admits that we cannot rule out "a priori" that there may exist "a number of 
ultimate realities" perceived as either "an orderly federation or a feuding multitude or an 
unrelated plurality. "27 However, he suggests that "if from a religious point of view we are 
trying to think, not merely of what is logically possible28... but of the simplest hypothesis 
to account for the plurality of forms of religious experience and thought, " we should stick 
to the singularity of the noumenal Real. 29 He further insists that "a proffered `best 
explanation' is not a proof, because it is always open to someone else to come forward 
and offer what they believe is a better explanation. "30 Therefore, he challenges critics to 
produce a "viable alternative" instead of complaining. 
The modest intentions of Hick's pluralism (namely that it is a unifying, all- 
embracing and very tolerant theory, unlike others) has also been challenged by several 
critics. They think that despite these ostensibly clean and good purposes, it is a form of 
exclusivism. G Loughlin, as a passionate critic of Hick, writes: 
"Pluralism is a subtle rhetoric, its very frankness is a deception. Only pluralism names the 
object of its mastery. It claims to name the truth of plurality and to be the ism that captures its 
actuality; the `system' that masters the fact. In blurring the distinction between plurality and 
pluralism, by subsuming the former within the latter, pluralism seeks to erase all that may 
resist the theory that so names the plural. It seeks to forget what is here plural, the variety and 
difference of religion; the otherness of strangers. "31 
Loughlin is not alone in this sort of harsh critique. D'Costa suggests that pluralism is a 
"form of exclusivism" in the sense that it uses a "notion of exclusive truth" which leaves 
out those who fall outside this notion. 32 JV Apczynski also claims it is implicitly 
exclusivist because its revisionist attitude towards religions discourages dialogue. 33 
Finally, 0C Thomas sees it as a form of inclusivism because it uses the same normative 
logic, that is the notion that the pluralist position is "more adequate, valid, or true than 
any other, " an arrogant attitude which is ascribed to inclusivists by pluralists though they 
25 Ward, K, Religion and Revelation: A Theology of Revelation in the World's Religions, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994. 
26 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 313-316 and "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " Religious 
Studies 26,1990,12. 
27 AIR, 248-49. 
28 My emphasis. 
29 AIR, 248-49. 
30ROF, 50-51. 
31 Loughlin, G, "Prefacing Pluralism: John Hick and the Mastery of Religion, " MQdcm. T. healogy. 
7, no. 1,1990,46. 
32D'Costa, G, "The Impossibility, " 233-25 8. 
33 Apczynski, J V, "John flick's Theocentrism: Revolutionary or Implicitly E. zclusivist?, " Mp(1 rn 
; o1Qgx 8,1992,49 
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too are guilty of the same offence. 34 In all fairness, I consider Loughlin's critique to be 
unfair and misdirected. He judges the pluralism and the Hick of his imagination, which 
may not adequately describe Hick himself. 35 Despite its revisionist attitude and advocacy 
for a mythical understanding of religious language, pluralism never claims that humanity 
will arrive a at single universal religion some day; 36 rather it maintains that "the adherents 
of each of the existing world faiths should respond as fully as possible to the Real, the 
Ultimate, in their own way by devoutly living out their own tradition. "37 
I will not repeat here Hick's response to the charges of exclusivism since I have 
dealt with them in chapter one, where I examined Race's threefold typology. This brings 
us to the political implications of pluralism and the charges related to them. 
In his well-documented essay, Surin contends that despite their standing on 
different stages regarding the relationship between Christianity and other religions, the 
underlying thought behind the attempts of Hendrik Kraemer, Rahner, Hick and Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith is the same. Surin describes: 
"Once upon a time, when they administered empires, the European powers and their peoples 
were able to get away with the blind presumption that because their religion - Christianity - 
was unquestionably the supreme religion none of its 'rivals' was really worthy of our serious 
and unqualified attention. Then the world changed. The colonial powers were increasingly 
unable to maintain their dominance, and the lands they controlled became independent 
nations. As this transformation was taking place, it became progressively more difficult for 
Christians to maintain, `unthinkingly, ' that the religions of these lands were in a relationship 
of 'automatic' subordination to Christianity. "38 
Surin then quotes extensively from C Smith, Rahner and Hick to justify this statement. 
He concludes: 
"That these sentiments were expressed, and continued to be expressed with hardly any real 
qualification... is a tribute to the intractable and remorseless optimism which united these 
otherwise very different thinkers. It is not difficult to see that each of our four thinkers 
subscribes to a particular periodization with certain correlative alignments in a Christian 
theology of religions: the period of Western imperial expansion and government (associated 
by them with the 'absoluteness' of Christianity, Christian 'exciusivism, ' 'non-dialogue, ' et 
cetera) versus39 the period of `post-colonialism' (aligned by them with the 'non-absoluteness' 
of Christianity, `inclusivism' and 'pluralism' and even a 'liberal exclusivism, ' 40 'dialogue, ' et 
cetera). "a1 
34 Thomas, 0 C, "Religious Plurality and Contemporary Philosophy: A Critical Survey, " jiarv.; I. r. d 
87,1994,198-99. 
35 For more, see Hick's response to Loughlin: "A Response to Gerard Loughlin, " MgdCm Tb. QolQgy 
7, no. 1,1990,57-66. 
36 AIR, 379; ROF, 123-124. 
37 ROF, 41. 
38 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 69. 
39 My emphasis. 
40 By "liberal exclusivism, " Surin has the later Kraemer in mind, as found in Why Christianity ofAll 
Religions? (trans. H Hoskings, Philadelphia: the Westminster Press, 1962), as opposed to the early 
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Surin believes that "the periodization and the accompanying correlations" shared by 
the famous four, whom he names "Cantwell Smith and Co., " are "hopelessly simplistic 
and deeply problematic. " It is simplistic because the independence achieved did not 
change the lives of ordinary believers in these ex-colonies. The power of rule has only 
changed hands from the colonialists to new "ruling elites. " "Instead of `liberation' after 
withdrawal' of the imperial power, " Surin claims, "those who do not belong to the ruling 
elites... continue to live the same lives of unrelieved toil and unabated poverty. "42 
Therefore, Surin concludes, "the periodizations of these thinkers... betokens a thoroughly 
`Eurocentric' or `First World, ' perspective on their parts, " and "the `global space' of the 
discourses" three-fold-typology "effectively incorporates, and thereby dissolves, the 
localised and oppositional `spaces"' of the underprivileged people. 43 
The periodization common to all four theorists is also problematic owing to the fact 
that it "never acknowledges that the part played by Christianity in shaping the 
understandings that Europeans had of the peoples of other continents was itself 
something that changed over time, " as the sources have changed. Following in the 
footsteps of B McGrane in Beyond Anthropology, 44 Surin identifies four different 
parameters used by the Europeans to evaluate others. First, "up to and including the 
sixteenth century, " it was Christianity, which was "the only religion, and those who did 
not profess it simply had no religion. "45 Second, during the Enlightenment of the 17th 
and 18th centuries, new categories came into play, such as "ignorance, error, untruth and 
superstition, " which would basically mean that "the other" was "unenlightened" and 
"primitive. " The third shift came with the industrial revolution during the 19th century. 
With the emergence of anthropology as a discipline, "different `stages of development"' 
have been introduced "between the pre-historically fossilized `primitive' and the 
evolutionary advancement of modern Western science and civilisation. "46 Beginning with 
the "early twentieth century, " the fourth shift has occurred: now "culture" was the key 
word to understand the difference. Surin quotes McGrane: "We think under the 
hegemony of the ethnological response to the alienness of the Other; we are today, 
contained within an anthropological concept of the Other. Anthropology has become our 
modern way of seeing the Other as, fundamentally and merely, culturally different. "47 
Kraemer as projected in The Christian Message in a Non-christian World (London: The Edinburgh 
House Press, 1938). To illustrate the point, Surin quotes from Why Christianity of All Religions? (p. 
123) where Kraemer, referring to a UNESCO conference in Manila in January 1960, states, in 
agreement with Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish and Roman Catholic scholars, that 'for all the 
major religions the paramount problems are the same. " (See Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 
71: 93, fn 7). 
41 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 70. 
42 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 71. 
43 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 71. 
44 McGrane, B, Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other, New York: Columbia UP, 1989. 
45 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 73. 
' Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 73. 
47 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 73-74. 
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"The upshot, " Surin maintains, "is that `difference' now becomes `democratised. "' He 
also identifies Hick's version of pluralism as "the most `democratic' version of the 
`pluralistic hypothesis. "' 48 
Surin thinks that it is no surprise that as the "missionaries of the `new' look" "the 
Cantwell Smiths and Hicks of this world are seemingly a new kind of subject, one that is 
`universal' or `global' in the way that the McDonald's hamburger has become the 
`universal' or `global' food. "49 Surin's position is that the people who eat "the first 
`universal' food, " "the McDonald's hamburger, " and drink the universal drink, Coca- 
Cola, and wear the universal dress, Levi's blue jeans, "also consume the American way 
of life, " and the pluralists who propose a "world ecumenism" "`consume' a certain way 
of life. " This may not be called "the American way of life, " but it is "the `life' of a world 
administered by global media and information networks, international agencies and 
multinational corporations, " according to which "nations, cultures, religions, and so forth, 
are simply obsolete if they are maintained in their old forms as fixed and intractable 
`particularities'. " This ideology, Surin suggests, first enables the McDonaldization and 
Coca-Colanization of the world and then sustains it by the proposals of the pluralists. 5° 
Surin insists that modern times did not bring anything new as far as the West's 
relation with the Other is concerned: it is still domination and acculturation of the Other 
by different means. Nowadays the fashion is democracy and therefore, the democratic 
means of seeing the Other must certainly be employed by the civilised West. Pluralism 
happens to be the means of achieving this, even though neither the Western view of the 
Other has changed, nor have the conditions that the majority of the Other live under. To 
put it more bluntly, pluralism and other means are only alternative ways of exploiting the 
Other and their resources. That is why pluralism does not offer any radical difference in 
its treatment of the Other; it cultures the difference and eventually leads the way to 
exploitation by the multinationals. It is but another disguised way of suppressing the 
Other whereby the few maintain control over the many by a more discreet approach. 
When one approach failed in achieving the goal, the West invented another one, which 
happens to be pluralism for some, liberal exclusivism for others and inclusivism for some 
48 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 74-75. Surin also remarks that neither Troeltsch nor 
Cantwell Smith can be a "genuine pluralist" for the fact that the former had developed an 
"ethnocentric version of 'pluralistic hypothesis, "' due to his emphasis on the importance of 
Christianity for the West, while the latter "has so far retained... a number of vestigial Bultmannian 
notions (e. g., the 'presentness' of 'faith-events, ' 'God's mission to all world')" (Surin, "A Certain 
'Politics of Speech, " 74-75; for Christian elements in Smith's theology of religions. see also 
Almond, P C, "Wilfred Cantwell Smith as Theologian of Religions, " j; Iatý(ald. Thcol( ýa1. R v1ýeW 
76, no. 3,1983, especially 340-41). It has to be pointed out that it is hard to share Surin's 
conclusion, due to his narrow understanding of pluralism. One can easily reverse the argument by 
saying that Hick's starting point, the notion of an all loving God, is quite Christian too, as one critic 
pointed out, which may make it less democratic. For me, the point is not strictly the Christian 
elements in a theory; rather the focus should be on the soteriological equality of the religions. (For 
Christian elements in Hick's hypothesis, see Hart, T A, "Universalism: Two Distinct Types, " in 
i, 1n? vý liSlll. äld. tht Iioýkiný. of R01, ed. Cameron, NM de S, Carlisle, U K: Paternoster Press, and 
Grand Rapids, USA: Baker Book House: 1992,7). 
49 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 72. 
50 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 78-79. 
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others. These attempts have not come about because these scholars have cared about the 
Other, but to restore the credibility of the West and Christianity and the benefits gained 
by the multinationals, which in turn means the West. 
Globalization has also been opposed by many Muslim scholars. They point out the 
dangers of globalization and suspicious of the West launching a "neo-imperialism" on the 
yet hot ashes of the colonial era which cost Muslims so dearly. Mahmoud M Ayoub, for 
instance, who argues for "unity within diversity, " picks on English becoming as a global 
medium of communication and warns us: 
"What people are most comfortable with is their own language and their own culture. So, we 
are not, and I hope will never be, heading towards global anything. Globalization is the latest 
form of Western neo-imperialism. It is therefore one of the evils of modern times. What we 
should be aiming for, as the Qur'an enjoins, is the acceptance and appreciation of the 
plurality of cultures and religions, but within the unity of faith in the One God. "51 
Even though I agree with Ayoub's fair point, as we shall see shortly, I am sure Hick is 
also aware of this danger and agrees with Ayoub. 
Hick initially dismisses the charges on the grounds of "guilt by association 
argument. " He maintains that the argument behind these political criticisms is that "to 
condemn the evils of the multinationals' influence is at the same time to condemn 
religious pluralism. " He holds that just because "contemporary religious pluralism is part 
of the same world as multinational capitalism" does not entail the conclusion that it is an 
"ally of international capitalism and its repressive universalising effects. " It is "simply 
unfair and logically untenable"52 to judge religious pluralism merely on the basis of these 
associations. 
However, when pressed harder he eventually gives in by accepting the 
responsibility of the West and the US for the mess that the world is in with respect to the 
unjust distribution of wealth. Yet this time, he generalises the guilt by saying that the 
same charges apply 
"impartially to religious exclusivists, inclusivists, and pluralists and also to post-modernists 
and everyone else in our societies, even including those who are personally working for 
world peace or against racism and against the unjust north-south economic divide. A Western 
post-modernist and a Western religious pluralist may be equally conscious of the evils of the 
international hegemony of the financial institutions, and yet be equally a part of the world 
that it has produced. But to use this as an argument specially against religious pluralism is, 
surely, simply unfair and logically untenable. "53 
Anticipating such a move from the pluralists, Surin highlights the immediate difficulty 
confronted by the critics, namely that the pluralists are seemingly "totally on the side of 
the angels. " He points out the paradoxical way that pluralists address the all-familiar 
51 Ayoub, M M, "! slam and Pluralism, " FamQuolas 3, no. 2,1997,110 (Emphasis added). 
52 ROF, 39. 
53 ROF, 39. 
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issues like "racism, the oppression of women, imperialism, " etc. On the one hand, these 
matters are ostensibly condemned by them, while on the other hand, they are "broached... 
in a peculiarly abstract and defused way. " To illustrate the point, he writes that "European 
colonialism is condemned, but the neocolonialism into which it has been largely 
transmuted is again not positioned in their discourses. "54 He also cites the condemnation 
of the bad examples of the West in the past, while the new ones such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been left untouched, which Surin construes as a 
"barely concealed enthusiasm for `our times. '1155 
In short, Surin senses a simplification and cover up in Hick's discourse about both 
the past and the present atrocities committed by the West against the Other. In order to 
achieve this, pluralism simply marginalizes the Other by reducing the differences almost 
to nil and subdues it for the ruling powers, be they colonial, political or economic. 
A few comments are necessary here. It is true that pluralism in its present shape is a 
child of the twentieth century, but this does not necessitate the conclusion that it is an 
invention of modern day imperialist powers. Firstly, as Hick rightly suggests, it has 
ancient roots. 56 Secondly, it seems unfair to side pluralism with the multinational powers 
and accept it as a supporter of the status quo just because, as a philosophical 
interpretation, it does not concentrate meticulously on the details of power share in the 
societies. It cannot do so, because it is not a political theory. Thirdly, one cannot accuse 
Hick of being a spokesperson for imperialism in the area of religion because his theory 
lacks the wider scope of a political theory. Naturally Hick focuses on the good points 
which the great religions share and values them, but we should not forget the fact that he 
does not turn a blind eye to the problems caused by the religions. Indeed one of his 
starting points is this notion that the great religions of the world have been mediums in 
the hands of their believers for committing both good and bad deeds, which would mean 
for Hick that there is no superior religion in achieving the good and suppressing the 
bad. 57 What matters, then, is not the medium but the human beings and their efforts. This 
is one of the fundamental epistemological equations of Hick which we ought not to 
underestimate. 
We also ought not to forget the fact that none of the pluralists is trying to establish a 
religious political theory; it is a well known fact that Hick is more of a philosopher- 
pluralist, while C Smith is a historian-pluralist. Yet it seems to me that the way Surin 
treats pluralist theories is far more political than a theory of religious pluralism would 
allow. It is simply, as I see it, too much to ask from a theory to address all the political 
questions and their implications as well as the religious and philosophical dimensions. It 
may, then, become a religio-political theory rather than a religio-philosophical one. To 
exemplify this, I would like to pinpoint one issue. In his article, Surin appears to be 
54 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 86. 
ss Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 86. 
56 ROF, 34-37. 
57 MCU, 30. 
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wanting to ascribe some value to the fact that, despite their different ethnic origins and 
backgrounds, Hick and Smart, two Englishmen, and Cantwell Smith, a Canadian, 
happened to develop their theories in the United States as the leading world power and 
the home for many of the multinationals. 58 This does not seem to be a sound argument at 
least as regards Hick and Smart, due to the fact that the seeds of pluralism had been sown 
in English soil with the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, when Hick was in 
Birmingham. I think this goes also for Smart who was educated in the British 
universities, taught in the UK for more than two decades and produced important works 
like Reasons and Faiths (1958) and The Religious Experience of Mankind (1969) etc. 
Even if Surin's implication was right, it should be applied to the work of every scholar 
who happens to be in the U S, including Surin's, placing him in a dilemma. He too is an 
Englishmen living in the U S, but can see the defects in the theories of religions that 
others cannot. If it is the effect of the environment, he should not have been different 
from the rest, since they all live and develop their theories and critiques in the same 
country. Thus it must be in the mind, rather than where one lives or writes. 
Last but not least, we should bear in mind that Hick is someone who conjoins 
saintliness and politics to produce the term "political saint, " and finds this the "more 
typical form of saintliness today. "59 Hence he reveres greatly the twentieth century 
figures like Mahatma Gandhi, 60 whom he perceives as "the greatest political saint of our 
century, "61 Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. These are modern-day saints in their 
struggles against the oppressions and injustices inflicted upon their nations by the 
Western ruling powers. 62 Indeed, he co-edited and published a book on Gandhi, Gandhi's 
Significance for Today, 63 in the same year he published his masterpiece on religious 
pluralism (An Interpretation of Religion). To me, this is an indication of as far as a 
philosopher of religion can involve himself in international politics. 
I believe Surin has a fair point in his critique of Hick's reductionist and homogenist 
attitude towards world religions; this constitutes one of my major concerns over Hick's 
theory and will be dealt with in the following section. 
4.3. Reductionism 
Surin traces an overall reductionist attitude in the approach of the scholars dealing 
with the issue of religious diversity from a Christian perspective: 
"Common to Kraemer, Rahner, Cantwell Smith and Hick is the assumption that the task of 
`theorising' the relationships between religions is one that is pre-eminently, or even solely, a 
58 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 79. 
59 ROF, 80. 
60 AIR, 306. 
61 ROF, 80. 
62 ROF, 80. 
63 Hick, J and L Hempel, eds., Gandhi's Significance for Today, London: Macmillan, 1989. Hick 
also dedicates part V (The Saints Come Marching In) of his latest book for Gandhi's thought as a 
case study. See: Hick, J, The Fifth Dimension, Oxford: Oneworld, 1999,173-218. 
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matter of affirming, clarifying, defending, and perhaps discarding certain philosophical and 
theological formulations. - 64 
Thus one can infer that, speaking from a postmodernist angle, every theoretical attempt 
on religious diversity would be criticised from several points of view. As far as Hick's 
pluralistic hypothesis is concerned though, it is reductionist from four angles: 
soteriologically, ontologically, theologically and epistemologically. 
Soteriologically speaking, Hick has taken the self-transformation of human beings 
from self-centredness to Reality-centredness as the central tenet and aim of the religions, 
for which he uses the term "salvation/liberation. " Hick describes the attainment of 
salvation/liberation as65 "to transcend the ego point of view... to become re-centred" in 
the Real, which triggers an "actual change in human beings..., which can be identified... 
by its moral fruits. "66 How comprehensive is this understanding of religion as a ground- 
breaking starting point for the evaluation of the great world religions? Speaking from a 
Muslim point of view, I would suggest that firstly, its scope is narrow that it excludes the 
majority of ordinary believers and primitive religions, secondly, it desacralises religion 
by not giving enough emphasis on the afterlife aspect of religions and thirdly, it 
downgrades religion to morality. To me, Hick's understanding of salvation/liberation 
sidelines the spiritual aspect of religion. One can look at the issue from two different 
angles: take the example of a morally good Muslim who strives for the betterment of his 
fellow human beings, but does not practice Islam in the strict sense of the word, i. e. 
neither prays five times a day, nor fasts during Ramadhan, etc. Let us imagine another 
Muslim who is a devout practitioner, fasts, prays, etc., but, nevertheless, does not involve 
himself very much in social activities which benefit society and humanity at large. It is 
obvious that according to Hick's criterion, the former is more likely to be saved and 
liberated than the latter, whereas from an Islamic point of view, despite the fact that 
neither is an ideal Muslim, the result is the opposite of Hick's. The examples could 
obviously be expanded to accommodate other traditions. Thus, it is not difficult to see 
that Hick's soteriological criterion is reductionist, though it may be appealing at first to 
the adherents of many of the traditions. 
Another aspect of this problem which one can detect is whether Hick is just in his 
treatment of the primal religions and consistent in his focus on salvation. We have seen in 
the previous chapter that Hick pointed out the different function of the pre-axial religions, 
namely, "the preservation of cosmic and social order. "67 My question is whether Hick is 
doing justice to the primal religions by leaving them out of the salvational scheme, 68 
64 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 79. 
65 AIR, 36-54. 
66 ROF, 17. 
67 AIR, 22. 
68 ROF, 109; AIR, 23. This is because they do not offer a "radical human transformation, " due to 
their focus on "keeping the communal life on an even keel both in itself and in relation to the 
sacred. " Hick considers them as "communal rather than individual responses to the Real. " (ROF, 
109). 
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despite his acknowledgement that they could be beneficial to modern societies in issues 
like the sustenance of ecological equilibrium and the awareness of the importance of 
"community. "69 I find this problematic and inconsistent when I consider his 
understanding of saintliness as a political response to the problems of the society one 
lives in. On the one hand Hick favours the individualistic responses to the Real, while on 
the other hand he leaves out the communal responses, despite the fact that he wants a 
better world. What I am arguing for is more widening and emphasising of the communal 
transformation aspects of religion, if Hick is serious about his search for a better world by 
peaceful means. I believe this is a reductionist attitude towards primitive religions, as far 
as the scope of pluralistic hypothesis is concerned. What could be the reason for this, one 
might wonder? Apczynski would offer some help: "Might hidden cultural assumptions 
regarding the superiority of `individualism' be informing Hick's pattern of interpretation 
which lead him to overlook the soteriological efficacy of communal, sacramental forms 
of transformation.? "70 
On the ontological level, one can observe two problems. One is the apparent 
problem of positing of the Real and the questions it raises, which I shall leave to the next 
section. The second is the issue of the implicit pressures on being different and being able 
to express it freely, especially as regards those who do not conform to the pluralist 
understanding, due to the fact that one can easily sense a dismissive attitude towards all 
differences. Once more, Surin deserves extensive quotation: 
"Hick's discursive 'space' is the typical 'space' of an educated liberal 'westerner'... The 
occupant of this 'space' is someone who ceaselessly dissolves the dense particularities of 
struggles against domination and injustice, who cannot allow for the impingement and 
encroachment of one social and political 'space' upon another because he is totally resolved 
to maintain the abstract equivalence of all such 'spaces. ' The result is a complete occlusion of 
the always contingent forces, 'the powers, ' which destroy, reconfigure and realign these 
`spaces. "'71 
The outcome, Surin insists, is "to affirm the abstract equivalence of all such 
`spaces: ' `good' here, but also there; `bad' here, but also there, " which, as cited from SP 
Mohanty, is "`debilitatingly insular spaces. "' "This subject, " Surin suggests, "ranges over 
the globe only to conclude that while of course everything is different everywhere, in the 
end things are perhaps not all that different after all" and "most important of all for the 
`religious pluralists, ' devout men and women can be found in every corner of the 
world. "72 Another critic spells this out more clearly: "Others, it is true, are not rejected by 
69 AIR, 28-29. 
70 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " n. 4,50. 
71 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 88-89. 
72 Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 89. Surin quotes Mohanty from "Us and Them: On the 
Philosophical Bases of Political Criticism, " Tht 
. 
Y. aýý Joumal. aý. ýciticism 2,1989,14-15. 
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pluralists for being different. They are accepted, but only in so far as difference is not the 
last word. "73 
I am not sure whether the charge of diffusing difference is totally justifiable. One 
can answer on Hick's behalf that: firstly, he never argues for a "single universal religion. " 
There will always be different religions, offering different ways of salvation/liberation. 
By pointing to the Real as the ultimate ground of religious experience pluralism never 
aims to erase the different ways of salvation. Secondly, his hypothesis leaves room for 
the flourishment of new religious movements by acknowledging their positive 
contribution to human transformation. 74 Lastly, for Surin to claim that "in the end things 
are perhaps not all that different after all, " it seems to me that he is moving between 
theological and political discursive spaces. Hick is clearly aware of this distinction. His 
hypothesis is constructed on the theological space, but does not turn a blind eye to 
political, economical and otherwise problems that we suffer. The suggestion of the 
salvific/liberational efficacy of religions never asserts the equation of the different 
political discursive spaces. Hick's emphasis on political saints, as indicated earlier, 
illustrates this point satisfactorily. 
Because epistemological and theological questions are interwoven and overlap, I 
would like to examine them together. I will take Hick's epistemology as an umbrella and 
treat the theological questions as part of it by way of exemplifying his epistemology. By 
epistemological reductionism I mean Hick's stance about religious language and its 
interpretation, and the way the pluralists gather their evidence. Built upon this 
epistemology, by theological reductionism I mean basically Hick's attitude towards the 
conflicting truth-claims of the religions and their effect upon their followers, such as his 
understanding of the doctrine of Incarnation. 
Critiques suggest that Hick's epistemology assumes a "conception of human 
knowing" which "ignores or dismisses the concrete differences between the traditions, 
homogenising them into a false unity. "75 Thus it "evacuates of content the doctrines and 
stories presented as true by the religious traditions by making their cognitivity depend 
solely upon their hypothetical power to orient human beings toward the merely formal 
and otiose concept of the noumenal Real. "76 This results in a "global meta-narrative that 
subordinates all individual and communal narratives, thus undermining `alterity' and 
eliminating the otherness of the Other. "77 In other words, "religious pluralism gives an 
importantly different account of the great world religions from that which each gives of 
itself, "78 or, as Rose remarks, it is an "outcome that negates these diverse and specific 
73 Tanner, K, "Respect for Other Religions, " 11. 
74 ROF, 109-111. 
75 ROF, 40; see also Surin, "A Certain 'Politics of Speech, " 72. 
76 Rose, Knowing the Real, 99. 
n ROF, 40. 
78 ROF, 40. 
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doctrines and stories as cognitive in their own right, by reducing doctrines and stories to 
the status of ornamental metaphors. "79 
To the charge of homogenisation, Hick responds by acknowledging that "the 
religions ask different questions" which are "specifically different, " but "generically the 
same. " "They all presuppose a profound present lack, and the possibility of a radically 
better future; and they are all answers to the question, how to get from one to the other. "80 
This may be true but I think Rose's point is still unanswered since the way of testing a 
narrative's power lies in the individual whether one is transformed or not. On the 
individual level it is difficult to assess this and it does not prove anything. But when we 
take into account the cumulative evidence, Hick seems to be right that despite the specific 
differences the genre of the religious discourse is the same. 
To be able to understand this answer, we need to go back and unearth the 
conception of human knowing Hick presupposes and the type of reason he follows. 
According to this notion of knowing, "all our knowledge is grounded in assumptions 
derived from our dwelling in a specific cultural heritage. "81 In Hick's case, it is the 
"tradition of modern liberal culture" which postulates a "universal reason that `interprets' 
selectively the myriad of sensory impulses from its environment according to acquired 
conceptual categories. "82 
But can there be a universal reason appealing to everybody? Apparently, not. Because 
6"reason'... is never what `any reasonable man holds, but is always tied to a particular 
language and communal form of life constituting its tradition. "83 Apczynski contends that 
Hick's theory is a 
"rather parochial one that has been shaped by a contemporary version of the liberal 
intellectual tradition. Its modern origins include the Enlightenment rejection of all forms of 
tradition-constituted reason in favour of a universal conception of rationality appealing to 
methods and principles deemed unexceptional by any reflective person. Upon the collapse of 
these Enlightenment certainties, twentieth century postmodernists continue to maintain this 
universal conception of reason, but now in an inverted form that upholds the relativity of all 
viewpoints - but without any explicit acknowledgement of its own. "84 
79 Rose, Knowing the Real, 99. 
80 ROF, 41. 
81 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " 40. 
82 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " 42. 
83 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " 46. 
84 Apczynski, "John flick's Theocentrism, " 47; for similar points expressed by Milbank, see his 
"The End of Dialogue, " 174-19 1. 
Regarding the application of this understanding to Hick's thesis, Apczynski also opines: 
"Corresponding to this is a perspectival view of truth. Since liberalism approaches all 
traditions from a universal standpoint, and since contemporary liberalism has been 
transformed so that it does not (explicitly) recognise any cultural heritage as normative, all 
claims to truth made from within particular traditions must be viewed from the vantage point 
of outsiders. To be sure, one must concede that members of a tradition make substantive 
claims to truth, but only from within the limits of their respective viewpoints" (Apczynski, 
"John Hick's Theocentrism, " 47). 
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Apczynski concludes that "Hick's implicit commitment to the liberal intellectual tradition 
effectively detaches him from the substantive truth-claims of every tradition so that in the 
final analysis the truth of none of them matters, "85 which corresponds to a "perspectival 
view of truth, " i. e., to approach "all traditions from a universal standpoint, " or "from the 
vantage point of outsiders. "86 
It is this detached "perspectival view of truth" that allows Hick to see the religious 
questions as "specifically different, " but "generically the same, "87 owing to the fact that 
epistemologically he is no closer to one than the other. But he immediately warns us that 
he is not ultimately arguing for a new universal world religion, which will "destroy 
religious particularity"; rather he continues to "view different types of religious 
experience as complementary and not mutually exclusive. "88 Therefore he vividly 
expresses that "the adherents of each of the existing world faiths should respond as fully 
as possible to the Real, the Ultimate, in their own way by devoutly living out their own 
tradition. "89 
However, there is a two-edged downgrading of religions in Hick's theory. One 
aspect is his understanding of religious language, which starts with his grounding of 
religious belief on religious experience. Because all experience is experiencing-as, human 
consciousness has a major role to play in Hick's epistemology in constructing our 
knowledge, which includes religious language too. He believes that input from our 
environment is interpreted variously in our brain depending on our existing socio-cultural 
filters. Therefore Hick believes, agreeing with Kant, that "all that we say about God is 
`mythical' and symbolic, ' meaning that it does not apply literally to the Real an sich. "90 
Thus all religious literature relating to the Real is mythical, which is contrary to what 
many of the traditions hold. This attitude, as far as I can see, takes Hick much closer to 
the naturalistic interpretations of religion, regardless of its claim to be a religious one. As 
someone coming from a Muslim background, I could see that it also presupposes very 
much a particular Christian understanding of revelation. 91 That is to say, it reflects a very 
loose understanding of the Bible as a source of knowledge of Jesus and of God, possibly 
because of the way the scriptures were compiled, written and understood within 
Christianity. It might be an easy task for Christian pluralists like Hick to mythologise the 
language about God, for they hold that the New Testament authors have put words in the 
mouth of Jesus. The authors were not to blame, because they wrote what they recollected; 
but, the pluralists claim, one should always bear in mind this crucial difference. However, 
when it comes to Islam, the situation is very different. Hick's mythical and symbolic 
85 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " 48. 
86 Apczynski, "John Hick's Theocentrism, " 47. 
0 ROF, 41. 
88 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 87. 
89 ROF, 41. 
90 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 107. 
91 Surely, the implication here is that there are many accounts of revelation within Christianity 
which take a more serious view of the divine scriptures. For them, revelation means a lot more than 
it means for Hick. 
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conclusion about the character of religious language is in almost total disagreement with 
the Islamic understanding of revelation where, the Qur'an is considered the direct 
revelation of God, written as soon as it is revealed during the life-time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, making it immune to the sort of criticism that Hick directs against the Bible. 
In other words, in the Qur'an's case, there were no authors to put words in the mouth of 
Muhammad and that it is considered a revelation from God, not the recollection of 
authors. 92 Therefore it is almost impossible for Muslims to apply Hick's mythological 
approach to the Qur'an. Commenting on the far reaching effects of Hick's approach on 
other religions, Rose writes: 
Nevertheless, most adherents of most religions will see the pluralistic hypothesis not only as 
reductionistic and thus derogatory to the visions of religious truth to which they adhere, but 
also as another form of Western or Christian religious interpretation and reduction to foreign 
assumptions of what they hold as the deepest truths of life... To escape the consequences of 
such an interpretation of religions, adherents of religious traditions will likely to continue to 
believe that the cognitive content of their religious traditions is to be found in their traditional 
interpretations of the mystery of life and not in a nebulous reference to a postulated Real that 
is beyond all knowledge and experience. "93 
Despite Hick's modest intentions and best efforts, this understanding of religious 
language, as Byrne rightly senses, "gives the human subject a heavy input into all 
cognition, one which increases as we move upward from physical to moral to religious 
elements of reality, "94 which I wholeheartedly agree with. Hick replies to Byrne's charge, 
reminding us that his stance is "certainly not a form of naive realism, " rather an 
"authentic form of critical realism. "95 We are not told, though, how an authentic form of 
critical realism differs from an inauthentic one. Nevertheless, to me, Hick's shift is more 
towards non-realism than to critical realism. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, 
all this-discussion will be rendered obsolete when Hick reveals that the contents of the 
scriptures are not after all very important so long as they orient people towards Reality- 
centredness. For him, they are "`secondary' packaging and labelling, "96 which is one step 
behind non-realists, such as Cupitt and others. In fact, despite Hick's adamant denial of 
non-realism, some critics point out that his position is non-realist. 97 Hick's attitude 
92 The recollections of the companions of the Prophet are considered separately among the Prophetic 
Traditions, Sunna. 
93 Rose, Knowing the Real, 101-2. 
94 Byme, P, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism: Reference and Realism in Religion, London: 
Macmillan, 1995,122,38-39. 
95 Hick, J, "Review of Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism: Reference and Realism in Religion, " 
ý? ýIigi. oA$. $tuý1C& 31,1996,290. 
96 Rose, Knowing the Real. 100: PRP, 46. 
97 See for example Alston, W P, "Realism and the Christian Faith, " IýIematlQfl 1. JP. uF4ýl. fSIC 
Ph110, wphy. Qf. Rt: ligicn, 38,1995,37-60. In this article, Alston takes an issue with Tillich, Kaufman 
and Hick and describes their position as "irrealism = nonrealism" and concludes that they have no 
convincing arguments and are just "paper dragons" (57). On the other hand, Eberhard Herrmann 
chooses Hick as the representative of realism and contrasts his position with Don Cupitt's anti- 
realism. See, his "The Trouble with Religious Realism, " lud ,I ýQ(ogic. 
50,1996,31-50. The 
two evaluations of Hick's position differ on their approach to Hick's philosophy. Alston focuses on 
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towards religious doctrines and texts reminds us of the disagreement in hermeneutics 
between functionalists and revelationists. Hick's pragmatic criterion certainly puts him 
among "functionalists" who claim that "certain texts are scripture only in so far as they 
pass certain pragmatic and functional text. "98 Primarily Muslims and certainly followers 
from other religions will disagree with this definition and the attitude. However, though it 
may seem an odd coincidence, there are a few orthodox Muslim scholars who also argue 
along the same lines as Hick. In Crisis in the Muslim Mind, 99 Abdul Hammed A 
AbuSulayman strongly argues that: 
"Any structure of Muslim knowledge, thought, or science that does not provide the Muslim 
mind with the means to achieve the best possible understanding and performance is not a true 
Islamic structure or methodology for thought, knowledge, or life. "100 
Naturally, AbuSulayman's thoughts are criticised since, in Mohammed AM Khan's 
words, they sound like a "recipe for positivism" and tautology. toi 
This brings us to the internal issue of theological reductionism. Hick was quick to 
realise that the doctrine of Incarnation was "incompatible" with his "Copernican 
Revolution. " 102 In order for his theory to work, it was "necessary to break the ontological 
identification of Jesus as the Christ with God. "103 What brought Hick to public attention 
as a pluralist, in fact, was firstly his call for a "Copernican Revolution in Theology, "104 
and secondly the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, as its editor and as a 
contributor with the article "Jesus and the World Religions. " 105. Both articles are closely 
Hick's treatment of religious teaching and finds his mythological approach irrealist/nonrealist, while 
Herrmann concentrates on Hick's position towards the existence of a transcendent Ultimate Reality. 
98 Esack, F, " Qur'antc Hermeneutics: Problems and Prospects, " T .. 
h mvl t im. W prlcý 83, no. 2, 
1993,122. 
99 AbuSulayman, AHA, Crisis in the Muslim Mind, trans. DeLorenzo, Yusuf T, Virginia: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993. 
100 Khan, MAM, "Review Article: Epistemological Poverty or Poverty of Epistemology, " The 
Muslim WorJd 87, no. 1,1997,74 (cited from AbuSulayman, Crisis in the Muslin Mind, 99). 
101 Khan, "Epistemological Poverty, " 74. 
102 Because of the unique importance of Jesus for Christianity, and the major obstacle it presents to 
against pluralism, we observe Hick trying to develop a consistent understanding of Jesus in line with 
his arguments. Therefore, we can trace his dealing with Christ as far back as his first book, Faith 
and Knowledge (1957), where he took a traditionalist line of thought (215-236) in his treatment of 
Jesus. The same major concern continued in subsequent works, especially in Christianity at the 
Centre (1968) (31-49), God and the Universe of Faiths (1973) (148-179), The Centre of Christianity 
(1977) (15-33), God Has Many Names (1980) (59-79), The Second Christianity (1983) (15-33) and 
Disputed Questions (1993) (35-104). His argument reached at its peak in The Metaphor of God 
Incarnate (1993), which is one of his latest books. For a detailed development and analysis of Hick's 
Christology, see: Gillis, C, A Question of Final Belief. ' John flick's Pluralistic Theory of Salvation, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan: 1989, Clip. 3; Carruthers, G H. Christian Theology of World Religions: An 
Elaboration and Evaluation of the Position of John Hick, Lanham, New York and London: 
University Press of America, 1990, Clips. 3&4; and Loughlin, G P, Mirroring God's World: A 
Critique of John Hick's Speculative Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University, PhD, 1987, Chp. 
5. 
103 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 89. 
104 GUF, Clip. 9,12-132. The article was an extended version of "The Christian View of Other 
Faiths, " Fxpogitory. Iimes 64, n. 2,1972,36-39, which, as Gillis rightly suggests, marked Hick's 
departure from the traditional interpretation of Christ (Gillis, Final Belief, 78). 
105 The article has been reprinted in God Has Many Names (1980) (59-79). 
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related to Christology. In the latter essay, he starts with the Feuerbachian conception of 
God as the "projection of human ideals. " 106 He then turns his attention to the doctrines of 
incarnation and resurrection. To prove that Jesus is not the only religious figure to be 
exalted to the status of divine, he quotes the divination of the founder of Buddhism, 
Gautama (or Sakyamuni), in the Mahayana Buddhism, 107 to conclude that the exaltation 
of the founder in each tradition to divinity "led the developing tradition to speak of him in 
terms which he himself did not use, and to understand him by means of a complex of 
beliefs which was only gradually formed by later generations of his followers. " Ios 
Regarding the issue of the resurrection of Jesus, a "significant point of difference 
between Gautama and Jesus, "109 he cites the examples of resurrections Jesus himself 
performed, such as those of Lazarus 110 and Jairus' daughter, " and states that Jesus' 
resurrection "did not automatically put him in a quite unique category. It indicated that he 
had a special place within God's providence; but this was not equivalent to seeing him as 
literally divine. "112 As far as the biblical evidence about the divine sonship of Jesus is 
concerned, Hick relies upon "the son of God terminology"113 of hermeneutical biblical 
scholarship to say that the expression was known to the Israelite people. Therefore, he 
infers that the unique experience of Jesus and his followers relationship to him and to 
God must have been dogmatised by Nicaea and Chalcedon; thus they are not authentic 
claims. "4 He contends that the doctrine of Incarnation can be 
"best expressed by saying that the idea of divine incarnation is a mythological idea. And I am 
using the term 'myth' in the following sense; a myth is a story which is told but which is not 
literally true, or an idea or image which is applied to someone or something but which does 
not literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers... That Jesus was God 
the Son incarnate is not literally true, since it has no literal meaning, but it is an application to 
Jesus of a mythical concept whose function is analogous to that of the notion of divine 
sonship ascribed in the ancient world to a king. " 115 
This was his conclusion then. Sixteen years on little has changed, and he states in 
The Metaphor of God Incarnate: 
"But for most modern Western Christians (including myself) it remains difficult to accept 
myth as myth. Returning to the crib, and the Christmas story as a whole, we know that it is 
historically unlikely that Jesus was born on 25 December (the date of a pre-Christian pagan 
winter festival which Christianity inherited), that the year of his birth was 1 CE (it was more 
probably about 5 BCE); unlikely that he was born in Bethlehem (which was probably adopted 
1°6 MYGI, 168. 
1w MYGI, 168-169. 
108 MYG1,170. 
109 Gillis, Final Belief, 83. 
110 John 11: 1-44. 
111 Mark 5: 35-43; Luke 8: 49-56. 
112 MYGI, 171. 
113 Gillis, Final Belief, 83. 
114 MYGI, 171-178. 
115 MYGI, 178. 
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into the story to fulfil prophecy), that he had no human father (a mythic theme that became 
attached to a number of great figures in antiquity); and we have seen reasons to reject the 
dogma that he was God incarnate (a dogma that Jesus himself would probably have regarded 
as blasphemous). In view of all this, how does one participate in Christmas?... The alternative 
is a Christian faith which takes Jesus as our supreme (but not necessarily only) spiritual 
guide; as our personal and communal lord, leader, guru, exemplar, and teacher, but not as 
literally himself God; and which sees Christianity as one authentic context of 
salvation/liberation amongst others, not opposing but interacting in mutually creative ways 
with the other great paths. " 116 
I have two immediate comments on these quotations from a Muslim perspective. 
One is about Hick's understanding of myth: "a myth is... an image which is applied to 
someone or something but which does not literally apply, but which invites a particular 
attitude in its hearers"117 It struck me as soon as I read the paragraph that this definition 
approves idolatrous practices, a very sensitive issue within Muslim circles. For a Muslim, 
this description is hard to come to terms with, due to the fact that it renders the work of 
prophet Muhammad among the pagan Arabs to nothing. Both the Qur'an and the 
historians of Islam make it crystal clear that pagan Arabs had an idea of a monotheistic 
god, Allah; on that front, Muhammad did not bring anything new. Their major problem 
was how to approach this strictly monotheistic god. They thought that idols were the 
appropriate means to worship Allah, which they claimed brought them near to Him. To 
abolish this idolatry, indeed, was Muhammad's first priority. According to Hick's logic, 
he should not have abolished the idols, since they produce the right attitudes in the hearer. 
C Smith produces a positive outlook towards idolatry in his excellent article, 
"Idolatry, " 118 by claiming that it could be seen as a positive way of worshipping God, or 
achieving salvation/liberation in Hick's account. Specifically addressing the issue of 
"idol-worship, " Smith quotes from one of his earlier works: "No one has ever worshipped 
an idol. Some have worshipped God in the form of an idol; that is what idols are for. "' 19 
He also cites from "the amir `Abd al-Qädir (ibn Muhyi-d-Din al-Hasani)"120 to bolster his 
contention. I have tremendous respect for the authority of C Smith, but these views 
represent a very tiny minority of the Islamic world; even if it may be true to the spirit of 
the Qur'an, the majority think otherwise. 
My second concern is about the virgin birth: not the event itself, but its wider 
implications for the authenticity of Qur'anic teaching, if the Hickian interpretation is 
taken to be true. Muslims do believe that, according to the Qur'an, Jesus was born 
without a father. It is very unlikely that they will surrender this literal understanding, 
116 MEG1,161-163. 
117MYGI, 178. 
118 Smith, W C, "Idolatry: A Comparative Perspective, " in The. MYth. Qf. ChdS. tj icluýtýcss, 
Toward. aýltaraýý tic. TheQlogx. of. RýGgiaaz, eds., Hick, J and PF Knitter, Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 1987,53-68. 
119 Smith, "Idolatry, " 53. 
120 Smith, "Idolatry, " 66-67, n. 1. 
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since it will not be understood as a problem of interpretation by many of the mainstream 
scholars. Rather they consider it as a test of the truthfulness of the Qur'anic revelation. As 
S Hossein Nasr puts it forcefully: "Islam will never accept that its Christology is false... It 
is He [Allah] who revealed to Muslims that an Islamic doctrine of Christ. If certain verses 
of the Qur'an like those of Surat Maryam [referring to Virgin Birth] are incorrect, then by 
what criterion should Muslims accept the rest of the Qur'an? "121 Fazlur Rahman also 
makes similar remarks about Muslim Christology. 122 However, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, Islamic Christology is not as rigid as these scholars suggest. Mahmoud 
Ayoub's efforts of constructing an Islamic Christology, which respects both Islamic and 
Christian understandings, worth mentioning. 123 
But surely Hick's critical realism expects a critical understanding from the 
followers of all great traditions towards the conflicting truth-claims. This may backfire 
though, and Rose accurately exposes this difficulty when he says: 
"This is a serious fault of the pluralistic hypothesis since not many adherents of specific 
religions would likely, upon reflection, agreeably allow their beliefs, or interpretation of the 
mystery of existence, to be subjected to the reductionism inherent in Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis. Nor would they likely agree that the noumenal Real is the true intention of the 
various vocabularies that they employ in their dealings with the mystery of existence. "124 
The second downgrading in Hick's epistemology is the test of truthfulness of 
religions. Hick's understanding of religious language also requires him to determine the 
truth or falsity of any given religious proposition on condition that it evokes an 
"appropriate dispositional attitude to"125 the Real, i. e. the transformation from self- 
centredness to Reality-centredness. Thus he states that "the truthfulness of a myth is... a 
practical truthfulness, consisting in its capacity to orient us rightly in our lives. " 126 
When questioned about whether his reinterpretation of problematic religious 
doctrines resembles at all the "doctrines held in the respected traditions; " he replies: "yes 
and no. " He maintains that yes, the conflicting truth-claims of the religions are left "intact 
within their own traditions, " but no, because they become partial truths as "different 
human responses to the Real, "127 i. e. true metaphorically as far as the phenomenal Real is 
concerned, but untrue in the case of the noumenal Real. So Hick first reinterprets the 
religious language as mythical and symbolic and then restricts it within the boundaries of 
121 Nasr, S H, "Response to Hans Kung's Paper on Christian-Muslim Dialogue, " ThP Mysjini 
WQrli 77,1987,100. 
122 Rahman, F, "A Muslim Response: Christian Particularity and the Faith of Islam, " in ChdS! llt0 
ýiýh ýn a. RcligigüSlY. ýý4T+ YS! QFIcý, ed. Dawe, DG and JB Carman, New York, Maryknoll: Orbis 
Books: 1986,78. 
123 See: Ayoub, M M, "Towards an Islamic Christology: An Image of Jesus in Early Shi'i Muslim 
Literature, " . Th 
. 
M. sjjnj. WQrJ 166, no. 3,1976 and "Towards an Islamic Christology, II: The Death 
of Jesus, Reality or Delusion (A Study of the Death of Jesus in Tafsir Literature), " The mu$bm 
. 
WQrkd 70, no. 2,1980. 
124 Rose, Knowing the Real, 100. 
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the phenomenal Real. In other words, he first gives them a modified language which has 
very little to do with religious realism of the relevant traditions, and lets the religious 
believers apply this pruned language to their now downgraded and localised gods. If one 
can call this an "authentic response, " it can only be so for Hick and like-minded 
pluralists, but not for the followers of the respected religions. When he was reminded that 
it sounds a "pretty radical reinterpretation, " he leaves us with an either-or dilemma: "We 
do really have to make a choice between a one-tradition absolutism and a genuinely 
pluralistic interpretation of the global religious situation. " 128 
There are also the questions relating to what an appropriate response is and how 
transformation from ego-centredness to the Reality-centredness occurs for the world 
religions. To resolve the issue, Hick sticks to the Golden Rule: "it is good to benefit 
others and evil to harm them. "129 He also believes that the rule is common to all great 
world religions as the reflection of "love, compassion, generous concern for and 
commitment to. the welfare of others. " 130 Although I have no objection to the Golden 
Rule, I have difficulty in differentiating between fiction and scripture, since they may 
both evoke the right attitudes in one and guide one towards the Golden Rule. What makes 
the scriptures different from fiction? We have not been given any indication. In fact, Hick 
may not even have such a distinction, since he does not have a definition of religion. 
However this seems to me mere ethicism rather than a religious reinterpretation of 
religion. 131 As Unamuno stresses, for Kant and for Hick too, "morality is the basis of 
eschatology, "132 i. e. the best way to achieve salvation/liberation. This may be true for 
many religions in general, but I wonder if it adequately reflects the complex structure of 
every religion, at least the ones Hick is concerned with. I believe it overlooks the ritual 
aspect of religion, to which I shall come back in the next chapter. 
Leading to the above conclusion is Hick's conviction that doctrinal differences 
between religions are not, after all "soteriologically vital. "133 Embarking on a borrowed 
Buddhistic principle, "undetermined questions, "134 Hick "views doctrines as a kind of 
`secondary' packaging and labelling, "135 which results in the subordination of "what is 
different between the religions to what he thinks is common to them. "136 So in the final 
analysis, Hick thinks it does not matter what we believe in; so long as we have the 
Golden Rule and behave accordingly, we are on the right path to achieve 
salvation/liberation. 
128 ROF, 43. 
129 AIR, 313-314,316. 
130 AIR, 316; see for more AIR, 316-340. 
131 For a similar claim by K Ward see "Divine Ineffability, " in Gpd, Truth ýpý. ýtýalicy;. $ ýyS.! [! 
Hpnpgr of, john. Iiick,, ed. Sharma, A, New York: St Martin's Press: 1993,215. 
132 Unamuno, M de, The Tragic Sense of Life, London and Glasgow: Collins/Fontana Library, 1962, 
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Throughout his study of religions, Hick is trying to establish a fine balance 
between, on the one hand, a critical realism and on the other, a mythical, metaphorical 
and symbolic understanding of religion. To me, Hick loses the argument by being either a 
religious reductionist or a "transcendental agnostic. "137 So on the issue of religious 
epistemology as an explanation of religious diversity, Hick's reductionist argument 
should be rejected since it does justice neither to the beliefs of particular religious 
followers nor their scriptures. The idea of a critical realism is quite vague since it leaves 
us with nothing but an empty shell; which is not far away from the naturalistic or non- 
realist understanding of religion. I concur with Rose138 that the reductionist attitude 
implicit in Hick's pluralism will most likely result in the theory's widespread rejection by 
the adherents of the major world religions. One of the main problems in this picture is the 
postulated noumenal Real, which I will examine in the forthcoming chapter. 
4.4. The Real an sich 
As noted earlier, one of the most distinctive features of Hick's later hypothesis is 
his adoption of Kantian epistemology by distinguishing between the Real as in itself and 
as humanly expressed and experienced as the object of religion. This is, one may suggest, 
one of the most controversial and much-discussed aspects of Hick's theory. For many, the 
initial reaction was to reject this distinction owing to the fact that Hick was trying to 
introduce a formal-transcendental concept, the Real, above and beyond the range of all 
human religious experience. However, as shown in the previous chapter, Hick has always 
maintained that the distinction, more readily available as "formlessness" in Eastern 
religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc., has been also existent in other major religious 
traditions, especially "within the mystical strands of Judaism, Islam" and Christianity. 139 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the Real an sich creates more problems for Hick than he 
tries to solve. 140 To begin with, as Rose accurately points out, Hick does not clearly 
address the question of transcendentality or causality vis-ä-vis the Real. That is, it is not 
clear whether we need the Real as the main cause of the human religious activity or as a 
necessary transcendental postulate for the religious experience of humankind or both. 
Secondly, there are problems related to the issue of ineffability and reference: how can 
we refer to something if it cannot be expressed or experienced directly. If it cannot be 
137 D'Costa, John Hick's, 162,167,170. 
138 Rose, Knowing the Real, 10 1-2. 
139 AIR, 236-239; ROF, 57-58. 
140 Keith Ward, for instance, confirming this conclusion writes: 
"... first, that it leads us to regard all objects of religious experience as illusory or subjective 
in some sense; whereas believers want to make claims to objectivity, however inadequate. 
Second, it leads us to renounce all claims to knowledge of noumenal reality; whereas most 
believers wish to claim some knowledge of ultimate reality - again, even if inadequately 
conceived. In other words, the Kantian distinction turns disputes about the relative adequacy 
of interpretations of reality into wholly unresolvable claims about a completely unknowable 
reality. In fact, if reality is completely unknowable, no cognitive claims can be made about it 
at all; so religion inevitably becomes a wholly subjective matter of personal attitudes. " 
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referred to, then there are some who question the need for the Real an sich in Hick's 
hypothesis. We shall deal with these questions in turn. 
4.4.1. Between Transcendentality and Causality 
This is a question developed particularly by Rose in his book Knowing the Real. 141 
Rose thinks that it is inconsistent and incoherent on Hick's part to hold that the Real an 
sich is both transcendental and causal. Hick sometimes perceives the noumenal Real as 
the "necessary postulate" of religious experience when he says, in response to the 
question of why we need the Real: 
"The answer is that the divine noumenon is a necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious 
life of humanity. For within each tradition we regard as real the object of our worship or 
contemplation... we are led to postulate the Real an sich as the presupposition of the veridical 
character of this range of forms of religious experience. Without this postulate we should be 
left with a plurality of personae and impersonae each of which is claimed to be the Ultimate, 
but no one of which alone can be. "142 
On the other hand, Hick also establishes a causal correlation between the noumenal Real 
and religious experience: 
"We have affirmed the noumenal Real as the necessary presupposition of the religious life. 
Trusting in the basically veridical character of the stream of religious experience and thought 
in which we participate, and extending that acceptance at least to the other major streams, we 
have postulated the Real as the ground of this varied realm of religious phenomena. Indeed 
we have already committed ourselves to such a postulate in rejecting the view of religious 
experience as simply human projection. For to deny that possibility is to affirm that the divine 
personae and metaphysical impersonae are not only shaped (as is evident) by the categories 
of human thought but express at the same time the presence and impact of a transcendental 
reality. We are thus led to affirm a noumenal ultimate reality of which the objects of religious 
experience are phenomenal manifestations. 143 
Rose contends that Hick aims at a double benefit by introducing the noumenal Real 
in his hypothesis. Firstly, he seeks to transform the "otherwise neutral or nonreligious 
phenomenological accounts of the life of religious communities" "into religious 
interpretations, thus distinguishing them from nonreligious, noncognitive, and functional 
interpretations of religion. "144 Secondly, Hick would like also to "prevent noncognitive 
or functionalist explanatory or interpretive strategies... from negating or ignoring the 
essential reliance of lived religion and religious interpretations of religion upon a 
transcendental divine reality. "las 
141 Rose, Knowing the Real, 106-110. 
142 AIR, 249. 
143 AIR, 350. 
144 Rose, Knowing the Real, 106. 
145 Rose, Knowing the Real, 106. 
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Rose, however, finds this a quite problematic and paradoxical interchange, since he 
maintains that "causality cannot be predicate of a transcendental postulate, which is 
merely a notional entity. " 146 The paradox lies in the fact that "a causal agent... cannot at 
the same time be a transcendental postulate, "147 which is what Hick is claiming for the 
noumenal Real. He further remarks that "Hick not only slides back and forth between 
these contrary ways of conceiving the noumenal Real, he often conflates them in the 
same sentence or paragraph, thereby creating an unanalysed confusion of transcendental 
and causal conceptions of the noumenal Real. "148 It is inconsistent, Rose suggests, to 
claim "manifestations" for a transcendentally postulated being, e. g. the Real an sich, on 
the one hand and on the other, to hold that it "effects schematizations of itself' through 
human cognition and "culture, " despite the fact that it cannot be experienced. 149 To 
substantiate his claim, Rose cites Hick: 
"Since we can never experience the unexperienced [the noumenal Real] we can never 
compare the world as it appears in consciousness with the postulated world as it exists 
independently of its impact upon our human sensory and nervous systems. But we know that 
we are able to survive, and indeed to flourish, as physical entities moving about in a physical 
world with which our bodies intermesh in a single causal system. "150 
We know too that Hick's departure point is the empirical veridicality of our 
religious experiences, which in turn depends on their fruits in the lives of believers. 
Evidently, Hick also holds that the idea of an "ultimate divine noumenon is arrived at 
inductively. " 151 Rose makes two startling comments regarding this. One asks that "how 
something to which the notion of cause does not apply can have an impact, "152 upon us 
and the other inquires that how a "transcendental postulate" can become "the product of 
an empirical doctrine? "153 Rose's answer to these questions is that apart from being a 
"spurious speculative, theoretical assurance to the one who has religious experience that 
such experience is not an illusion, " the noumenal Real can be "neither the veiled object 
nor the partial cause of religious experience. " 154 In conclusion, Rose sets forth Hick's 
task as follows: 
... Me most fundamental question to address to Hick at this point is this: Does he intend that 
the noumenal Real should be understood as simply an entity necessitated by the 
transcendental logic of his quasi-Kantian reliance upon the noumenon/phenomenon 
distinction, which then serves as the sole guarantor of the cognitivity of religions? Or does he 
146 Rose, Knowing the Real, 107. 
147 Rose, Knowing the Real, 107. 
148 Rose, Knowing the Real, 107. For this sort of usage, see AIR, 134-35,165,169,200,243,244, 
350. 
149 Rose, Knowing the Real, 107. 
150 AIR, 134-135. 
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154 Rose, Knowing the Real, 109. 
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intend that the noumenal Real be understood as partial cause, along with the biological 
processes of cognition and also of culture, of religious experience? " 155 
In order to make it a tenable and "defensible" theory, Rose's solution to Hick's dilemma 
is to suggest that if Hick seeks to avoid the criticisms levelled against his theory, he 
should first abandon both the idea that "the noumenal Real is... an element in a 
transcendental logic justifying a priori a religious over against a nonreligious 
interpretation of religions"156 and also his "quasi-Kantian" "noumenon/phenomenon 
distinction. " Secondly, he should give a more causal role to the noumenal Real as a 
"factor in the generation of religious experience, " which is supported by the "traditional 
mystical interpretations of the diversity of religious experience. " 157 This, Rose believes, 
is also in line with "Hick's rejection of the traditional and modern attempts to prove the 
existence of God, " and his claim instead that "it is reasonable for a religious person to 
trust her own personal experience, " which proves to be, in Rose's understanding, "the 
best promising strand... for developing a pluralistic hypothesis that can account for the 
plurality of religions as well as their cognitivity, their claim for veridicality. "lss 
What can be said about Rose's interesting and stimulating remarks about the exact 
nature of the noumenal Real? Perhaps I could start by pointing out a few problems with 
Rose's criticisms. His claim that the noumenal Real is a purely transcendental postulate 
does not necessitate the conclusion that there can be no causal relationship between the 
noumenal Real and its manifestations in religious traditions. Hick's concern has always 
been the detachment of the noumenal Real from human conceptions and terms. 159 Hick 
writes: 
"It is not a thing because it transcends all our thing-concepts, including our religious thing- 
concepts. But on the other hand it is not nothing; it is that reality in virtue of which, through 
our response to one or other of its manifestations as the God figures or the non-personal 
Absolutes, we can arrive at the blessed unselfcentrcd state which is our highest good. "160 
Again, when he is questioned about the possibility of the noumenal Real possessing 
attributes "analogous to goodness and love, " he refuses to concede this because it would 
violate the "principle that any comprehensive interpretation of religion must take account 
of all the major traditions, and not just of one's own. "161 Another reason for his resistance 
is that when considering all personae and impersonae analogous attributes of the Real, it 
"leads to manifest contradictions. " And "the more you add to the list the more incoherent 
it becomes. "162 So Hick's conclusion is that: 
155 Rose, Knowing the Real, 109. 
156 Rose, Knowing the Real, 109. 
157 Rose, Knowing the Real, 109. 
158 Rose, Knowing the Real, n. 32,124. 
159 Certainly one can question whether this is the best way of dealing with the seemingly conflicting 
truth-claims of religions which I shall be wrestling with in the following section. For now, though, 
our concern is transcendentality and causality of the Real. 
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"... rather than get into such a morass of impossibilities it seems to me that we should 
acknowledge that all these attributes are components of our human conceptual repertoire. But 
a comprehensive interpretation of religion requires us to postulate an ultimate reality which 
exceeds that conceptual repertoire, and is thus from our point of view ineffable or formless. It 
has its own nature, presumably infinite in richness, but that nature is not thinkable in our 
human terms -and indeed even the concept of a nature, or an essence, 
belongs to the network 
of human concepts which the Real totally transcends. " 163 
As I see it, Rose is mistaken in his belief that because the Real transcends our 
concepts, it cannot affect us and our environment in any way. However, I believe that an 
entity can be both transcendental and causal at the same time. This should not certainly 
be taken to mean that the Real is like the unmoved Mover of Aristotle. Contrary to what 
Rose implies, 16 neither does it suggest that just because it transcends everything we can 
think of does not mean that it is invented a priori out of nothing to overcome the 
theoretical difficulties. Indeed, one can even say that whether we postulate it or not, the 
noumenal Real exists independently of us. Or to take it a step further, who can guarantee 
that the God of Jesus, of Muhammad and of Buddha is different? 165 The question surely 
is: what is the evidence? In Hick's case it is our experience, and hence the conclusion is 
inductively reached. But how can one be sure that this is the case? Hick's answer is that 
no-one can, because on the personal level there is no overwhelming evidence that 
Christians are better human beings than Muslims or Hindus or vice versa, while on the 
global level things could be interpreted both religiously and non-religiously. This leads 
Hick to the conclusion that the religious nature of the universe is ambiguous: everybody 
can find in it "proof" to support his/her argument. 166 An evolutionary biologist like 
Richard Dawkins can see it developing on its own through natural forces without the 
hand of God, whereas a theist could argue that the universe is governed and sustained by 
an all-loving God. Whichever is true, we will find out in the hereafter. 
I cannot see a real contradiction in Hick's understanding of the noumenal Real as 
both transcendental and causal. To me, this does not pose a serious challenge Hick's 
theory. I do, however, have problems with his understanding of the ineffability of the 
noumenal Real, which I shall begin to examine next. 
4.4.2. The Ineffability and Redundancy of the Noumenal Real 
In approaching the problem of ineffability, I would like to deal first with the 
question of identity. Supposing that Hick might be right in claiming that all the great 
world traditions point to an ultimate Reality, what makes him so sure that it is the same 
Reality that they point to? Could not there be separate, ineffable, ultimate realities? 
163 ROF, 62. 
164 Rose's understanding of transcendence seems to be closely related to the Platonist view of 
transcendence. 
165 As we have seen earlier (150-1), Verkamp in fact supports Hick by suggesting that they are not 
different (Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 113). 
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Keith Ward agrees with Hick in his assertion that ineffability is one of the common 
features of the Ultimate in many traditions. However, he thinks that "it may seem a short 
move from saying that two ideas are of an ineffable reality to saying that they are of the 
same reality; for what could distinguish two ineffables? "167 
If A and B are "indescribable" by someone, Ward argues, "it does not follow that" 
the two are "identical. " "On the contrary, there is no way in which" A and B can be 
identified with each other, "since there are no criteria of identity to apply... If I do not 
know what either is, I ipso facto do not know whether they are the same or different. " 168 
Hick, according to Ward, in fact commits "the quantifier-shift fallacy, " where he moves 
from "many religions believe in an ineffable Real" to "there is an ineffable Real in which 
many religions believe. "169 Hick concedes that he would accept "the quantifier-shift 
fallacy, " if he were to use such an argument. However, he argues that his reasoning is 
rather different and therefore the charge is not valid. He puts his case forward: 
"My reason to assume that the different world religions are referring, through their specific 
concepts of the Gods and Absolutes, to the same ultimate Reality is the striking similarity of 
the transformed human state described within the different traditions as saved, redeemed, 
enlightened, wise, awakened, liberated. This similarity strongly suggests a common source of 
salvific transformation. So it seems to me that the most reasonable hypothesis is that of a 
single ultimate ground of all human salvific transformation, rather than of a plurality of such 
grounds. " 170 
Ward, nevertheless, dismisses Hick's "simplicity" argument, 171 i. e. the claim that 
identification of different concepts of God fits better than the separation of them, or the 
bid to find "the simplest hypothesis" to describe the diversity of religious experience and 
thought of humankind. 172 Ward rightly questions Hick's reasoning to claim simplicity 
instead of complexity as an attribute of the ultimate reality, 173 a point which is also raised 
by PL Quinn. Quinn holds that one might repudiate (indeed "some philosophers of 
science do") the claim that "theoretical simplicity is indicative of truth, viewing it instead 
as a merely pragmatic virtue. "174 Hence Ward infers that one is "not entitled to assert 
167 Ward, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions. " 5. 
168 Ward, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 5. 
169 Wem, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 5. 
170 ROF, 69. 
171 AIR, 248-249; ROF, 69. 
172 AIR, 248. 
173 GI Mavrodes also criticises Hick severely on this point in "A Response to John Hick" (E. ith. anii 
Philo ophy 14, no. 3,1997,292): 
"But isn't it hard to see how something which is described only by the via negative- 'not this, 
not that'- could provide at all, simple or otherwise, for any positive data? The religious life of 
the world is amazingly resistant and resilient. The religions of the world are surprisingly 
diverse... They produce actual human characters of profound beauty and goodness. These are 
facts (or so, at least, it seems to me). What could account for such facts? " 
174 Quinn, P L, "Towards Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity, " 
ýntýýmationaýJoumal. fQr. P. kýäýQSQphx. oýfReliglon 38,1995,152. Interestingly enough, Hick suggests 
on another occasion that he seeks to "complicate our understanding by distinguishing between the 
Real as it is in itself, independently of human cognizers, and the Real as humanly experienced in a 
range of different ways" (Hick, J, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy, " 
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identity or difference of ineffable objects"175 when there is no other compelling evidence 
to do so. Ward concludes: "There does not seem to be much hope of uniting all traditions 
around even the rather short creed of one ineffable reality. They may say there is no such 
reality; or that there are more than one; or that it is not ineffable. "176 It should be noted, 
however, that Ward, as a fellow Christian pluralist, is not arguing on these grounds for 
the impossibility of the pluralist stance. His point is rather directly related to Hick's 
notion of an ineffable noumenal Real as the grounding source of all religious experience. 
We will see Ward's solution to Hick's predicament towards the end of this section, where 
he proposes a moderate notion of ineffability compatible with some descriptions of the 
Real provided by the great religions. 
Now we can move on to the problem of ineffability of the noumenal Real as such. 
In a recent article to defend his position and to respond to its critics, Hick writes: 
"The Real is thus not experienced as it is in itself, but is postulated to satisfy (a) the basic 
faith that human religious experience is not purely projection but is at the same time a 
response to a transcendent reality or realities, and (b) the observation that Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism etc. which are communal responses to these different gods and 
absolutes, seem to be more or less equally effective contexts of human transformation from 
self-centredness, with all the evils and miseries that flow from this, to a recentering in the 
Transcendent as experienced within one's own tradition"177 
Having considered a few analogies to show the relation between the Real as it is and as 
humanly experienced, he concludes: 
"There can indeed be no true analogy for the unique relationship between the postulated 
ultimate, ineffable, reality the universal presence of which gives rise, in collaboration with 
the our human spiritual practices and conceptual schemes, to the range of forms of religious 
experience reported in the history of religions. " 178 
This is a typical Hickian statement to picture the diversity of religions while maintaining 
that: 
i. the religious experience of humankind is not an illusion but a response to a 
transcendent reality, 
ii. the great world religions are more or less equally effective ways of 
salvation/liberation, 
iii. yet, as the basis of all these, the Real lies beyond the grasp of human `language- 
games, ' i. e. it is totally ineffable. That is to say, unlike the traditionally known moderate 
Religious Studies 31,1995,420). This, however, in my opinion seems to be a different complexity 
than the one mentioned in the paragraph. In this sense complexity is to widen our understanding of 
the Real from locality to universality. 
175 Ward, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 5-6. 
176 Ward, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 6. 
177 Hick, J, "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism, " E tb. wil.. biIasi2phy. 14, no. 
3,1997,284-285. 
178 Hick, J. "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism, " 284-285. 
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ineffability where religious language relates to the Real, in Hick's theory, there is a 
complete discontinuity between the Real as it is and our experience and understanding of 
it. 
The connection between the first two premises is not difficult to establish. But 
linking the third to them is the hardest thing for Hick. Hence the ineffability of the 
noumenal Real constitutes one of the major obstacles against the pluralistic hypothesis. 
As Ward notes, three major questions come to mind immediately vis-ä-vis the ineffability 
of the Real proposed by Hick: "If the Real is ineffable, how can one know that it exists? 
If no truth-claim can apply to it, how can one be entitled to say anything of it? And if this 
reality is unknowable, how can we know that all claims about it are equally valid, except 
in the sense that all are completely mistaken? " 179 I should point out at this stage that if the 
Real is totally ineffable, I do not think we can even know that "all claims are completely 
mistaken. " What Ward would be meaning here is that we could speculate about or 
suspect that religious language might be just an illusion or a "language game. " Otherwise 
the claim of illusion cannot really be an exception to the general ineffability of the Real in 
the sense that "we can definitely be sure that they are mistaken. " I believe strong 
ineffability does not allow this certainty of knowledge either negatively or positively, but 
both are possibilities. 
The main problem with Hick's ineffability is that, to use K Yandell's expression, he 
supports "strong ineffability"180 of the Real as opposed to a moderate version. 
Nonetheless, he starts with the basic traditional doctrine of ineffability (that is moderate, 
i. e. God a se and God pro nobis in Christianity), which he thinks is evidently existent in 
other great religious traditions as well. '8' Hick is certainly aware of the difficulties 
associated with strong ineffability, but he sees them as "logical pedantries" which should 
not be worried about. 182 
After the dismissal of "logical pedantries, " Hick goes on to emphasise the classical 
distinction between "substantial" and "purely formal and logically generated properties" 
to back up his argument about the total ineffability of the Real an sich. 183 His claim is 
that while substantial properties like "being good, being powerful, " and "having 
179 Ward, K, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " Religious Studies 26,1990,5. 
180 AIR, 239 (cited from Yandell, K E, "Some Varieties of Ineffability, " Jr)ttrrn; 1tlo4alJc? urnat. for 
Phl10p9R(y. 9(JKeJig(0I1 6, no. 3,1975,172). 
181 AIR, 236-240. 
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183 For some reason -possibly technical- in a footnote replying to P Eddy in 1995, Hick expressed 
his willingness to use W Alston's terminology, which differentiates between "extrinsic" and 
"intrinsic" attributes of God, instead of the traditional differentiation of formal and substantial 
attributes (Hick, J, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 418, n. 4). According to this division, 
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operations of the subject" as "negative" or "extrinsic, " whereas "predicates" that "`tell us 
something' about such matters" as "intrinsic" (Alston, W P, Divine Nature and Human Language, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989,40). I have not found any trace of this change in 
Hick's subsequent writings, though I am sceptical about whether it makes any positive contribution 
in Hick's argument. 
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knowledge, " do not apply to the Real an sich, 184 purely formal and logical properties such 
as "being a referent of a term and being such that our substantial concepts do not apply" 
do belong to the noumenal Real. 185 He also wishes to gather support from "via negativa 
(or via remotionis)"186 by stating that the distinction paves the way to say that the Real 
"lies beyond the range of all our positive substantial characterisations. It is in this 
qualified sense that it makes perfectly good sense to say that our substantial concepts do 
not apply to the Ultimate. "187 
Hick's appeal to the long established tradition of via negativa in Christianity seems 
to be misleading, since it does not actually assert the total "lack of knowledge" of God, 188 
as Ward points out: 
"We get to the notion of Divine ineffability by starting with the power and wisdom of a 
personal creator, as seen in the world; or by starting with a personal creator, as seen in the 
world; or by starting with personal experience of a presence which seems to be both awe- 
inspiring and mysterious. Only when we qualify these initial concepts by successively 
denying all limitations on the creator and denying the adequacy of all specific descriptive 
terms to characterise the object of our experience do we come to say that God is ineffable. In 
other words, the idea of `the ineffable God' is not simply the idea of something totally 
unknowable... it is essential to theism to claim that one knows the ineffable God; one is 
acquainted with what is beyond understanding... this idea of ineffable is not just of some 
ineffable thing or other; it is the idea of an ineffable God; that is, of a creator truly known to 
us in experience, yet whose essential nature transcends our understanding. "189 
Hick's ineffability is certainly "far more radical... than that proposed even by such a 
radical ineffabilist as Dionysius the Aeropagite (c. 500), " who in his Mystical Theology 
even "negates negation itself. " 190 Despite his radical proposal of ineffability, Rose points 
out, Pseudo-Dionysius sees via affirmativa as playing a complementary role to via 
negativa, a relation which Hick's "apophaticism fails to acknowledge. "191 Ward makes 
the same point when he says that Hick "has taken the doctrine of the via negativa out of 
relation to its complementary doctrine of the via eminentia, to produce a new doctrine 
184 AIR, 239. 
185 AIR, 239,246,352. 
186 Hick cites Aquinas: "We are unable to apprehend [the divine substance] by knowing what it is. 
Yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not" (S. c. G., I: 14: 2- Pegis 1955, 
96) (AIR, 239). 
187 AIR, 239. 
188 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 6. 
189 Ward, K, "Divine Ineffability, " 211. Confirming this position elsewhere, Ward declares that "the 
traditional doctrine of ineffability arises from the exploration of the greatness and infinity of God. It 
presupposes the truth of many descriptive statements; indeed, it entails at least one descriptive 
statement, namely, that God is ineffable (a proposition which is not self-evident)" ("Tnuh and the 
Diversity of Religions, " 9). 
190 Rose, Knowing the Real, 111. 
191 Rose, Knowing the Real, 111; AIR, 247. 
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that the Real an sich is wholly unknowable. "192 This results, as Rose observes, in "the 
incoherence of the pluralistic hypothesis. "193 
Then there is the troubled relationship between substantial and logical properties, 
despite Hick's quick dismissal of the question as "logical pedantry. " Rose deems Hick's 
distinction "unworkable, since we don't seem to be able to say anything at all about that 
to which no substantial properties apply. "194 In fact, we are desperately in need of help 
from substantial properties to be able to "identify that to which the logical properties 
supposedly apply. "195 Thus, Rose contends, Hick's purely formal and logical properties 
such as "being able to be referred to" are "substantial properties in disguise. "196 Ward 
fully exposes this difficulty when he says that "if X has the property of being able to be 
referred to, this reference must be accomplished either by ostentation or description. "197 
We have only one option, "description, " since "ostentation is ruled out" for transcendent 
objects. Thus "X must be identified as `the X which... "' Additionally, Ward warns us that 
a successful "identifying reference" requires "to pick out X as some sort of substance, 
process or stuff. " Therefore it is not satisfactory to say, as Hick does, "`the X which exists 
beyond universe, ' if there may be such things. One will need to say, `X is the one and 
only thing which satisfies the properties ...... 
198 In this sense, Ward considers Hick's 
generic term "the Real" a failure, since he believes that for Hick "X is the one and only 
thing which is real in the fullest sense, " which is "independent, self-existent, unchanging 
in its essential nature, unlimited by anything else... "199 This means that "for it even to 
have a meaning, it is apparent that quite a lot of our concepts do need to apply to X. "200 
So the distinction between logical and substantial properties cannot be used to defend the 
view that since the noumenal Real transcends all our human concepts, it can only be 
spoken of in purely logical properties. Ward likens this position to "doing Logic with 
nothing but p's and q's: " setting out "possible argument-forms without actually uttering 
an argument. "201 Rose argues similarly, concluding that Hick's ineffable noumenal Real 
is nothing but a "formal place holder, empty of all content, incongruously taken as the 
superexcellent ground and referent of all the substantial properties that the religions 
ascribe to their divine realities. "202 
WJ Wainwright expresses, furthermore, the inappropriateness of the distinction 
between logical and substantial properties of the noumenal Real. He exemplifies the issue 
by taking up the property of "goodness, " as a common feature to all religions. He 
19 2 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 11. 
193 Rose, Knowing the Real, 112. 
194 Rose, Knowing the Real, 110. 
195 Rose, Knowing the Real, 110. 
196 Rose, Knowing the Real, 110-111. 
197 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 9. 
198 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 9. 
199 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 9. 
200 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 9-10. 
201 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions, " 10. 
202 Rose, Knowing the Real, 110. 
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suggests that if experience is the starting point in our awareness of the Real, "why can't 
we say that it is (literally) good? " since "all the great traditions experience the Real as 
good. "203 He continues to reveal the paradox in Hick's discourse: 
"Since the Real transcends all human concepts, it transcends our concepts of good and evil. 
So even though the religions agree that the Real is (literally) good, we must deny that it is. 
The Real is good only in the sense that it is the ground of the change from self-centredness to 
blessedness. Hick's view is thus similar to Maimonides': God (or the Real) is good in the 
sense that it `causes' goodness. But Hick needn't draw this conclusion. Goodness may not be 
a formal property but it isn't clearly `substantive' either. It is a second order property that 
supervenes on first order substantive properties. "204 
So the way out for Hick, Wainwright proposes, is to "modify his position" and adopt the 
view that "the Real is literally good, " a position quite close to Ward's as will be seen later 
in this section. Apparently Wainwright thinks that this would not contradict the 
ineffability of the Real and would be in line with Hick's other views. This modification 
also grants Hick the additional benefit of "silencing one common criticism -that since, for 
all we know, the Real might be evil, we have no reason to think that love and compassion 
are more appropriate responses to it than hatred or cruelty. "tos 
Paul Eddy unearths another discontinuity between Kantian epistemology and 
Hick's application of it to pluralism. In discussing what led Kant to postulate the "strictly 
unknowable" noumenon in addition to "phenomenal apprehension, "206 Eddy quotes 
Stephen R Palmquist: 
"it would be impossible to give any plausible account of the source of `the empirical 
differences in shapes and sizes' of the objects of everyday experience... Only what is 
common to all representations is, for Kant, supplied a priori by the subject in the act of 
representing. So the thing itself must be posited and assumed to determine in some sense the 
raw material for any possible object of knowledge. "207 
203 Wainwright, W J, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " , 
ToAt i1. fQC. thC. P. hiJQSQpby 
Qf. R giQL $ 42,1997,125. 
However, Hick writes a few pages earlier that he accepts the corrections of K Ward ("Truth and the 
Diversity of Religions, " 10) and P Eddy ( "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 472) that it is "not a 
good example... of a purely formal concept" ROF, 60. 
204 Wainwright, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " 125. Even though Wainwright's thoughts in 
this paragraph are interesting, I disagree with his reasoning as stated below, because it contradicts 
Ward's remarks above: 
"Just as we know that something is capable of being referred to without knowing anything 
about it other than that it has the properties it must have to be an object of reference, so we 
can know that something is good while knowing nothing of its nature except that it has those 
properties it must have to be good. We can thus know that the Real is good without knowing 
what the Real is in itself' (p. 125). 
205 Wainwright, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " 126. 
206 Eddy, P R, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine: Another look at John Ifick's Neo-Kantian 
Proposal, " Religlous. Studiee 30,1994,477. 
207 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 477 (cited from Palmquist, S R, Kant's System of 
Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy, Lanham, University Press 
of America, 1993,169-170,176-177). 
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Eddy notes that in Hick's case such a reason is not available owing to the fact that 
"Hick's subject based categories themselves... contribute significantly to the supposed 
`raw material' of religious experience. "208 Eddy maintains that for Hick to be able to 
explain the religious phenomenon, unlike Kant, "there is nothing residual that requires 
the postulation of an `unknowable' (divine) noumenon. "209 Indeed, Eddy asserts that 
"everything can be adequately explained, via the human form/category- 
analogues... without the noumenon. '210 
With the postulation of an unknowable ineffable divine noumenon, Hick's thesis 
becomes more vulnerable to challenges posed by sceptics like David Hume and non- 
realist interpreters of religion such as Ludwig Feuerbach and more recently Don Cupitt. 
Hume, for example, writes in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: 
"The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have 
no comprehension; but, if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just and adequate, and 
correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is 
the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who 
maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who 
assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible? "211 
Again, Feuerbach declares forcefully: 
"But a being which has no predicates or qualities cannot possibly affect me, and what has no 
effect upon me, does not exist for me. Where man denies God all qualities- God himself is 
denied. A being without qualities is one which cannot become an object to the mind, cannot 
be conceived of as existing. Where man deprives God of all his qualities, God is no longer 
anything more to man than a negative being... But this distinction between what God is in 
himself and what he is for me is an unfounded and untenable distinction. I cannot possibly 
know whether God is something else in himself or for himself than what he is for me. What 
he is to me is, to me, all that he is. "212 
Developing this Humean and Feuerbachian line of criticism, Cupitt wrote almost 
three decades ago in his review of Hick's God Has Many Names: 
"Everything said of God is seen as highly variable, symbolic and culturally conditioned, then 
religious language ceases actually to describe God. It becomes cultural expression, not 
metaphysical description. God becomes an I-know-not-what, like substance in Locke's 
philosophy, on the point of vanishing altogether. Why not just take one more step and say 
that religion is wholly human and that religious practices and values must be chosen and 
followed for their own sakes, disinterestedly. "213 
208 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 477. 
209 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 477. 
210 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 477. 
211 Hume, D, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Aiken, H D, New York: Hafner Press, 
and London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1948,31. 
212 Feuerbach, L, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Eliot, G, New York: Frederick Ungar Pub., 
1964,12-13. 
213 Cupitt, D, "Thin-line Theism, " The Times Literary Supplement, 8 August 1980,902. 
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These are crucially important charges which may eventually shatter Hick's noumenal 
Real. But Hick is adamant in his response to Eddy, maintaining that these are not unique 
criticisms specifically levelled against a pluralist understanding of religion. "For the 
naturalistic option can be invoked against non-pluralist as easily as against pluralist 
religious views. "214 Thus Hick claims that the argument cannot be used against a pluralist 
by an exclusivist. Hick's point is certainly true and seemingly fair. However, one can 
easily recognise that it only diverts the attention rather than answering the question. There 
is a significant difference between an exclusivist and a pluralist in their understanding of 
ineffability. An Exclusivist is less likely to resort to strong ineffability than a pluralist. 
What Hick's theory does is to widen the traditional space that used to exist between God 
as He is in himself and as understood and experienced by us by supporting a strong 
ineffability thesis, which weakens both his theory as a religious interpretation of religion 
and the notion of Real. 
Thus Hick's notion of Real did not even satisfy his fellow pluralists, as P Byrne 
argues when he affirms that Hick's distinction between the Real as in itself and as 
humanly apprehended and experienced "leaves too little in the way of human cognitive 
responses in the religion to be caused by the transcendent, and too much to be caused by 
human social and historical factors, "215 which makes it almost impossible to "posit 
cognitive contact with religious reality. " Within this open space of cultural, social and 
historical concepts, in the end, we come to realise that "we could have those beliefs, those 
experiences, regardless of how the transcendent in itself acts or of whether it exists at 
all. "216 In short, Byrne thinks that Hick's ineffable noumenal Real fails because "culture 
and religious tradition play too great a causal role" to the degree that they engender the 
entire role of the Real "in generating the means of referring to sacred. "217 This in turn 
renders the noumenal Real redundant. 
Byrne is not the only scholar to question the necessity of the noumenal Real in 
Hick's hypothesis and to judge it to be otiose. Eddy, for example, avows in concluding 
his evaluation of Hick's hypothesis that the Real an sich is a "purely unnecessary and 
unjustifiable construct. While it may exist, like almost anything in the realm of the 
`conceivably possible, ' there is certainly no reason to think that it does. 11218 To add to this 
list: Loughlin describes the notion as "ontologically unnecessary, "219 a claim which is 
214 Hick, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 419. 
215 Byrne, P, Prolegomena, 38-39. 
216 Byrne, P, Prolegomena, 38-39. 
217 Byrne, P, Prolegomena, 38-39. K Ward also airs the same concerns in "Divine Ineffability, " 215. 
218 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 478. 
219 Loughlin, "Prefacing Pluralism, " 43. 
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also backed by D'Costa220 and S Grover. 221 Finally, Rose speculates that "like Locke's 
matter and Kant's noumena" the notion is an "arbitrary construction" and therefore 
"useless. "222 Instead of clarifying Hick's position, it brings the pluralistic hypothesis to a 
"dead-end as a defence of religious cognitivity" and eventually debases Hick's efforts to 
"the noncognitivist, nonreligious, and functionalist interpretations of religion that the 
pluralistic hypothesis is designed to counteract. "223 
If the ineffable noumenal Real is so problematic, what could the solution be, if any? 
One thing is certain: "strong ineffability" of the Real is untenable. Thus the critics almost 
unanimously suggest that Hick should drop it. Opinions differ, however, when the 
question arises: what should its replacement be? 
It is an irony that Hick on the one hand has been accused by G Loughlin of placing 
God "on the periphery with the deities of the other religions" and creating an "`empty 
space, "' and an "absent `presence"' not to be filled by any conceptuality or account, 
neither the Nirvana of Buddhism, nor the God of Christianity" which puts "the question 
of religious truth in an acute form. "224 On the other hand, to bail Hick out of the problems 
of the noumenal Real, Smart proposes that it be replaced with the Buddhist notion of 
"Emptiness" as the "Foci of religion" which "bypasses concepts both of Reality and of 
Process. "225 
Eddy maintains that the whole project of pluralism is a total failure because to 
remedy the situation Hick has to "reinvest the noumenal Real with the ability to deliver a 
decisive -and identifiable- amount of raw experiential content, above and beyond any 
human-based contributions. "226 According to Eddy, because of the unbridgeable gap 
between the two notions of the Real (in itself and as humanly experienced) in Hick's 
hypothesis, the Kantian model cannot deliver what he requires. 227 Therefore, unless Hick 
drops the noumenal/phenomenal Kantian distinction his hypothesis fails. 
Verkamp, however, proposes an analogical-God-talk solution. He believes that the 
Real in Hick's pluralism could be given a "more determinate content" to "bring it into 
closer correspondence with its phenomenal manifestations. "228 To be able to do that, Hick 
220 D'Costa, G, "John Hick and Religious Pluralism: Yet Another Revolution, " in Problems in the 
Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies of the Work of John Hick, ed. Hewitt, H, London: 
Macmillan, 1991,7-9. D'Costa describes the Real as redundant and Hick's position as 
"transcendental agnosticism. " In the same volume B Hebblethwaite shares D'Costa's redundancy 
charge by summarising the Real as "so vague as to be entirely redundant" (Hebblethwaite, B, "John 
Flick and the Question of Truth in Religion, " 130). 
221 Grover, S, "Unmatching Mysteries, " review of An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses 
to the Transcendent, by John Hick, ; j'iingAJ.. ii4rdry. 5pppjcmcnt, no. 22-28 December, 1989,1404. 
Grover alleges that in the pluralistic hypothesis "the nebulous notion of the Real seems to be doing 
no work. " 
222 Rose, Knowing the Real, 113. 
223 Rose, Knowing the Real, 112. 
224 Loughlin, G, "Noumenon and Phenomena, " )Zejjglpus. S(uajes 23,1987,504-505. 
225 Smart, N, "A Contemplation of Absolutes, " in Gosh. ' tuU). atltl. Re lity;. Ess: jys. ittjHonou. rof. Johu 
kUck, ed. Sharma, A, New York: St Martin's Press: 1993,180. 
226 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 478. 
227 Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine, " 478. 
228 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 112. 
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does not even have to sacrifice "its noumenal character and the symbolic, mythical nature 
of all talk about it. "229 Here Verkamp moves towards a solution which highlights once 
more the need for a "genuine analogical talk" in Hick's hypothesis which does not 
"preclude the recognition of mystery"230 and recognises the possibility of a harmonious 
"analogical relationship between man and God" on the lines of "`similarity within an 
ever-increasing dissimilarity. 111231 However, I cannot see how Hick could manage to 
provide such a solution unless he assigned a new role to the word "noumenon. " It seems 
to me that it is difficult to put analogical talking and noumenon together since, for Hick, 
noumenon suggests the total otherness and ineffability of the Real, which is the reason 
why he opted for the Kantian epistemology in the first place. To me, therefore, this looks 
like an unworkable suggestion, though I would be interested to see how Verkamp might 
develop it in more detail. 
Last, but not least, I would like to present two pluralist solutions which are quite 
close to each other and argue for the same cause: a "convergent pluralism. "232 First 
Byrne's version of it: 
"The proper way to cope with these categorical differences is to see them as pointing to some 
faltering insight into the character of the sacred, and not to its absolute unknowability as 
implied by Hick. In short, we must see such differences as pointing to the true conclusion that 
the transcendent has both personal and impersonal aspects to its nature. "233 
Here is Ward's version: 
"The pluralistic hypothesis now becomes the view that virtually all serious religious 
traditions will contain matrices of myth which implicitly contain a disclosure of a reality of 
compassion and bliss which calls human beings to union with itself... it may be termed 
`convergent pluralism'... there is a spiritual reality of supreme power and value; but we are 
unlikely to have a very adequate conception of it. However. there are many ways in which it 
may be disclosed to human beings; and all of them are likely to exhibit defects of human 
conception and limitation of vision. In particular, the claims of any tradition to have an 
exclusively true grasp of it must be denied... there are genuine experiences of the Real, 
however difficult it is for us to distinguish the real from the illusory; and thus that the Real is 
truly expressed in the phenomenal, even if its nature far transcends what we can grasp. We 
can still truly say that it is one, perfect, the cause of all. "234 
Before we proceed to evaluate the above suggestions, one point should be noted to 
clear up any misunderstanding. Even though it has been vaguely hinted at, we need to 
remind ourselves that two distinct understandings of ineffability have been appealed to in 
the preceding discussions. One is what Rose calls a "modest" ineffability which is 
common to almost all the great world religions of concern to Hick: Judaism, Christianity, 
229 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 112. 
230 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 112. 
231 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 112. 
232 Ward, K, "Divine Ineffability, " 218. 
233 Byrne, P. Prolegomena, 154. 
234 Ward, K. "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219. 
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Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. According to this understanding, although we do not and 
cannot know the essence of the Real, our language still relates to it in an imperfect way; 
i. e. we know that it possesses goodness but that is different from our goodness. This is 
what Hick starts with to establish his point. He moves on, however, where others halt, to 
claim a complete discontinuity between the Real as it is and as we experience and 
understand it, which brings us the second type: that is "strong ineffability" which Hick 
favours and champions. 
Both understandings of ineffability agree that the real essence of the Ultimate is 
beyond the grasp of human capability and of language. The problem arises when the 
relevance of religious language is brought into discussion with regard to the Real. Where 
moderate ineffabilists such as Aquinas, Maimonides and (as presented above) Ward et al 
hold that it does reveal some aspects of or have some purchase on the Real, strong 
ineffabilists like Hick maintain that it cannot be applied to the Real an sich at all. 
Hick opposes the moderate way on the grounds that firstly, it is not 
"comprehensive" enough to include all varieties of religious experience (i. e. "non-theistic 
as well as theistic"). Secondly, human conceptions, such as "value, love and 
compassion, " will lead us to ascribe "mutually contradictory attributes" to the Real such 
as being "personal" and "non-personal. "235 One wonders what makes Hick so sure that it 
is a contradiction to suppose that the Real can be expressed in different ways, e. g. 
personal and non-personal. In other words, if the Real is utterly unknowable, then we 
cannot know whether or not contradiction applies to it. It is a weakness in Hick's theory 
to suppose so. Certainly not all points of difference lead to contradiction; they can be 
incommensurable, but not contradictory. I suppose this is the case with the different 
experiences of the Real. Hick might object to this suggestion for I, too, do not have 
access to the knowledge of the Real to support my claim of the authenticity of 
incommensurable experiences of the Real. I take the point, but still hold that the Real can 
be experienced in different ways without contradiction for two reasons. Firstly, I endorse 
moderate ineffability as opposed to Hick's strong ineffability, whereby I can appeal to 
religious language. Secondly, Hick and I also agree on the veridicality of one's 
experience. Thus in searching for the simplest hypothesis, my contention is primarily 
based on the observable data and not on knowledge of the Real; this supports my 
conclusion and not Hick's: that to suppose to experience the Real both as personal and 
impersonal can be incommensurable but not contradictory. 
It is my understanding that Hick seems to be mistaken about the necessity of 
moving from conflicting veridical experiences of the Real to the postulation of a totally 
ineffable noumenal Real. To me, it is hard to follow Hick's logical steps to be able to 
account adequately for the data: that there are conflicting authentic experiences of the 
Real and that therefore we must postulate ineffable noumenal Real corresponding to the 
data. Hence the critics are right in pointing out that the gap between the noumenal and the 
235 ROF, 64. 
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phenomenal Real is too big to be overcome. Thus Hick pays a high price to secure the 
authenticity of the religious experience of humanity which equates to "transcendental 
agnosticism. "236 Rather if one seeks to achieve the simplest hypothesis to account for the 
data, it can be produced, as Byrne and Ward suggest, by positing that there is a 
transcendent Reality with certain properties like "supreme power and value" as "the cause 
of all" and can apparently be experienced in different ways237 such as personal and 
impersonal. This is what the data suggests, as I see it, contrary to what Hick proposes. 
In conclusion, although I am in sympathy with the criticisms directed at Hick's 
hypothesis by Eddy, D'Costa, Verkamp and Rose et al, I disagree with their solutions or 
final comments about the fate of pluralism. Starting from the veridicality of our 
experience, which to me includes religious language, I want to suggest that the Real can 
be experienced and expressed in different ways, e. g. personal and impersonal. Thus if 
Hick wishes to rescue the situation, he should drop the notion of "strong ineffability" of 
the Real and adopt instead, as suggested by Byrne and Ward, a "moderate ineffability. " I 
believe this is essential, if pluralism is to survive the day. Consequently, in the next 
chapter, I will substitute strong ineffability of the noumenal Real with moderate 
ineffability. This will constitute one the major modifications I shall introduce into Hick's 
pluralism; because of the vital importance of moderate ineffability to the whole 
hypothesis, I shall call my modified version moderate pluralism. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion gives rise to another question: which ways of 
experiencing the Real constitute the appropriate ways? Even though Hick concentrates on 
personal and impersonal experiences of the Real, he does acknowledge that there are 
other ways of experiencing the Real. He dismisses "Satanism"238 as an inappropriate 
response to the Real, while giving credit to "Marxism" and "humanism" as possible 
imperfect responses. So what are Hick's criteria in assessing religions? If he has any, 
what problems are associated with them? This is what I turn to in the following section. 
4.5. The Criterion: Salvation/liberation239 as Human Transformation 
236 D'Costa, "John Hick and Religious Pluralism, " 7. In a recent article, Hick replies D'Costa's 
charge: "But it is a mistake to equate the concept of ineffability with agnosticism. Agnosticism in 
this context is the view that the Ultimate is either personal or non-personal but we do not know 
which. That the Ultimate is ineffable means that it is beyond the scope of our human conceptual 
systems, including the personal/impersonal dichotomy" (Hick. "The Possibility, " 163, fn. 4). But, 
eventually, Hick's defence comes down to the same conclusion, i. e. putting the Ultimate beyond the 
scope of human concepts implies agnosticism. The previous quotations from Hume and other 
sceptics exposes this more clearly. 
237 Ward, K, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219. 
238 ROF, 79. 
239 WC Smith exposes the inappropriateness of this when he writes that: 
"The traditional Christian term 'salvation' is certainly not generic; and while some Christians 
will continue to use it ..., others internally have come to find it problematic; not to say, 
especially among youth in the West, vacuous. The concept behind the word, and to some 
degree the reality behind the concept, have been lost; part of what was traditionally signified 
must be recaptured, a new word to express it probably being requisite. `Liberation' has 
caught the fancy of some, with but little of its traditional Hindu connotation; and shalom is 
beginning to move beyond Jewish borders. `Identity' is currently having surprising vogue; 
some of us find it less rich and compelling that others seem to do" (Smith, W C, Towards a 
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Human transformation as "salvation/liberation" constitutes one of the three corner- 
stones of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, the other two being the postulated Real as the 
ground of religious experience and trusting one's experience, including religious 
experience. Hick thinks religions are "appropriate responses" to the Real depending on 
their fruits: "how effectively they promote" "salvific transformation" within the 
framework of "seeking the good of others as much as of oneself. "240 N Smart describes 
this as a "pretty squashy criterion, "241 which apparently Hick likes, since he is after a 
"soft"242 criterion, a criterion which deals with that which cannot be precisely measured. 
Hick's criterion does not come cheap, as Byrne observes. It has two severe effects 
on religions: firstly, it de-emphasises the importance of their doctrines and theories and 
secondly, it renders `unimportant' the methods they employ to achieve 
salvation/liberation243. 
One of the most serious charges brought against Hick's criterion is that it reduces 
the contents of religions almost to nothing but a bundle of ethical principles. For him, 
since we will never be able to resolve conflicting truth-claims conclusively in this world, 
we should focus on how we could transform ourselves from self-centredness to Reality- 
centredness. Indeed Hick is not ashamed of saying that everything in a religion is a 
relative means towards this transformation, we should not be distracted by trivial issues, 
and should concentrate on being better human beings. He writes: 
"The basic thought is that religious teachings are not absolute and eternal truths but are 
human ideas that can help people to move at particular stages of their spiritual growth 
towards the goal of enlightenment, liberation, awakening or, in Christian terms salvation... 
And the entire corpus of ideas, pictures, stories, doctrines, spiritual practices, social ethos and 
forms of life constituting a religious totality is only valuable as a means to an end -the end 
that we variously know as salvation... awakening. If each of the world religions could come 
to see both itself and the others in this way, they would allow people to grow within their own 
different faith-traditions, and would also be able to share spiritual resources across traditional 
borders. "244 
He furthermore engages with Buddha's "skilful means" and expresses his liberal 
approach to religious means in a fashion which sounds more like a radical Sufi: 
"Likewise, the Buddha said, the Dharma (or in Christian terms, the gospel) is `for 
World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion, London: Macmillan: 1981, 
182). 
240 ROF, 76. 
241 Smart, N, "A Contemplation of Absolutes, " 181. 
242 ROF, 77. 
243 Byrne, Prolegomena, 92-93. 
244 ROF, 115-116. He also cites (115) Wittgenstein as one of his main inspirations: "My 
propositions are elucidatory in this sense: he who understands me finally recognises them as 
senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them (He must so to speak throw 
away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it. )" (Wittgenstein, L, Tractatits Logico-Philosophictts, 
trans. Ogden, C K, London and New York: Routledge, 1998,189,16.54). 
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carrying over, not for retaining... You, monks, by understanding the Parable of the Raft, 
should get rid even of (right) mental objects, all the more of wrong ones. "las 
Hick's attitude to the living tissue of religions vis-ä-vis salvation has two 
implications. Firstly, contrary to his initial intentions of producing a better and more 
comprehensive hypothesis, he commits the mistake of naturalistic explanations: 
reductionism. Hence, giving it a bit of a religio-ethical twist via the postulated Real did 
not rescue his theory from being described by SM Heim as a "friendly reductionism, 
which sees a true religious meaning of the faiths obscured by metaphorical language. "246 
Heim also criticises Hick for trying to present the ethical dimension of religions not as the 
"best test for the realisation of a religious end, " but "as the index of the achievement of 
only one religious end" by using the "word `salvation' in a univocal sense. "247 In this 
way, despite the incommensurability of different forms of being human (e. g. religious 
and humanist) Hick grants even to humanists, Marxists, etc. a religious share under his 
umbrella of salvation/liberation by claiming that they, too, are responding to the Real, 
making them in Heim's terms "anonymous religionists. "248 Hick is aware of this 
inclusivist tendency in his theory and is happy with it. 249 One could argue, however, that 
this may work against him. If Marxism can save us, why do we need religion at all? Hick 
has two answers to this question: One is that there are different inclusivisms and 
inclusivism in one area does not necessitate it in another. "Each issue has to be 
considered on its own merits. "250 This leads us to his second answer, which he gave at a 
conference: at the salvational level, Marxists and humanists are responding to the Real, 
but at the ontological level their system is wrong in denying the existence of a 
transcendent being. 251 
The second problem with Hick's pragmatic criterion, Rose holds, is that in the final 
analysis he converts to a "crypto-perennialism. " When Hick deserts the doctrinal and 
theological contents of religions in favour of "soteriological efficacy, " he seems to be 
moving, Rose argues, towards a "new form of perennialism. "252 The pragmatic criterion 
makes the pluralistic hypothesis "as vacuous and ahistorical a reductionism as 
perennialism"253 since it commits "the error of the perennialists by slighting the concrete 
differences of the religions in favour of a criterion thought generally applicable to all true 
religions. "254 Hick's theory falls apart, according to Rose, because his "thin ethical 
245 ROF, 115. 
246 Heim, S M, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion, Maryknoll, New York: Orbiss Books, 
1995,30. 
247 Heim, Salvations, 27. Byrne also points out the same problem in Prolegomena, 92-93. 
248 Heim, Salvations, 30-31. 
249 ROF, 81. 
25e ROF, 81. 
251 Hick, J. "Is Christianity the Only True Religion?, " Birmingham: Birmingham University, 
November 1997, privately recorded audio material. 
252 Rose, Knowing the Real, 115-116. 
253 Rose, Knowing the Real, 116. 
254 Rose, Knowing the Real, 116. 
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assertion" as the true aim of religions' transforming power "can be interpreted in 
nonreligious terms as the guiding principle of a nonreligious system of ethics. "255 
Rose's charge of implicit perennialist tendencies in the pluralistic hypothesis is 
certainly fair, yet I disagree with his conclusion. That the whole phenomenon of religious 
experience can be explained in nonreligious terms does not weaken Hick's hypothesis, 
since Hick already upholds the religious ambiguity of the universe; that is to say, it could 
be interpreted both religiously and nonreligiously. To me, Hick's way of explaining the 
situation religiously makes better sense than explaining it nonreligiously, due to the fact 
that it provides a more satisfactory account of the centuries-long religiosity of people. 
But if the Real is utterly unknowable, how does he know for sure that actions like 
"love, bliss, compassion, etc. " are the right responses to the Real? Hick, agreeing with 
Wainwright, admits that his argument is circular in the sense that "the criterion is 
authentic because the traditions that teach it are authentic. The only test for their 
authenticity, though, is that they meet our criterion. "256 Hick, however, defends his 
position on the grounds that this kind of circularity cannot be avoided in comprehensive 
theories. If one believes in a naturalistic explanation of religion, one naturally uses 
"naturalistic assumptions to support it. " The same goes for any other explanation, 
whether religious, such as in Christianity or Islam, or "sense perception. " All appeal to 
internal criteria valid within those systems. Thus Hick, as someone "speaking from 
within the circle of religious faith, not professing to establish the validity of that faith, " 
concludes that "there are no non-circular ways of establishing fundamental positions. ' 257 
Wainwright replies by insisting that Hick's position does provide a convincing 
answer. It is true, he agrees, that the justifications of religious and sense experiences are 
"indeed ultimately circular" in the sense that Christian "criteria are justified by Christian 
views about God, " as are perceptual criteria by "views about the nature of physical 
objects and our perceptual apparatus. "258 At this stage, however, Hick faces a dilemma. If 
the Real is totally ineffable, there is no way of justifying "the pluralist's criterion (viz., 
love/compassion). "259 This leads us back to our point about the need to revise the strong 
ineffability of the noumenal Real. That is, to be able to justify his theory Hick has to 
subscribe to a moderate version of ineffability in line with Ward and others' stance and 
agree that certain aspects of our language do apply to the Real, such as goodness, 
compassion, etc. 
255 Rose, Knowing the Real, 117. 
256 Wainwright, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " 126; the same charge has been brought against 
Hick by TR Stinnett. See his "John Hick's Pluralistic Theory of Religion, " : Mp Qj4mQI. ci(. RcJ, gion 
70, no. 4,1990,586. 
257 ROF, 78-79. 
258 Wainwright, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " 126. 
259 Wainwright, "Review of The Rainbow of Faiths, " 126. 
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Rose detects a contradiction between (i) the pragmatic criterion of 
salvation/liberation as human transformation, which, he avers, is an appeal to "practical 
reason" and (ii) the postulation of the Real as an appeal to "theoretical reason. "260 
It seems to me that Rose is mistaken in two ways in his understanding of Hick's 
pragmatic criterion. Firstly, Hick does not associate his pragmatic criterion with Kant's 
practical reason. At first sight he may appear to be so, but my reading of Hick does not 
support Rose's claim. On several occasions, Hick clearly states that he is using just one 
aspect of Kantian philosophy in the epistemology of religion, a use which he concedes 
Kant himself might have objected to. 261 So Hick's appeal to theoretical reason does not 
necessarily entail his subsequent appeal to practical reason in establishing the criterion of 
salvation/liberation. Rose's other mistake lies in thinking that Hick turns to practical 
reason after his failure in locating a tenable noumenal Real. For me, practical and 
theoretical reason support each other, and the relation between them works in the 
opposite direction that Rose argues for. That is to say, Hick wishes to postulate the 
noumenal Real after he observes the fruits of religion in each of the great world religions. 
This leads him to the conclusion that there must be an ultimate being as the cause of all 
these. In other words, the pragmatic criterion is not an escape from failure; it is rather a 
step leading to the postulation of the Real. 
To ascribe the goodness of the action of a human being to his religiosity seems to 
me rather a weak principle, since it is immensely difficult to analyse exactly what the real 
motive is behind a person's action. There could be several explanations for a person's 
good action, from obedience to law to hedonism or nihilism. Religion could certainly be 
one of these, but this does not necessarily suggest that it is the only motive. Hick accepts 
in several places that morality does not have to be based on religion. Thus although there 
could be a relationship between religion and ethical soundness, there cannot be a direct 
relation applicable in all instances. Additionally, one should remember the fact that the 
good results do not always guarantee the truthfulness of the tradition that one follows, 
just as bad examples do not prove the falsehood of a tradition. Hence Rebecca Pentz, 
arguing along the same lines, urges Hick to "establish a positive correlation to the same 
degree between being transformed to Reality-centredness and exhibiting the fruits of 
saintliness. " She reckons that Hick has not done this and "it cannot easily be done. "262 
Even if one establishes that religion is the main cause of the good actions of people, 
how can one be sure that all these actions have been caused by only one ultimate reality? 
Religions might be soteriologically efficient and "point toward separate Realities. " Pentz 
scrutinises Hick's position and accuses him of leaning on assumptions instead of offering 
260 Rose, Knowing the Real, 114. If this claim is sustainable then the same may apply to Kant, since 
he, too, believes that although we cannot know God by theoretical reason, we do need a postulated 
God to be able to behave morally. 
261 See for example ROF, 46. 
262 Pentz, R, "Hick and Saints: Is Saint-production a Valid Test?, " Eiit4, ancj. 1. hilq$Qphx 8, no. 1, 
1991,101. 
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necessary evidential data to support his conclusion that the soteriological criterion points 
toward the same Reality. She cites Cobb, who suggests (in the light of the empirical data 
that Hick uses) that religions do in fact point towards separate realities. 263 But Pentz's 
point is not totally justifiable. As indicated previously in the discussion of the Real all 
sich, Hick does not necessarily believes that there is one Real and all salvation/liberation 
is directed towards it. He rather leaves open the logical possibility that there could be 
more than one Real (even though the notion of plurality does not apply to Hick's Real), 
but for the sake of simplicity he opts for one. 
As I said earlier when presenting Hick's hypothesis, despite its claim of plurality, 
universality and comprehensiveness, Hick's salvation/liberational doctrine seems to me 
still narrow in its treatment of archaic/primitive religions264 and new religious 
movements. Despite Hick's resistance to accepting a fixed definition of religion and 
eagerness to replace a formal definition with the Wittgensteinian "family resemblance" 
theory, he seems to be operating with a fixed understanding of religion. In other words, 
he has certain assumptions about what a religion is and the importance of different 
aspects of it, e. g. moral, social, ritual and so on. Heim rightly exposes this point when he 
argues that Hick's understanding of "religion" is restricted to a "`post-axial' tradition" in 
which "salvation" is its "main concern. " It is also Hick's assumption that, according to 
Heim, the nature of salvation "taking place in each tradition" is the same and "no other 
sort is possible. "265 I believe that while Hick emphasises rightly the moral and social 
fruits of religions, he overlooks the importance of other aspects, especially rituals, and 
their contribution to the salvific/liberational process. I will look at this issue in more 
detail in the next chapter while revising Hick's thesis. 
I contend that many of the living archaic religions, or pre-axial traditions in Hick's 
terms, and probably some of the new religious movements, would feel unjustly treated 
under the shadow of the established great religions. Considering the important role of the 
pre-axial religions in keeping the social and ecological order stable on the one hand and 
Hick's coined term of political saintliness on the other, there arises a problem of 
contradiction in determining the aim of religion. The problem as I see it is this: Hick 
identifies accurately "ego transformation" in the great religions as their main aim. Thus 
he values unselfishness and wishes human beings to become integrated in society by 
putting the benefit of the majority before their selfish needs. In a way, he argues that 
religions aim for a harmonious society in which every group of human beings live 
happily ever after. But he does not value an already ego-transformed primitive society 
living harmoniously both with nature and with each other. That is, Hick does not consider 
them as transformed, even though just like his political saints, individuals in primitive 
societies put the order of society and nature always before their own gain. I am not here 
263 Pentz, "Hick and Saints, " 98. 
264 I use archaic, primitive and pre-axial synonymously to refer to the pre-axial religions. 
265 Heim, S M, Salvations, 26. 
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making a value judgement on either type of living, only arguing for a better 
understanding and treatment of primitive religions in Hick's pluralist salvific/liberating 
project, if it is to suffice as a truly pluralistic religious interpretation of the religious 
experience of humanity. As it stands, Hick's theory does not do justice to other, less 
common ways of living according to salvific/liberating schemes, and reflects a Western 
understanding of life, society and religion. This seems to me to point to a narrow- 
mindedness in evaluating the whole of religious experience. 
It appears, then, that Hick has not carefully thought through his understanding of 
primal religions in relation to salvation. When I met him in Birmingham in November 
1997, he seemed to imply on one occasion that the followers of primal religion have a 
better way of living and therefore do not actually need the type of transformation required 
by the followers of post-axial religions. This is because, Hick believes, the question of 
ego-centredness does not exist among primal societies. 266 However, when I put to him the 
question of whether some forms of living are better than others, he denied this and said 
that there are just different ways of living/being. This brings me to the conclusion that 
Hick's focus on post-axial religions prevented him from producing a better understanding 
of primal religions. In fact, some speculate that Hick is still "searching for some 
`universal theory' or `common source' of religion. "267 Nevertheless, I disagree with this 
assertion, for, in my opinion, Hick's soteriological criterion of "human transformation 
from self-centredness to Reality-centredness" is right in identifying the ultimate aim of 
the great world religions. But I believe its scope needs to be widened to embrace ritual 
and other aspects of religion and to recognise the salvific importance of primitive 
religions and new religious movements. I shall come back to this task in the next chapter. 
4.6. Partial Conclusions 
My aim in this chapter was to offer an extensive critique of the pluralistic 
hypothesis. I focused my attention on four points: theological arrogance, reductionism, 
the problems associated with the Real and the problem of criterion, respectively. 
The charge of theological arrogance is frequently brought up against Hick's theory, 
since it claims to have the most comprehensive explanation of religious phenomena, 
despite the fact that nobody can have God's eye view of religions. Hick's answer is that 
he never claims to have God's eye view or any privileged position, but rather maintains 
that his theory is inductively reached. I believe this is partially true, since he initially 
relies on the observable fruits of religions manifested in the lives of particular 
individuals, namely saints. However, it is not purely inductive, since right from the 
266 AIR, 29-30,32. Hick quotes Robert N Bellah: "From the point of view of [the post axial, or in 
Bellah's terminology the historic, religions] a man is no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe 
or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation. 
That is to say that it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (Bellah, R N, Beyond 
Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World, New York and London: Harper & Row, 
1970,33). 
267 Verkamp, "Hick's Interpretation of Religious Pluralism, " 114,123n. 
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beginning it starts with certain epistemological premises about religion, religious 
experience, soteriology, saintliness, etc. (e. g. that religious experience is not in toto 
delusory and that all religions teach the Golden rule). Nevertheless, any theory, religious 
or non-religious, faces the same dilemma. That is to say, other theories about religion also 
begin with certain epistemological assumptions (though not always stated openly), 
choose their material accordingly and produce an interpretation, as illustrated in the case 
of naturalistic explanations in chapter two. In other words, there is no non-theory based 
way of producing an interpretation. Therefore it does not put pluralism in a worse 
position than any other theory. 268 
To me, the charges related to reductionism, particularly those relating to religious 
language, are more serious and cannot easily be fended off. Hick's theory not only 
projects a selective attitude towards the religious phenomena, but also contradicts the 
perceptions of the religions themselves. Thus this forms one of the points that I propose 
to modify in Hick's theory by developing a hermeneutical approach towards the holy 
texts. 
The postulation of the totally ineffable Real poses one of the major difficulties in 
Hick's theory. I concentrated on three issues related to the Real. Firstly, transcendentality 
or causality of the Real, which is brought up by Rose. I argued that Rose's narrow 
understanding of transcendence put him in a position of accepting causality and refusing 
transcendentality. However, I believe that Hick's broader understanding of transcendence 
gives him enough manoeuvrability to be able to accept the causality of the Real, while 
holding onto its transcendence. My main concern with the Real lies in the second point: 
ineffability. Hick supports the strong ineffability of the Real, to which human concepts 
and language do not apply. This brings several problems with it: firstly, it makes the Real 
redundant (in that it does not serve any purpose and ultimately we can have religious 
experiences whether it exists or not). Secondly, the theory cannot successfully establish a 
link between religious experience and the Real. Thirdly, it reduces revelations to human 
products, which generates the fourth problem by creating a deadlock in interreligious 
dialogue. Thus, along the lines of Ward et. al., I propose the second modification in 
Hick's theory, that is the moderate ineffability of the noumenal Real. This will form a 
bridge between the noumenal and the phenomenal Real and make religious language 
more meaningful. Lastly, against Rose's assertion that the noumenal Real is redundant, I 
contend that the Kantian distinction is relevant, since, in essence, the Real is still 
unknowable and lies behind the human scope of understanding. The distinction will also 
268 Ward's remark about Hick's position shed's important light on this issue: 
"I do not think one can hold a religious view of some sort, however attenuated and revised it 
may be. Any such view presupposes the truth of some basic religious beliefs-such as that 
there is a suprasensory realm, having a certain character, which actively discloses itself to 
humans. In that respect, however, the account no more objectionable than that of theorists 
like Durkheim, who work from an equally strong presupposition that no such realm exists" 
(Ward, Religion and Revelation, 108; see for more part V, sects. 7,8). 
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help to boost religious tolerance among believers and non-believers alike by reminding 
them that nobody is capable of holding the absolute truth. 
As the last point, I examined the criticisms related to Hick's criterion of 
"salvation/liberation" as human transformation. I argued that despite my principal 
agreement with it, I noticed that it was too narrow to accommodate different 
salvational/liberational stages found in world religions269 Thus I concluded that the scope 
of Hick's soteriological criterion has to be extended, which formed my third modification 
point in Hick's theory. In chapter five, I shall modify Hick's theory considering these 
points and discuss the implications of the modified religious pluralism for Islam. 
269 Hick's understanding of salvation/liberation implies narrowing down religion to almost moral 
heroism, whereas if we look at religions from a wider perspective, religion covers a much broader 
area in addition to ethics. I suggest Smart's nine-dimensional examination of world religions 
illustrates this quite well. The dimensions are (1) "the ritual or practical, " (2) "the doctrinal or 
philosophical, " (3) "the mythic or narrative, " (4) "the experiential or emotional, " (5) "the ethical or 
legal, " (6) "the organisational or social, " (7) "the material or artistic, " (8) "the political, " and (9) "the 
economic (Smart, N, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs, London: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1996,10-11). See also his earlier work where he put forward a seven- 
dimensional hypothesis (minus the last two from the above list): The World's Religions, esp. 164- 
167 and 299-304 where he applies his hypothesis to primal religions, the Polynesian and African 
traditional religions respectively). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. MODERATE PLURALISM AND ISLAM 
"You are cold, but you expect kindness. 
What you do comes back in the same form. 
God is compassionate, but if you plant barley, 
don't expect to harvest wheat. " 
Rümil 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I shall first present a modified version of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis 
in the light of the criticisms I considered in chapter four and then apply this modified 
version - which I refer to as moderate pluralism- to an Islamic milieu in order to highlight 
possible problems and offer solutions to them from an Islamic perspective. 
Before presenting my modifications to Hick's hypothesis, to refresh our memories, I 
summarise certain points of pluralism which are crucial to the argument and where I deem 
no modification is necessary. I will keep them very brief, since they are discussed at length 
in the previous chapters. In my modification of Hick's theory, I focus my attention on three 
points in particular: i) against his reductionist mythical/metaphorical approach towards 
religious language, I call for a "hermeneutical approach, " ii) against Hick's total ineffability 
of the noumenal Real, I argue for a "moderate ineffability, " and iii) I believe the scope of 
his soteriological criterion needs to be widened by Dan Cohn-Sherbok's "viability 
principle. " When I move to the Islamic context, I deal with five primary concerns. Firstly, I 
tackle the fundamental issue of how to reconcile the strict monotheistic faith of Islam in one 
God and the validity of the different religions argued by moderate pluralism? "The principle 
of plurality, " as attested by the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions, leads to the solution 
here. Next I deal with the verses which carry an apparently exclusivist tendency, which 
brings us to the prophethood of Muhammad and the question of salvation. The third 
important point is the "freedom of religion" and law of apostasy as understood and applied 
to the Other (especially the people of the Book). Fourthly, I demonstrate the workability of 
a hermeneutical understanding of the Qur'an in the example of kufr (unbelief). Lastly, in 
this chapter, I consider the postmodern concerns from an Islamic perspective. To illustrate 
the point, I give one positive and one negative appreciation of postmodernism. The answer 
to postmodernism, I reason, lies not in a retreat to particularism in any form -inclusivism or 
exclusivism- but in developing a more positive, tolerant and pluralistic attitude, as proposed 
by moderate pluralism. 
I will conclude first that, contrary to Hick's version, moderate pluralism is 
compatible with Islam. Secondly, as Islam has an intrinsic pluralistic character, moderate 
pluralism might facilitate Muslims to further this feature in their effort to form a better 
understanding of other religions. Finally, moderate pluralism can make positive 
1 Rumi, Unseen Rain, 80. 
contributions to the interreligious dialogue and world peace by fostering mutual- 
understanding, co-operation, respect and tolerance among different religious groups. 
5.2. Religious Pluralism Revisited: Towards a Moderate Soteriological 
Pluralism 
In what follows, I shall offer a brief summary of points in Hick's pluralism where, I 
think, no modification is necessary. I will enumerate five points: (i) "the right to believe, " 
(ii) the effect of environment on us in our perception of the world (more specifically, the 
correlation between the accident of birth and choosing a religion), (iii) the evaluation of 
religions by their fruits (i. e. salvific effectiveness of great world religions), (iv) 
"salvation/liberation as human transformation" and (v) the Kantian distinction of noumenon 
and phenomenon. 
Firstly, I think Hick has a good case in arguing that all experiencing is experiencing- 
as, as adopted from Wittgenstein's "seeing-as" principle. Thus, unless proven otherwise, 
one is justified in experiencing the world religiously just as one is in experiencing it 
naturalistically; in other words, as William James famously put it, one has a "right to 
believe. " As far as the evidence is concerned, the principle of the religious ambiguity of the 
universe does not allow to us to falsify either religious or naturalistic explanations. Each is 
justifiable in its own right because they use different filters in their perception of the 
universe. This epistemology of religious experience also extends to the relations between 
religions. Just as one is justified in believing what one's experience reveals about the Real, 
so is everybody else who has a different experience of the Real than ours. This leaves us 
with the plurality of religions. 
Secondly, I concur with Hick that since we are social animals, we perceive and 
respond to our environment through the culture-relative language-fed filters which involve 
an "active process of selecting, grouping, relating, extrapolating, and endowing with 
meaning by means of our human concepts. "2 That is to say, although we do not contribute 
much to the formation of the socio-cultural factors that shape our perception of the 
universe, neither are we passive receivers of information. This has three bearings on the 
plurality of religions. One is that it is natural that we have different religions because we 
have different filters through which to process information relating to the Transcendent. 
Secondly, we positively contribute to the plurality of religions because of our selective 
approach in assessing the information received. The third, Kantian inference, is that we 
must make a distinction between the noumenal Real, the Real an sich, and the phenomenal 
Real "as humanly perceived in different ways, "3 though the gap is not so wide as Hick 
thinks it is. Hence I shall replace Hick's strong ineffability of the noumenal Real with 
moderate ineffability. 
2 ROF, 29. 
3 ROF, 29. 
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When we approach the great world religions, therefore we observe that the great 
majority of human beings make their religious choice4 within the boundaries of an 
environment, in which geographical, familial and social circumstances play a major role. 
Thus a Christian, a Muslim or a Buddhist is such because they are born into a Christian, 
Muslim or Buddhist environment. 5 This means that to associate salvation with a particular 
religion does not do justice either to human beings or to a compassionate and all-loving 
Ultimate Being. As far as human beings are concerned, exclusivist and inclusivist 
approaches ignore the human conditioning by ascribing salvation to the means beyond the 
capability of human beings. For I believe that, up to a certain age, we can neither choose 
our environment nor have a hand in our upbringing, which play the most crucial role in 
one's choice of religion. As to a compassionate and all-loving Transcendent Being, one can 
easily understand that it can neither deprive the vast majority of human beings of salvation 
nor favour one way over the other for one reason or another, such as that a particular 
religion corresponds to the Transcendent's particular way of making itself known (e. g. a 
particular prophet or a specific time it was revealed in or the holy scripture it is based 
upon). Such a God, Hick thinks, can only be called "the Devil. "6 
Thirdly, on a more basic and practical level, I also hold that Hick is right in his 
conviction that great world religions are "vast complex religio-cultural totalities, each a 
bewildering mixture of varied goods and evils. "7 This means that there is no "objective" 
way of "calibrating their respective values, "8 i. e. "it is not possible to establish the unique 
superiority of any one of the great world faiths. "9 To verify this, Hick urges us to focus on 
the "spiritual and moral fruits of these faiths"10 and more specifically invites us to examine 
different followers from the great world religions. He maintains that despite the 
exclusivistic salvational claims of religions there is no real difference between followers of 
the great religions. Writing from a Christian perspective, he observes: 
"... It has become a fairly common discovery that our Muslim or Jewish or Hindu or Sikh or 
Buddhist fellow citizens are in general no less kindly, honest, thoughtful for others, no less 
truthful, honourable, loving and compassionate, than are in general our Christian fellow 
citizens. People of other faiths are not on average noticeably better human beings than 
Christians, but nor on the other hand are they on average noticeably worse human beings. We 
find that both the virtues and the vices are, so far as we can tell, more or less equally spread 
among the population [of] major faiths. "t t 
4 One may ask what of those who do not make religious choices at all. The response of the 
pluralistic option is given in the first point. That the right to believe' can be exercised both ways. 
i. e. the right not to believe. 
5 GHMN, 44. 
6 ROF, 19. 
7 ROF, 14. 
8 ROF, 14. 
9 ROF, 15. 
10 ROF, 14. 
11 ROF, 13. 
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Hick's argument for the salvific effectiveness of the major world faiths appears to be on the 
right track, but from this equation I would like to drop the "major" component by which 
Hick excludes indirectly the "primitive" religions and the newer religious movements. I 
shall come to this later. 
Fourthly, certainly, salvific effectiveness relates to a specific understanding of 
salvation/liberation. Despite my reservations about its scope, I regard Hick's definition of 
"salvation/liberation " as the "transformation of human existence from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness"12 a satisfactory starting point. This may sound too mystical or 
abstract, but I still believe that, as has been demonstrated in chapter three, it is justifiable to 
claim that our ultimate goal is to lose our ego and re-identify or in Hick's terms "re-centre" 
ourselves in the Ultimate Reality. 13 One should not be confused, however, by the 
proximity of "salvation" to Christian theology. Hick does not use the term with the 
common Christian meaning which necessitates the "atoning death of Jesus, " etc. He only 
borrows the term and installs a different meaning to it. Indeed, in order to emphasise this 
different usage and to include impersonal experiences of the Real in this scheme, Hick 
always uses the term "salvation/liberation" rather than salvation. 
Finally, as for the truth-claims of the religions, I hold with Hick that the Kantian 
distinction of the noumenal and phenomenal Real is viable and different religions are 
different ways of experiencing and expressing the noumenal Real, be they personal or 
impersonal. However, I believe that in order to avoid the total reductionism of Hick we 
have to establish a link between the noumenal and the phenomenal Real. Thus I call only 
for a partial ineffability of the noumenal Real and maintain that the religious language 
relates to the noumenal Real, but only at the very basic level, such as goodness, 
compassion, etc. This certainly runs against Hick's thesis of the "total ineffability" of the 
noumenal Real, which puts it "beyond the scope of our networks of human concepts. "14 
I shall now develop my modifications of the pluralistic hypothesis with respect to 
three points: (i) epistemological reductionism, (ii) the ineffability of the Real and (iii) the 
scope of the salvational/liberational criterion. Since epistemological reductionism and the 
ineffability of the Real are closely linked, I will discuss them together. 
Arguing for a religious epistemology of pluralism, Hick avers that, theoretically 
speaking, one is justified in trusting what one's experience presents to one about the 
religious nature of things and, practically speaking, the majority of the believers from 
different religions are good human beings, i. e. salvifically transformed or liberated. 15 
12 AIR, 36; ROF, 18. 
13 In a recent interview, Hick's conclusion is also shared by Karen Armstrong in her saying that 
"religion at its best is about the loss of ego... " (34). See for more: Smoley, R, "What is God? 
Interview with Karen Armstrong, " Qngsi$ Mgggzigý, Spring 1995,28-34. 
14 ROF, 27. 
15 I may address one possible question here by referring to earlier discussions in previous chapters. 
One can possibly ask what about those who experience the universe non-religiously or experience 
the Ultimate as evil. Hick's answer for the first is that neither naturalistic nor religious account of 
the universe can be shown demonstrably to be true. The verification of either account can only take 
place in the hereafter. But from "the right to believe" we build our theory on the religious account, 
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When he is faced with the conflicting truth-claims of the religions, he appeals to the 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal Real. As a necessary consequence of 
this move, he believes that religious language only applies to the phenomenal level, since 
the noumenal Real is beyond the scope of human knowledge. That is to say, all religious 
language is symbolic and mythical. 
However, as I indicated in chapter four, Hick's call for the strong ineffability of the 
noumenal Real and a mythical understanding of religious language creates many problems 
and undermines his hypothesis in the long run. Firstly, it renders the noumenal Real 
redundant, since if we cannot know anything of it, how we can know that it exists in the 
first place. Secondly, a postulated Real with formal qualities endangers his main task of 
accounting for religions cognitivity, for he cannot secure that the Real and religions are not 
entirely human constructions. Thirdly, it reduces Holy scriptures, thus revelation, to 
human productions. Fourthly, the reductionist attitude towards religious language puts off 
many devout religionists from pluralism and precludes its acceptance as a widespread 
reality. I will not go into detailed discussion of these points here for I did that in chapter 
four, but only address certain issues like revelation and other related questions. 
The first problem to be resolved here is that of the Real, which has paramount 
importance as the ground for all religious experience. If pluralism cannot secure its place as 
a viable factor within the religious sphere, then the whole programme fails. Thus to solve 
this dilemma, I propose, as opposed to Hick's strong ineffability, a "moderate ineffability, " 
which is common to all great world religions. According to this understanding, although 
we do not and cannot know the essence of the Real, our language still relates to it in an 
imperfect way; i. e. we know that it possesses goodness but that it is different from our 
goodness. With moderate ineffability, while maintaining that the real essence of the 
Ultimate is beyond the grasp of human capability and language, we still will be able to 
make good sense of both religious language and the necessity of the noumenal Real. 
Moderate ineffability holds that there is a transcendent Reality with certain properties like 
"supreme power and value" as "the cause of all" who can apparently be experienced in 
different ways16 such as personal and impersonal. Thus the moderately ineffable noumenal 
Real becomes a necessity as the ground of all religious experience for a pluralist 
hypothesis, without which cognitivity of religions cannot be explained. Since it is known 
for all traditions, unlike Hick's strong ineffability, it can stimulate a positive atmosphere 
among religions towards a pluralist dialogue rather than creating a deadlock. I will not 
since we believe it to be true. For the second objection, experiencing God as evil, Hick holds that 
those who experience God as evil are mistaken, since their experience does not conform to the notion 
of the Real that the great world religions espouse. Hick argues for this on the phenomenal grounds 
-since we cannot know anything of the totally ineffable noumenal Real, not even good or bad- and is 
seriously criticised for it. I believe moderate ineffability offers a better solution here. for we can say 
that the Real is good and compassionate. 
16 Ward, K, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219. 
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discuss Hick's objections to moderate ineffability here, since I replied to them in chapter 
four. 
Another problem in Hick's picture is the concept of revelation, which is so crucial to 
Islam and many other traditions. It seems to me that there is no genuine contribution of the 
Real to religious language, i. e. revelation, which is reduced to human productions in 
Hick's hypothesis. He certainly claims that the Real has a contribution to the revelatory 
process, but very indirectly. In drawing attention to this point, Byrne accurately criticises 
Hick for giving "the human subject a heavy input into all cognition. "17 The same point has 
been made by Rose that Hick's hypothesis "grants too much power in the shaping of 
religions to the cultures within which they arise, " and therefore fails to "respect the activity 
of the divine in the formation of religious traditions. ""8 If we do not recognise the active 
role of the Real in the shaping of religious traditions in the form of revelations, then we will 
end up in Hick's negative position that "all are human creation, " which helps neither 
pluralism nor induces any positive incitement among religions. I argue that, even though all 
are expressed in imperfect human languages within a historical period, the Real has a 
positive contribution in all of them, i. e. revelations are not entirely human products. 
However, I am aware of that the stress on revelation poses more serious problems, 
such as an apparent relativity in divine willing. That is to say, the appeal to "revelation" 
effectively transfers issues of plurality (even incompatibility) from consideration of the 
conditions of human knowing to considerations of theology proper -viz. what God wills 
and does. This certainly engenders wider problems that go beyond the scope of this study 
at this stage. I will not attempt to answer them, but here are a few of them: why the Real 
wills more than one revelation, if any at all; whether one or all can be true at the same time; 
whether we are required to attempt to understand this diversity in any way or, since they 
are all the act of the Ultimate, just leave them as they are, and so on. Why do I appeal to 
revelation and where do I draw the line then as far as its place is concerned with moderate 
pluralism? My tentative understanding is that "revelations" are all caused by the Real, relate 
to it at the basic level (e. g. possessing goodness, being supreme power and value, etc. ) but 
none can express it fully, because of the limitedness of our human languages. When it 
comes to the conflicting truth-claims that religions proffer, we have two means to deal with: 
firstly, since nobody has the absolute truth, all will be aware of the limitedness of their 
evidence. Secondly, I suggest we should follow a hermeneutical approach to understand 
and resolve these conflicts. I will come to this shortly. What if we do not have a moderate 
understanding of ineffability? We are then left with either total relativity or reductionism. 
I argue that moderate ineffability offers a viable middle way between the total 
relativity of all religions, which is asserted by Rose, Heim and others, on the one hand; and 
Hick's reductionism, on the other. In a recent article, Doctrine and Tolerance in Theology 
17 Byrne, P. Prolegomena, 122,38-39. 
18 Rose, K, "Doctrine and Tolerance in Theology of Religions: On Avoiding Exclusivist 
Hegemonism and Pluralist Reductionism, ",, ýýpljj$h jQý ýý pý ýliglS2U . 
S. tUdIC 17, no. 2,1996, 
114. 
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of Religions19, Rose argues that in order to prevent religious intolerance, religious 
doctrines should be treated as "revealed teachings, 20 which is a line earlier proposed in his 
examination of Hick's pluralism, Knowing the Real. 21 Rose's case is almost identical to 
Nasr's thinking that religious doctrines are "divinely willed" and should be treated as 
such. 22 Rose develops an imaginary scenario in which six missionaries, "a Mormon 
bishop", "a fundamentalist Christian missionary, " "a Hindu Vaisnava devotee, " "an 
Advaita Vedantist monk, " "a Buddhist monk, " and "a Muslim mullah, "2 are taken captive 
and imprisoned, but have to live together for the rest of their life, in a manner analogous to 
our communities. He concentrates on personal and impersonal experiences of the Real, and 
concludes that they all have to learn to live by the principle of "subjective certainty and 
objective modesty. " That is to say that subjectively, everybody is certain about their 
apprehension of the truth, while maintaining the objective possibility that they may "all be 
wrong" or that "only one" of them may "finally be right. "24 
However, Rose's suggestion may lead to what D'Costa calls "transcendental 
agnosticism, " since nobody is sure of the truth, despite their experiences and, in some 
cases, the supporting holy scriptures. Rose does not take into account the other side of the 
calculation either: the naturalistic explanation of religions, which claims that "none of their 
doctrines are true, " which in effect is what Rose concludes. I cannot imagine a Muslim 
saying "I accept that Islam may not be true after all but still I keep on practising it, since I 
was brought up in it. " This simply is like putting minus and plus together. Indeed, this is 
the sort of agnosticism that Hick refers to in response to D'Costa's charge of 
"transcendental agnosticism. " Hick proclaims: 
"D'Costa describes my position as 'transcendental agnosticism'. But it is a mistake to equate 
the concept of ineffability with agnosticism. Agnosticism in this context is the view that the 
Ultimate is either personal or non-personal but we don't know which. "25 
In Hick's sense, I suppose Rose's position can be described as "agnostic, " which results in 
scepticism among the followers of religions and undermines the religious doctrines he 
seeks to preserve. I wonder what makes Rose so sure that one's "subjective certainty" is 
nothing but an illusion, if one takes his principle of "objective modesty" seriously. 
The commitment to doctrinal fidelity on the one side and religious tolerance on the 
other drives Rose to his rejection of Hick's Kantian distinction of noumenal and 
phenomenal Real. Despite his acceptance of the partial ineffability of the Real, he produces 
19 Rose, K. "Doctrine and Tolerance, " 109-121. 
20 Rose, "Doctrine and Tolerance, " 109. 
21 Rose, Knowing the Real, 140. 
22 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 262. Asian brought together Hick and Nasr (which was their first 
meeting) and conducted a joint interview at Birmingham University in October 1994 when Nasr was 
delivering the Cadbury Lectures. In the interview, Nasr defends, as a traditionalist, the authenticity of 
the Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and Incarnation as "divinely willed" against Hick's 
mythological/metaphorical understanding (261-262). 
23 Rose, "Doctrine and Tolerance, " 115. 
24 Rose, "Doctrine and Tolerance, " 119. 
25 Hick, J, "The Possibility, " , 163, fn. 4. 
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a non-Kantian version of Hick's pluralism, because "it presupposes no 
noumenon/phenomenon distinction or dichotomy. "26 Even though he accepts a "waid 
distinction between the degree of reality that a finite organism can apprehend and the whole 
of reality itself, "27 he does not believe that there is a "formal dichotomy 
between human 
experience and that which transcends it. " Because, Rose states, 
"we, as finite beings, " 
cannot know "where a supposed line between the finite and the infinite should be drawn "2% 
I take Rose's point that we finite beings cannot know where the exact line lies between us 
and the Real, neither does the moderate ineffability that I advocate claim to do so. 
However, I insist that without the "metaphysical hubris" of Kant's philosophy we should 
still keep the noumenon/phenomenon distinction within the framework of a pluralist 
philosophy of religions. What is the point of having the distinction? Firstly, even if we 
have moderate ineffability, the essence of the Real an sich still lies behind our human scope 
of understanding. Secondly, it will be a constant reminder to all that there are not only 
different ways of being human, e. g. religious and non-religious, but also different ways of 
experiencing the world religiously, e. g. personal and impersonal. Moreover, as a result of 
moderate ineffability, the distinction tells us that nobody's way is absolute, no tradition can 
grasp and represent the whole Real, despite the fact that the Real causes and contributes to 
all. For the distinction acts as a constant guard against absolutism, it may indeed endorse 
Rose's passionate support for the "truth" expected to emerge through "conversation" 
contributed to by every sect in a society, religious and otherwise. 
However, let alone convincing and encouraging "conversation, " Rose's argument for 
total relativity and scepticism will eventually backfire and discourage "conversation, " 
without the crucial backing of moderate ineffability and its natural conclusion that "there is 
more than one true way of experiencing and expressing the Real. " This is even more so, as 
we shall shortly demonstrate, for a pluralist Muslim who accepts other religions as equally 
salvific alongside Islam. This is a result of his/her faith in the Qur'anic message. Rose's 
suggestion of scepticism towards religious claims and Hick's proposal of reductionism 
(that Qur'an is human production and its language does not refer to God/Allah) will sound 
insulting to a Muslim instead of encouraging tolerance, respect and conversation. I 
conclude, then, that in order to do justice to the essential particularity of the religious 
traditions, and avoid Rose's scepticism and Hick's reductionism, a moderate pluralism 
should adopt the moderate ineffability of the Real. This will (i) secure its foundation as the 
basis for religious experience, prevent its redundancy, give more room and meaning for the 
Holy texts of the religions and encourage mutual as well as self understanding among 
religions. 
In addition to the idea of moderate ineffability, as suggested above, in order to 
combat reductionism, I believe that moderate pluralism also has to adopt a more 
26 Rose, Knowing the Real, 132. 
27 Rose, Knowing the Real, 133. 
28 Rose, Knowing the Real, 133. 
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hermeneutical approach towards religious language. The room given to revelation by 
moderate ineffability should be assessed carefully under the light of hermeneutics. What I 
have in mind here is the modern hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and others, which has been 
successfully applied to Islam by some Muslim scholars. Contrary to Rose's claims, I 
presume that religious doctrines, whether revealed or not, are open to reinterpretation. To 
illustrate this one can quote Rahner's "anonymous Christianity, " which gained widespread 
support in Catholic circles, became almost the official doctrine of the Catholic Church and 
probably paved the way to more pluralistic approaches. I am not arguing whether it is the 
right approach to deal with other religions or the right interpretation of the texts. I am 
simply saying that it shows that, in addition to existing understanding of any text, new 
interpretations are always possible and in time might become the prevalent opinions among 
believers. In order to achieve this, I believe hermeneutics might be a better tool than Hick's 
mythical/metaphorical approach, which is totally reductionist when taken together with its 
co-supporter strong ineffability. 
How different is the hermeneutical approach I argue for from Hick's 
mythical/metaphorical understanding? It differs from Hick's approach in three aspects. 
Firstly, it does not have the negative connotations that Hick's approach has, e. g. that holy 
texts are human products, which immediately puts off many devout believers even from 
considering pluralism a possible choice. One might ask: "Is this just a proposal to adopt a 
more friendly name then? " No, it is not. Hence the second aspect proposes a broader 
reading of the scriptures ("prophetic, legislative, narrative, sapiential and hymnal 
(poetic)"), 29 which includes Hick's mythical/metaphorical reading, too. Last but not least, it 
treats holy texts as revelations, not mythological human products which do not relate to the 
Real. I will not develop a hermeneutical religious pluralism, since this is not a 
hermeneutical examination of Hick's thesis. But in the following discussion of moderate 
pluralism from an Islamic point of view, I shall provide a hermeneutical framework by 
Arkoun and exemplify it by Esack. I will begin with a striking example of a narrow 
reading, or rather understanding of holy texts, by Rose as opposed to the wider reading 
that I urge, which will also form a bridge for the next topic. In explaining Hick's 
soteriological criterion (that a religious doctrine is authentic if it induces saintliness, i. e. 
directs one to the Real), Rose jumps hastily to exemplify the issue. According to the 
criterion, he contends that Hick can judge "a religious view that prescribes human or animal 
sacrifice is a worse viewpoint than one that proscribes such activities. "30 The immediate 
inference one can draw from Rose's illustration is that Islam is a worse viewpoint since it 
prescribes animal sacrifice than, let us suppose, Christianity which contains neither 
sacrifice. This certainly is an ill-fitting example and a narrow reading of the doctrine, not to 
mention the fact that it is insulting to and offensive Muslims. I described it as ill-fitting, 
because it is a mistake to put human and animal sacrifice together; while the former is 
29 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 38. 
30 Rose, Knowing the Real, 135. 
Chapters Moderate Pluralism and Islam 190 
almost unanimously proscribed by the great world religions, the latter is an agelong practice 
common to almost all of them. Furthermore, before making any judgement about its 
inductive soteriological value -and I believe it has that value and directs one towards the 
Real, one should consider the hermeneutical conditions surrounding animal or human 
sacrifice. In this regard it suffices to recall the narrative of Abraham's sacrificial event, 
commonly shared by Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions, and of Jesus' crucifixion on the 
cross. One can purport that even Hick's criterion of human transformation from "self- 
centredness to Reality-centredness" is tied up with the metaphor of sacrifice, that is 
sacrificing oneself for others and ultimately in the Real. Otherwise, I believe it will be too 
reductionistic to jump to the conclusion that religions commanding animal sacrifice are less 
efficient salvifically than those that do not. It will certainly help neither pluralism nor 
Rose's grand invitation for "conversation" for the sake of truth. Thus I conclude that a 
wider hermeneutical reading of the holy texts is vital to any pluralistic hypothesis, if it is to 
achieve comprehensiveness and viability in its account for religious diversity and to avoid 
reductionism. 
As for Hick's salvation/liberation criterion, I hold that Hick's definition of 
"salvation/liberation" as the "transformation of human existence from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness"31 is an adequate ground. However, as indicated in chapter four, I have 
my reservations on three points: firstly, its scope is too narrow, both for the followers of 
the great world religions and for the religions themselves. Secondly, it is largely a 
secularised or desacralised evaluation of religions, a charge also frequently directed against 
the modernist Islamic scholars, such as Arkoun. 32 That is to say, it fails to address the 
importance of particular religious rituals, and de-emphasises the idea of the afterlife. Lastly, 
it also tends to equate religion with morality, i. e. it is reductionist. 
Starting with the first of these charges, it seems to me that the scope of Hick's 
soteriological criterion is narrow from two aspects. For one thing, despite its claim of 
comprehensiveness, it does not fully take into account the primitive religions and the new 
religions and religious movements. Hick's position is not clear about the treatment of 
primitive religions. On the one hand, he thinks since the idea of the individual did not 
develop in these societies, we cannot apply the ego-transforming salvation/liberation 
criterion to these religions, viz. their function is different. As he puts it they are "communal 
rather than individual responses to the Real. "33 On the other hand, when I argued in my 
interview that since Hick's application of the Golden Rule ("it is good to benefit others and 
evil to harm them"34) is also applicable to these religions, their fruit might be as good or as 
abundant as the post-axial religions, he did not give a clear answer either. I believe that the 
31 AIR, 36; ROF, 18. 
32 Khan, "Epistemological Poverty, " 76. 
33 ROF, 109. 
34 AIR, 299. 
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absence of self realisation35 might not be as bad a factor in salvific transformation as Hick 
supposes. Thus, even though the function of the primitive religions might be different, 36 
the spiritual fruits they bear, such as "generous goodwill, love, compassion, "37 etc. upon 
the individuals might just as commonly be found in these religions, which indicates that 
they too might be authentic responses to the Real. What assurances do I have for the claim 
of similar spiritual fruits in the primitive religions? Firstly, communal life requires from one 
caring attitudes such as "generous goodwill, love, compassion. " Secondly, I take these to 
be rooted in the character of every human being, which can flower and nourish in any 
environment, especially in primal societies where "personal relationships are so intense and 
so wide. "38 Thirdly, the central role of priests in Maya39 and Aztec religions in the society 
and the stress on "moral, as well as ritual, purification before worship" in Aztec religion 
might provide us with clues to the occurrence of such moral fruits as compassion, love and 
caring towards others. 40 Therefore, I contend that, regardless of their functions, these 
religions should also be included among the religions which are salvifically/liberationally 
effective. 
Hick is positive about the contribution of the new religious movements, such as 
Mormonism, Baha'i, Theosophy etc., to the salvific transformation of human beings, but 
doubts that these provide as good a path as the well established great religions. He believes 
that the same criterion of authenticity, which is "their observable moral and spiritual fruits 
in human life, "41 is applicable to them also. At this stage, Dan Cohn-Sherbok's "criterion 
of viability, " namely that "their capacity to satisfy the spiritual demands and animate the 
lives of adherents, "42 might offer some help in our evaluation of both primitive religions 
35 In fact, even this is not a claim which can be accepted without reservations. For instance, in some 
primal African societies "ego-centredness" has also been reported (Shorter, A, "African Religions, " in 
A New Handbook of Living Religions, ed. JR Hinnells, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997,570-571). 
36 In fact, it is difficult to substantiate such a sharp distinction between the functions of pre- and 
post-axial religions. Smart, for instance, mentions the commonality of salvation both in the ancient 
and classical worlds. He describes "salvation" as the idea that 
"human beings are in some kind of unfortunate condition and may achieve an ultimately good 
state either by their own efforts of through the intervention of some divine power. Very 
commonly, there is belief in a saviour God, that is, a God whose special concern is with the 
welfare of the human race. Examples of this idea are, in the ancient world, Isis, Mithra, and 
Christ; in the Far East, Amida Buddhain Japan and Kuan-yin in China; and Krsna and Rama 
in the Hindu tradition" (Smart, N, "Soteriology, " in rný, ýýyclQpedýa. Qf. Kýligion, ed. M 
Eliade, London and New York: Macmillan, 1987, vol. 13,418). 
37 AIR, 317. 
38 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 209. See also Ray, "African Religions, " 63, in which 
he points out that "from the point of view of African religions, a human being consists of social, 
moral, spiritual, and physical components united together. " Even Hick accepts that primal religions 
ppromoted a stronger sense of community (AIR, 23,29) than that of post-axial religions. 9 Goring, R, ed., Chambers Dictionary of Beliefs and Religions, London: BCA, 1992,331. 
40 Goring, Chambers Dictionary of Beliefs and Religions, 50-5 1. It should also be noted that many 
of the primal religions have religious leaders such as "prophets, " "priests, " "mediums and diviners, " 
and "shamans" who act as guides for the society. See for example: Mbiti, African Religions and 
Philosophy, chp. 15; Parrinder, African Traditional Religion, chp. 9; Cooper, G, "North American 
Traditional Religion, " in TjarW. orJS' ReýýBions, ed. S Sutherland, et al., London: Routledge, 1988, 
876-877; Brotherston, "Latin American Traditional Religion: Three Orders of Service, " 894; Geertz, 
"Native North American Religions, " 537. 
41 ROF, 111, AIR, 307-308. 
42 Cohn-Sherbok, D, "Ranking Religions, " Religious Studies 22,1986,382. 
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and the new religious movements. Cohn-Sherbok uses this criterion to asses the popularity 
of the modern Jewish movements, but I would like to quote another interesting example. 
Watt, both as a committed Christian and an eminent Islamist, observes in explaining the 
expansion of Islam in a "large area of the original heartlands of Christianity -Palestine, 
Syria, Egypt, Iraq and subsequently Asia Minor"43 that: 
"[T]his result was due only to a slight extent to the political success of the Muslims, and 
much more to the fact that Islam could meet the spiritual needs of the peoples involved as 
well as, and perhaps even better than, Christianity could. "44 
However, in the spiritual realm there is no place for laziness and no community is 
indispensable. Therefore despite the praising verses that they "are the best community that 
has been raised up for mankind, "45 which I think should not be taken literally, 46 Muslims 
are also warned that "if you turn away [from this teaching], He will substitute you for some 
other folk, and they will not be like you. "47 Even though one cannot demonstrate this, it is 
likely that probably because of this and other factors, we see new religious movements 
springing everyday here and there. Thus in addition to Hick's criterion of moral spiritual 
fruits, if we can see that they meet the criterion of "viability, " we can say that they are 
43 Watt, W M, "The Nature of Muhammad's Prophethood, ". Thc.. $cQttish. ]. Qlitn? l.. Qf., CalgjQU$ 
, Jlldjg$ 8, no. 2,1987,82. 44 Watt, "The Nature of Muhammad's Prophethood, " 82. 
45 The Qur'an, 3: 110. 
' The verse (3: 110) reads: "You are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is 
right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah... " 
I suggested that the verse should not be taken "literally. " My suggestion may sound unjustified in 
the first glance. But there are several reasons for this. Firstly, both classical and modern 
commentators unanimously agree that the verse does not imply the notion of a "chosen nation, " as 
such found in Judaism (Ayoub, M M, The Qur'an and Its Interpreters: The House of 7mran, Albany, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 1992, vol II, 290-297). Such a notion would 
certainly contradict Islam's claim of being a "non-sectarian, non-racial" universal religion. Secondly, 
the meaning is conditional, that is Muslim community is not automatically designated as the best 
community just being Muslim; as Sayyid Qutb puts it, it is not "based on a religious or ethnic 
privilege" (Ayoub, op. cit., 295). There are certain conditions to be met: "(1) Faith, (2) doing right, 
being an example to others to do the right, and having the power to see that the right prevails, (3) 
eschewing wrong, being an example to others to eschew wrong, and having the power to see that 
wrong and injustice are defeated" (The Holy Qur'an, 173, n. 434). Thus it is not the Muslim 
community that is best, but it depends on the social environment they provide through their work. 
As long as they fulfil these conditions, they can be a role "model for other communities and a leader 
in establishing a good and wholesome society" (Ayoub, op. cit., 295), which can be seen in Islamic 
history (e. g. Moorish Empire in Spain). However, if they do not obey by those rules, they are 
reminded that they are not indispensable (The Qur'an. 47: 38; cf. 9: 38) and can be replaced by any 
other nation that would fulfil those duties. I suppose this, too, can be illustrated by several examples 
from Islamic history, especially the recent situation of Muslim world is a case in point. Finally, 
from a pluralistic perspective, I believe the verse should be understood in the wider context of the 
Qur'an (particularly 2: 62 and 5: 69, which will be examined in detail later). Hence 
salvation/liberation is not reserved to Muslims only. Rahman remarks that nobody, including 
Muslims, "will be automatically God's darling" by carrying certain labels; that is, "those who 
believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds -from any section of humankind- are saved" 
(Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an, 166-167 and Rahman, "A Muslim Response, " 74-75). Nor 
are Muslims qualified automatically for salvation/liberation, just because they are Muslims. In this 
respect Muhammad Abduh's remark on 2: 62 are crucial: "God's approval or wrath" is not related to 
"one's religious identification or social status. What really counts is a heartfelt belief in God. " 
(McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of the Sabi'un, " 100-101. ). I suppose this suffices for the time 
being, since I shall deal with these issues in more detail in the forthcoming sections. 
47 The Qur'an, 47: 38; cf. 9: 38. 
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salvifically effective. However, Cohn-Sherbok warns us that "viability" cannot guarantee 
authenticity. Therefore, I suggest we should be cautious about generalisation of all 
movements, since, as I shall emphasise shortly, the content of a movement is of paramount 
importance in evaluating a religion or a religious movement. 
The second aspect of narrowness in Hick's soteriological criterion concerns the actual 
followers of a religion. One gets the impression that it is mostly designed for the saints in 
the great world religions, who are naturally gifted and have achieved a great deal on the 
spiritual journey. However, the majority of followers rarely achieve this status. Hick is 
right in describing the ultimate goal of religions as "ego transformation, " but fails to 
discuss the intermediate states which I described in two Muslim cases and among the 
primitive religions. One may not be a socially fruitful and productive follower of a religion; 
that is to say, one may not be putting as much effort in social activities as Hick's political 
saints, but might still achieve salvation/liberation spiritually by following the basic rules of 
one's religion. I shall develop this point further while discussing the other two problems of 
Hick's soteriological criterion in the following paragraphs. 
Since the last two points, namely the restriction of religion to the earth/world and 
downgrading of religion to morality, are intertwined, I shall discuss them together. Hick's 
understanding of salvation/liberation sidelines the spiritual and the ritual aspects of religion. 
I shall cite here once more the examples of two Muslims presented in chapter four: Take the 
example of a morally good Muslim who strives for the betterment of his fellow human 
beings, but does not practice Islam in the strict sense of the word, viz. neither prays five 
times a day, nor fasts during Ramadhan, etc. Let us imagine another Muslim who is a 
devout practitioner, fasts, prays, etc., but, nevertheless, does not involve himself very 
much in activities which benefit society and humanity at large. It is obvious that according 
to Hick's criterion, the former is more likely to be saved and liberated than the latter, 
whereas, in fact, Islamically speaking, despite the fact that neither is an ideal Muslim, the 
judgement is the reverse of Hick's -I should perhaps note that here by "saved" I refer to the 
Islamic notion of najat orfalah, that is to please Allah and be rewarded by Heaven. 
Examples could obviously be expanded to accommodate other traditions. Thus, it is not 
difficult to see that Hick's soteriological criterion is reductionist, though it may be 
appealing at first to the adherents of many traditions. As Ward puts it accurately, what Hick 
does is 
"to interpret soteriological efficacy solely as moral heroism or the achievement of spectacular 
virtue. The problem is that many clearly false ideologies can lead to morally heroic conduct 
on the part of believers, from Marxist-Leninism to Existentialist Humanism. 48 Moral 
efficacy may be one test of an acceptable belief; but it is not even a necessary condition of a 
belief's being true, much less a sufficient one. "49 
48 It is no coincidence that Hick's salvific scheme includes those as well. 49 Ward, K, Religion and Revelation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994,316. 
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Hick appears to be mistaken in assuming that the doctrinal or ritual aspect of religions 
are "secondary packaging" for they, too, direct one to the Real and bear observable moral 
and spiritual fruits upon the human beings. Religion encompasses morality but it is more 
than that. Thus a theory as broad as Hick's, instead of reducing religious epistemology to 
morality, should take a wider spectrum towards the salvific ends and efficacy of religion. 
Hence, on the basis of respecting religious doctrines and avoiding reductionism, it should 
declare that while losing one's ego and recentring oneself in the Real is the ultimate goal of 
religions, the basic formal and ritual structures of religions are also important steps 
preparing and leading one towards that goal. Reductionist and dismissive attitudes towards 
religious doctrines will not help Hick's theory, but damage it. I believe that, as Ward put it 
cogently, "the possession of some particular beliefs is necessary to salvation. People 
without those beliefs will not attain salvation, for the simple reason that salvation consists 
in attaining a state which entails possessing such beliefs. "50 Hick, indeed, should welcome 
the background different religions provide for their adherents, while stressing the need to 
achieve the ultimate goal. However, I should distance myself from S Mark Heim who 
advocates a "post-pluralistic" "orientational pluralism, " largely adopted from Nicholas 
Rescher51 and deeply effected by DiNoia's inclusivistic thoughts. Heim believes it is 
possible to be a pluralist while entirely remaining committed to one's particularist beliefs. 52 
That is to say, there are different salvations and different ways to achieve them, i. e. 
divergent religions offer different salvations, equally effective and equally true from 
different orients. He also claims that the salvational ends of religions are different and 
cannot be converged into one. He finishes by saying that "Truth is one. Our ways are 
many. Our ends are distinct"53 or to use one of his subheadings: "many true religions... 
and each the only way. "54 The ultimate relativism of Milbank, Heim, and Rescher has been 
rightly criticised by Anselm K Min. 55 Against the claim of Milbank and Heim's different 
"concepts" of justice among religions and cultures, Min argues vehemently that: 
"There is a common longing for the reality of justice in the sense of basic fairness in 
treatment and basic freedom from genocide and externally imposed material suffering and 
political oppression... all of them demand a minimum of justice, namely, security of life and 
basic fairness in the distribution and exercise of economic and political power. The theory of 
justice, its concept and justification, may indeed be different from religion to religion, but 
50 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 316. 
51 Rescher, N, The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical 
Diversity, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1985. 
52 Nasr puts forward a similar argument, but less relativist, derived from philosophia perennis which 
claims that different religions in their unique forms are "relatively absolute, " for only "the Absolute 
is absolute" (192). (See for more: Nasr, S H, "The Philosophia Perennis and the Study of Religion, " 
in ed. F Whaling, Edinburgh: T&T Clark: 1984,181-200). 
53 See for more Heim, S M, "Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis, " j lj. n.; holQgy 10, 
no. 4,1994,359. 
54 Heim, Salvations, 219. See for more especially chapters 5,7 and 8. 55 Min, A K, "Dialectical Pluralism and Solidarity of Others: Towards a New Paradigm, " JQUrgal Qf 
he,. tAmericänAa1d . r. nY Qf. 
ReligiQn 65, no. 3,1997,587-604. 
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there is no religion that defends the reality of such gross injustices as genocide and outright 
exploitation. "56 
Min also accuses Rescher's and Heim's "orientational pluralism" of indifference to the 
problems of humanity at large and their consequences. He observes: 
"Orientational pluralism reduces the issue of pluralism to the theoretical and intellectual 
question of the pluralism of perspectives and truth, and remains indifferent to the problem of 
the social, practical context and consequences (justice) of conflicting orientations or 
perspectives. However, when Orthodox, Catholics, and Muslims murder one another in 
Bosnia, can we really say, as Rescher does say, `Never mind about others; they may follow a 
different drummer. Our job is to follow ours'? 57 Such an attitude would be historically most 
irresponsible. All religions are compelled to enter into the practical dialectic of justice in a 
pluralistic society and propose a positive solution by retrieving the best of their respective 
traditions... "58 
Min's cogently expressed points, I suggest, give us clues why Hick is so insistent on the 
issue of political saints like Gandhi and Mandela. I believe that Heim and others cannot 
easily dismiss Min's charges and therefore think that Hick's ego transformation as the 
ultimate goal of religions is intact. 
The upshot of what I said about Hick's soteriological criterion is that while I affirm 
that the ultimate goal of a religion can be summarised as ego-transformation in the form of 
"orientation to the good, "59 because of our differing capabilities in the spiritual journey, as 
in other things, there might be intermediary stages of salvation, which are equally legitimate 
and worthy in the eyes of respected traditions, as we saw in the examples of two Muslims, 
and therefore should be integrated into the salvific process. Because of his persistence on 
"ego transformation" through observable moral fruits and branding theological doctrines as 
"secondary packaging, " Hick seems to be missing the important contribution the ritual 
aspect of religion provides for salvation/liberation. The Salvific process might be like 
climbing a mountain which has several peaks and an ultimate peak, which I take as the 
"recentring of ego in the Real, "fana fillah in the Islamic Sufi literature. But to ascend other 
peaks is also worthy of effort and reward and of consideration in a pluralistic hypothesis. 
I conclude then that to be able to offer a viable and comprehensive account of 
religious diversity, Hick's hypothesis must be modified in three aspects. 
Firstly, it has to affirm moderate ineffability of the noumenal Real, instead of strong 
ineffability. This will (i) secure the foundation of the noumenal Real in the formation of 
religious phenomena, which in turn will support the cognitivity of religions as the crucial 
claim of pluralism; (ii) respond to the charges of reductionism by acknowledging the active 
role of the Real in the process of revelation and accepting Holy texts as more than merely 
human products; and because it is a common notion to great world religions, (iii) it will not 
56 Min, "Dialectical Pluralism, " 600. 
57 Rescher, The Strife of Systems, 201. 
58 Min, "Dialectical Pluralism, " 601. 
59 gee, Prolegomena, 106. 
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create a dead-lock against the pluralist paradigm in its recognition as a wide spread 
phenomenon. 
Secondly, in its treatment of revelations, it must adopt a hermeneutical approach 
rather than a mythical understanding, because it (i) does not bear the negative implications 
that Hick's does, (ii) offers a broader and more nuanced reading of the holy texts, and (iii) 
treats scriptures as revelations not human products. 
Finally, the soteriological criterion of salvation/liberation as human transformation 
must acknowledge and be integrated with the positive contribution that the ritual aspect of 
religion provides in the process of salvation/liberation. It will respond to the charges of 
downgrading religion to morality and mere heroism. 
I call the modified version of Hick's pluralism a "moderate soteriological pluralism. " 
It is moderate in the sense that it argues for a moderate ineffability of the Real all sich as 
opposed to Hick's strong ineffability. But, in line with Hick's pluralism, it still maintains 
the soteriological efficacy of the great world religions. Therefore it is a "moderate 
soteriological pluralism, " though for the sake of brevity I shall refer to it as "moderate 
pluralism. " Thus, in the rest of the chapter, unless otherwise specified, where I use 
pluralism and its derivatives I simply refer to "moderate pluralism. " 
5.2.1. Moderate Pluralism: Possible Complications 
Having modified Hick's pluralistic hypothesis into a "moderate pluralism, " I should 
perhaps deal with some of the problems it raises before moving on to its relation to Islam. I 
must, however, point out straightforwardly that the purpose of this thesis was not to 
develop a new and better version of religious pluralism as opposed to Hick's. Its primary 
aim was to examine Hick's pluralistic hypothesis from an Islamic perspective. Instead of 
totally abandoning Hick's project due to certain problems it possesses or poses particularly 
within an Islamic context, I wanted to develop a modified version and test it within an 
Islamic context. But what is the difference between a modified (Hickian) pluralism and a 
new and better religious pluralism? It is a question of emphasis and scope. If I were to 
develop a new theory of religious pluralism, I would only mention and summarise Hick's 
theory briefly in one chapter and move on to develop the new theory. In other words, I 
would not put this much emphasis on Hick's pluralism by devoting three chapters to its 
exploration and criticism. This would then give me space to discuss the full implications of 
a new theory of religious pluralism from several aspects. I would, in fact, call such a 
project "Moderate Pluralism and Islam" without mentioning Hick directly, not "Religious 
Pluralism and Islam... " However, because my initial intention was to examine Hick's 
theory from an Islamic perspective, I spent justifiably much time and space on its 
exploration. Thus I describe my final analysis as a "modification" of Hick's pluralism not 
inventing a new. theory of pluralism, a description which allows me to utilise the earlier 
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discussions and arguments to establish my case vis-ä-vis moderate pluralism. 60 It should, 
therefore, be noted, as a precautionary remark, that examining all the issues involved 
would take us far beyond the scope of this study. Hence I will address some possible 
questions within the limited space. 
A critic might argue that, whilst Hick's mature philosophy of religions is the result of 
a careful exit from the sphere of Christian influence and the problems that causes pluralism 
per se, moderate pluralism seems to be a return to a particular sphere of religious influence, 
this time Islamic rather than Christian. The problems that Hick overcame in his mature 
thought reappear again in moderate pluralism. In what ways, then, is moderate pluralism 
different from Hick's earlier `Copernican' revolution in theology? How does it avoid the 
pitfalls of pluralism without having to take refuge in agnosticism and strong ineffability? 
Does moderate pluralism wholly avoid the problems raised by conflicting truth-claims 
(particularly concerning the nature of `the Real an sich')? If moderate pluralism relies on an 
understanding of `the Real' as good, compassionate, merciful etc., does it not also rely on 
an understanding of the Real an sich as personal? If so, then what are the implications? I 
will try to address these questions in turn. 
I have no pretension of writing from the viewpoint of a "neutral observer. " On the 
contrary, I make no secret of the fact that I look at the issues from a Muslim perspective, 
but always trying to keep an open mind to other traditions. Thus, however hard I try to 
hide and be objective, my Muslim background will be disclosed one way or the other. In 
this respect I concur with Ward that it is very difficult for one to have a "religious 
interpretation of religion" "without holding a confessional view of some sort, however 
attenuated and revised it may be. "61 However, describing moderate pluralism as a return to 
the "influence of Islam, " I think, might not be correct. It may seem to be "theistic" at first 
sight, but it is hardly Islamic, certainly not in the orthodox sense of Islam, which, as seen 
in chapter one, rejects salvation/liberation outside Islam. Whether moving from strong to 
moderate ineffability makes it a "theistic" approach is another question, which will be dealt 
with separately. How does moderate pluralism differ from Hick's earlier "theocentric 
pluralism"? 
Moderate pluralism is Real-centric not theo-centric. It does not suppose that other 
religions revolve around the God of theistic religions. Rather it proposes that the Real is 
approached, responded to and expressed in different ways. It does not replace Hick's Real 
with the God of theism; all it does is to modify Hick's understanding of it with moderate 
instead of strong ineffability -I concede that this is a radical modification and will examine 
its effects separately. Thus the Kantian distinction between noumenal and phenomenal is 
still an element of moderate pluralism. One might object that we cannot know anything of 
the noumenal, but moderate pluralism claims to know certain aspects of it. I can respond to 
60 For instance, when I refer to "moderate ineffability of the Real, " the reader will remember 
immediately the arguments related to the Real and discussions about moderate and strong ineffability 
in chapters three and four. 
61 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 108. 
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that in two ways. One is Hick's answer to those who criticise him for taking Kant's 
epistemological system beyond the sensory realm, which the totality of the Kantian system 
does not-allow. He replies that he only takes one part of Kant's system and applies it to 
religious epistemology, aware that Kant might have objected to this extension. He thinks 
that one has a right to attempt this sort of application and I think he is right to do so. This is 
what I do as well. But in moderate pluralism the Kantian distinction is not as important as 
in Hick's. It is rather loosely located, since the distinction is not an absolute necessity in 
explaining religious phenomena, but a useful tool in explaining the fact that in its essence 
the Real lies beyond our conceptual framework, but is still accessible to us in different 
names and forms, even if these are inadequate. The second is the notion of moderate 
ineffability, commonly found in great world religions (except some forms of Buddhism 
and Hinduism), allows us to make such a distinction. Here what I have in mind is the usual 
distinction found among many of the great world religions between the Real an sich, who 
"in its perfection, its value and its power" "transcends our understanding, "62 but, 
nevertheless, is expressed inadequately in our human terms in different ways. Thus great 
world religions make a distinction between the Real in itself and as its humanly known and 
experienced. As a result, we find the distinctions between nirguna Brahman ("the eternal 
self-existent divine reality, beyond the scope of all human categories, including 
personality") and saguna Brahman ("God in relation to his creation and with the attributes 
which express this relationship")63 in Hinduism; the ultimate, formless Dharmakaya and the 
"heavenly Buddhas" -constituting Sambhogakaya (which appears to devotees as concrete 
Buddha through meditation) and the Nirmanakaya (the body of the historical Buddha)- in 
Mahayana Buddhism; dharmata dharmakaya (the Dharmakaya -nirvana- an sich) and the 
upaya dharmakaya (nirvana manifesting as Amida, the Buddha of infinite compassion) in 
the Pure Land Buddhist tradition; the Jewish scholar Maimonides' distinction between "the 
essence and the manifestations of God; " and God a se ("God's infinite self-existent being, 
beyond the grasp of human mind") and God pro nobis ("revealed in relation to humankind 
as creator and redeemer") in Christianity. "64 As a Muslim, I can say that Muslims are 
always conscious that Allah transcends everything65 and yet is revealed partially in the 
Qur'an. 66 One can, then, say that the holy scriptures that world religions have do relate to 
the Real, though none is able to express it fully, for the fact that it is ultimately ineffable. I 
have argued throughout the thesis that Hick seems to be mistaken by moving beyond the 
common line by postulating a totally ineffable Real. I suggest we stop at the moderate level 
62 Ward, "Divine Ineffability, " 220. 
63 GUF, 144; AIR, 236. 
64 AIR, 236-37. 
65 Among several verses, 6: 103 is a well-known one: "No vision can grasp Him, but His grasp is 
over all vision; He is subtle well-aware. " 
66 "Say: `if the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner would the 
ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it, for its 
aid" (18: 109); cf. 31: 27. The notion of "Archetypal Book" (Umm al-Kitab) is also an important lead 
to be remembered in this context, which implies that the Qur'an does not embody the complete 
truth. I will come back to this later in the following section. 
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and try to understand the rest in the light of cumulative religious experience of humanity, 
their fruits and the scriptures. 
Does "moderate ineffability" of the Real solve all the problems like a magic word? I 
doubt it does, certainly, it also has problems. But I believe they are less grave compared to 
those raised by strong ineffability. We have mentioned in chapter three that as soon as Hick 
developed his Copernican revolution, critics pointed out that whichever way Hick might 
turn there will be no easy way out for his theocentric model. The problems with God, they 
asserted, would remain with the Absolute or the Real, 67 i. e. "either the understanding of 
these terms will be too broad (indeterminate with respect to theistic and nontheistic 
conceptions) or too narrow (asserting a specific theistic or nontheistic conception). "68 We 
have also seen in D'Costa's criticism of Hick (in chapter one while discussing typological 
problems) that he will also end up with either "transcendental agnosticism" or privileging 
one phenomenal image of the noumenal Real over the other. I do not think that these 
charges can be overcome and resolved easily. To me the charge of "transcendental 
agnosticism" is more serious than that of "theistic" or "nontheistic" leanings on either side. 
Hick claims that strong ineffability does not lead to agnosticism, 69 but we have seen in 
chapter four that it does. It jeopardises the core of his hypothesis: that religious experience 
is not total delusion, that it is a response to the Real. Hence, for me, the first priority was to 
overcome this predicament, which meant to return to moderate ineffability. One may ask if 
it is the ultimate, flawless solution. No, it is not. Now it faces the charge of 
"theocentricism. " But it does address the main problem by securing a meaningful place for 
the Real within the hypothesis. It argues that we can know certain qualities of the noumenal 
Real (like "supreme power and value" as "the cause of all"70), that religious language 
relates to the Real, that revelation is not a wholly mental product of human beings. These 
have, I believe, paramount importance for great world religions and have to be given more 
room in a meaningful way rather than made mythical mental constructions. Moderately 
ineffable Real does make sense to many of the great world religions and their followers, 
whereas strong ineffability leads to agnosticism, self-defeating and leaves an empty shell 
for the religions and their followers. As Partridge puts it, "belief borders on unbelief when 
nothing can be said about the object of belief itself. "71 
But how consistent is moderate pluralism, especially with regard to the conflicting 
truth-claims of religions, such as those made concerning the nature of `the Real an sich'? 
How does it explain the language referring to the personal and impersonal understandings 
of the Real? How much of what we have in scriptures refers to the Real all sich? First, we 
should bear in mind that moderate pluralism advocates a hermeneutical approach to the 
revelatory texts in order for us to be able to make sense of how the Real may be expressed 
67 Lipner, "Does Copernicus Help? ", 254. 
68 Rose, Knowing the Real, 71. 
69 Hick, J, "The Possibility, " , 
163, fn. 4. 
70 Ward, K, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219. 
71 Partridge. C. H. H. Farmer's, 335. 
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and experienced in quite different ways. (More detail will follow on this in an Islamic 
context). Secondly, at a more general level, we should perhaps begin by analysing the 
different models of revelation at work in the Semitic and Indian traditions. Let us follow 
Ward: 
"In the Semitic tradition, the early rapture of trans-states gives way to the eighth-century BCE 
prophets who proclaim the 'word of God' in moral judgement and the offer of social liberation 
on condition of obedience to God's law. There emerges the idea of one supreme Spirit who is 
`other' than the created world, since he stands in judgement over it and is able to promise 
deliverance from the oppressive powers within it. Such a view often threatens to turn into a 
dualism of good and evil powers, and in Zoroastrianism, which left as its legacy the idea of 
Satan as a fallen angel, it in part did so. Yet the Hebrew prophets retained a belief that God is 
the only creator of a fundamentally good creation, so that evil is a perversion which can be 
removed by God in the end, by decisive Divine action. "72 
The essential idea of revelation at work in the Semitic traditions, Ward continues, is then an 
"encounter with a supreme, morally demanding Will" which "expresses itself in historical 
actions of judgement and deliverance and in the disclosure of what it demands (the Torah) 
and what it promises (the Messianic Kingdom). "73 We see basically three elements: (a) an 
"experiential element" (as in the "prophetic encounters with God"); (b) a "propositional 
element" (in the form of "judgement and promise"), and (c) a "salvific element" (as in "God 
delivers Israel from Egypt" and "directs the people's history" according to their "obedience 
and lack of it"). "Faith" then is fundamentally "obedience to Torah, which establishes and 
sustains the covenant relationship of this people to God. " However, Torah is not just an 
"abstract, timeless set of commands, " rather it is attached to "historical circumstances" and 
needs to be "interpreted by that community as a living form of relationship between God" 
and them with a "specific, morally ordered history, vocation, and destiny. " "Revelation" in 
the Semitic context is thus, Ward concludes, "the discernment of the moral purpose and 
vocation of a particular people by the prophets who are called into special relationship with 
one supreme, morally purposing, providentially acting God. "74 
When we look at Indian Traditions, however, we discover that a "rather different 
development occurs. " Ward suggests that "there is a movement towards belief in one 
Supreme Spirit; but this is seen as `identical' with the names and forms under which it 
appears in time. '"75 Here is Ward once more: 
"It is sages, who, by ascetic discipline and practice in meditation, pass beyond attachment and 
desire to achieve salvation or liberation and become able to unveil the true nature of the one 
reality. Their experience is construed in terms of a non-dual experience which passes beyond 
72 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 329. 
73 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 329-330. 
74 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 330. 
75 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 330. He cites Taittiriya Upanishad (2.6. ): "'Ihe Real became 
everything, " which appears to be an exact translation of the Sufi saying in Persian: "Hama ost" 
(Everything is Him, i. e. God). 
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all the limitations and conceptual constructions of the everyday world of appearances. The)- 
discern time, not as expressing the purposive acts of a providential God, but as an unfolding 
of the cosmic law of ignorance, desire, and suffering and as an expression of potentialities 
somehow inherent in the nature of the one unchanging Real, Brahman. The propositional 
clement of their discernment is found partly in dharma -social laws which reflect the cosmic 
law of moral order- and partly in the teaching of the true nature of reality and its concealment 
by desire or ignorance. "76 
Ward infers that the basic model of revelation at work in Indian tradition is "that of the 
enlightened apprehension of the nature of reality, as the true and unchanging substratum of 
manifold appearances. `n 
The examination of these two different revelation models, Ward contends, 
demonstrates that "in almost every respect the Semitic and Indian traditions are 
complementary, emphasising the active and unchanging poles respectively of Supreme 
Spiritual Reality to which they both seek to relate. "79 Ward warns its of the frequent dancer 
of hardening these "complementaries" into "contradictions. " Thus, as a result, one usually 
contrasts "a personal God with a non-dual Absolute; a temporal moral purpose with a 
timeless and all-including Real; the exclusive worship of one God with an acceptance of 
many gods and forms of devotion" etc 7 However, Ward suggests that contrasts of this 
sort can become "contradictions if the meaning of terms used is clear and precise enough to 
enable one to see just what they exclude. " For instance, let its take a book, if one says "it is 
a red book, " and the other says "it is a green book, " this results in a "contradiction, " since 
it cannot be "both red and green. " But, if one says "it looks red to me, or in this light, " and 
the other says, "it looks green to me, or in this different light, " this does not result in 
"contradiction, since objects can look differently to different people or in different lights. " 
(We should remind ourselves here the discussion about Wittgenstein's "seeing-as" and 
Hick's expansion of it to include all human experience as "experiencing-as" in chapter 
three). Likewise, if one says "God is a person, " and the other says "God is not a person, " 
this results in a contradiction, since something cannot be a "person and not be" 
simultaneously. However, if we conduct the conversation in terms of "experiencing-as, " 
the contradiction disappears. One would say "God relates to me as a person would, " and 
the other would say "God is a limitless ocean of being, " there is no contradiction. KO To 
clarify the matter further, Ward argues, "one will have to enquire whether a limitless ocean 
of being can relate in personal ways to creatures. " If we can admit that "God is much more 
76 Ward, Religion and Revelalion, 330. 
77 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331. 
78 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331. 
79 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331. 
80 One may ask whether those who would opt for the notion of Real as "limitless ocean of being" 
would be able properly to ascribe goodness to it. I believe they can in a different sense, since 
goodness is not totally an alien notion as far as their understanding of Real is concerned. But this 
need more explanation, which I shall deal with later. 
Chapter 5 Moderate Pluralism and Islant 202 
than a person, " and also that "unlimited being can take a limited form for the sake of 
creatures, then a straight contradiction has disappeared. "81 
Ward is aware that not everyone will be impressed or is ready to accept such a 
complementary approach 82 But he thinks that there is room for dialogue between the two 
traditions, especially for some people, "who are prepared to concede the inadequacy of 
human concepts to describe a supreme being"83 and "allow that different concepts may 
apply in different respects or from different points of view. "84 Does this settle all the 
disagreement? Of course, it does not. There are still questions to be faced, such as "in what 
sense can something be `more than personal, ' or can an unlimited being come to possess 
limits? " Ward believes that "such questions are not finally settlable, " but with "further 
enquiry and reflection, " new doors might be open, new ways of seeing and understanding 
disagreements might be developed 85 This is what Ward calls a "convergent spirituality, " 
but not in the sense of converging "all traditions to a new, universally accepted tradition. " It 
is a "recognition that many cultures and traditions are engaged in a common quest for unity 
with supreme perfection; a hope that they may seek and achieve a convergence in common 
core beliefs, as complementary images come to be more widely recognised; and an 
acceptance of the partiality and inadequacy of all human concepts to capture the object of 
that quest definitely. "86 
Where does this leave moderate pluralism then? I believe it is possible to adopt such a 
complementary approach instead of Hick's reductionist approach. It does not have to be an 
"either/or" dichotomy; rather, as Ward has shown, there could be a third way of saying, 
81 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331; cf. li:: ages of Elernity, 157. Smart, considering "the 
properties of more direct experiences, " supports Ward's conclusion that despite the doctrinal 
differences between personal and impersonal understandings of the Real, it is possible that "different 
experiences might apply to the same entity, " i. e. "perhaps nirvana and the Divine arc one. " He lists 
six similar properties: First, both arc "timeless; " second, both are "transcendent; " third, "though 
perhaps for differing reasons, " both "have ineffability; " fourth, both arc "literally invisible" which 
"symbolises the transcendent; " fifth, "neither the Divine nor nirvana is in space; " and sixth, both are 
"full of potential bliss, beyond ordinaryjoy" (Smart, Digressions of the Sacred, 173). 
82 See for instance: Rose, K, "Keith Ward's lixcepºionalist Theology of Revelations, " New 
Blackfriars79,1998,164-176. 
8-3 Ward, Religion rund Revelation, 33 1. 
84 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331. 
85 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 331-332. Ward's comparative remarks about the Buddha and the 
Christ are illuminating and worth quoting: 
"[T]hese icons of the Christ and the Buddha stand as complementary polarities marking out 
the path of human spiritual experience. They are the universalised epitomes of historically and 
culturally determined polar models of the suprasensory realm, as it has been apprehended by 
spiritually devoted individuals. The Buddha commits himself wholly to the path of non- 
attachment and discovers release from self and union with a supreme bliss, wisdom, and 
compassion. The Christ commits himself wholly to devotion to God and discovers in himself 
the Divine love, purpose, and power working actively to found the dawning of Gcxi's rule in a 
new community of the Spirit" (334). 
The major difference between the two is that: 
"[I ]In the person of the Buddha, the temporal is decisively transcended in the unbroken calm of 
the Unconditioned and a human person achieves liberation from the chains of desire and 
ignorance. But in the person of the Christ, the eternal dynamically enters into and transfigures 
the temporal, so that individuality, creativity, temporality, and community arc positively 
affirmed as that person finds its fulfilment in a transparency of feeling, mind, and will to the 
creative source and goal of all things" (335). 
Ward, Religion and Revelation, 339. 
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without falling into contradiction, that both are different manifestations and expressions of 
the same Ultimate reality in different intonations. I say in "different intonations, " because 
one must be cautious about sweeping generalisations, such as "locating a Supreme Being" 
as the ultimate concern of all religions. Some Indian traditions in this respect remain 
resilient to such generalisations and still, one might say, pose to be slippery ground 
(namely, the Theravada and Madhayamika). Thus, for instance, in his nine dimensional 
examination of world beliefs, 87 Smart states that in some Indian religions "there is a 
supreme God, Goddess or Couple, the rest of the gods exist more or less as servants of the 
supreme, or as substitutes. " "But in the case of non-theistic religions there is not a supreme 
God, but rather a set of supreme teachers and an ultimate liberation. So the gods are 'loose' 
in the system. They function as powers, but are not spiritually important. "88 Hence the 
Dalai Lama declares: "We Buddhists are atheists. "89 But their atheism is not "unspiritual. " 
"Buddhism has its other spiritual resources and goals. It looks to nirvana. It relies on the 
Sanghamm... But it is still atheist: it rejects the notion of a creator God who will help out 
with our troubles. ")1 Naturally, a theist might equate "nirvana" with the "ineffable side of 
God. " Smart, though acknowledges the necessity of traditions making sense of each other 
from their standpoint, considers this equation phenomenologically wrong. Because "it is 
not natural for a Theravadin to identify nirvana with God. "('' How does nirvana relate to 
other religions then? It is a "kind of purified consciousness, " "the contemplative 
experience" that "abolishes the distinction between subject and object. "')-3 Smart stresses 
that "although nirvana is the ultimate it is not the ultimate Being or God, but rather the 
ultimate state, to be classified ordinarily in the Indian tradition as moksa, or salvation or 
liberation. "94 This is what I mean by "different intonation, " i. e. that the emphasis may 
differ according to different religions. Even then, Smart believes that the atheist(! ) 
Buddhists' ultimate state of nirvana is not very different from the "mystical union, " often 
talked in the theistic religions. There is a caveat though. Smart believes that because the 
modern day "study of mysticism" was initiated in the West, a "misleading" assumption has 
become common knowledge that mysticism aims "union with God, with the One. " In fact, 
"since mysticism involves, by virtually universal testimony, the disappearance of the 
subject-object distinction, then if an Other is postulated a kind of merging or union is 
87 The dimensions are (1) "the ritual or practical, " (2) "the doctrinal or philosophical, " (3) "the 
mythic or narrative, " (4) "the experiential or emotional, " (5) "the ethical or legal, " (6) "the 
organisational or social, " (7) "the material or artistic, " (8) "the political, " and (9) "the economic 
(Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 10- 11). 
xH Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 34, my emphasis. In another context, he writes "Where the 
Supreme is conceived non-personally it is quite common to perceive the personal God as 
intermediate, lying as it were `below' the non-personal" (34). 
89 Smart states that the remark was made in 1991 (spring) in Santa Barbara, California, at a "large 
meeting" in which he was also present (Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 27). 
90 "The Buddhist order of monks, nuns and holy laypersons" (Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 
xxiv). 
91 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 27. 
92 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 31. 
93 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 29. 
94 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 31. 
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envisaged, often expressed in terms of love, of the two-in-one. But if an Other is not 
postulated, the image of union does not arise. This is the case with Theravada. '5 So 
although the experience is very similar in each case (that is the disappearance of the subject- 
object distinction), because of the different mind sets each adherent has, the expression of 
that experience turns out to be different. Consequently, the Theravada Buddhist might 
describe the ultimate state of nirvana in the formulae of "there is nothing, "XX whereas a 
Sufi, such as al-Hallaj, utters it in the controversial declaration of "Ana'l-Haqq" (literally, I 
am the Real, i. e. I am united with the Real), for which he was made a martyr. In short, the 
emphasis in the Theravada Buddhism is not on the object of the experience, but on the 
ultimate state itself; whereas in theistic religions the emphasis on the object of the 
experience still exists even in the final stages 97 Smart elucidates this differentiation in the 
forms of religious experience. He suggests that 
"there are two or three major forms of religious experience which help to account for 
differences in doctrines. One is dhyana98 and the 'empty' experiences of purified 
consciousness; another is the experience of the nunminous') Other, not only exhibited in 
particular kinds of religious experience as delineated by Otto, but also expressed in blrakii. ttx) 
The combinations or non-combinations of these kinds of experience help to explain differing 
patterns of philosophy. Non-theism expresses dhyana without hhnkti. Theism expresses 
hhakti. Theism with a strong emphasis on the ineffable and impersonal side of God combines 
bhakti and dhyana in some degree of balance; while absolutism or quasi-absolutism with a 
Lord as lower manifestation shows d/tyana to be dominant and bhakti secondary. "tot 
We have examined two different approaches to world religions: Ward's comparative 
"open" theological model and Smart's phenomenological approach. Despite the dangers 
associated with generalisation, one can conclude that both agree on the fact that the two 
different models of experience and of expression of religious experience are 
complementary, rather than being contradictory'()'- and that the Real can be experienced and 
95 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 39. 
`X' Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 29. 
`n Cf. Ward, Religion and Revelation, 335-337. 
98 "In Pali, j/tana; in Chinese, ch'an; in Japanese, Zen: meditation or a stage of meditation in the 
upward ascent of the contemplative life. Though the term is more familiar in the Buddhist context, it 
is also used in the Hindu tradition" (Smart, Dimensions of t/ie Sacred, xv). `ý') Numinous experience: "The type of religious experience delineated seriously by Rudolf Otto in 
his 1917 book Das Heilige. The experience emphasises the otherness and tremendous and mysterious 
power of the Other, but is different from most mystical or contemplative experience" (Smart. 
Dimensions of the Sacred, xxii). 
100 "Devotion; devotional religion in the Indian tradition" (Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, xii). 101 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 67-68. 
102 Smart's observations about how the two seemingly different poles have absorbed each other's 
approach and evolved are very illuminating and worth quoting: 
"Both Islam and Christianity, which started out of numinous backgrounds, came to absorb 
contemplation as a major feature. It was the combination of the two which made up Classical 
Christianity and the rich creativity of the Sufi movement. At the other end of the bipolar 
scale, Buddhism seems to have begun without significant bhakti, but in the course of the 
evolution of the Great Vehicle it developed foci of worship in such figures as Amitabha and 
Avalokitesvara. Putting it simply: Buddhism made the opposite transition from that of Islam" 
(Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 296). 
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expressed in different ways. 103 More fundamentally, they do it without the radical 
reductionism of Hick. I believe this conclusion supports the argument of moderate 
pluralism that one can make sense of conflicting truth-claims of religions about the nature 
of the Real with a moderate understanding of ineffability, rather than a strong 
ineffability. 104 I concur with Ward's conclusion that: 
"it does make sense to speak of a common structure of faith at the heart of many- religious 
traditions, and that it makes sense to speak of a common, if rather general, core of belief in a 
number of traditions about the ultimate goal of religious practice... [Great world religions] 
have a common concern to know suprasensory reality and to relate to it in ways conducive to 
true human fulfilment. They arc concerned to provide a diagnosis of the human condition, as 
one from which liberation is desirable; an authoritative teaching of a final goal of human 
striving in which liberation is to be found, which is characterised in terms of knowledge, 
bliss, and compassion; and a disclosure of a supreme intrinsic value which is actualised or 
actualizcable in reality. "105 
These conclusions may seem noble and plausible for some. However, for some others, 
especially the adherents of non-theistic religions, they may sound implausible. For I, as 
believer of a theistic religion (Islam), tried to back up my arguments with (he arguments, 
analyses and expositions of another two theologians who also have theistic commitments 
and backgrounds (Christianity). To what extent, can moderate pluralism be pluralistic, or is 
it at all? This brings me to the final point in this section: "the theistic features and elements 
in moderate pluralism. " In the words of the critic: "If moderate pluralism relies on an 
understanding of `the Real' as good, compassionate, merciful etc., does it not also rely on 
an understanding of the Real an sich as personal? If so, what are the implications? " 
I said at the beginning of the section that I write from a Muslim perspective with an 
open mind to other traditions. In fact the title of my thesis -Religious Pluralism and Islam- 
gives it away as well. In chapter one, when I discussed D'Costa's concern about Race's 
typology, I concluded that epistemically speaking it was almost impossible to produce a 
totally tradition-neutral pluralistic hypothesis. Even Hick's seemingly tradition-neutral 
approach has its own exclusive truth criteria. But we have seen that while solving some of 
10-; One can still question the link between the noumenal Real and the phenomenal Real by asking 
whether "experiencing-as" render the Real an sick and that it might inevitably be the "Real for us. " 
There can be several answers for this query. I believe that the common notion of moderate 
ineffability justifies our conclusion that the differing experiences of the followers of great world 
religions refer to one ultimate Reality, the Real (tit sich. As I just quoted above, I think Smart's 
deduction that "perhaps nirvana and the Divine are one" (Dimensions of the Sacred, 173) also 
supports this inference. As seen earlier in chapter four, Hick also deals with this question and 
concludes that it is very likely that all religious experience refers to the same Real, because, he 
reasons, the end states (i. e. fruits) are the same. However, he leaves the door open by saying that 
logically it is possible differing experiences might refer to the different Real an sicks, i. e. that there 
might be more than one Real an sich. Yet, for the sake of simplicity he opts for one. Ward also 
endorses this conclusion ("Divine Ineffahility, " 219). 
104 I am aware that conflicting truth-claims of religions in other areas should be dealt with separately 
with a hermeneutical approach, the full scale of which goes beyond the scope of my project, though 
I study it at some length by way of exemplifying the issue. My main concern here is to sotcriology. 105 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 337-338. 
Chapter 5 Moderate Pluralism and Islan 206 
the obstacles in the way of a tradition-transcending hypothesis, Hick's pluralism brings 
about bigger ones (such as endangering the existence of the Real). Thus I have suggested, 
in a way, to step back from Hick's radical approach to a more tradition-sensitive approach, 
focusing on a soteriological pluralism. I am aware that moderate pluralism uses exclusive 
truth criteria, hence the understanding of the Real, as good, compassionate, and all-loving, 
which is much like a personal interpretation. But, as we have seen above, because no 
tradition is capable of the total grasp of the Real, this exclusivity does not necessarily 
suggest that impersonal interpretations of the Real arc wrong or delusions. Rather the 
personal interpretation of the Real is only a way of seeing world religions among others. 
As Ward suggests, we should not take these different interpretations as "contradictories, " 
but rather complementaries. I see no harm using such an approach, since it does not affect 
the soteriological criteria that I employ. Ward, for example, declares honestly that his study 
of "Revelation and Religion" "has been undertaken from a specific Christian standpoint, so 
that the immediate aim is to clarify the nature of Christian revelation and to locate it in 
relation to other religious views as justly as possible. ""06 Smart also talks of the need for a 
"theist" making "sense of nirvana from the standpoint of theism" and a "nirvanist" making 
sense of theism from the standpoint of a Theravadin Buddhist. 107 Because I am a Muslim 
and a theist, a theistic interpretation is of the Real is apparent in my work. The important 
point is that it is soteriologically still pluralist (the great world religions are viewed as 
different ways of responding to the Real and equally effective in providing 
salvation/liberation to their adherents). In other words, it is how a theist sees the Real, but 
it does not exclusively suggest that there cannot be other pictures of the Real. Indeed, we 
have other pictures of the Real, for it can be experienced and expressed in different ways. 
Thus there can be more than one way of seeing great world religions from a pluralistic 
perspective, just as there are more than one way of seeing them from particularistic 
perspectives. 
The theistic inclinations in a moderate perspective, however, raises further questions, 
such as whether moderate pluralism privileges personal over impersonal ways of 
understanding the Real. For instance, how do the notions of "love, compassion, 
goodness, " etc. relate to the impersonal understandings? Or whether moderate pluralism 
implies that impersonal ways of expressing the Real is less adequate compared to the 
personal ways. Before I proceed examining these questions, I must make two points clear. 
First, I should repeat once more that moderate pluralism maintains that Real can both be 
experienced and expressed in different ways. The two always go together. It may sound 
contentious, but I suggest that if one is secured, so is the other one. Put simply, if we can 
106 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 325. Ward suggests that: 
"It is for non-Christian theologians or practitioners to develop their own views, which will 
then have to be taken account of in a continuing discussion. It is possible, and I think likely, 
that such discussion will enable the Christian faith to come to a clearer and more adequate 
view of itself, as knowledge of the wider context in which it exists becomes better known and 
thus deepens Christian self-understanding" (325). 
107 Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred, 31. 
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say, without falling into contradiction, that the Real can be experienced both personally and 
impersonally; this renders the implication that it can also be expressed both personally and 
impersonally. If we recap our conclusions in chapter three about how socio-cultural 
conditioning effect our experiences, this double link will not sound that odd. We 
established there that the way we are programmed linguistically and culturally affects our 
perceptions, which include the Real. '°8 This conditioning in turn is reflected in our 
expression of those experiences. As Ward has shown, the two different models of 
revelations (Semitic and Indian) illustrates this well. Additionally, if we consider the 
contribution of the Real to the process of revelation, it will not be too off target to argue that 
the Real can be expressed personally and impersonally. 1°' My second point is a clarification 
about the emphasis put on the nature of the Real in moderate pluralism. Because I am 
primarily concerned with soteriology, I seem to give the impression that the Real has only 
moral qualities such as goodness, compassion and love. Indeed, it holds that the Real is 
"one, perfect, the cause of all, " "supreme value and power, "' to "knowledge, bliss, and 
compassion. "111 It is hardly possible to suggest that this is supported by all traditions (thus 
an exclusive truth criteria), but I believe it is not totally alien either. In what follows I shall 
try to map out some overlapping elements in Hindu and Buddhist traditions with such an 
understanding of the Real. 
Due to the immense diversity of Indian religions, I will be very selective and mostly 
rely on Ward's expositions. It might be appropriate to open up with a quote from 
Ramanuja, the twelfth century philosopher who is known as the founder of "Qualified 
Non-dualism" or "Non-dualism of the differentiated [Brahmanl" (Vishist-Advaita). 
Ramanuja states: 
"We know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is absolute bliss and 
goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of the origination, 
sustenance and dissolution of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings; who is 
all-knowing; who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes; who is an 
ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is all merciful; who is 
108 Ward also supports this argument by saying that "one's initial conceptual analysis and one's 
method of spiritual practice will largely govern the "objects" of subsequent spiritual apprehension" 
(Religion and Revelation, 165). He also cites Steven Katz to bolster his conclusion: "Experiences 
themselves are inescapably shaped by prior linguistic influences such that the lived experience 
conforms to a pre-existent pattern that has been learned, then intended, and then actualised in the 
experiential reality" (Katz, S, ed., Mysticism and Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992,5). 
109 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 135-38. Ward writes: "Thus, if the Supreme Reality does 
disclose itself under the forms of conceptual and cultural thought, it will do so in different ways in 
these [Semitic and Indian] traditions. There is little reason to say that such diverse disclosures will 
all be equally adequate. Before one can decide that, one will have to examine the basic conceptual 
schemes much more closely. It certainly seems to be impossible to accept both as true accounts of 
reality as they stand. It cannot be both true that the universe has a moral goal envisaged by a creator, 
and that the physical existence of the universe has no goal, but is just a natural manifestation of 
desire, like foam on a wave, which will in time return to its source in a non-dual reality. Yet, it may 
be the case that something of the nature of the Supreme Reality is disclosed in each tradition which 
is needed for the unfolding of what is implicit in the other. It may be that at a deeper level these 
traditions arc complementary rather than wholly disparate" (138). 
110 Ward, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219 
111 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 337-338. 
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immeasurably raised above all possibility of anyone being equal or superior to him; whose 
name is the Highest Brahman. "112 
Ward remarks that Ramanuja's exposition clearly refers to a "God with personal 
attributes, "113 which radically differs from Sankara, an eighth century CE philosopher who 
is the founder of Advaita (pure non-dualism or impersonal monism). Sankara is renowned 
for his "distinction between saguna Brahman (God with attributes) and nirguna Brahman 
(God without attributes). "114 The notion of nirguna Brahman, Ward continues, that "leads 
commentators to speak of an impersonal and abstract Brahman. " Ward, however, doubts 
this claim, for Sankara also states that "Brahman is all-knowing and endowed with all 
powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom. "115 Construing 
having "knowledge or intelligence" as having qualities and considering Brahman's relation 
to the world "as its Lord, " Ward comments that Brahman "may rightly be worshipped, at 
least in one aspect, as a personal Lord. "' 16 He further bolsters this by contending that "even 
in its unqualified form, " Brahman is not a "total blank. " Thus "certain things are truly 
affirmed of Brahman [such as "intelligence" "bliss"]-, 117 but those things characterise 
Brahman so inadequately that they must also be denied; it must then be said that Brahman is 
so far beyond our linguistic resources that it must be spoken of as without qualities. "' 1' 
Ward rejects the claims of "impersonal monism" on Sankara's part and compares his view 
with Thomas Aquinas' theism. According to Aquinas, Ward quotes, "God is utterly simple 
and without parts; is timeless and changeless; stands in no real relation to the finite 
universe; and is wholly ineffable, except by the use of terms which, though appropriate, do 
not signify what we think they do. "' 19 Ward argues that for both, "the Divine in itself is 
beyond conceptual reach. For both, the Divine manifests to us for the sake of our eternal 
bliss in the forms of time and space. For both, the apparent can truly express or signify the 
Real, even though it is an illusion to take it for the Real in itself. ""=0 Despite these 
convergences, Ward concedes that in Indian tradition the "Supreme did not appear as a 
commanding subject, judging the world; but as the inner ruler of the world, expressing 
itself in it. " Consequently, "non-dualism has no conceptual place for a moral judge and 
law-giver. Rather, the law (dharma) expresses the true self-manifestive principles of 
112 Ward, K, Images of Eternity: Concepts of God in Five Religious Traditions, London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1987,7 (cited from Ramanuja, The Vedatrla-Sutras, trans. G Thibaut, Sacred 
Books of the East, cd. M Muller, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962, vol. XLVIII, 770). 
113 Ward, Images of Eternity, 7. 
114 Ward, Images of Eternity, 8. 
115 Ward, Images of Eternity, 8 (cited from Sankara, The Vedanta-S« trau, trans. G Thibaut, Sacred 
Books of the East, ed. M Muller, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962, vols. XXXIV and XXXVIII, 
14). 
116 Ward, Images of Eternity, 8. 
117 On another occasion, Ward writes that although Sankara "speaks of Brahman devoid of form, he 
always characterises it as omniscient, blissful and cause of all through will. " "This, " Ward deduces, 
"is a personal reality in the end" (Images of Eternity, 24, cf. 27). 
118 Ward, Images of Eternity, 13. 
119 Aquinas, T, Sum, na Theologiere la. 3, London: Eyre and Spottiswoodc, 1964,8-10. 
120 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 147; cf. also hitages of Eternity, 18. 
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Brahman, which lead to a realisation of the inner unity of all things. ""2' Ward's overall 
conclusion, however, is a positive one. He suggests that: 
"If there arc many oppositions arising from the basic polarity of Semitic moralism and Indian 
non-dualism, there are also many convergences arising from the shared spiritual quest for 
liberation from self-will by unity with a supreme reality of wisdom and bliss. The idea of 
revelation as a Divinely given law of human and social fulfilment can be complemented by 
the idea of revelation as a teaching of the realisation of personal unity with the one self- 
existent reality... [B]oth ideas are necessary for a fully comprehensive view, and that any 
adequate theology for the next millennium must take both seriously. " 22 
I suppose Ward's explorations might allow one to conclude that even the seemingly 
"impersonal monism" of Sankara has a place for a moderate understanding of the Real as 
"the cause of all, " "supreme value and power, ""23 "knowledge, bliss, and compassion. "124 
I am not certainly suggesting that the personal and impersonal understandings of the Real 
are the same. Rather, there are differences as well as similarities. Thus there is room for 
saying that the two are not contradictories, complement each other in different ways, and 
may agree at some deeper level on basic qualities. 
How about the Buddhist traditions, which seem to pose a more serious problem to 
the Semitic traditions than the Indian impersonalistic approaches, for many of the Buddhist 
traditions lack a clear concept of revelatory authority and resist to any sort of Divine 
Being. '25 As has already been noted, "the central concept of Buddhism is not God, but 
nirvana. "126 All Buddhist schools agree that "nirvana cannot be spoken of; that it is the 
unconditioned; that the way to it is by overcoming greed, craving and attachment, by 
freeing oneself from a sense of selfhood, with all its transient desires; and that it brings to 
the mind calm, tranquillity, peace, joy and enhanced knowledge. ""27 The best way to 
describe the state of nirvana, Ward suggests, is as "self-transcendence -finding one's truest 
reality in being fully attentive to the unconditioned, which brings bliss and knowledge. ""28 
Ward claims that "this is, despite all protestations to the contrary, recognisably akin to 
theism. It places the highest reality in a form of being which is more analogous to 
awareness, knowledge and bliss than to matter, randomness and unconscious. "1-9 The 
difference of course is the "lack of emphasis on creativity or activity in the Supreme Mind, 
and the very extreme reticence about its character. " 13() This is understandable, when one 
considers how Buddhism established itself as a rejection of Hinduism. Thus Buddhists do 
121 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 155. 
122 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 155. 
123 Ward, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219 
124 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 337-338. 
125 Ward, Images of Eternity, 59. 
126 Ward defines Buddhism as an "atheistic religion" (images of I: teriity, 59) which concurs with the 
Dalai Lama's earlier mentioned declaration that "Buddhists arc atheists" (Smart, Dimensions of the 
Sacred, 27). 
127 Ward, Images of Eternity, 63; cf. Religion and Revelation, 161-163. 
128 Ward, Images of Eternity, 63; cf. Religion and Revelation, I& . 129 Ward, Images of Eternity, 63. 
130 Ward, Images of Eternity, 63. 
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not accept the authority of the Veda and do not rely on a "verbal revelation. " Rather, they 
depend on the "experience of the Buddha, the Enlightened One. " The Buddha's main 
concern is the attainment of liberation, not "the inner nature of the supremely real. " 
Guatama not only shows the way to attain liberation, his experience also "testifies" that it is 
achievable. For Buddhism is based on a "testimony" of a "particular kind of human 
experience of the unconditioned; it takes a minimalist view of the creative action of 
God. "131 Ward suggests that "at least in one school of Mahayana, and in some others 
implicitly, " Buddhism is "theistic, in that it speaks of Eternal Mind as the truest reality, or 
at least as the best analogy we have for the truest reality. But it is non-theistic, in so far as it 
attributes to this Mind no action, " i. e. "it can be achieved or attained, but it does not 
prompt, help or reveal itself. " It is spoken of as a "simple, impassable, eternal, immutable 
being of bliss, wisdom and knowledge. " In other words, it is a "state of perfection, far 
from being non-existent, impersonal or abstract. "13' 
However, one should note that there are other interpretations of nirvana in 
Buddhism. Some schools in Mahayana thought, particularly some Chinese and Japanese 
schools, are even closer to theism. One school influenced by The Awakening of Faith in 
the Mahayana'33 clearly favours a "doctrine of personal saviour. " The book opens up with 
an affirmation: "I take refuge in the greatly compassionate one, the Saviour of the world, 
omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient" (23). Ward suggests that in this school of Mahayana 
Buddhism, there is a "belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient being which can appear 
within the world and help people towards liberation. "i34 In some others "there is the `rich' 
doctrine of a Cosmic Body of bliss, omniscience, and compassion, from which emanate 
endless worlds of suffering, with the aim of bringing all finite beings to Release by 
realising the germ of the Buddha-nature (the tathagatagarbha) within themselves. In most of 
the richer versions, there are Bodhisattvas in paradisaical worlds who actively help on the 
way to Release. "135 
Ward concludes that "the ultimate goal of nirvana can be conceived" in several ways. 
It may be seen as a "permanent state of bliss, other than all conditioned elements of the 
world. " It can be thought of as "this world, when apprehended by a mind free of the 
illusion produced by desire. " It may be understood as "the realisation of ultimate unity with 
a Cosmic Absolute, omniscient and all-compassionate. " All three share the conviction that 
"it is possible to be liberated from this realm of desire and suffering, to apprehend supreme 
bliss and wisdom. " Ward believes that theism "offers yet another interpretation of that 
131 Ward, Images of Eternity, 63-64; cf. 68. 
132 Ward, Images of Eternity, 64. 
133 The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, trans. YS Hakeda, New York: Columbia U P, 1967. 
The book is traditionally attributed to the second-century Indian thinker, Asvvaghosha, but is 
completely available in only in a sixth century Chinese text. 
134 Ward, Images of Eternity, 70; cf. Religion and Revelation, 171. 
135 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 171. 
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ultimate goal, characterising the Supreme Reality of bliss and wisdom by the use of the 
concept of God. "136 
In his overall assessment, Ward contends that, despite the apparent opposition of 
"Buddhist world-view and discipline" to theism, "even in its Madhyamaka form, for which 
any absolute is denied, reality is taken to be very different from the way it appears to the 
senses and the conceptualising mind. It has the character of wisdom, compassion and bliss, 
though these are not properties of any finite mind or state of human consciousness. They 
are characteristics of reality itself, when rightly apprehended. At an admittedly rather 
abstract level, this is not as different as might at first seem to be the case from the theistic, 
beatific vision of a God who possesses supreme wisdom, compassion, and bliss, and who 
is immediately present to all finite entities. "137 Comparing the Vedantic and Buddhist 
understandings of the nature of the Real, Ward observes: 
"Here, views can vary from a very active, personalist view of God to the quietist and passive 
notion of the Void. The Buddhist account is the most agnostic or reticent of all; yet the use of 
personal terms connoting wisdom, compassion and knowledge, awareness and bliss is fairly 
common with regard to the ultimately real. The Vedantins explicitly use the model of the 
Self, though that is construed as primarily knowledge and bliss, without creative action being 
an essential or fully real part of its being. Nevertheless both Buddhists and Vcdantins speak of 
avatars or of Bodhisattvas who represent creative and saving actions on behalf of other 
sentient beings, and so an active element is not completely absent in these views, even w%-hen 
it is only a relatively minor theme in the structure (though not necessarily a minor one in the 
practical devotional life believers). -138 
Does this brief survey of Indian traditions lead one to conclude that all religions worship 
the same God? One can hardly say so, especially after considering the disinterest of the 
Buddhists towards such a notion. In fact, I did not attempt to show that they worship the 
same God. Rather my aim was to substantiate the argument of moderate pluralism that Real 
can be experienced and expressed in different ways and, at some deeper level, the great 
world religions share some common values and notions which point to this understanding. 
I believe, through the examination of Ward's analysis, I have shown that certain aspects of 
the Real are revealed in great world religions, such as that it is "supreme value and power, 
wisdom, knowledge and bliss. " Certainly, not all of them shares and ascribes the same sets 
of values and qualities to the Real in the same way, they overlap and crisscross according 
to the emphasis given on a certain dimension of religion in a certain tradition. ''` Thus, as 
Ward puts it, from a theistic perspective, "the Buddhist way affirms the primacy of the 
practical, in religious life. The goal of liberation from attachment and a personal realisation 
of wisdom, compassion, and bliss takes precedence over any requirement of assent to 
136 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 171-172. 
137 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 166, my emphasis. 
138 Ward, Images of Eternity, 76. 
139 It is worth remembering here the Wittgenstein's theory of "family resemblances" and Hick's 
application of it to religion. 
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`correct' beliefs. The source of religious revelation is located in the attainment of such a 
goal, and its primary function is to offer the most skilful means to lead others towards 
it. "140 
My short study of Hindu and Buddhist traditions has established that a link can be 
found between the theistic and non-theistic concepts of the Real as personal and 
impersonal. Despite the seemingly opposing concepts of the Real both ways profess to 
hold, at a deeper level, they do share a concept of the Real as "supreme value and 
power, "14' "knowledge, bliss, and compassion. "142 I suppose moderate pluralism must 
now face the questions: "why choose these characteristics but not others" and "what are the 
criteria to do so. " Again, according to what criteria, does moderate pluralism exclude 
certain experiences (e. g. Satanism and Nazism) and expressions (e. g. uncomppasionate, 
evil, etc. ) of the Real as inauthentic? These are certainly difficult questions which do not 
have easy answers. 
I believe that it is hardly possible that one can have objective and universally accepted 
criteria to decide what characteristics of the Real an sich can be known. One way of doing 
this is to take the concept of one's own tradition and try to find traces of that concept in 
other traditions (e. g. the comparative approach of Ward). Another way is to examine the 
concepts of the Real in great world religions and compare and contrast these with each 
other to see if they refer to the same entity (e. g. the phenomenological approach of 
Smart). 143 To establish my point, I began with a premise that implied more of the first 
approach, while including some of the latter as well. I stated that religious experience is no 
delusion and that certain aspects of the Real can be known to us, such as goodness, being 
the supreme value and power, wisdom, knowledge and bliss. I conceded that this premise 
sounds tradition specific, i. e. theistic. In order to substantiate the viability of this premise, I 
appealed to both approaches, comparative and phenomenological. The result was that 
despite their striking differences at first sight, personal and impersonal concepts of the Real 
appeared to support the initial premise of moderate pluralism. Therefore it was possible to 
conclude that certain characteristics of the Real can be known to us. But why these specific 
characteristics, not the others? The answer has a dual-aspect and is probably a circular one. 
I suggest that these characteristics are both attested by the great world traditions at different 
levels and their fruits are also demonstrated in the lives of saints and the followers of those 
traditions. This is the duality. That is to say, in the Semitic traditions, these characteristics 
are more apparent at the theoretical level and their fruits can be seen to be demonstrated in 
the lives of saints. In the Indian traditions, however, the fruits of these characteristics are 
more apparent at the practical level, i. e. in the lives of the saints, and at a deeper level, 
theoretically, can be seen to be related to the Real. This is how it seems to be, at least from 
140 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 173. 
141 Ward, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219 
142 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 337-338. 
143 Hick's Kantian approach of course offers a different way, which I rejected due to its reductionism 
and agnosticism. 
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a theistic perspective. But why draw the line under these specific characteristics? This is 
where the circularity comes. Initially I choose certain characteristics of the Real, which are 
more common to some traditions than others as related to the Real, and then tried to 
substantiate the authenticity of these characteristics by appealing to those traditions. In 
chapter four, we have seen a similar discussion between Hick and Wainwright about the 
nature of the Real. 1" They both agreed that circularity in comprehensive theories cannot be 
avoided. If one believes in a naturalistic explanation of religion, one uses naturalistic 
assumptions to support it. Likewise, a Christian uses Christian criteria, a Muslim uses 
Islamic criteria; in short, all appeal to internal criteria valid within those systems. I think 
Hick is right in his conclusion that "there are no non-circular ways of establishing 
fundamental positions, " when one speaks "from within the circle of religious faith, not 
professing to establish the validity of that faith. "145 However, the difference between my 
position and Hick's is that while I can appeal to the teachings of the great world religions 
through moderate ineffability, he cannot do so for he advocates the strong ineffability of the 
Real an sich. 146 Consequently, I can say that certain aspects of the Real an sich (e. g. 
compassion, wisdom and bliss) can be known to us, because the traditions teach them; but 
Hick cannot do so justifiably, since these teachings do not apply to the Real an sich. The 
argument is by no means over. I am aware that it is circular and makes exclusive truth 
claims, but I can reasonably hold that the notion of the Real moderate pluralism offers is 
shared by great world traditions. 
The truth criteria that moderate pluralism advocates certainly excludes certain 
experiences (e. g. Satanism, Nazism, etc. ) and expressions of the Real (e. g. 
uncompassionate, evil, etc. ). But how can one know that these are not the right responses 
to the Real and according to what criteria? We have two criteria to judge with these kinds of 
assertions related to the Real. One is the basic notion of the Real that moderate pluralism 
argues for as "compassion, wisdom, bliss, supreme value and power" which is taught by 
the great world religions. In this sense, like Hick's, moderate pluralism is also "explicitly a 
religious interpretation of religion. " It, too, "starts from the basic faith that religious 
experience is not purely imaginative projection but is also a cognitive response to a 
transcendent reality" and "originates within a particular religious tradition"147 -Christianity 
in Hick's case and Islam in my own. Then one recognises the characteristics of the Real as 
the confirmation of divine presence in one's religious tradition. At this juncture, it is worth 
noticing that, as Hick points out, "religious experience and its fruits in life cohere 
together. "148 Now when we look at the claims of the experiences of the Real as 
"uncompassionate, evil, etc. " resulting in fruits such as hatred, misery, unkindness, 
violence, etc., we can say that these are not authentic experiences of the Real. Put bluntly, 
144 See: 4.4.1. "Between Transccndcntality and Causality. " 
145 ROF, 78-79. 
146 Wainwright, "Review of T 1w Rainbow of Faiths, " 126. 
147 Hick, "The Possibility, " 164. 
148 Hick, "The Possibility, " 164. 
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the "uncompassionate, evil, etc. " claims of the Real not only contradicts the notion of the 
Real found in the teachings of the great world religions, but also the fruits they bear are 
grossly the opposite of what we can find in the exemplary lives of saints and witness in the 
daily lives of the devout followers of the religions who live by their beliefs. This first 
criterion is also backed up by the second which is what Hick calls a "basic moral insight 
which Christians have received from Christian teachings, Jews from Jewish teachings, 
Muslims from Islamic teachings, Hindus from Hindu teachings, ""49 and so on. Hick 
summarises this moral insight as the Golden Rule ("it is good to benefit others and evil to 
harm them")150 which is common to all great world religions. 151 So, in judging the 
authenticity of a religious experience, moderate pluralism offers two criteria: the notion of 
the Real as "the cause of all, " "supreme value and power, "152 "knowledge, bliss, and 
compassion, "153 which is supported by the great world traditions and the moral criterion to 
which it refers specifically to the fruits a religious experience bears in the lives of its 
adherents. 
Instead of resolving the problems by a postulated totally ineffable Real, I suggest we 
should face the problems as they are and try to find a solution within the boundaries of 
moderate ineffability. In fact, Ward and Hick more or less agree that some questions are 
unsettlable ultimately (for Hick they are not important in attaining salvation/liberation 
anyway). Therefore rather than "mythologising" religious language, I believe we should 
stick to the common understanding of moderate ineffability as a good starting point to 
resolve epistemological differences, keeping in mind that in the final analysis some 
differences will remain and that is natural. As long as we concede that different religions 
are equally effective ways of providing salvation/liberation, I think it is more likely that we 
have a better chance of establishing a fair dialogue about mutual and self understanding, 
respect and tolerance between religions. '54 This recognition is a crucial step in the right 
direction. That is why I said in chapter one that "how many are saved" was an important 
question for me. One can argue that many of the disputes between religions have started, 
and are still caused, not over epistemological differences but because of "how many are 
saved. "155 Am I coming dangerously close to Hick's argument that all religious doctrines 
149 Hick, "The Possibility, " 164. 
150 AIR, 313-314,316. 
151 Sec for more: AIR, 309-315. 
152 Ward, "Divine Ineffability, " 218-219 
153 Ward, Religion and Revelation, 337-338. 
154 Ward's remarks about Buddhist contribution to theism arc worth quoting in full: 
"Its value as a complement to theism lies in its firm grasp of the fact that liberation from 
selfish desire is the heart of religion. Religions must be assessed at least in part in terms of 
their effectiveness towards that end. One importance of Buddhism lies in its criticism of 
authoritarian and anthropomorphic practices and images, and in its recognition of the 
inadequacy of the human mind to grasp ultimate realities in their own being" (Religion and 
Revelation, 172). 
155 Of course, I am not arguing that revelation (truth claims) has no relation to the question in hand. 
Because what one believes in is of crucial importance in one's attaining salvation/liberation. 
However, I believe salvational/liberational claims override other epistemological claims in many 
cases. For instance, the changing attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards members of other 
faiths since Vatican 11 illustrates this best. Ward's words also bears testimony for my argument: 
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are secondary packaging, as long as one is directed to the Real, one should not worry about 
them too much? I suppose not. Despite my agreement with him about the vital importance 
of soteriological efficacy of great world religions, I consider doctrines still as a challenge to 
be faced and that putting the essential object of religion (the Real an sich) beyond the scope 
of human concepts and language is not a helpful solution. Believers do believe that they 
deal with something more than that in their day-to-day practice., They hold that the 
language they use does relate to the Real, though inadequately. Our awareness and 
acceptance of the soteriological efficacy of religions, I argue, does not give us the right to 
alter this course as radically as Hick does. A moderate pluralism should remain, at least to 
some extent, true to the meaning that believers hold. But, one might argue, moderate 
pluralism also proposes changes in self and mutual understandings of religions. It certainly 
does, because everybody -believers, theologians, philosophers, etc. - agree that the 
awareness of religious diversity affects, positively and negatively, an adherent of a 
religion. In a way change is inevitable, 157 the proposal moderate pluralism argues is one of 
them, in addition to others. 
Because of the eventual theistic leanings, can one see moderate pluralism as another 
cycle in the cycle of Ptolemaic explanations, to use Hick's term? As indicated earlier, I 
maintain that, epistemologically speaking, there can be no non-Ptolemaic explanations of 
religious phenomena, as far as an interpretation is concerned. However, soteriologically 
speaking, it cannot be described as a Ptolemaic attempt, for it argues the soteriological 
efficacy of religions, without accepting the monopoly of one tradition. I contend that at best 
moderate pluralism is a proper reinterpretation -modification- of Hick's theory, which 
avoids many of its fatal pitfalls. At worst, however, one might call it an Islamic 
interpretation of religious diversity disguised in Hickian forms. I am aware that it has 
certain problems, but I suggest they are not as fatal as the one's in Hick's theory. The 
weight of it needs to be seen in the future. With these in mind, I can now proceed to 
explore the possible problems and solutions between moderate pluralism and Islam. 
5.3. Moderate Pluralism and Islam 
"Religion is not just concerned with a speculative account of what reality is like -though it usually 
involves such an account. Its concern is primarily a practical one, a concern with how to achieve 
well-being, or liberation from the limitations placed upon us by existence" (Ward, Images of 
Eternity, 43). 
15' In Rose's words: "Not many Muslims would assert that there is probably no God but Allah, and 
Muhammad is probably his prophet. Not many Buddhists would say that hodlti is probably the goal 
of human life, which is probably characterised by endemic dukkha. Not many orthodox Christians 
would say that they are probably saved by the blood of Jesus, who probably was the Incarnate Son of 
God and the probable messiah" (Rose, "Keith Ward's, " 171). 
157 Indeed it has always been inevitable, i. e. change has always been around. Every generation lives 
its own time. In this respect I believe the Christianity of first century Christians was radically 
different from present day Christians. This goes for the adherents of other religions too. 
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Before I progress any further, it should be noted that this will be the first reading of 
Hick's modified pluralism by a Muslim within an Islamic context. None of the Muslim 
scholars I have referred to earlier in chapter one (and will refer to in the following 
discussions) engage directly with Hick's writing. The Muslim scholars I study respond to 
religious diversity rather than Hick's work. Of course, Asian (the nature of whose work I 
evaluated in the introduction) and Özcan (whose incoherent study of al-Maturidi's theology 
I presented in chapter one) constitute a partial exception to this statement, both of whom 
deal with Hick's original work partially and from a specific view point. Both dismiss it as 
unsuitable for an Islamic context. My study of Hick's modified pluralism then will be the 
first of its kind and be a thorough test of its appropriateness for an Islamic context. 
It must also be noticed that my aim in this examination is not to read or find an exact 
copy of moderate pluralism within the boundaries of Islamic thought. It would be a mistake 
to do so, since the two are entirely different systems: Islam is a religious system based 
primarily on a "first-order religious creed, "158 i. e. the Qur'an and the teachings of 
Muhammad, whereas moderate pluralism is a "second-order philosophical theory or 
hypothesis" "about the relation between the historical religions. "159 Rather what I shall try 
to achieve is to examine the Islamic evidence regarding other religions and trace possible 
links, overlaps or, if any, clashes between Islam and moderate pluralism. This is what I 
mean by the "appropriateness" of moderate pluralism to an Islamic context. 
Another point, related to the structure of the argument in this section, is the way in 
which the two arguments are presented. (i) Since I spent a considerable amount of time and 
space discussing pluralism in both forms (Hick's and moderate) in the preceding chapters, 
I shall mostly be concerned with presenting the Islamic response to religious diversity in 
the following paragraphs. (ii) Despite the best of my efforts to point out the elements of 
moderate pluralism in the Islamic discourse, for the sake of keeping the fluency of the 
arguments presented, from time to time, I will refrain from doing so. To compensate for 
this, I will give an overall evaluation of both arguments in the partial conclusion to this 
chapter, where I also compare my own moderate pluralism with Hick's pluralism in terms 
of their success or failure in their relation to Islamic discourse. 
What, then, are the possible problems still facing Muslims in this modified version of 
Hick's pluralistic hypothesis? There are three obvious challenges, which I will address 
respectively. The first is how to relate the personal (theistic) and the impersonal (non- 
theistic) religious experiences witnessed in the great world religions to the confines of the 
oneness of Allah/God (tawhid); put pluralistically, can Islam accept that different religions 
are salvifically effective ways of responding to the moderately ineffable Real? This issue is 
very important since Muslims traditionally judge other religions according to their 
compliance to the tawhid principle and particularly tend to disregard the non-theistic 
experiences of the Real on the basis that it violates the tawhid principle. The second is the 
1 Hick, "The Possibility, " 163. 
159 Hick, "The Possibility, " 163. 
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finality of Islam as the most evolved religion, which brings in the issue of the Qur'an as the 
final and full revelation of Allah/God and the prophecy of Muhammad as the final prophet, 
i. e. Islam is not the only or the best way to salvation, but one among many. The third is 
whether the soteriological criterion put forward by moderate pluralism corresponds to the 
theory of salvation (falah or najat) in Islam. Lastly, I shall illustrate the hermeneutical 
approach I included in moderate pluralism within the Islamic context. There are also minor 
problems like mission and dialogue which I shall deal with in the general conclusions, but 
they are not the primary aim of this study. 
Even though all the three points are interrelated, I will try to focus on the first to 
begin with. Much of the Islamic literature on pluralism tends to rely heavily on Qur'anic 
verses and rarely quotes the sayings of the Prophet, hadith. Thus both because of the 
importance of the of the following hadith and also to balance the weight of the argument 
towards the sayings of the Prophet, I shall start examining the Islamic case with a popular 
quotation from the hadith collection: "Every child is born with an innate capacity for 
submission to God, i. e. islam; it is her/his parents that Christianise, Judaise or Magianise 
her/him, as an animal delivers a perfect baby animal. Do you find it mutilated? " 1«, The 
hadith makes two important points vis-a-vis pluralism as we have seen in Hick's 
hypothesis. The first part signals what Hick calls "the right to believe. ""6" He believes that 
a human being can be defined as a "worshipping animal, with an ingrained propensity to 
construe his world religiously, "16' which projects itself in the lives of human beings in the 
formation of their religiosity as an "inclining cause" in the modern days and as a 
"determining cause" in the primitive era. 16-3 Another verse from the Qur'an makes a similar 
statement to the hadith quoted above: "So set your face truly to the religion being upright, 
the nature in which Allah has made mankind: No change (there is) in the work (wrought) 
by Allah: that is the true Religion. But most among mankind know not. "114 Combining the 
two together, Ismail R al-Faruqi calls Islam "din al-fitrah, " "religio naturalis" or "Ur- 
Religion"I65 in both senses of the word, that is (i) Islam as the institutionalised religion and 
(ii) islam as the general name for the messages of the prophets conveyed throughout history 
("the religion of God"). In this second sense islam is synonymous with faith in one God, 
tawhid. Therefore all previous prophets are called muslims in the Qur'an in several 
places. 166 As with other places where "islam" is mentioned, especially 2: 19 and 3: 85, 
which I will examine in detail later, here I partially agree with al-Farugi and partially 
disagree. I suppose he is right in saying that Muhammad did not bring anything new as far 
as the essence of the message is concerned and that he was affirming what the previous 
160 Reported by all authentic hadith collections. This one is in al-Bukhari, Sahih a! -Bukhari, vol 2, 
hadith no. 467. 
161 AIR, 227-229. 
162 FK, 136. 
163 FK, 137. 
164 The Qur'an 30: 30. 
165 al-Faruqi, "Islam and Other Faiths, " 93-96. 
1()() The Qur'an 2: 135; 3: 67,95; 4: 123; 6: 79,161; 10: 105; 16: 120,123; 20: 31. 
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prophets have all preached. In understanding these references to al-fitrah as "the primordial 
religiosity, " Asian and Ayoub concur with my conclusions. '67 But I disagree with al-Faruqi 
in his inclusivist understanding that Islam, the institutionalised religion, can be equated 
with the religio naturalis, 168 since this contradicts divine justice and the spirit of Islam due 
to the fact right from birth the majority of the world's population is destined to be 
underprivileged in terms of salvational/liberational matters because of the wrong 
environment they are born into. In other words, the inclusivist understanding of al-Faruqi 
violates the pluralistic option that different religions are salvifically effective different ways 
to the Real and that an all-loving, compassionate Ultimate Being does not deprive human 
beings of salvation/liberation for something which they have no hand in. This brings us to 
the second part of the hadith. 
In the second part of the hadith we witness the statement of what Hick calls the 
accident of birth in choosing one's religion. '69 The majority of the followers of the 
religions choose or rather follow this or that religion because they are brought up with it. 
Thus one is a Muslim or a Christian or a Buddhist, etc. depending on which environment 
one is born into. The question I would like raise here is this: "Is the diversity of religions 
divinely designed? " Or if I put it in Hick's words: "What is the contribution of the Real in 
the diversity of religions, if there is any? "170 Rose detects that according to Hick's 
understanding there are two causes of the diversity of religions: the human differences and 
the "revelatory openness" of the Real. '7' Even though the Real is not a direct contributor in 
the diversity of religions in Hick's case, it is only partial, I suggest that in Islam's case it 
goes further than that; it is a direct wilful involvement. I believe that religious plurality is 
our destiny and purposely designed by the Ultimate Reality. This is what I call "the 
principle of plurality, " meaning that the intrinsic principle in Islam is pluralism not 
exclusivism or inclusivism. This applies not only to religions but also to other areas of 
human existence, such as race, culture and language. Bernard Lewis cogently puts it: 
"Unlike most earlier religious documents, " the Qur'an "shows awareness of religion as a 
category of phenomena, and not merely as single phenomenon. There is not just one religion; 
there are religions... The notion of religion as a class or category, in which Islam is one and 
167 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 102; Ayoub, "The Word of God and the Voices of Humanity, " 62- 
63. 
168 a]-Faruyi, I R, "Islam and Other Faiths, " 94. 
169 In addressing this matter, Hick writes: 
"... it is a fact evident to ordinary people (even though not always taken into account by 
theologians) that in the great majority of the cases -say 98 or 99 per cent- the religion in 
which a person believes and the which he adheres depends upon where he was born. That is to 
say, if someone is born to Muslim parents in Egypt or Pakistan, that person is very likely to 
be a Muslim; if to Buddhist parents in Sri Lanka or Burma, that person is very likely to be a 
Buddhist; if to Hindu parent in India, that person is very likely to a Hindu; if to Christian 
parents in Europe or the Americas, that person is very likely to be a Christian" GHA/N, 44; 
see also GUF, 132. 
170 By the Real, I refer to the modified notion of the real which has moderate ineffability. For I-lick, 
my question probably does not exist, since the noumenal Real is beyond the capability of human 
conception. 
171 Rose, Knowing the Real, 131-132. 
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in which besides Islam there are others, seems to have been present from the advent of the 
Islamic dispensation. " 172 
Therefore, in line with the Biblical narrative of the city of Babylon and the tower of 
Babel, 173 the Qur'an attests that even though humankind started to their journey in unity as 
one community, the divine will prevailed in plurality in order to give chance to humankind 
to compete in good deeds. Let us look at the following verses: 
"Mankind was one single community and Allah sent (unto them) prophets as bearers of glad 
tidings and as warners, and revealed therewith the Book with the truth that it might judge 
between mankind concerning that wherein they differed. And only those unto whom (the 
Book) was given differed concerning it, after clear proofs had conic unto them, through hatred 
one of another... "174 
"... Had Allah willed He could have made you one community. But that he may try you by 
that which He has given you (He has made you as you arc). So vie with one another in goxxl 
works. Unto Allah you will all return, and He will then inform you of that wherein you 
differ. "175 
So humanity's religious journey is from unity to diversity according to the Qur'an. 
Commenting on the second verse, Ayoub states that "human diversity is a divinely 
instituted, or at least divinely sanctioned phenomenon. " 76 But we should be careful about 
what is meant by diversity. It is neither total relativism nor chaos. Because of the essential 
underlying unity and the universality of revelation, it is as a diversity within unit%'. 
"Although prophets are many, " Ayoub observes, "their essential message is one. But 
within this unity of creation , there must be from the Qur'anic point of view a diversity of 
human ethnic, linguistic and religious identity. ""77 Confirming the principal of plurality, he 
further states that "religious diversity is a normal human situation. It is the consequence of 
the diversity of human cultures, languages, races and different environments 111791 beg to 
differ here from Ayoub about the consequential relationship between religion and the other 
components listed. Even though they have a contribution to diversity, I would not suggest 
that they are the direct reasons. Different cultures, languages, races and environments can 
also share the same religion, as is the case with the universal religions. For me the main 
reason lies primarily in the revelatory openness of the Real, viz. diversity, be it religious, 
ethnic or otherwise, is divinely designed; and secondarily, our differing conditions play a 
major role in our response to the Real. 
However, I am not saying that since it is natural to disagree, we should keep on 
disagreeing, as is the case with Heim's orientational pluralism. What I am arguing for is 
172 Lewis, B, The Jews of Islam, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994,12. 
173 Genesis 11: 1-9. 
174 The Qur'an 2: 213, cf. 10: 19; 49: 13. 
175 The Qur'an 5: 47, cf. 11: 118 which reads: "And if your Lord had willed, he verily would have 
made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing. " 
176 Ayoub, M M, "Islam and Pluralism, " Encounters 3, no. 2,1997,113. 
177 Ayoub, 'Islam and Plruralism, 108. 
178 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 108. 
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not total relativity, but that we acknowledge that we differ in detail and it is natural, since 
the Real wanted us so. However, in line with the Qur'anic invitation, I suggest religions 
could meet on the minimum shared points, accept that they originate from the same source 
and work to achieve the same end, salvation/liberation. This certainly is the pluralistic 
option that moderate pluralism upholds. I believe this positive approach to diversity will 
foster a better understanding and more peaceful co-existence among the people, religious 
and non-religious. 
Now, in the face of what Hick calls "the directory of gods, " I would like to present 
my life long dilemma as a hypothetical case. On the one hand, the plurality of religions is 
natural and divinely designed. Conservative Muslims, on the other hand, hold that only 
Muslims will be saved. The rest will either go to Hell or convert to Islam. There could be 
two explanations to this dilemma: Either Allah is to be seen as deliberately condemning a 
certain percentage of humanity to Hell since he did not want one religion. This proves that 
he is neither merciful nor just. Conversion of all others to Islam, in my opinion, is not an 
option for three reasons: (i) it contradicts the principle of plurality, (ii) it would still be 
unjust to ask somebody born into a non-Islamic environment to convert to Islam compared 
to one born into a Muslim society. It is almost impossible to bridge the gap between the 
two societies and overcome the difficulties, which indicates why conversions are so rare 
and considered as exceptions. Moreover, (iii) both historical and present data disprove the 
viability and practicality of this option (Islam has never been and will never be the world's 
single universal religion). That is to say, the majority of human beings have gone and will 
continue to go to Hell, theoretically speaking, since none has confessed the shahaelu, to 
believe in One God and the prophecy of Muhammad. Or we are faced with the second 
option, which is pluralism. Since Allah is good, merciful and just, and wanted plurality as 
a "general principle" of life on the earth, we naturally follow the consequence of the 
universality of revelation as witnessed in the great world religions and confess that different 
religions are different ways to Allah, the Real. I believe that Hick's hypothesis is a positive 
tool for understanding the diversity of religions, with its nottmenal and phenomenal 
distinction supported with moderate ineffability. As Hick states, I think inclusivism is 
finally offensive to the believers of other religions accepting them in effect as second class 
religionists. Inclusivism is also contradictory to the idea of divine justice I just mentioned. 
That is to say, for the reasons one has no hand in, e. g. family and society, one is either left 
in the dark or destined to achieve a lower status in the spiritual journey. Thus I do not 
consider inclusivism as a valid option. 
However, inclusivism could be a popular choice among Muslim scholars because of 
the over all emphasis of the Qur'an on the continuity of the revelations and the special 
privilege given the Judeo-Christian tradition (uhl al-Kitab) in the Qtir'an. Verses like the 
following affirm strongly this conviction: 
"We, indeed, sent among every people an apostle" (16: 36). 
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"There was never any people without a warner having lived among them" (35: 24). 1'7) 
As a result of this and similar verses, we see that figures like Fazlur Rahman, renowned for 
his modernist thought, 180 and al-Faruqi, one of the first Muslim scholars in this century to 
address religious pluralism from an Islamic stand, are taking an inclusivist line and arguing 
for the superiority of Islam. 181 I will not repeat, however, what I have already said above 
about inclusivism and I believe my argument still stands. Furthermore, the continuity of 
revelation can marshalled as an argument for pluralism as well as inclusivism. Since God 
clearly states that he did not mention all the prophets in the Qur'an, '82 it is possible to 
extend the Qur'anic understanding of revelation beyond the boundaries of theistic religions. 
Taking this line, for example, Aslan writes: 
"Muslims receive a Qur'anic sanction which enables them to expand an Islamic account of 
prophecy in such a manner that it could include those messengers who are not mentioned in 
the Qur'an, including Guatama the Buddha and the avatars of the Hindus. Although all the 
messengers spoke about the same reality and conveyed the same truth, the messages the) 
delivered were not identical in their theological forms. That is simply because the message 
was expressed in the specific forms which would accord with and make sense for the culture it 
was sent to. Thus, a messenger is to speak within the cultural context of the community to 
which the message is revealed. "183 
Asian is certainly alluding to the verse in 14: 4 which attests that God "never sent a 
messenger save with the language of his folk, that he might make (the message) clear for 
them. " We also see a Hickian line of argument, despite Asian's claim of a "radically 
different" thesis than Hick's, 184 by the conveyance of the message "within the cultural 
context of the community, " which means, in effect, "different approaches to the same 
Real. " Nevertheless, Asian clearly does not say which branches of Hinduism he has in 
mind. I believe he is likely to be hesitant about accepting the salvific efficacy of the non- 
theistic religions without dealing with the problem of the Ultimate Reality. Alternatively, 
Asian might be leaning on Nasr's Perennialist philosophy, which is as problematic as 
Hick's, according to Asian, since he does not deal with the conflicting truth-claims of the 
religions while granting salvific efficacy to all religions. is5 Thus though it is laudable, I 
consider, Asian's proposed Islamic religious pluralism to be ambiguous and immature. I 
shall try to clarify this matter more towards the end of the chapter. 
179 Cf. other verses in the Qur'an 2: 115; 4: 163-165; 6: 130-131; 13: 7; 23: 44. 
180 See Rahman, F, Islam and Modernity, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984 and Islam, Chps. 12,13 and 14. 
181 Sec Rahman, "Islam's Attitude toward Judaism, " 1-13 and al-Fatugi, "Islam and Other Faiths. " 
82-113, especially 94 where he regards other religions in partial error. Rahman writes in his article: 
"Although their revelation is incomplete, both Jews and Christians are recognised by the 
Qur'an in the Madinan period as religious communities... This is certainly done in a 
concessional mood since these communities would still be living only by 'partial divine 
guidance, ' and both of them are still invited to Islam" (4). 
182 "Verily, We sent messengers before you, among them those of whom We have told you, and 
some of whom We have not told you... " (40: 78). 
183 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 188. 
184 Aslan, Ultimate Reality, 279. 
185 Asian, Ultimate Reality, 281. 
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So far, I have dealt with the question of the veridicality of experience and the effect of 
environment in its formation, the principal of plurality in Islam and the universality of 
revelation to humankind. How do these findings relate to the moderate pluralism I put 
forward? They demonstrated that (i) there is a moderately ineffable Ultimate reality, which 
reveals itself to different groups in different modes of knowing (e. g. personal god or 
impersonal absolute) through different revelations by different means (e. g. holy texts or 
divine incarnations). (ii) The principle of plurality, i. e. the universality of revelation, as 
found in and supported by Islam, concurs with the claim of moderate pluralism that 
different religions constitute at the phenomenal level salvifically effective ways of 
approaching to the noumenal Real. This settles partially the first predicament I set out to 
address at the beginning of the section: that how to reconcile the different experiences of the 
Real (personal and impersonal) with the principle of tawhid in Islam. I said "partially" since 
it only establishes that there are other religions alongside Islam offering salvific/liberational 
choices, but still does not properly address the question of how Islam responds to and sees 
them. This part of the problem is closely related to the second issue at hand: the finality of 
Islam as the only or best way to salvation/liberation and the nature of the prophethood of 
Muhammad, which is my task now. 
5.3.1. Islam or Islam 
As I explained in my introduction to the thesis, I differentiate between the wider, 
literal, meaning of Islam, i. e. submission to the will of God (and its noun form a muslim, a 
submitter) and the colloquial use of it in a limited sense as the name of the institutionalised 
religion, Islam (and its noun form as commonly known a Muslim). As indicated here, I 
shall use "islam/muslim" without a capital "i" or "m" to refer to the state of total submission 
to the will of God and who does it, and "Islam/Muslim" with a capital "I" or "M" to denote 
the Islamic religion and one who follows it. Hence is the title "Islam or islam, " for I will be 
dealing, in this section, with the Qur'anic verses specifically dealing with these meanings 
and also more pluralistic ones. 
I start directly with the verses which have caused so much disagreement between 
exclusivists, inclusivists and pluralists. First the verses which support the pluralist stance 
in the Qur'an and grant salvation to others beside Muslims, that different religions are 
different effective salvational/liberational ways of responding to the Real: 
"Lo! those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who arc Jews, and Christian, and Sabacans 
-whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does right- surely their reward is with their 
Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve. "'F' 
The same verse has been repeated almost exactly in 5: 69 with minor grammatical and 
linguistic changes, 187 but the crucial meaning is there. That is, as long as they believe in 
1 86 The Qur'an, 2: 62. 
187 The verse reads: "Lo! those who believe, and those who are Jews, and Sabacans, and Christians 
-Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does right- there shall no fear conic upon them 
neither shall they grieve. " There are three differences in the second verse: i. The order of Christians 
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God, the Last Day and do good deeds, Christians, Jews and Sabaeans will be saved. '88 
However, on the other hand, there are two further verses, which constitute the bedrock of 
the exclusivist stance and at first sight contradict the verses above, 2: 62 and 5: 69. Both 
verses are in chapter three, the House of Irrrun, 19 and 85. They read as follows, 
respectively: 
"Lo! religion with Allah is the Surrender (to His will and guidance)" 
"And whoso seeks as religion other than the Surrender (to Allah) it will not be accepted from 
him, and he will be a loser in the Hereafter. "189 
The interesting thing about these two verses is that the Arabic word "islam, " repeated in 
both, can mean two things: first (and the immediate meaning coming to mind) is "Islam" 
-with a capital I- as the institutionalised religion, which is highly favoured and vehemently 
supported by the exclusivist scholars. The second meaning is the literal meaning of the 
word "islam, " i. e. "submission to the Will of God, " which is widely accepted by the 
advocates of inclusivism or pluralism, '90 as we shall see soon. Hence we see that some 
commentators191 and translators are anxious to project both meanings, while others just 
take an exclusivist stance. Thus, Marmaduke M Pickthall, who I cited above, favours the 
literal meaning but uses a capital "s" for "surrender" to show its relation to Islam, as well as 
giving the Arabic word in the footnotes. 192 Of the other two translations I examined, one 
translates "islam" as Islam the religion but gives the literal meaning, "submission to His 
Will, " in parenthesis. 193 The last one does not mention the literal meaning at all and gives 
the verses the usual exclusivistic meaning of Islam the religion. 194 To back this 
understanding, the translators al-Hilali and Khan write a long footnote to 3: 85, supported 
with several prophetic sayings, among which this one is very interesting. Abu Hurairah 
narrated: "By him (Allah) in whose hand Muhammad's soul is, there is none from amongst 
the Jews and the Christians (of these present nations) who hears about me and then dies 
and Sabaeans has been changed; ii. Sabaean is in the "nominative rather than the accusative; " iii. 
"surely their reward is with their Lord" has been dropped (McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of the 
Sahi'un, " 101). 
188 This universal salvation is also confirmed in the Qur'an in 16: 97 which reads: "Whosoever does 
right, whether male or female, and is a believer, him verily we shall quicken with gcxxi life, and we 
shall pay them a recompense in proportion to the best of what they used to do. " 
189 In addition these two, a third verse is also usually provided by the conservative scholars. It is in 
5: 3 and reads: "This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed my favour unto you, 
and have chosen for you as religion AL-ISLAM. " To emphasise the meaning Pickthall specifically 
gives capital letters for Islam (The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, 119) 
he Sec Faruqi, "Islam and Other Religious, " 94, Asian, Religious Pluralism, 192, Ayoub, "Islam 
and Pluralism, " 1113-114. 
191 For a summary of the explanations of the classical commentators on the verses, see: Ayoub, The 
Qur'an and Its Interpreters, 66-72,241-243. 
t`n The Meaning of (lie Glorious Qur'an, trans. Pickthall, M M, London: Everyman, 19)2,68,77. 
193 The Holy Qur'an, 145,166. 
194 The Noble Qur'an, 113-114. 
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without believing in the Message with which I have been sent (i. e. Islamic Monotheism), 
but he will be from the dwellers of the (Hell) Fire. "195 
Asian, however, quotes A Yusuf Ali's commentary on 3: 85196 as a pluralistic 
understanding "islam" in these verses, but to me it is exclusivistic and Asian is mistaken. 
Ali is arguing for Islam's representation of the universal Truth which is one, preached by 
the Prophet and expected of everybody to follow. This becomes clearer when All 
comments on 5: 69 where he equates the belief in God with "the belief in the Prophethood 
of Muhammad (peace be upon him), "197 as did Kogyigit in chapter one against the 
inclusivist Ate,. Thus I believe Ali's overall attitude is exclusivist and Adnan's argument 
presenting him as a pluralist is misleading. 
As we have seen in chapter one in Kogyigit's answer to the inclusivist Ate;, there is 
also the exclusivist claim of abrogation regarding the pluralistic verses, 2: 62 and 5: 69. 
Depending on a hadith reported by Ibn Abbas, some exclusivist scholars believe that 2: 62 
and 5: 69 have been abrogated by 3: 85.198 Thus Kocyigit believes that 3: 85 declares the 
general rule, whereas 2: 62 and 5: 69 just posit a tactical missionary signal for Muslims in 
their dealing with other religions. To the claims of abrogation, Ayoub has two responses. 
One is that the verses carrying a pluralistic character, 2: 62 and 5: 69, "represent the 
beginning and the end of the Prophet's Madinan career. "199 When the Prophet arrived at 
Madina, 2: 62 was revealed as a guidance to deal with "Jewish Tribes of Madina and the 
Christian community of Najran, '»00 which I shall examine separately shortly. Then it is 
"repeated verbatim in the last but one major sera201 to be revealed to the Prophet before his 
death. "20' Neither the repetition, nor the timing of the verses is discussed by the 
exclusivists. Certainly there are important implications of these to weaken the claims of 
abrogation. Suppose the first one, 2: 62, was abrogated, then the second one, 5: 69, still 
195 The Noble Qur'an, 133 (The hadith is cited from Sahih Muslin:, the Book of Faith, vol 1, hadith 
no. 240). 
196 Ali writes: 
"The Muslim position is clear. The Muslim does not claim to have a religion peculiar to 
himself. Islam is not a sect or an ethnic religion. In its view all Religion is one, for the 
Truth is one. It was the religion preached by all the earlier Prophets. It was the truth taught 
by all the inspired Books. In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and Plan of 
Allah and a joyful submission to that Will and Plan. If any one wants a religion other than 
that, he is false to his own nature, as he is false to Allah's Will and Plan. Such a one cannot 
expect guidance, for he has deliberately renounced guidance" (The floht' Qur'an, 166, n. 418). 197 Let us follow Ali: 
"The verse does not purport to lay down an exhaustive list of the articles of faith. Nor does it 
seek to spell out the essentials of a genuine belief in Allah, , which has no meaning unless it is accompanied by belief in His Prophets for its is through their agency alone that we know 
Allah's Will and can abide by it in our practical lives. This is especially true of His final 
Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him) whose message is universal, and not confined to 
any particular group or section of humanity. Belief in the Prophethooel of Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) is thus an integral part and a logical corollary of belief in Allah. Moreover, it is 
also an essential test of genuineness of such beliefs" (The Holy Qur'an, 309, n. 779). 198 The Noble Qur'an, 34,231. 
199 Ayoub, `Islam and Pluralism, " 113. 
200 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 113. 
201 Sura is a chapter in the Qur'an. 
202 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 113. 
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stands. If it was abrogated already, why was it necessary to repeat it then the second time? 
That the second revelation is close to the end of the Prophethood of Muhammad makes it 
very unlikely that it is abrogated. Hence I hold that, as Ayoub concludes, that "neither the 
words nor the purport of these two identical verses was abrogated. "203 Ayoub's second 
point concerns the technical side of abrogation. He believes that Qur'anic verses "dealing 
with other religious communities, " especially with the Christians, are not "legislative verses 
(ayat al-Ahkam), '204 which makes them immune to abrogation. The only exception to this 
principle is 9: 29 which legislates Jizya, poll tax. The rest, Ayoub continues, fall in the 
category of "narrative verses, " namely, "they are moral and religious statements, but do not 
legislate any rulings. "205 Therefore he concludes that the verses in dispute, 2: 62 and 5: 69, 
are not subject to abrogation: 06 
Next, Ayoub comes to the two controversial verses (3: 19,85) and the distinction 
between the two meanings of Islam as the total submission to the will of God and the 
institutionalised religion. He warns us that if we do not differentiate between the two 
meanings, then we "must in the end negate the other. "207 He also contends that if islam in 
these verses is taken to refer to Islam the religion, the verses relating the message of the 
Prophet to the earlier prophets from Adam onwards and of their "islan" are "meaningless. " 
If we also take, Ayoub remarks, the meaning of 3: 85 at face value, namely that "no other 
manifest or institutionalised religion will be acceptable to God except Islam as we have it 
today and have had it for the last 1500 years, " the Qur'anic verses, to which I referred 
earlier, declaring the "principal of plurality" and the "unity of faith are meaningless 
words. "208 
Ayoub moves the discussion further by distinguishing three different levels and 
understandings of Islam: The first and the widest sense "signifies the attitude of the entire 
creation before God" and "applies to the heavens and the earth and all that is in them"=e`' 
including human beings. The second level is the more common meaning which we have 
been discussing throughout the chapter, namely "any human being or human community 
which professes faith in the One God and seeks to obey God in all they do and say. '210 
This understanding permits Muslims to call Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus and his 
disciples muslims. Finally at the most specific level, it is "the Islam of a given community 
following a particular divine law revealed to a particular prophet, the Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him). "211 Ayoub believes that this balanced pluralistic understanding of 
islam undermines neither "the continuity of revelation from the words which `Adam 
received from his Lord' to the Qur'an of the Prophet Muhammad, " nor the "revelation 
"(13 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 113. 
204 Ayoub, "Islain and Pluralism, " 114. 
205 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 114. 
2206 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 114. 
207 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 114. 
208 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 114. 
2W Ayoub, "Islamn and Pluralism, " 114. 
210 Ayoub, "Islamn and Pluralism, " 114. 
211 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 115. 
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vouchsafed to all the prophets with the inspiration of righteous people in every age to 
interpret and implement God's revelations in their lives and the lives of their peoples. "212 In 
Islamic terms, the basic distinction is portrayed accurately in the shahada which forms the 
basis of Islamic faith. In the first part, la ilah ilia Allah -there is no god but Allah, the wider 
meaning of Islam is affirmed. In the second part, Muhammad rasal Allah -Muhammad is 
the messenger of God, the concrete meaning is affirmed, which is what makes Muslims 
different from "the people of other faiths, " in that Muslims follow Islamic principles, pray 
five times a day, fast in the month of Ramadhan, etc. 213 
Ayoub's pluralistic inferences of Islam as devotion, personal commitment and total 
submission to the will of God are largely derived from Wilfred C Smith, whom Ayoub 
deeply respects and was highly influenced by during his pursuit of doctoral research under 
Smith's supervision. As is well known, Smith is also a fellow pluralist, though coming 
from a different approach -the comparative study of the history of religions- and deeply 
respected and appreciated by Hick as well. In his The Meaning and End of Religion, 214 
Smith calls for jettisoning both the "word `religion"' itself and the referring names such as 
"Christianity, Buddhism and the like, '215 which are, in his opinion, all historical 
constructions that prevent us from seeing the "end of religion: " God. 216 He uses the 
imagery of dirty windows which, as our constructions, obstruct what is behind them, 
namely "the outside world. "217 As a replacement for religion, he argues for a "pair of 
concepts: " "cumulative tradition" and "faith. " 18 In his assessment of the Islamic case, 
which he takes it is to be the only religion apparently with a "built-in name, "=1`9 as opposed 
to the others which are historical constructions, he, too, deals with 3: 19,85 and 5: 3. He 
starts by examining the frequency of the appearance of islant in the Qur'an (eight times). 
Firstly, islam, as a noun, occurs a lot less frequently compared to other tenets of islam, 
such as Iman (faith), for instance, (45 times) and "God" (2,697 times). '-'-0 Its verb form 
aslama ("to submit, to surrender oneself wholly, to give oneself in total commitment") 
outnumbers (72 times) dramatically its usage in noun form? -'' Secondly, "when it is used 
it can be, and on many grounds almost must be, interpreted not as the name of a religious 
system but as the designation of a decisive personal act. " 22 To illustrate this point, he cites 
"They refused, after they had accepted" (after their acceptance, after their islant)223 and its 
212 Ayoub, "Islam and PluralLsm, " 115. 
213 Ayoub, "Islam and Pluralism, " 115-116. 
214 In his "Foreword" Hick describes it as a "modern classic of religious studies" (1-lick, J, 
"Foreword lo The Meaning and End of Religion, " in The Meaning and End of Religion, by WC 
Smith, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991, v). 
215 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 194. 
216 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 201. 
217 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 193.. 
218 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 194-195. 
219 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 80. 
220 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 110-111. 
d6' Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 111. 
222 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 110. 
223 The Qur'an 9: 74; cf. 3: 96,90 and 49: 11. 
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personal usage as islamukum, 224 "your Islam, your personal commitment to heed God's 
voice. " As regards to 3: 19, which is at the centre of the debate, he writes: 
"What in modem times has become 'Verily tue religion in the eyes of God is /s! 11111'225 
originally meant (was taken to mean: for instance, by the most respected and authoritative of 
the early commentators, al-Tabari) rather that to conduct oneself duly before God is to accept 
His commands; the proper way to worship Him is to obey Him -or, simply, true religion 
(not `the true religion') is obeisance. "226 
He even says that the original and more general meaning of the verse is "virtually identical" 
with the "definition" accepted for religion in the Catholic Encyclopaedia: "`Religion... 
means the voluntary subjection of oneself to God. " 227 Smith identifies three qualities in 
the term "islam" in the Qur'an: it is "vivid and dynamic-and personal. "228 His conclusion is 
that: 
"`Islam' is obedience or commitment, the willingness to take on oneself the responsibility of 
living henceforth according to God's proclaimed purpose; and submission, the recognition not 
in theory but in an overpowering act of one's littleness and worthlessness before the awe and 
majesty of God. It is a verbal noun: the nahte of an action, not of art institution of it personal 
decision, not a social system. "229 
Smith illustrates this point well in two different usages of muslim. A Christian can be a 
muslim (submitter) "in accord with the truest apprehension as to what God's will is" of 
which one is capable. But a Christian is not a Muslim -with capital M- in the sense of 
following the teachings of Muhammad and belonging to the Islamic community. Even 
though a Christian and a Muslim differ as to "how best one knows what God's will is, " 
they agree in their "acceptance, " their "islam, of such commands" as they apprehend 
them. 230 
One can see clear parallels between the interpretations of Ayoub and Smith. I believe 
their interpretation of Islam in these seemingly exclusivistic verses as the "submission to the 
will of the Real" is more likely to be true than the particularistic understandings. Certainly, 
the traditionalist conservative scholars will disagree with such interpretations of these 
verses, 3: 19 and 85. But they cannot show that the pluralistic explication is an un-Islamic 
interpretation or runs against the spirit of the Qur'an. On the contrary, I suggest the 
pluralist understanding (according to which the verses allude to a general tendency of faith 
found among human beings) are more in line both with the general teachings of the Qur'an 
224 The Qur'an 49: 17. It reads "They make it a favour unto you (Muhammad) that they have 
surrendered (aslanw) (unto Him). Say: Deem not your Surrender (islnnn, kmn) a favour unto mc; nay, 
but Allah does confer a favour on you, inasmuch as He has led you to the Faith, if you are earnest. " 225 The Qur'an 3: 19. 
226 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 113. 
227SMith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 113 (Cited from The Catholic Encyclopedia, cd. C0 
Hcrbermann et al., 15 voll., New York, 1913. The article is by CF Aiken, vol XII, 739). 
228 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 113. 
229 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 112, my emphasis. 
230 Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 114. 
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vis-a-vis other religions and with the centuries old practices of Islam 23' So the appeal to 
3: 19 and 85 to prove the finality of Islam as the only absolute way to salvation, since it can 
not only be interpreted particularistically but also pluralistically. Thus I proceed to the next 
point: the nature of the prophethood of Muhammad. 
Even if we are satisfied that Smith and Ayoub's arguments are convincing about the 
interpretation of islam as the "submission to the will of God" in the verses in question, 
there remains one more problem to be solved: the acceptance of the prophethood of 
Muhammad for one in order to be qualified for salvation/liberation. Despite the declaration 
of the verses 2: 62 and 5: 69 that those who believe in God, the Last Day and do the good 
deeds can attain salvation, the majority of the Islamic scholars have insisted that the verses 
did not project the over all argument of the Qur'an towards non-Muslims. They claim that 
when one considers other verses relating to the issue, 232 it becomes clear that one has to 
accept Muhammad's message in order to attain salvation/liberation. 233 As I mentioned 
earlier All, for example, is a staunch supporter of this opinion, 234 so was Kogyigit, against 
the inclusivist Ater. Even Ates was insistent on others' acceptance of Islam as a true path to 
salvation, but did not ask them to convert to Islam unlike the cxclusivists. 235 
A pluralist answer to this question can be found in Muhammad Abduh's remark on 
2: 62: "God's approval or wrath" is not related to "one's religious identification or social 
status. What really counts is a heartfelt belief in God. "236 This view is furthered by his 
disciple Rashid Rida in his elaboration that since "belief in the Prophet has not been 
stipulated in this verse as a prerequisite to eternal reward, " "all those who have had access 
to a prophetic revelation are potentially eligible, be they Muslims, Jews, Christians or 
Sabaean. "237 In this regard what Fazlur Rahman writes summarises the point very well: 
231 I am not arguing that Islam's treatment of others has been perfect. I accept that there have been 
problems, some of which I shall deal with shortly. However, the parallel reading of history portrays 
Islam as a religion which has been more positive and tolerant to other religions than its counterparts 
have been. This is a fact repeatedly put forward not only by Muslim scholars but also by fair-minded 
Western Islamists. Consider this as a case in point: 
"Persecution, that is to say, violent and active repression, was rare and atypical. Je«-. s and 
Christians under Muslim rule were not normally called upon to suffer martyrdom for their 
faith. They were not often obliged to make the choice, which confronted Muslims and Je s in 
re-conquered Spain, between exile, apostasy, and death. They were not subject to any major 
territorial or occupational restrictions, such as %%, ere the common lot of Jews in premodern 
Europe" (Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 8, my emphasis). 
See, also Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 19,24,62 and Gibb, HAR, Mohammedanism, London and 
New York: OUP, 1957,4. 
232 See for instance 2: 40; 3: 31-32,4: 150-151,170; 5: 15,19; 7: 157,158; 21: 107; 25: 1,33: 40; 
61: 6. 
233 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 194. 
234 See Ali's comments on 5: 69 in The Holy Qur'an, 309, n. 779. 
235 See Chapter I. Inclusivism-A Muslim Approach. 
236 McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of t/je Sahi'un, " 100-101. 
237 As Jane D McAuliffe points out, Muslim exegetes cannot agree on the identity of the mysterious 
religious community Sabi'un (Sabaeans). Some hold that they are part of the people of the Book 
(96,101), others deny this, while others claim they either "angel" or "sun" or "star-worshippers (97- 
98). Some others believe that Sabaeans are those whom the message of a "prophet has not reached" 
(100), i. e. they follow "an independent religion" (101). This ambiguity, one may argue, led to a 
loose application of the term to those remain outside the Judco-Christian-Islamic circle in the "easy, 
inexact fashion of those who despised such religions and thought of them unworthy of serious 
consideration" (106) (See for more: McAuliffe, "F_regetical Identification of the Sabi'un. " 95-I06). 
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"In both these verses, the vast majority of Muslim commentators exercise themselves 
fruitlessly to avoid having to admit the obvious meaning, viz, that those who believe in Gcxl 
and the Last Day and do good deeds -from any section of humankind- arc saved. Thcy either 
say that by Jews, Christians, and Sabacans here are meant those who have actually become 
`Muslims' -which interpretation is clearly belied by the fact that 'Muslims' constitute the 
first of the four groups mentioned, i. e. `those who believe'- or that they were those gtxxl 
Jews, Christians, and Sabaeans who lived before the advent of the Prophet Muhammad -which 
is an even worse tour de force. Even when replying to Jewish and Christian claims that the 
hereafter was theirs and theirs alone, the Qur'an says, `On the contrary, whosoever surrenders 
himself to god while he does good deeds as well, he shall find his reward with his Lord, shall 
have no fear, nor shall he come to grief' 2: 112. "238 
Despite my earlier remarks about Rahman's inclusivist stance, I believe his comments on 
these verses are fair and in line with the pluralist understanding of Islam. (Nevertheless, he 
is still an inclusivist, since he affirms the superiority of Islam as the best way for 
salvation). I believe he is right in his inferences that not only the four groups mentioned in 
the verses can be saved as long as they meet the conditions laid out, but also his 
generalisation of the logic of these verses, namely that those who meet the conditions "from 
any section of humankind" can be saved. 
Asian, however, takes on board the traditional understanding and afterwards seeks in 
vain to find a solution in the writings of Muhammad al-Ghazali, whom he describes 
accurately as a "spokesman of Islamic orthodoxy. "239 Instead of Asian's version though, I 
shall follow William Shepard's summary of al-Ghazali's opinions because of its brevity 
and clarity. According to al-Ghazali, people can be divided into three groups as far as 
Islam's message is concerned: i. those who have never received the message of 
Muhammad and hence can be excused and saved; ii. those who heard it with all its glory 
and gift, but rejected it. These are "unbelievers who have strayed from the right path; " and 
iii. those who heard it but under wrong circumstance, such as being fed with prejudices 
and given false images of Islam and Muhammad "since childhood. " Considering the 
circumstantial evidence, al-Ghazali thinks the last group are like the first and therefore can 
be saved 240 To me, there is nothing new or, unfortunately, very hopeful for others in this 
argument to support pluralism, contrary to what Asian suggests. Asian appears to be 
mixing the exclusivist and the inclusivist stances in this argument. The former believes that 
when one receives the message of Islam under normal circumstances, like the ones in 
In The Holy Qur'an (27, n. 76), A. YusufAli also gives some valuable information in the light of 
latest archaeological research which links them to a religious group in Lower Iraq, near Basra, to a 
kingdom in the Yemen tract, and to the Queen of Sheba. 
238 Rahman, "A Muslim Response, " 74 and Rahman, F, Major Themes of the Qur'an. Chicago and 
Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980,166. 
239 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 194. 
240 Shepard, W, "Conversations in Cairo: Some Contemporary Muslim Views of Other Religions, " 
The Muslim World 70, no. 3-4,1980,194-195. 
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group (ii) of al-Ghazali, they either have to become Muslims or unbelievers, regardless of 
their religious position in their own religion. To someone like al-Ghazali to receive the 
message and not believe in it and not to practice it is tantamount to unbelief, which runs 
directly against the pluralistic case. However, in inclusivism and pluralism, believing in 
something and accepting it as a way of life is totally different and separable from each 
other, and expected of other religions. This was one of the points the inclusivist Ate; was 
passionately arguing for, as examined in chapter one. Thus even an eminent pluralist like 
Hick, let alone many tolerant and practising followers of other religions, cannot be saved in 
al-Ghazali's argument, while he is most welcome in inclusivism and pluralism. Hence 
Asian's attempt to prove the pluralistic case by appealing to al-Ghazali fails. Our problem 
today is very different than that of al-Ghazali's day. It is not a question of who heard a 
specific message in what circumstances; it is a question of how to relate the devout 
followers of different religions to a common source, the Ultimate Reality. It cannot be 
achieved in exclusivism because of its rejection of other religions, while inclusivism offers 
some hope but fails in the end because of superior claims of one way over others. It can, 
then, possibly be done plausibly in pluralism 
One can still ask whether the question of mutual acceptance among religions is totally 
irrelevant to the relationship between religions and their followers? Although I still believe 
that the mutual recognition will not make much difference in whether or not one achieves 
salvation, I contend that it will have dramatic effects on interreligious dialogue and improve 
relations and increase co-operation among religions. Of this more will come in the "general 
conclusions. " For now though, I believe Hick's epistemic Golden Rule is in order here. To 
use Peter Byrne's paraphrase, we should "weigh similar evidence in other people's 
traditions as would weigh its counter part in ours. "241 Since Islam made believing in other 
religions a condition of faith, Muslims are understandably sensitive about the issue of 
recognition. I trust that they have a case to argue for, but nevertheless its scope is not too 
wide as to convert all other religionists to Islam, as the exclusivists would claim. Thus the 
pluralistic aspect of Islam should never be put aside. I will re-visit the issue of mutual- 
recognition in the general conclusions to my dissertation. 
What conclusions can be drawn in relation to moderate pluralism from the preceding 
discussions? The argument so far has established that certain verses in the Qur'an (2: 62 and 
5: 69) clearly espouse a pluralistic tone and others (3: 19,85) send an exclusivist message, 
which ties indirectly salvation/liberation to acceptance and/or recognition of Muhammad's 
message. If the possibility of interpreting Islam, referred to in the exclusivistic verses, as 
submission to the will of the Transcendent is considered, in addition to the strong tone of 
the pluralistic verses, it becomes evident that the over all argument of the Qur'an is 
pluralistic. As we shall see shortly, the Prophetic practices strongly corroborate this 
conclusion, too. Thus I can conclude that, as with moderate pluralism, Islam also embraces 
241 Byrne, P, Prolegonnena, 126-127. Hick defines it as "granting to others a premise on which we 
rely ourselves" (AIR, 235). 
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the view that different religions are salvifically effective ways of responding to the Ultimate 
Reality. To bolster this conclusion, I will now survey the Prophetic traditions as they 
constitute the most important evidence second to the Qur'anic verses. 
5.3.2. Prophetic Traditions 
Now I would like to present a few prophetic traditions to portray further the 
pluralistic character of Islam. There is the famous example of the Christian community of 
Najran, who came to Madina in 632 to visit Muhammad and stayed for one month during 
which time they were allowed to use the Prophet's mosque for worship in their own 
way. 242 This reminds me of a discussion I had a few months ago with a colleague in a 
mosque in England. It was a gathering for the late night prayer, 'isha, which consisted of 
around forty or so Turkish Muslims from different backgrounds, lay as well as educated. 
After the prayer a session of questions and answers was held. One of the contributors, 
probably thinking along the lines of what one observer put "a reaction of a healthy nature, 
which cannot easily accept that the sincere and good man may be eternally damned, "=4; 
asked about the salvational end of the good Christians he saw, met and worked with. The 
conservative colleague instantly replied that "as far as we are concerned they are heading 
towards Hell, regardless of what they do, on the grounds that they are in shirk, 
unbelief. "2" To bolster his argument, he immediately quoted the one of the famous verses 
critiquing the doctrine of Trinity. 245 A little bit later another question was asked about 
religious tolerance in Islam. This time he narrated the good behaviour of the Prophet of 
2422 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 151; Atc , "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 33; 
Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, 176; al-Faruqi, "Islam rund Oilier Faiths, " 102-103. 
I was once told a real life story of a sufi, Muslim mystic, closely related to this example. The suli 
visited New York with a group of his followers. It was a Friday and they wanted to perform the 
weekly Friday Prayer (salat al-Jum'a). Since there was no mosque around, they went to the nearest 
church and asked the person in charge if they can perform their prayer in the church. He happily said 
"Yes! " After the prayer, wanting to make a point about modern day Christianity's toleration to 
members of other faiths, he asked: "Would you let me use a mosque for the same purpose, if I came 
to Turkey? " The sufi replied: "No, I would not. Because we Muslims accept Jesus as an important 
prophet in the chain of the prophets and therefore have a right to use your church for worship. If you 
Christians accept Muhammad as a prophet, then you have the same right, too. " Even though the suti 
made a fair point, I disagree with his analogy, since it contradicts with the authentic prophetic 
tradition related to the Christians of Najran, who were granted the same right without fulfilling that 
condition. 
243 Shepard, "Conversations in Cairo, " 195. 
244 As we shall see soon in more detail, this example clearly shows how a conscrvativc/cxclusivist 
mind works which disproves Asian's argument that nobody is guaranteed salvation, not even a 
Muslim (Asian, Religious Pluralism, 195). Asian misses the crucial difference between Muslims 
and others: that the former have a hope of being "saved" whereas the latter arc condemned to Hell 
right from the start. Asian addresses neither this, nor makes any correlation of it to the notion of a 
God "whose mercy embraced everything" (7: 156). 
245 The verses in 5: 72-73 reads: 
"They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary. The Messiah 
(himself) said: 0 Children of Israel, worship Allah, my Lord and your Lord. Lo! whoso 
ascribes partners unto Allah, for him Allah has forbidden Paradise. His abode is the Fire. For 
evil-doers there will be no helpers" (72). 
"They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the third of three; when there is no God save 
the One God. If they desist not from so saying a painful doom will fall on those of them who 
disbelieve" (73). 
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letting the Najran Christians worship in the only mosque in Madina, an example usually 
cited by Muslim scholars as evidence of Muslims' toleration of other religions. 246 
However, as I hinted in chapter one, Muslim scholars quoting this example rarely think 
about its full reciprocal implications for Islam itself. So, even though I was among the 
listeners, I had to step in to point out the apparent contradiction in the two answers just 
given by the colleague: that the Christians are condemned to Hell because of their violation 
of belief in one God, tawhid, and that the Najran Christians were allowed to worship, in a 
manner which, traditional Islam claims, leads to unbelief, in the Prophet's mosque. I told 
him that with basic historical thinking, one can show that the argument is flawed. We know 
that long before the Prophet was born and Islam came into existence, the Christian 
doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation were established among the Christians. Thus it is very 
likely that the Najran Christians and others, whom Muslims met and the Qur'an criticises, 
were hardly any different in holding to these doctrines than a committed Christian today. 
By suggesting that today's Christians are unbelievers and therefore will likely go to Hell, 
are you claiming then that the permission of the Prophet for the similar Christians holding 
almost the same beliefs to worship in his mosque was nothing more than an indication of 
respect or tolerance? He was also the same Prophet whose mission was to clean the Holy 
Ka'ba in Mecca from idols and idol worship, but tolerated the similar thing to be done in 
Madina in his mosque. Does not this have any bearing on how we should understand 
Christianity and behave towards Christians? No theological consequences what so ever? I 
believe it certainly does have important consequences and repercussions on Islam's dealing 
with other faiths. This brings me to the second issue I would like to discuss in this section: 
Ahl al-Kitab (people of the Book) as a generic term. 
In my discussions of verses (2: 62 and 5: 69) which illustrate best the pluralistic 
character of Islam, I deliberately focused on the Judeo-Christian tradition and did not spend 
much time on the mysterious religious group the Sabaeans. Because the discussions about 
the so called people of the Book, or "societies of the Book"247 as Arkoun calls them, gives 
direction how Muslims should treat other religions. Ahl al-Kitab is mentioned in the Qur'an 
several times in other contexts, 2' in contrast to the Sabaeans, just three times, 249 though all 
related to salvation. Thus right from the times when Muslims started to form their own 
community, they were given a framework to deal with other religions in a very concrete 
fashion. 
The formula of ahl al-Kitab never remained as a theoretical concept and had be 
actualised as soon as the Prophet arrived at Madina to face the considerable number of the 
Jewish inhabitants of the city. As a result, the "Charter of Madina"25° was signed to 
legislate the affairs of all concerned, which initially included the Jewish population and 
246 Ate,, "Nobody Has Monopoly over Paradise, " 22. 
247 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 103. 
248 See for instance: The Qur'an, 3: 64-65,69-72; 4: 123,171; 5: 65,68, etc. 
249 The Qur'an, 2: 62; 5: 69 and 22: 17. 
250 Also called "Madina Contract" or "Madina Constitution. " 
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with a special letter later extended to the Christians of Najran, whose special case I have 
just discussed. The Charter consists of 47 articles. Article I declares the inhabitants of the 
city to be one community (ummah) 251 in contrast to the hadith that identifies "unbelievers 
as one community" 252 which forms the exclusivist traditional understanding of others. This 
certainly proves that "people of the Book" are not among the unbelievers. Article 25 lays 
down bilateral recognition of religious liberties and rights for all parties concerned253 and 
article 37 builds not only political but also personal, one to one, community spirit and 
friendship. Part of it reads: "Between them is sincere friendship and honourable dealing, 
not treachery. ""- Thus some Muslim scholars believe that the Charter of Madina could be 
revived as a workable framework to manage Muslims' relation with other religions or 
rather communities 255 However, it appears that the argument is oversimplified, argued 
only on political grounds, not religious, and from an inclusivist point of view, given a 
special role to Islam. -' The Charter might be a good starting point, but I believe we have to 
go beyond its boundaries in order to be able to include, as Bulac contends that it had, both 
religious and non-religious, particularly anti-religious, groups. 257 This would require 
Muslims to re-address the traditional understandings of and practices related to "people of 
the Book, " unbeliever, and the law of apostasy, etc. Thus I will examine closely these 
issues in next section. 
Even though the phrase "societies of the Book" has been used primarily to designate 
Jews and Christians at the time of the revelation of the Qur'an, later it has been extended to 
other communities as Muslims came to know new religious and ethnic communities, such 
as "Zoroastrians in Persia" and later to "Hindus in India and other groups elsewhere. "258 
Although I take ahl al-Kitab to be as a generic term to deal with other religions, which has 
been applied for so many years, Lewis argues that the expansion of the principle of 
toleration to communities other than Judeo-Christian tradition was made possible because 
of the "inclusion of the not very precisely identified Sabaeans, " in the verses 2: 62 and 5: 69. 
'-St Watt, W M, Muhammad at Madina, Karachi: OUP, 1988,221. 
252 This saying is cited frequently by Muslim as a hadith when others are mentioned, especially in 
political terms (see for instance: Shepard, "Conversations in Cairo, " 194) But it is not an authentic 
saying of the Prophet. 
253 It is worded: "... To the Jews their religion (din) and to the Muslims their religion. (This applies) 
both to their clients and to themselves... " (Watt, Muhammad at Ma(lina, 223). 
2-54 Watt, Muhammad at Madina, 224. 
255 Kadioglu, "Republican Epistemology, " 16. 
256 Kadioglu, "Republican Epistemology, " 16. According to Kadioglu, Ali Bulaq claims that the 
Madina Contract "made possible the livelihood of various groups with different religious 
convictions, secularists, and atheists in political unity. " I believe that it is hardly possible to prove 
the Contract included any secularist and/or atheist. On the contrary, as Lewis puts it superbly, 
"polytheists and idolaters, [and the atheists] were not eligible to receive the toleration of the Islamic 
state; for them, indeed, according to the laws, the choice was the Qur'an, the sword, or slavery" 
(Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 20). Hence Bulaq seems to be mistaken. 
=57 Kadioglu, "Republican Epistemology, " 16. 
258 Lewis, The Jews of Islaºn, 20. al-Faruqi writes on this issue: 
"As the Muslims fanned out of Arabia into Byzantium, Persia and India, large numbers of 
Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus and Buddhists came under their dominion. The same 
recognition granted to the Jews and Christians by the Prophet personally was granted to every 
non-Muslim religious community on the one condition of their keeping the peace" (al-Farugi, 
I R, "Islam and Other Faiths, " 103). 
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Even though I believe that the Sabaeans must have had an effect on the issue, I believe Uhl 
al-Kitab itself, as understood to denote Jews and Christians, was enough to make the 
extension possible. The reason for my thinking is the famous letter of Umar b. al-Khattab, 
the second caliph, to the administrator of Iran ordering him to treat the Zoroastrians as the 
Uhl al-Kitab is treated, i. e. granting the status of al-dhimmi, protected, when Iran was 
conquered. Asian contends that this pact grants any participant "an equal status with 
Muslims in religious, economic and administrative domains. "259 (I believe that 
theoretically, it might be the case, but in practice Muslims did not extend this beyond socio- 
political domain. This is a point missed by Asian, which I will deal with this at length in the 
forthcoming heading). In return for protection by the state, one (that is a! -dhimmi) has to 
stay loyal to the state and pay poll tax. But if one considers the Sahaean among Uhl al- 
Kitab, which is possible according to some commentators, 260 the dispute might be 
resolved. 
However, there could be a useful contemporary application of Lewis' point about the 
mysterious group Sabaeans and its bearing on other religions within an Islamic context. I 
believe that the logic Lewis points out can be extended today to primitive religions and 
newly emerging religious movements to consider them as possible ways of salvation 
besides Islam. Obviously, the criterion of "salvation/liberation" as human transformation 
applies to them as well. I shall consider this issue under a separate heading shortly (5.3.4. 
Salvation/liberation and Fa/ah). 
The Prophetic traditions we studied in the general framework of Uhl a! -Kitah as 
understood and applied by the Prophet Muhammad (to Najran Christians and in the 
Madinan pact) seem to substantiate our previous conclusion concurring with the moderate 
pluralism and reached by the examination of the relevant verses: that different religions 
constitute legitimate ways of salvation/liberation besides Islam. The extension of ahl al- 
Kitab later by Muslims to include all "other religions" (theistic and non-theistic) is laudable 
and most welcome. However, as will be seen soon more clearly, their restriction of the 
wider understanding of the formula (which includes theological sphere, too) to the socio- 
political domain only is disappointing and should be re-considered carefully in order to 
embrace not only great world religions but also primitive religions and new religious 
movements as valid ways of attaining salvation/liberation. The pluralistic character of Islam 
obliges Muslims to do so, which would in effect mean following the footsteps of the 
Prophet, otherwise this will prove to be a major obstacle between moderate pluralism and 
Islam. This will be my task for the next heading. 
5.3.3. Religious Freedom and the Other 
259 Aslan, Religious Pluralism, 197. 
260 See for a summary of classical and modern comments: McAuliffe, "Eregetical Identifrrntion of 
the Sabi'un, " 95-106. 
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Certain verses in the Qur'an form the bedrock of religious freedom in Islam, on 
which the above mentioned articles in the Madinan Contract are based. Here are two of 
them: 
"There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And 
he who rejects false deities and believes in Allah has grasped a firm hand-hold which will 
never break. Allah is hearer, knower. "261 
"And if your Lord willed, all who arc in the earth would have believed together. Will you 
(Muhammad) compel men until they are believers? "262 
These and other verses acted as guarantors of religious freedom in Islamic communities 
throughout history. Thus, as Lewis points out deservedly, "in the early centuries of Islamic 
rule, there was little or no attempt at forcible conversion, the spread of the faith being 
effected rather by persuasion and inducement. "263 As a consequence of this, Lewis 
continues, though it is difficult to obtain accurate figures, some argued that "as late as the 
Crusades, non-Muslims still constituted a majority of the population. 11264 Lewis' comments 
on the pluralist character of the Middle Eastern Region are very interesting and worth full 
quotation: 
"Apart from one episode, of brief duration and minor significance, the Arab Muslim rulers of 
the new empire did not repeat the errors of their predecessors but instead respected the pattern 
of pluralism that had existed since antiquity. This pattern was not one of equality, but rather 
of dominance by one group and, usually, a hierarchic sequence of the others. Though this 
order did not concede equality, it permitted peaceful coexistence. While one group might 
dominate, it did not as a rule insist on suppressing or absorbing the others. The new 
dominant group is variously defined -at first as Arab Muslims, then simply as Muslims. And 
with the replacement of an ethno-religious by a purely religious definition, access to the 
dominant group was open to all, thus making it possible, in the course of the centuries, for a 
dominant minority to become an overwhelming majority. "265 
As Lewis illustrates accurately, Islam, as an "egalitarian religion" which "recognises neither 
cast nor aristocracy" both "in principle and in law, " managed to show some form of 
plurality and "peaceful coexistence" in its history up to recent times. However, this 
application also had its limitations and defects. In Lewis' words, "the rank of a full member 
of society was restricted to free male Muslims. Those who lacked any of these essential 
qualifications -that is, the slave, the woman, or the unbeliever- were not equal. "26 Of these 
three, the slave and the woman are not directly related to my project, but I am more 
concerned about the third: the case of the unbeliever, which is directly linked to the law of 
apostasy in Islam. 
261 The Qur'an 2: 256. 
2622 T he Qur'an, 10: 77; cf. 19: 29. 
263 Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 17. 
264 Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 17. 
265 Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 19. 
26'6 Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 8 (my emphasis). 
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The unbeliever includes two categories: those who do not follow a religion or do not 
make religious choices, e. g. agnostics, atheists, etc., and the converts from Islam to any 
other religion. There are three issues at hand here: first, does the religious freedom which 
Islam so cherishes include the freedom not to have religion at all or how liberal is the 
religious liberty of Islam? Second, how does one solve the dilemma of converts from Islam 
to other religions, who are faced with either exile or death, despite the fact that they are 
recognised as legitimate ways of living by Islam? Finally, is the recognition of other 
religions purely a political act on the part of Islam without any theological implications, 
where does apostasy law stand in this context, political or theological, and what is the 
connection between apostasy law and the tolerance of other faiths? So far I have found no 
Muslim scholar either relating these issues to each other or offering any solution to either of 
them. Nasr, for example, thinks that apostasy law is politically motivated and signals the 
need to re-think the issue. He even mentions that the process has already started in Egypt, 
Iran and other countries. 267 But he, too, neither connects the recognition of one tradition 
and condemning a convert to that tradition to death as an apostate, nor questions the logic 
of it. 
As an example embodying all three problems in one, I shall start with a famous case 
related to a Jewish citizen of an Islamic state: Maimonides, properly Moses ben Mainion 
(1135-1204), the Jewish philosopher and physician. In his birthplace Spain, he was forced 
to convert to Islam and later embraced Judaism when he fled to a freer environment to the 
east. "At the height of his power and fame" in Cairo, one of his Muslim countryman "who 
knew of his earlier conversion, " recognised him and took him to court demanding the death 
penalty, because he was an "apostate from Islam. " Luckily for Maimonides, his case was 
dealt with by the judge, qadi, al-Fadil, who was "his friend and patron. " He ruled that 
according to 2: 256, which forbids coercion in religion, "Maimonides' first conversion to 
Islam in Cordoba" was not "legally or religiously valid. " Thus "his reversion to Judaism" 
did not mean apostasy; therefore the law did not apply to him and the case was dropped 2(s 
Maimonides' case illustrates well the dichotomy that I am trying to address. On the 
one hand, we have a verse declaring the freedom of religion and on the other, one cannot 
choose a certain religion, even though it is officially recognised by the state. Moving 
closely to the first problem, that is not to make a religious choice, I assert that throughout 
their history Muslims usually understood and applied this verse as the freedom to belong to 
one of the religions, i. e. it did not include the right not to have a religion. One had to be 
religious, e. g. Muslim, Christian, Jew but not atheist or agnostic, if one wanted to stay in a 
Muslim country. This certainly contradicts the generalisation of the epistemic version of the 
Golden Rule in the pluralistic theory, that we should treat others' premises in the way that 
we treat ours. Considering also Hick's theory of "the religious ambiguity of the universe, " 
2207 Nasr, S H, 'Islamic-Christian Dialogue -Problems and Obstacles to Ile Pondered and Overcome, " The Muslim World 88, no. 3-4,1998,230. 
268 Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 100 (quoted from Ibn al-Qifti, Tarikh al-Hutrama, cd. J Lippert, 
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it becomes more urgent for Muslims to rethink the narrow understanding of the verse to 
move towards a more general sense as it is intended. It would require them to reconsider 
some sensitive terms, like kufr (unbelief), kafir (unbeliever), mushrik (polytheist), etc. I 
shall present, as an example, Esack's understanding of kufr in the light of hermeneutics in 
the following pages. Even though the process of re-thinking certain religious dogmas is a 
long and a hard process, I can say that it has already started. In Turkey, for instance, a 
recent doctoral thesis in Islamic Law examining the religious freedom of ah! al-Kitab during 
the time of the Prophet takes a bold step. It recognises "the right not to have a religion" 
within the boundaries of religious freedom guaranteed by the verses 269 A welcome and 
laudable work from the pluralistic perspective. 
The second problem was the dilemma of the converts from Islam to other faiths. 
They faced either exile or death regardless of which religion they chose as long as it was a 
departure from Islam, the truest path(! ), to some other. However, neither Muslims nor 
Christians prevented a Jew from choosing "the rival religion. "270 Even though this sounds 
like a historical case, I believe it is still applied in certain Islamic countries; if not legally 
then socially. It has also serious effects on new religions and newly revived religions. 27' 
Many scholars defend the law on the grounds of state security or "treason against the 
state. "272 Nevertheless, the general attitude of the Qur'an, especially towards ahl al-Kitab 
does not let us justify this reason. On the one hand we recognise, say, Christianity as a 
legitimate way of living and even allow Muslims to socialise with them through marriage, 
neighbourliness, etc., and on the other we are allowed to put them to death if they try and 
reject Islam. In my view, there is no justification for this whatsoever. If one says that this 
practice was historically conditioned and not applicable any more, then the Muslim world 
ought to make it known that this was and will be the case from now on. However, for this 
to happen, I maintain that we have to determine the nature of Islam's recognition of others? 
Is it socio-political or theological? This is the final point regarding the status of unbelievers 
in Islam. 
The last issue related to unbelievers is the nature of both the tolerance of other 
religions and of the law of apostasy. I shall try to determine these and call for a shift in their 
direction. I have maintained throughout this thesis that Islam's relation with other religions 
has always been good compared to other traditions. However, the plurality that Islam 
portrayed at religious, social and political levels within its borders wherever it went, was 
269 Bostanci, A, Islam Hukukunda Gayri Müslimler (Hz. Peygamber Devri Uygulamase Temelinde) 
(Nan-Muslims in Islamic Law -Based on the Practices of Muhammad's Times), Istanbul: Marmara 
University, PhD, 1999,92; Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 100. 
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always motivated by socio-political conditions not by theological considerations. 273 It 
hardly crossed these borders at the official level and may be in the public mind, except in 
the Sufi strand of Islam, where pluralism has always been evident. As a result of this, I 
believe the Islamic world had the apostasy law and, as we have seen in Maimonides' case, 
tried the devout followers of other religions for going against the Holy Law. Certainly, the 
underlying reason for these persecutions was, as already noted, the strictly exclusivistic 
understanding of 3: 19 and 85, that "the religion in the eyes of God is Islam" (3: 19), which 
was meant to be taken that any defector of the absolute way had to be punished. However, 
what was needed was to extend the socio-political recognition across the theological 
spectrum and declare, along the lines of 2: 62 and 5: 69, that followers of other religions can 
also be saved. 
In conclusion, I hold that a clear shift is needed in Islam's treatment of other 
religions, which are not totally alien to it and have a basis in the Qur'an and Sunna (the 
prophetic tradition). That is to say, broadening the scope of socio-political acceptance of 
others to the theological sphere. This will correspond to the argument of the moderate 
pluralism that different religions are salvifically effective ways of approaching the Real. 
Thus far I have discussed two of the three questions that I put forward in relation to 
moderate pluralism and Islam. The first was how to relate the different experiences of the 
Real (as the personal and impersonal) to the principle of tawhid (faith in the oneness of 
Allah). The second was the issue of the finality of Islam as the only way to salvation. We 
have demonstrated that Islam had resources to answer positively to these questions, which 
meant that, up to this stage, moderate pluralism is compatible with Islam. This brings us, 
then, to my third question put forward at the outset: the issue of the soteriological criterion 
between Islam and moderate pluralism. 
5.3.4. Salvation/liberation and Falah 
Salvation, falah or najat, in Islam is not as much stressed as it is in Christianity, since 
there is no central figure related to salvation in Islam. According to Islam, a Muslim is 
expected to have faith in certain principles (Allah, angels, the revealed book, the prophets, 
the judgement day and predestination) and live by the five pillars of Islam. These are: 1. 
shahada (to bear witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his servant and 
prophet), 2. salat (five daily prayers), 3. savm (fasting during the month of Ramadhan), 4. 
zakat (state tax), and 5. hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). One tries one's best and leaves the rest 
to the mercy of Allah, who guarantees that nothing will be left unrewarded or 
unpunished. 274 The basic level of falah is to be rewarded by entering Heaven and the 
ultimate level is to please Allah, do everything for the sake of Him, which I believe is equal 
273 Arkoun also notes this fact briefly when he says that "Jews and Christians recognised as peoples 
of the Book (ahl al-Kitab), " dhimmi (protected peoples) in legal terms, "but as theologically beyond 
the 'community promised salvation' (al-firga al-najiya)" (Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 10). 
274 "l'he Qur'an 9: 7-8. 
chapter 5 Moderate Pluralism and Islam 239 
to the transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness that moderate pluralism 
supports. 
Earlier I argued that despite certain deficiencies in its scope, in essence Hick's theory 
of salvation/liberation fits the Islamic understanding of salvation, falah or najat. Asian 
criticises Hick for, though describing the Islamic notion of falah correctly, 275 in the end 
using the wrong phrase: "the state of Islam" instead of the state of taqwa (fear of Allah, 
righteousness, piety, good conduct). I do not think Hick is entirely mistaken about his 
usage, if we consider above Ayoub and Smiths' argument for interpreting islam as "total 
submission to the will of Allah. " Thus derived from Islam, the expression "ahl-i taslimiyat 
" (people of total submission) among the Sufis is very common. To illustrate the point, 
they narrate the story of Abraham when he was thrown into fire: 76 The story tells that just 
before he was thrown into the fire, the archangel Gabriel and other angels came to him with 
several suggestions to stop the tragedy if he would like them to. Abraham refused saying, 
"God knows in what state I am in, if he wants to intervene, he can, therefore I do not need 
your help. " The total submission, taslimiyat, in Sufi understanding requires one to be like a 
"dead body in front of an undertaker. 11277 Nevertheless Adnan is right in insisting that 
taqwa is more common and well known among ordinary Muslims and also has the 
advantage of distinguishing "ordinary Muslims from those who live a saintly life. "='78 
Another criticism Asian puts forward against Hick's criterion of "salvation/liberation 
as human transformation" is that since it undermines the "sacred principles of a particular 
tradition, " it can make, say, a "Muslim lose the incentive to lead a saintly life. " 79 Asian 
seems to be misunderstanding either pluralism or saintly life, maybe both. It is true that 
moderate pluralism may necessitate rethinking of certain traditional teachings of some 
religions, particularly Christianity. But as far as Islam is concerned, the pluralist hypothesis 
neither undermines nor calls for the revision of any of the central tenets of Islam, which, I 
believe, are the keys for leading a saintly life. What I mean by "central tenets of Islam" is 
the five pillars, which I explained at the beginning. As far as I can see none of these pillars 
is effected negatively from the moderate pluralist stand. In fact, on the contrary, one can 
even claim that from an Islamic perspective the more saintly a life one leads, the more likely 
that one may become a pluralist. The Sufis are the best examples of this, many of whom 
are pluralists and are admired by Hick as well. In my interview, I suggested to him that he 
seemed to be more attracted to Sufism than the orthodox way of Islam. He said, if he were 
to be a Muslim, he would choose the Sufi way of living Islam. Indeed, his latest book The 
Fifth Dimension=S° is a good indication of Hick's mystical quest. Hence I believe that to 
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accuse Hick of undermining the saintly life, at least from an Islamic perspective, is 
unjustifiable. 
Asian contends that Hick's position "cannot endorse the Muslim's belief in Heaven 
and Hell, but would praise the result of such belief, namely, their saintly life. "=5' In my 
view, this is the wrong connection, but nevertheless correlates my criticism and 
modification of Hick's soteriological criterion. As I indicated in my modification of Hick's 
theory, from the outset Hick's theory seems to neglect the input of certain rituals in human 
transformation. It is true that, in addition to an ultimate aim, there can be several other, 
subordinate, aims of a religion as far as salvation is concerned. From an Islamic 
perspective, for instance, even though leading an Islamic life or worshipping solely for the 
sake of Allah is the ideal form of being a Muslim, it is not the only way. One can obey 
Allah for the fear of punishment or reward, which is a lesser form of obedience, but still 
legitimate one, compared to doing everything just for the sake of Allah. But this does not 
mean that the pluralistic hypothesis denies these as legitimate ways of salvation; rather, as 
expected of a meta-theory of that size, it focuses on "the ultimate aim of reliiioýns, " which 
is recentering one's life in the Ultimate Reality. Thus to counter these charges, I put 
forward in moderate pluralism that the scope of soteriological criterion must be broadened 
to embody different aims of religions in addition to its emphasis on the ultimate aim of 
Reality-centredness. I said that Cohn-Sherbok's viability principle -that is the satisfaction 
of one's spiritual needs- might offer a way forward in terms of supporting soteriological 
criterion. The same argument could apply to primitive religions and new religious 
movements, that they may or may not serve the ultimate aim of religion, but in any case 
have a positive function to play in one's salvific/liberational journey. However, their 
viability must constantly be checked by the observable fruits they produce within 
individuals, that is goodness, compassion, caring for others, etc. Thus they can also he 
seen as positive ways of salvation/liberation. This might help to remove the negative stigma 
attached to these movements as total heresies. 
As for Asian's correlation between the belief in "Heaven and Hell" and its 
inducement of "saintly life, " I hold that while reward and punishment can be gird 
incentives for lay Muslims, to suggest so for the saintly life is a total injustice for saints in 
general and Sufis in particular. Only Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya of Basra, the pioneering female 
Sufi of the early times, can answer such a grave misunderstanding. One day she was seen 
"running with speed, " carrying "fire in one hand and water in the other. " When she was 
asked what she was going to do with fire and water, she replied: 
"I am going to light fire in Paradise and to pour water on to Hell so that both cil. (i. e. 
hindrances to the true vision of God) may completely disappear from the pilgrims and their 
purpose may be sure, and the servants of God may sec Him, without any objet of hope of 
281 Asian, Religious Pluralism, 150. 
Chapter 5 Moderate Pluralism and Islam 241 
motive of fear. What if the hope of Paradise and the fear of Hell did not exist? Not one %%ould 
worship his Lord or obey Him? "28' 
Certainly, there is a connection between the belief in Heaven and Hell and religiosity of lay 
Muslims, but extending this to Sufis' saintly life is unjustifiable and misleading. Rabi'a has 
another saying which absolutely denies this connection: "0 my Lord, if I worship Thee 
from the fear of Hell, burn me in Hell, and if I worship Thee from hope of Paradise, 
exclude me thence, but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake then withhold not from me 
Thine Eternal Beauty. " 
Asian also writes that "human transformation" "is not the aim but the result of it pious 
life which can only be attained by the firm belief and commitment to the sacred 
principles. "284 This looks a bit like the chicken and egg dilemma. If we take human 
transformation, following Hick, as the "total surrender of the self to God. " (islum) in the 
orthodox sense and as a "total re-centring in God" (fana) "leading to haja', human life 
merged into the divine life"285 (wahdat al-wujud), in the Sufi sense, we could say that 
human transformation or saintliness is the aim of "pious life, " not the result. The rest is the 
means to achieve that aim and the pluralist theory holds that we have different means to do 
that. Allah declares in the Qur'an that "I created the jinn and humankind only that they 
might worship me"286 and in another one "Lo! worship preserves from lewdness and 
iniquity, but verily remembrance of Allah is more important. And Allah knows what you 
do. 'n287 As far as moderate pluralism is concerned, it undermines neither the aim of worship 
to God, nor of the means of doing so. Although there is truth in Asian's closing lines about 
Hick's salvific criterion, it is misdirected. 
Asian, probably because of his dissatisfaction with Hick's salvific criterion, 
promotes the classical Muslim understanding of salvation in his framework for -, in Islamic 
religious pluralism as a more accurate model, in which apparently nobody is guaranteed 
automatic salvation. One believes, does good deeds and tries one's best to lead it perfect 
moral life. The rest is in the hands of Allah. Drawing on the Sufi notions of fear (khuº%J) 
and hope (raja), Asian describes the Muslim understanding of salvation as being "neither 
absolutely optimistic, nor absolutely pessimistic, " which promotes best "the desire to 
accomplish a sound moral life. "- I believe, however, that it offers not much incentive and 
is also less adequate than Hick's for a pluralistic framework. To illustrate this, it is enough 
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to remember how an exciusivist mind works, when my colleague easily condemned 
Christians to Hell because of their belief in the Trinity and Incarnation, which is shirk in his 
understanding. The way that a conservative/exclusivist mind works disproves Asian's 
argument that nobody is guaranteed salvation, not even a Muslim. It is true that nobody has 
automatic salvation by belonging to a certain religious camp, but it is also true that some 
might be condemned to eternal fire by not belonging to that camp. The main difference. 
then, between Muslims and others, according to the exclusivist mind, is that the former 
have a hope of being "saved, " whereas the latter are condemned to Hell right from the start. 
In the inclusivist frame, where I believe Asian belongs, although there is hope for 
everybody, both the opportunities and the end result is likely to be better for the follower of 
the favoured tradition than the underprivileged one. Asian neither addresses this, nor makes 
any correlation of it to the notion of a God "whose mercy embraced everything"(7: 1-6). 
The balance lost in Asian can be found in Rahman's observation that, on the one hand, 
nobody, including Muslims, "will be automatically God's darling"=`) by carrying certain 
labels, whereas, on the other hand, "those who believe in God and the hast Day and do 
good deeds -from any section of humankind- are saved. "=90 In my view, this is both 
Islamic and pluralist, though not entirely Hickian, since I disagree with his treatment of 
religious language, for that matter "the Last Day, " here. This brings us to the hermeneutical 
approach which I mentioned in my modification of Hick's thesis. 
Before I move on to hermeneutical exemplification, I might as well summarise what I 
have so far presented with regard to "moderate pluralism and Islam. " I have started with 
three apparent questions (different experiences of the Real, Islam's finality and the question 
of criterion) that might pose problems for Islam, if moderate pluralism is taken seriously. I 
have taken up all three in turn and demonstrated that all can be resolved positively within an 
Islamic context. Hence I may infer that moderate pluralism is compatible with Islam. But 
how does this conclusion compare with Hick's version; in other words, what is the 
contribution of moderate pluralism to the dialogue between Islam and pluralism that Hick's 
version does not offer? I will reply to this question at the end of the chapter. 
5.3.5. A Hermeneutical Turn 
In my modification of Hick's pluralistic theory, I argued for a hermeneutical 
approach in understanding the scriptures. It differs from Hick's in three aspects. Firstly, it 
does not have the negative connotations that Hick's approach has, e. g. that holy texts are 
human products, which immediately puts off many devout believers even from considering 
pluralism as a possible choice. Secondly, it proposes a broader reading of the scriptures 
("prophetic, legislative, narrative, sapiential and hymnal (poet ic)"), 2')I which includes 
Hick's mythical/metaphorical reading, too. Last but not least, it treats holy texts as 
289 Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an, 167 and Rahman, "A Muslim Response. - 75. 
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revelations, not mythological human products that do not relate to the Real. As mentioned 
earlier, even though this is not a hermeneutical analysis of Hick's thesis, I shall present 
briefly a framework from Mohammed Arkoun, followed by an example from Farid Esack. 
Following on the Qur'anic distinction between the "Archetype of the Book" (tunen ul- 
Kitab)2 and "the Arabic-language Qur'an, " Arkoun first establishes a common ground for 
the Holy scriptures 293 In fact, as an original approach, he generalises this understanding to 
give a broader meaning to the term ahl al-Kitab/Kitab, societies of "the Book, " always with 
capital B -referring to the Archetype- and that of "the books, " referring to the particular 
revelations of world religions. 29, t It is worth noticing that Muslims are also considered ='i 
or any other religion for that matter, among "the societies of the books" in this general 
meaning of the term. 296 Since the archetype contains "the inaccessible, mysterious totality 
of the Word of God"'m (i. e. Umm al-Kitab), 98 none has the full truth, but all has some 
portion of it. I believe that this might offer a more workable solution compared to Hick's 
humanly constructed mythological compilations. The moderate ineffability of the Real is 
kept intact, since nobody has the full, absolute truth and also what human beings have is 
not mythologies but revelations containing portions of the Truth. In this respect, Arkoun 
seeks to establish, for instance, a relation between the way that the "discourse of Jesus 
Christ in Aramaic (and not Greek; the distinction is important ) at a precise time and in a 
precise place on Earth is related to God the Father" and the way the '*Qur'anic discourse in 
Arabic transmitted by Muhammad is related to the Archetype of the Book retained in the 
presence of God transcendent. "299 His point is that all scriptures were bound with certain 
"historical, linguistic, and cultural constraints: " they all started as "oral enunciations" and 
later were passed to a "text" which made them an "object of scrutiny for the historian. "111' 
Moving on to more specific Qur'anic discourse, Arkoun adopts Ricoeur's five-fold 
typology of discourse for the Bible301 to Qur'an. They are: "prophetic, legislative, 
narrative, sapiential and hymnal (poetic)" and "all proclaim a revelatory purpose. ' ° 
Regarding the "structure of grammatical relations, " he observes: 
"A divine I/We addresses with the imperative mode (qul, or'say. ' 'speak') an intermediary you 
(Muhammad) to reach the they of human beings subdivided into you, believers, and thry, 
infidels. Such is the realm of grammatical communication defined in Qur'anie diuuuise. 
Inside that realm, pronouncements with profane content, such as laws on inheritance and the 
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prescription of lawful levels of giving to the poor (zakat), are bound together simultaneously 
in the divine domain of the 1/We speaker-sender and recipient you. "3a; 
In tackling this complicated structure, Arkoun has two main tools: a mind that is free of 
every ideology and all the scientific procedures of latest linguistic theories and techniques 
(syntax, semantics, rhetoric, history, theology and philosophy). 304 In doing this, he 
advocates a "progressive-regressive method. " The "regressive procedure" requires its to 
refer to the past "to discover the historical mechanisms and factors which produced these 
texts and assigned them such functions" 305 Since Arkoun believes that "these texts are still 
alive, active as an ideological system of beliefs and knowledge shaping the future, " as the 
next step we have to follow the "progressive procedure" to transform the "initial contents 
and functions into new ones. "306 We shall now see a proximate application of this 
procedure in Esack's work. 
Prior to presenting Esack's work though, I should point out that by putting Akron 
and Esack together, I am not in any way suggesting that they do pursue the same argument. 
or one is a copy of the other. In fact, as I indicated in chapter one, they differ on malty 
things, of which the most important is their understanding of rationality. Arkoun believes it 
is possible to have an "ideology-free reason" and approach the text accordingly, whereas 
Esack believes that every "interpreter" carries a baggage of theological (or other types) 
assumptions, regardless of the space and time one lives in, studies, produces, etc. 
However, there are commonalities. The two most important links that bind them together 
are their commitment to "liberty" and the "hermeneutical method" in understanding the 
texts 307 
My reason, however, for choosing Esack's work rather than Arkoun's was its 
originality. As a South African Muslim scholar, speaker and social activist, Esack, unlike 
Arkoun, is actively involved, both as an observer and a participant, in the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa. His commitment for justice and liberty, in fact, sometimes put 
him against his fellow Muslims next to Christians and other strugglers in the South African 
context. When I considered this against the common classical Muslim stereotyping of 
others in the context of "unbelievers are one community, " 08 I thought his examination of 
kufr (unbelief) and mushrik (polytheist) in the light of hermeneutical principals might offer 
a valuable and stimulating example. 
In his long article "Qur'anic Hermeneutics, "30`9 Esack explains that in his usage, in 
general "hermeneutics" "refers principally to textual interpretation, the recovery of meaning 
and the problems surrounding this procedure. "31° He is more specifically concerned with 
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"reception hermeneutics" which focuses on the "process of interpretation and the 
appropriateness of interpretation rather than on the fixed literal text. "311 He is totally 
committed to the historicity of the Qur'an and argues that, "despite its 'beyondness, "' in 
order to "become meaningful, " the Qur'an has to be located within a"historical moment. " 
"Belief in the supra-historicity of the Qur'an, " he continues, "thus does not preclude its rule 
as historical scripture. "312 Drawing on Smith's findings, Esack forcibly concludes that: 
"The Qur'an's claims to be a guide to people who are located within history mean that 
revelation remains related to history. Muslims, like others, have connected with a realist 
transcending history and that revelation, putative or real, has taken place within history and 
has been conditioned by history. "313 
Within this understanding, he approaches the term kufr (literally ingratitude, 
commonly unbelief) -other forms are the "participial noun kufir, and its plural, kuffar or 
kafirun"3t`ß- in the light of 3: 21-22: 
"Verily, as for those who reject/are ungrateful Lvakfurl for the signs of God, and slay the 
Prophets against all right, and slay people who enjoin justice, announce unto them a t; ric%oth 
chastisement. It is they whose works shall come to nought, both in this world and in the lile 
to come; and they shall have none to succour them. " 
In his general summary of the verses, Esack remarks that the quotation contains the 
"apparently doctrinal (kufr) with the apparently socio-political (justice). " The verse is a 
powerful statement against those who do kufr and "obstruct justice. " lt starts with the 
condemnation of both types of acts, promises the perpetrators severe punishment, threatens 
them with loss of all work and of "support. " Esack criticises classical exegetes for their 
failure in distinguishing "between kufr as an active attitude of individuals (or a collection of 
individuals) and the socio-religious (and often ethnic) identity of a group. "-"-' He also 
observes that in the Qur'anic and Muslim discourse, kufr has "become the most pregnant 
word with all that is despised in the rejected Other, "316 both in the past and in the present 
contexts. To exemplify this, he gives two modern usages from the South African example: 
"kafir [with one "f"] as a `violent symbol of religious exclusion"' and "karr (with double 
"ff"] as racist demonising of the Other, " the black majority. 3» This proves that, he 
concludes, "rethinking kufr is deeply human and firmly connected to the search for 
justice. "318 
311 Esaek, "Qur'anic Hermeneutics, " 122-123. 
312 Esack, "Qur'anic Herrneneutics, " 126. 
313 Esack, "Qur'anic Hermeneutics, " 136. He refers to Smith's views in this paragraph: 
"Not only what we study is historical, however; so, too, is our study of it... The pursuit (It* 
truth, too, takes its conditioned place in an historical development. Scripture. %%hatcver cl. r it 
may additionally be, is also an historical phenomenon. The understanding of scripture that i' 
becoming possible, truer than any that have gone before, is possible because %%e can no%% 
construct it on the basis of a new critical awareness of what has gone before" (Smith, W C. 
What Is Scripture?, London: SCM, 1993,68). 
314 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. 
315 Esack, F, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 134. 
316 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. 
317 Fsack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. 
318 eck, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. 
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According to lexicographers, in its original meaning kufr meant (i)"to conceal, "'''' 
which later came to mean (ii) "concealing something with the intention of destroying it; " 
more commonly though it meant (iii) "concealing an act of grace or kindness, i. e. 
ingratitude. "32° Then after the term Islam came to "represent an act of God's grace, " kufr 
became (iv) "synonymous with denying it. " Thus a "kafir came to mean someone who, 
having `received God's benevolence, shows no sign of gratitude in his for hen conduct, or 
even acts rebelliously against his benefactor. ' 11321 Esack's semantic round up is completed 
with a quotation from Toshihiko Izutsu, who after examining "pre-Islamic literature, " 
concludes that the "`real core... of its semantic structure was not unbelief, but rather 
ingratitude or unthankfulness. " 322 Both Esack and Izutsu agree that in the Qur'anic usage. 
the "secondary meaning" of kufr as "unbelief" (opposite of Iman -faith, belief- and Wan: ) 
overtook the original meaning. However, Esack warns that even if this is the case with kufr 
, 
it always involves "a conscious attitude and a set of concrete actions, " "rather than :1 
casual ignoring or disregard of the existence of God. '323 Another important point he makes 
is that we should never let the "doctrinal" term totally overshadow the original meaning of 
kufr, since this would mean losing the "most significant semantic element in it. "'=-+ 
In its wider meaning as the "rejecter of faith, " kafir was originally employed to refer 
to "some Meccans who insulted Muhammad and, later, in Madina, to various elements 
among the People of the Book as well. " In the early formative years of Islam during the 
reign of the caliphs, it was freely used by several groups to "exclude the internal Other with 
whom one differed. "325 We finally hear Esack's understanding of kufr in the widest sense 
as it is applied in the Qur'an: 
"The Qur'an portrays kufr as an actively and dynamic attitude of ingratitude leading to %%ilful 
rejection of known truths, God's gifts, and, (lowing from this as well as intrin%ically 
connected to it, a pattern of actively arrogant and oppressive behaviour. "32' 
To corroborate this understanding, he brings in the verses cited above in which kufr was 
related to "violent opposition to the prophets of God and a determination to destroy their 
mission. "327 Among other characteristics of kufr, he lists "striving for" it (16: 106; 22: 51; 
34: 5), "struggle in the way of evil" (4: 76), "refusal to spend one's wealth on the poor" 
(2: 254; 3: 179; 9: 34,35; 41: 7) "oppress the weak" (4: 168; 14: 13) and "maintains silence in 
the face of evil and oppression" (5: 79). In this juncture, he introduces one of the most 
important contributions to the discussion, by which he departs from the traditional 
319 From this usage, for instance, tillers are called kuffar in the sense that they sow the seed and 
cover it up with soil. In the Qur'an 57: 20, it is used with this meaning. 
320 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. See the Qur'an 2: 153; 14: 7,15: 20: 11). 27: 40; 
29: 66; 30: 33 and 39: 7. 
321 eck, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135. 
322 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 135-136 (quoted from lzutsu. T. Ethieo"l: rligiouº 
Concepts in the Qur'an, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966,26). 
323 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 136. 
324 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 136. 
325 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 137. 
326 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 137. 
327 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 137. 
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understanding of the term. It is the distinction between the "violent opposition to God" and 
the "theological, rational or philosophical problems with the notion of a supreme deity, " 
due to the fact that kafir already "freely acknowledge the existence of such a entity" (2: 61- 
63; 31: 25; 33: 9,78). The notion of the God the Meccans had, and the God Muhammad 
introduced, was not very different theologically, except that it challenged the whole 
structure of the society, especially the status quo of the powerful, with the proposals of 
"concrete transformations" from "exploitation to justice, from selfishness to selflessness, " 
from "narrow tribalism" to ummah (one united community), etc. 328 As Fazlur Rahman 
cogently expresses, the monotheism Muhammad preached was, "from the very beginning, 
linked up with a sense of social and economic justice whose intensity is no less than the 
intensity of the monotheistic idea, so that whoever reads the early Revelations of the 
Prophet3---9 cannot escape the conclusion that the two must be regarded as expressions of the 
same experience. "330 
At this point, to erase the doubts that he is ignoring the doctrinal relevance of kufr, 
Esack turns his attention to address its relation to dogma in the Qur'anic context. In doing 
this he raises four points: 
Firstly, when there is a link between kufr and dogma, it is always made within a "real 
socio-historical context" and with the conviction that "sincere belief in the unity of God and 
ultimate accountability to Him would lead to a righteous and just society. "331 
Secondly, it is emphasised in the Qur'an that kafir is someone who is "deliberate" in 
what s/he is doing, which is closely related to its linguistic meaning "covering something" 
consciously. In this sense, the Qur'anic definition of kafir is "someone who has actually 
recognised the unity of God and Muhammad as His Prophet, but who nevertheless, 
wilfully refuses to acknowledge it. "332 Other Qur'anic synonyms of kufr such as kidhb (to 
lie) and katm (to conceal) also support this point (2: 42,159,174). 
Thirdly, it is an "antagonistic attitude to Islam and to Muslims, in the sense of 
submission to God and to a people who wanted to organise their collective existence on the 
basis of such submission, that the Qur'an denounces as kufr. "333 He remarks that opposing 
for instance, contemporary "reified Islam" or "socio-religious community known as 
Muslims" are entirely different 334 
The final point is about the "motives of the kuffar's decision to refrain from 
professing belief. " According to the Qur'an they knew that Islam was more than uttering 
certain words or a mental exercise, rather it "required a radical change in personal life, in 
3=8 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralisºn, 138. 
329 The Qur'an 107: 1-7. 
330 Rahman, F, Islam, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979,12, 
331 Esack, Qur'an, liberation and Pluralism, 138-139. 
332 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 139. 
33 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 139. 
334 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 139. 
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values and in socio-economic relations. "335 They neither accepted nor wanted to do them 
and thus opted for refusal. 
Flack's concluding remarks are very revealing and worth full quotation: 
"According to the Qur'an, it is not labels that are counted by God but actions that are weighed 
(2: 177; 99: 7-8). One cannot hold hostage to the ethos of kufr which characterised their 
forebears, those who, by accident of birth, are a part of any group, nor others who 
subsequently emerge from it; nor can we do this to individuals who existed within that group, 
but were nonparticipants in kufr. Similarly, one cannot attribute the faith commitment and 
faith of preceding generations of Muslims to contemporary Muslims... The fact of group 
identity should not be allowed to subvert a principle of personal accountability... If 
individuals arc held accountable for deeds that are going to be weighed, then one is left with 
no alternative but to affirm the dynamic nature of islam, imam and krufr "336 
The lines written at the beginning of Kahlil Gibran's collected works by the translator 
illustrates best what Esack has just stated. Commenting on the notion of kafir (unbeliever), 
the translator states: "if we confine Islam to the outward details, Gibran will be a kafir and 
the translator of this book will be a wrongdoer by rendering it into Arabic... However, if 
we look at the essence of Islam deeply, not superficially, we will find Gibran in the 
forefront of Muslims, who strive to spread the eternal truth ... "337 
Without taking into account the historicity of both our texts and their interpretation of 
them by us, pigeonholing people with static dogmas does justice neither to the dynamic 
individual, nor to the "ego-transformation" that takes place everyday, nor to the "perpetual 
transformation" that Esack expresses beautifully: "Individuals are ever-changing entities. 
Every new encounter with ourselves and others, every deed that we do or refuse to do, is a 
step in our perpetual transformation. "338 Esack decidedly finishes with personal 
accountability of individuals and their assessment according to their deeds. This requires a 
hermeneutic condition that checks the labels (iman, Islam, kufr, etc. ) constantly to nourish 
their "dynamic nature" against the easy option of freezing them through dogmatic practices. 
If one compares Esack's hermeneutical approach to Hick's mythological/metaphorical 
approach, it does not take long for one to spot the difference. It differs from Hick's in three 
aspects. Firstly, it does not have the negative connotations that Hick's approach has, e. g. 
that holy texts are merely human products, which immediately puts off many devout 
believers even from considering pluralism a possible choice. Second, it proposes a broader 
reading of the scriptures ("prophetic, legislative, narrative, sapiential and hymnal 
(poetic)"), 339 which includes Hick's mythical/metaphorical reading, too. Last but not least, 
it treats holy texts as revelations, not mythological human products which do not relate to 
335 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 139. 
33 Esack, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 144. 
337 Gibran, K, al-Majinu'a al-Kamila (Collected Works -2 vols. ), trans. Bashir, al-A A, Beirut: n. 
n. d., 7. 
Eyck, Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, 144. 
339 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 38. 
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the Real, which means that the danger of reductionism is not as grave as it is in Hick's. 3-1° 
It offers a middle way between on the hand the exclusivist narrow reading of the Qur'an 
which, from a pluralistic perspective, condemns the majority of the humankind -religious 
or otherwise- to Hell because they happen to be born into a different environment and are 
equipped with different filters in their response to the Real and, on the other hand, it avoids 
the mistake of Hick's mythological approach which reduces sacred texts to human products 
and expects a critical reading of them. To relate to Hick's approach, one can say that the 
hermeneutical approach reminds Muslims that there is myth in the Qur'an but, contrary to 
what Hick claims, not the whole of it. To be able to decide which is which, Muslims have 
to take hermeneutics more seriously and utilise it for a better understanding of the Qur'an in 
general and in particular in their relation with other religions. 
5.3.6. Postmodern Concerns 
With hermeneutics, I completed my essential task of comparing moderate pluralism 
and Islam, which concludes that pluralism and Islam are compatible. There is, however, 
one more problem: the postmodern dilemma and its resonance in the Islamic world. As 
seen in chapter four in Surin's critique of Hick, pluralism, as a by-product of 
postmodernism, has been severely scrutinised by critics on the grounds that it robes the 
Other of its otherness, debases and renames them under the label of pluralism to be 
consumed by the global conglomerates of the Western world. In other words, it does not 
mean respect and tolerance to the Other, but Coca-Colanization and McDonaldization of the 
Other in disguise. In addition to others (e. g. economical, political, etc. ), religious pluralism 
is nothing but another means of operating in the religious field through its relativising 
philosophy serving to achieve the wider project. I have dealt with Hick's critics in chapter 
four, but left the Muslim reactions to postmodernism to this chapter because of its relevance 
here. Thus, since many of the criticisms levelled at Hick's theory can be directed against 
moderate pluralism, too, before my finishing touches, I seek to address briefly some 
similar concerns from Islamic perspective. 
In the Muslim world, there have been mixed reactions to postmodernism. In 
Postmodernism and Islam, 341 one of the most important and first books from an Islamic 
perspective, Akbar S Ahmed classifies Muslim responses to postmodernism under three 
headings according to their attitude to Islam and the West 342 (1) "Traditionalists" who 
emphasise the "larger message of Islam, rather than the narrower sectarian or personal 
34() A good example of this can be found in the attitudes of two Muslim scholars, Nasr and Rahman, 
who both refuse to review the Qur'anic statements, for instance on Christology and Virgin Birth, in 
the light of Hick's mythical/metaphorical understanding (Nasr, "Response to Hans Kiing'sPaper, " 
100-101 and Rahman, F, Major Themes of the Qur'an, 170). However, with hermeneutics Ayoub 
provides both a pluralistic and an Islamic answer to seemingly difficult problems between 
Christianity and Islam. Sec for more: Ayoub, "Towards an Islamic Chrisiology, " 163-188 and 
"Towards an Islamic Christology, II, " 91-121. 
3.41 Ahmed, A S, Posnnodernisne and Islam: Predicament and Promise, London and New York: 
Routledgc, 1992. 
342 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 29. 
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squabbles" and believe in the "universal message of God and in inter-faith dialogue"343 
(e. g. Ismail R al-Faruqi, Ali Shariati, S. H Nasr and F Rahman). (2) "Radicals" who are 
also committed to Islam, but have "lost patience with and rejected traditionalists'3 and are 
"usually driven by hatred and contempt for what they call `the West. "' "They tap the anger 
and resentment among Muslims. "345 Shabbir Akhtar, Parvez Manzoor, Ziauddin Sardar 
and Kalim Siddiqui are considered among this group. (3) "Modernists" who believe that 
"religion as a force, nostrum, or guide is no longer valid in our age" and thus "dropped the 
past altogether and succumbed to the global civilisation dominated by the West. "n46 He 
includes Salman Rushdie, Tariq All, Hamza Alavi and Eqbal Ahmed, whose only 
connection with Islam is perhaps their name 7 
Ahmed points out that Muslims writing on postmodernism, who are very few, have 
tended to take a very negative attitude against it. They "dismiss it as a continuation of 
Western modernism, as destructive and doomed, equated to `Americanization, ' `nihilism, ' 
`anarchy' and `348 He believes that the general tone of Muslim responses to 
postmodernism is "usually incomprehension and anger. "349 Thus postmodernism in a 
Muslim context means, Ahmed observes: 
"a shift to ethnic or Islamic identity... as against an imported foreign or Western one; a 
rejection of modernity; the emergence of a young, faceless, discontented leadership; cultural 
schizophrenia; a sense of entering an apocalyptic moment in history; above all, a numbing 
awareness of the power of and pervasive nature of the Western media which are perceived as 
hostile. "350 
Commenting on the negative role the media play in postmodern discourse between Islam 
and the West, Ahmed argues that it fosters a "shallow, impressionistic and often execratory 
assessment in the West; in return, it creates a strident radicalisation among Muslims. "351 
We have just seen that, according to Ahmed, one of these young radical voices is Sardar. 
The title of his recent book on postmodernism echoes the scepticism Ahmed has just 
343 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 158. 
3*44 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 159. 
345 Ahmed, Postnwdernism and Islam, 160. 
346 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 163. 
347 Ahmed's category might fit into his definition of modernism, but I think it is oversimplified, 
misleading and does not adequately reflect the diversity of Muslim opinion. He half-heartedly 
concedes this deficiency and tries to defend it by referring to his departure point, that is whether one 
has a faithful connection with Islam and how one relates to the West. For instance, he locates 
Rahman among "traditionalists" just because he values Islam, but the popular opinion places him 
among the "modernists, " which requires a radical revision of the whole taxonomy. It would be more 
accurate to have four categories to reflect both the diversity of the Muslim scholarship and his 
project of "postmodernism and Islam" without really altering his definition. Thus this is how I 
would do it: i. traditionalists (e. g. Nasr and al-Faruqi), ii. radicals (e. g. Sardar and Siddiqui), iii. 
modernists (e. g. Rahman and Arkoun), and iv. postmodernists (e. g. Rushdie and Ali). The reason 
why I separate traditionalist and modernists is that their opinion about the related issues is too 
diverse to be classified under the same umbrella. 
3-18 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 28. 
349 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 29. 
350 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 44. 
351 Ahmed, Posimodernisnt and Islam, 154. 
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described prevalent among some Muslims: Postmodernism and the Other: The New 
Imperialism of Western Culture. 352 
In this book, Sardar identifies six characteristics of postmodernism. Apparently, in 
his view, five of them are negative and only one is perhaps "positive. " Negative ones are: 
(i) that "all that is valid in modernity is totally invalid and obsolete in postmodern times, " 
such as "Truth, Reason, Morality, God, Tradition and History. "353 (ii) That "there is no 
ultimate Reality behind things. "3u (iii) That instead of reality, what we have is a 
"simulacrum: a world in which all distinction between image and material reality has been 
lost. "355 (iv) That everything is "meaningless. " Quoting Umberto Eco from Foucault 's 
Pendulum, 356 Sardar states that "the world is nothing, but an onion" to be "deconstructed" 
"layer by layer, " which at the end gives us "a grand void. "357 (v) That "doubt" is the 
"permanent human condition, ": i. e. "no theory, no absolute, no experience: doubt 
everything. "359 Finally the positive one (vi) comes: that postmodernism "emphasises 
plurality of ethnicities, cultures, genders, truths, realities, sexualities, even reasons, and 
argues that no one type should be privileged over others. "360 At least on this positive aspect 
of pluralism, Ahmed361 and Sardar can agree. However, Sardar spells out his suspicions 
about the whole package and contends that "far from being a new theory of liberation, 
postmodernism, particularly from the perspective of the Other, the non-western cultures, 362 
is simply a new wave of domination riding on the crest of colonialism and modernity, "363 
which is identified as the "main thesis" of the book. To substantiate this claim, he argues 
vehemently that "colonialism, " as "physical occupation, " "modernity, " as intellectual 
occupation, and "postmodernism, " as existential occupation, 364 make three bad bedfellows 
that constitute an evil-triangle. 
Sardar concludes that despite its promising departure as a "legitimate protest against 
the excesses of suffocating modernity, instrumental rationality and authoritarian 
353 Sardar, Z, I'osnnodernisnr and the Other: New Imperialism of Western Culture, London: Pluto 
Press, 1998. 
353 Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other, 8. 
354 Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other, 9. Interestingly enough Sardar's exposition of this 
principle sounds very Hickian: "We see largely what we want to see, what our position in time and 
lace allows us to see, what our cultural and historic perceptions focus on" (ibid. ). ý55 
Sardar, Postnwderni_vn and the Other. 10. 
356 Eco, U, Foucault's I'endulum, London: Secker and Warburg, 1989. 
357 Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other, 10. 
3-59 Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other, 234. Sardar accurately pinpoints this as the main argument 
of Rushdie's the Satanic Verses (ibid. ). In another book, which Sardar is a contributor, Rushdie is 
quoted from an interview conducted on the day Ayatollah Khomeini's death fatwa was issued: 
"Doubt, it seems to me, is the central condition of a human being in the 20th century. One of the 
things that has happened to us... is to learn how certainty crumbles in [our] hand[s]" (Appignancsi, 
R et al., Introducing Postnwdernistn, London: Icon Books, 1999,157). 
359 Sardar, f'ostinodernism and the Other, 10. 
360 Sandar, Postmodernism and the Other, 10-11. 
361 Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam, 27. 
362 By successively describing "other cultures" as "non-western, " which implies the Western as the 
definitive culture, Sardar seems to be projecting himself subconsciously as a victim of the 
dominating postmodern thinking or was it a characteristic of modernity? 
363 Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other. 13. 
304 Sardar, Poslmodernisrn and the Other, 13. 
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traditionalism, " postmodernism itself has "become a universal ideology that kills everything 
that gives meaning and depth to the life of non-western individuals and societies. "365 It 
declares the end of "grand meta-narratives, " but paradoxically postmodernism itself 
becomes a grand meta-narrative. Seen as a meta-theory about religions, the similar charge 
may be raised against religious pluralism (in either form) in the sense that it, too, 
announces the end of religions which claim to hold the "absolute Truth, " but this statement 
itself makes an absolute claim, which can only be made by the Real, nobody can hold the 
absolute truth -what is called a God's eye view- which may be taken as championing total 
relativity. As we have seen earlier, Hick's usual answer to this question is that, firstly, his 
theory never claims to hold the God's eye view of religions and secondly, it has been 
reached inductively, that is by studying different religions366 and observing their followers, 
not from the postmodern doubt that "there is no absolute Truth to be held. " Thirdly, 
contrary to the postmodern claims that "there is no ultimate Reality behind things, " 67 
Hick's pluralism believes that there is an Ultimate Reality behind things that can be 
experienced and expressed differently, as witnessed in the world religions. This is one of 
the most important differences between postmodernism and Hick's religious pluralism that 
their epistemological starting point is different. Postmodernism originates from "doubt, " 
whereas pluralism argues for an epistemic distance from the Real, which can nonetheless 
be known and experienced differently at the phenomenal level. However, by advocating the 
strong ineffability of the noumenal Real, Hick puts too big a gap between the Real and 
humankind, which brought about the charge of "transcendental agnosticism" and reduced 
the sacred knowledge of the Real to "human production. " Hence, I have argued instead for 
a moderate ineffability of the noumenal Real, to reduce that gap and acknowledge the 
contribution of the Real in the process of our knowledge of the divine, and to give more 
room to the holy scriptures as a vehicle in this process. Thus moderate pluralism tries to 
accomplish a balanced understanding of religions by avoiding, on the one side, the 
predicaments of postmodernism and responding to its threats to religious epistemology and 
on the other, interacting with its positive aspects, respecting and tolerating diversity in 
different forms. Consequently, it defends the cognitivity of the religions (that there is a 
Real behind all things) against postmodernist "doubt" and acknowledges the diversity of 
religions as effective ways of salvation/liberation. 
Towards the end of his book, Sardar examines postmodern attitudes to religion, 
labels them as worthless and confirms his belief that they transfer "western imperialism into 
a new phase where uncontrolled and self-glorified lust and all-encompassing consumption, 
365 Sardar, Postºnodernism and the Other, 13-14. 
366 The contribution of "cognitive" historians, such as Eliade, is worth noting here: "that the unity 
of everything mental must necessarily lie in the unity of the human mind" (Eliade, and Couliano, 
The Eliade Guide to World Religions, 1). 
367 Sardar, Posnnodernisrn and the Other, 9. Interestingly enough Sardar's exposition of this 
principle sounds very Hickian: "We see largely what we want to see, what our position in time and 
place allows us to sec, what our cultural and historic perceptions focus on" (ibid. ). 
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including the consumption of the Other, become the norm. '73ý He quotes David Griffin and 
John Milbank, but concentrates his attacks on Don Cupitt's non-realist understanding of 
religion as "love. " Sardar does not seem to be aware either of western pluralists such as 
Hick and Smith, or Muslim pluralists such as Ayoub369 and Arkoun. How Sardar would 
react to moderate pluralism is difficult to prejudge, but I assume it would be a mixture of 
ambiguity and suspicion. As we shall see in his call for moving to tradition as a response to 
postmodernism, ambiguity and rejection (or "incomprehension and anger"370 as Ahmed 
puts it) is a predominant character of Sardar's thought. 
In the last chapter, Sardar finally offers his solution: that is, to be able to survive 
postmodernism, we should all move "forward to tradition. " "Cultural resistance to 
postmodernism, " he continues, "begins with tradition, as did opposition to modernity 1,371 
But what does he mean by "tradition"? He warns that "traditions of resistance" that do not 
"go forward" are in the brink of "being a dead weight. " He calls for a distinction between 
"tradition and traditionalism. " He argues for a tradition that moves forward, which he 
defines as: 
"the summation of the absolute frame of reference provided by the values and axioms of a 
civilisation that remain enduringly relevant and the conventions that have been developed in 
history into its own distinctive 'gaze': patterns of organisation, ideas, lifeways, techniques 
and products. "37- 
He believes that it can be "periodised" and "studied as work of human history wherein 
there has been change" and "most significantly tradition is. "373 Traditionalism is, on the 
other hand, "passive, " "fixed in specific space-time co-ordinates, " "oppressive and 
backward-looking, " "as personified by fundamentalist movements. " 74 
The charges Sardar has just made against postmodernism and have been raised by 
others against pluralism can be applicable to Sardar's own forward moving or living 
"tradition. " Sardar does not explicate the epistemic, social, and political position of the 
"tradition" that he longs to revive and preserve. Will it be (i) Islam as a "meta-narrative" 
and others are also tolerated, or (ii) is he arguing for a pluralism similar to moderate 
pluralism, or worse (iii) is it a total relativity of all traditions, living in peaceful co- 
existence? He cannot probably seek to advocate (i) and (iii) since they, one way or the 
other, lead to the postmodern condition that he relentlessly despises. That is, either the 
consumption of the Other within a dominant culture, or total anarchy of relativism where 
fiction and reality cannot be differentiated. We cannot be sure about (ii) either, since he 
does not say anything about it, but I suspect his oversensitivity towards and overprotection 
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of "tradition" and general suspicion of anything Western might bar him from doing so. He, 
for instance, expresses his strong desire on another occasion to have a truly "pluralistic 
society. " Thus he cautions us against the cynical postmodernist agenda of elimination and 
acculturation of the Other, which makes it impossible to have a truly pluralistic society, for 
there will be no one with whom to have a dialogue 375 But he does not discuss what he 
means by a "pluralistic society, " what it means to be a "pluralist, " what the relation of the 
Muslims should be towards other religions in such a society and how traditions relate to 
each other in a pluralistic society. 
Two further points are also notable in Sardar's evaluation and the rejection of the 
West and postmodernism. Ahmed, as a social anthropologist, notes that one of the general 
characteristics shared by the three groups is that almost "all are permanently based in the 
West. By definition, immigration creates insecurity and neurosis. "376 My first point is that 
if Sardar were to live in his native country or in any of the Islamic countries, despite his 
insistence on "tradition, " he would be branded as a "modernist" and be in serious trouble 
for breaching certain holy or otherwise laws. The very Western postmodern system that he 
criticises gives him the right to speech, write and campaign, if necessary, but the system he 
wants to revive does not. I am not arguing that the Western systems are the best, but to 
look at the appalling human rights377 records of any of the Islamic countries to prove the 
point that they are worse. As Ahmed put it bluntly, the "brutality of despotic Muslim 
leaders" show mercy (which is one of the most cited names of Allah in the Qur'an) to 
neither their own citizens, nor to any other believer 378 It is ironic that many of these leaders 
thrive on the arguments based on tradition that Sardar put forward. The second is related to 
that, precisely because he lives in a country that is foreign to his own culture, his 
suggestions are romantic, utopian and out of touch with reality. He does not go into details, 
for instance, which of the Islamic institutions are considered to be within the boundaries of 
"traditionalism" and which are in "tradition, " which are "human products" that can be 
"periodised" and "studied" and which are not. 
I strongly believe that Sardar is right in pointing out many of the dangers of 
postmodernism, such as losing cultural diversity, the dangers of globalization and 
multinational companies, but I think his solution of a retreat to tradition is unworkable. 
Islam is "essentially the religion of equilibrium and tolerance; suggesting and encouraging 
breadth of vision, global positions and the fulfilment of human destiny in the universe. "379 
His total rejection of anything and everything western puts him in "danger of rejecting 
features central to Islam -such as love of knowledge, egalitarianism, tolerance- because 
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they are visibly associated with the West. "180 The other danger is to "reject the universalism 
of human nature, " which is the "main topos in the Qur'an. " Commenting on this Ahmed 
writes: 
"In locating anti-Islamic animosity firmly in the West they [radicals] also implicitly reject the 
universalism of human nature. But Allah is everywhere... God's purview and compassion take 
in everyone, 'all creatures. ' The world is not divided into an East and a West: 'To Allah 
belong the East and the West: «hithersoever ye turn, there is Allah's countenance' (Surah 
2: 115)... God cannot be parochial or xenophobic. "381 
Postmodernism, like any other school of thought, has its weaknesses and strengths, 
because no theory is perfect. It does not make it any better or worse, just because it 
happened to be developed mainly in the Western countries. What matters is the general 
Muslim principle of considering wisdom as a "lost property of Muslims" and the command 
of "seeking knowledge even if it is in China [i. e. wherever it is]. " I believe the same is true 
of moderate pluralism, which constitutes a middle-way by avoiding the perils of 
postmodernism (e. g. meaninglessness, doubt, acculturation and globalization) and utilising 
its promises (diversity, respect and tolerance). This probably suffices for the purpose of 
this dissertation, which also brings an end to my comparison of moderate pluralism and 
Islam. 
5.4. Partial Conclusions 
In this chapter, I presented a modified version of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis and 
applied it to an Islamic milieu to see possible problems and offered solutions to them from 
an Islamic perspective. 
In my modification of Hick's theory, I focused my attention on three points: i) I 
argued that a "moderate ineffability, " instead of total ineffability, of the noumenal Real 
might be the solution for Hick's problems, ii) I called for a "hermeneutical approach" 
against his reductionist mythical/metaphorical approach to religious language, and iii) I 
asserted that the scope of his soteriological criterion needs to be widened by the Dan Cohn- 
Sherbok's "viability principle" to acknowledge the ritual aspect of religions. In the Islamic 
context, I addressed five primary concerns. Firstly, I examined the ways of reconciling the 
strict monotheistic faith of Islam in one God and the validity of the different religions 
argued by moderate pluralism. "The principle of plurality, " as attested by the Qur'an and 
the Prophetic traditions, led to the solution here. Next I dealt with the verses carrying an 
apparently exclusivistic and pluralistic tendencies. In this matter two different 
understandings of islum (Islam and submission of oneself to the Real) has made important 
contributions. This brought us to the finality of Islam as the only salvific way, the 
prophethood of Muhammad and the question of salvation. The third important point was 
the "freedom of religion" and law of apostasy as understood and applied to the Other 
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(especially the people of the Book). It became clear in this context that Muslims' 
recognition of other religions usually remained within the boundaries of socio-politics, but 
never reached to the theological level. This must be reconsidered in the light of the authentic 
evidence, if a more positive relation is to be sought with other religions and those who do 
not make religious choices on the basis of moderate pluralism. Fourthly, I demonstrated the 
workability of a hermeneutical understanding of the Qur'an in the example of kufr 
(unbelief). Finally, in this chapter, I considered the postmodern concerns from an Islamic 
perspective. With the collapse of confidence in the Enlightenment reason and the project of 
modernity, there is a tendency among some Muslims to reject everything that is somehow 
related to the West, regardless of whether Islam embraces it or not. The hastened 
overreaction to postmodernism carries signs of this prejudice. However, it evinced that the 
positive aspects of postmodernism have been practised in Islam for centuries and need to be 
reclaimed through careful study. In this sense, the answer, I believe, lies not in retreat to 
tradition (i. e. particularism in any form -inclusivism or exclusivism) but in developing a 
more positive, tolerant and pluralistic attitude. I trust that moderate pluralism can provide a 
highly plausible option in this context. But why moderate pluralism, not Hick's version of 
it? I tried to answer this question on several occasions throughout the chapter. But the 
cogency of Islamic discussion necessitated keeping it as an intra-Islamic discourse at 
points. Therefore, as indicated earlier, I wish to amplify once more why a moderate 
pluralism is more suited to an Islamic context rather than Hick's version. 
I stated at the beginning of my dissertation that this will be an examination of Hick's 
pluralistic hypothesis from an Islamic perspective to test its viability for appropriation 
within an Islamic context. After careful consideration, I concluded that Hick's theory is not 
suitable for an Islamic context for three main reasons: its assertion of the strong ineffability 
of the Real, its mythical approach to religious language, and the scope of soteriological 
criterion, of which the first two are closely linked. What are the obstacles, then, that these 
three pose against a dialogue between Hick's hypothesis and Islam? I consider them in turn 
and offer my solutions to them. 
Strong ineffability of the Real puts an almost unbridgeable barrier between an Islamic 
discourse and Hick's pluralism. First and foremost, Hick's totally ineffable Real 
contradicts the notion of Allah/God in Islam, to which Hick usually appeals by one of His 
ninety nine names: as al-Haqq, the Real. Hick's Real lies beyond the scope of human 
language, but in Islam Allah is not. He makes himself known through different means, of 
which revelation is the most important. Even though we cannot know His essence, we can 
know certain aspects of Him, such as that He is good, the cause, the creator and the 
sustainer of all, none of which can be applicable to Hick's Real. If Hick's theory cannot 
even make room for the notion of Allah as He is understood in Islam, this blocks the way 
to dialogue right from the start. Hick then faces the postmodernist charge of localising the 0 t5 
gods of respected world religions. 
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Strong ineffability, furthermore, has very serious bearings on the Qur'an. I said 
earlier that the Qur'an holds a position in Islam similar to Jesus' in Christianity. Thus any 
argument directly affecting this position will bring strong resistance from Muslims towards 
any pluralist dialogue. By denying any applicability of religious language to the noumenal 
Real, Hick's strong ineffability poses a double jeopardy to the Qur'an. First, it cuts off any 
link the Qur'an might have with the Real, and second, it reduces it to Muhammad's 
expression of his religious experience rather than a revelation from God/the Real. This 
treatment of the Holy scriptures will preclude not only Muslims but also other religions 
from accepting Hick's hypothesis. We have seen examples of this from Nasr and other 
Muslim scholars. 
Thus I suggested that the link between the Real, the notion of God in Islam and the 
Qur'an must be re-established, if pluralism seeks to have any conversation with Islam and 
be a theory that respects the Holy scriptures of the world religions as they uphold it. My 
solution was to adopt instead the common notion of moderate ineffability, with which Hick 
starts. It will first accord to and save the notion of God as believed in Islam. That is to say, 
since Muslims have always been aware of the fact that the Qur'anic language does not relate 
to the Real as it is in itself, it is possible to have a common ground that pluralism needs, 
that is the moderately ineffable Real. The rest will follow easily for we can say that the 
Qur'an is a revelation that relates to the Real, not the product of Muhammad. This, I 
believe, is acceptable for Muslims and can open the doors for dialogue between moderate 
pluralism and Islam. This, as far as I can see, is where the crux of the matter lies. Then 
comes the hermeneutical space to deal with the Qur'anic data that suggest a particularistic 
tone. 
Hick's theory opens a double wound for any Muslim to approach it as a possible way 
of understanding religious diversity. As if the humiliation of accepting that the Qur'an is the 
mere product of Muhammad and that it does not relate to God in any sense was not 
enough, a Muslim must also concede that it is a myth, one among many; worse is that it is a 
myth which should be handled critically. Any Muslim will regard the description of the 
Qur'an as myth offensive, which is very bad news for a theory whose main slogan is 
respect and tolerance to all. Hick's efforts to give a positive twist to the notion of myth 
-such as that it directs us to the Real and produces saintly fruits- will prove to be fruitless in 
terms of establishing a positive link between the followers of any religion. 
The hermeneutical approach I advocate in moderate pluralism bears none of the 
negative connotations of Hick's mythical/metaphorical approach. It offers a wider reading 
of the texts, such as legal, narrative and hymnal, which includes Hick's 
mythical/metaphorical reading, too. It may positively encourage Muslims to identify and 
evaluate carefully the different discourses that exist in the Qur'an. I believe this will be 
acceptable to many Muslims and applicable to the Qur'an, as I demonstrated with ample 
examples in the preceding discussions and particularly in Esack's work. 
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I do not have much quarrel with Hick's soteriological criterion, since we agree on the 
basic principle that the ultimate aim of religions is to transfer human beings from "self- 
centredness to Reality-centredness. " However, I suggested that in order to avoid reducing 
religion to moral heroism, moderate pluralism should put emphasis also on the 
transforming impact of the ritual aspect of religion, which has paramount importance in any 
religion, particularly in Islam. 
I conclude, then, that moderate pluralism is compatible with Islam and in the long run 
will encourage Muslims to develop a more positive approach to deal with religious 
diversity. Conversely, Hick's theory as it stands is neither compatible with Islam, nor 
likely to encourage Muslims to adopt it as a way of understanding other religions, because 
of the fatal blows it carries against the central tenets of Islam, such as the notion of 
Allah/God, the Qur'an and revelation. I also believe that, contrary to the common 
misperception among Muslim communities, pluralism, not particularism in any form, is the 
general character of Islam. Consequently, moderate pluralism might offer better solutions 
to the problem of religious diversity in our effort for peaceful co-existence and for 
improvement in mutual self-understanding. It will also, at the global level, increase the 
chances of genuine dialogue between the world religions, which in turn contribute 
positively and actively to the world peace. 
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The ever changing contemporary situation of our world makes religious pluralism a 
more urgent problem to deal with for the scholars, especially of Christianity and Islam. For 
the past three decades, Hick's contribution, from a pluralistic perspective, to the discussion 
of religious diversity has been monumental. As a Muslim, I have always felt the 
seriousness of the problem of religious diversity, primarily existentially and then 
intellectually. When I first discovered Hick's pluralistic hypothesis during my MA studies, 
it sounded very different, appealing and convincing at first sight. His assertion is that 
"various religions are equally effective ways of attaining salvation/liberation, " which is 
what I call the pluralistic option. This was completely a new discovery for me, compared to 
the Islamic explanations I had known within the orthodox domain. Therefore, I have 
decided to study it from an Islamic perspective to test its viability for an Islamic context, 
which probably meant the beginning of embarking on a life-long intellectual quest. 
6.1. An Overall Synopsis of Discussions 
In chapter one, I have examined three Muslim scholars' views of other religions by 
applying Race's three-fold taxonomy (exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), which is, 
to my knowledge, the first attempt to classify Muslim responses to other religions. For 
exclusivism, I studied the classical scholar al-Maturidi's thoughts. His main discussion of 
other religions centred around (i) the criticism of Christianity and Judaism, and (ii) his 
desire to prove the superiority of Islam as the final way for salvation over other religions. 
In the end, it became apparent that, according to his argument, everybody has to convert to 
Islam in order to attain salvation. This did not help at all to resolve my life-long dilemma of 
"why a compassionate and merciful Allah leaves so many good religionists outside the 
scheme of salvation just because they happened to be brought up in a different religious 
climate. " 
I then focused on the inclusivist views of Ate;, who made a good start by 
concentrating on the pluralistic verses in the Qur'an that imply salvation outside Islam. 
However, his commitment to the orthodox understanding of tawhid, faith in one God, put 
him in a position of excluding the majority of Christians and Jews, and refusing even to 
discuss the cases of non-theistic religions vis-a-vis salvation. Consequently, despite his 
firm belief in the possibility of salvation outside Islam, he ended up defending a very 
narrow understanding of inclusivism, that is, salvation for strict monotheists only. Thus 
we are left once more with the question of "why should a just and loving God abandon 
many devout believers either in partial darkness or place them in a disadvantaged position 
as far as salvation/liberation is concerned because of geographical differences which they 
have no hand in? " 
For the pluralist paradigm, Arkoun's thought seemed the best option, since he and 
Hick met years ago, worked together and knew each other as fellow pluralists. Yet, it made 
it more interesting, for neither refers to the other's work. Arkoun and Hick's thought 
converge on the pluralistic option that "different religions are equally valid ways of 
attaining salvation/liberation. " But Arkoun's pluralism is incomplete and immature, and, as 
a result, leaves out many of the crucial issues, such as different conceptions of the 
Ultimate, conflicting-truth claims of religions and the criterion for salvation. His strong 
advocacy of secularism as the ultimate political system, his total reduction of Islam to 
morality and spirituality and his relativism is too radical to be accepted by the followers of 
any religion, let alone Muslims. Above all, there are more important questions related to his 
methodology: on the one hand historicism is the only criterion to judge everything, but on 
the other he seems to be implying he is ahistorical; his total rejection of previous Islamic 
scholarship as biased seems to miss the important point that there is no such thing as 
unbiased "reason. " In this context, even though he is aware of postmodern writers, it is 
hardly possible to understand his advocacy of Enlightenment reason as the knower of all 
truth, or "critical reason" as he puts it. Hence his solid belief in the ideology-free 
"knowledge" as the ultimate authority is a serious mistake. In conclusion, apart from 
certain aspects of his hermeneutic, I maintain that, at this stage, Arkoun's pluralistic project 
is immature, too radical to be accepted by Muslims, and eventually doomed to be a failure. 
With Arkoun's pluralism, our survey of Islamic scholars within the boundaries of Race's 
threefold typology was completed and the scene for Hick's pluralistic hypothesis was set 
up. 
Chapter two, provided us, firstly, with the basic elements of Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis ahead of its full discussion and, secondly, how he evaluated naturalistic and 
particularistic explanations of religious diversity. Since Hick holds that the universe is 
religiously ambiguous, i. e. could be interpreted both religiously and naturalistically, and 
the evidence for and against the existence of an Ultimate Reality cannot be conclusively 
proved, he appeals to religious experience and tries to construct a new epistemology of 
religious experience. In order to do this, we followed how he borrowed several theories 
from various philosophers, such as Wittgenstein's "seeing-as, " Swinburne's "principle of 
credulity, " and Pascal's "wager. " He extended "seeing -as" to "experiencing-as" to justify 
the rationality of believing in and being conscious of the presence of an Ultimate Reality. 
Put in James's famous phrase, this was called the "right to believe. " Hick inferred that 
religious experience was cognitive, i. e. real as the believers take it to be, and not total 
delusion. 
"Experiencing -as" meant that we had different experiences of the same Reality, 
depending on our mind sets or cognitive filters, and the epistemological golden rule 
required us to treat others' experience in the same way as we do ours. Hence we have 
different sets of religious experiences stemming from different religions. But what is a 
religion? How can one define it? Hick claimed that it can best be described, not defined, 
and that Wittgenstein's "family resemblance theory" could be a fitting model to approach 
religions. According to the theory, Hick maintained that there cannot be a single essence of 
religion, but there can be several overlapping features of which some religions may have 
some and others may have some others. In this context, he took "the belief in the 
transcendent" as the main feature of the great world religions that he focused on in his 
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study. They are five post-axial religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam. Then came the question of how to account for the plurality of religions. 
Hick first examined two (Freudian and Durkheimian) of the common naturalistic 
explanations of religious plurality. He thought that their explanations of religion as "total 
delusion" were unsatisfactory. Then he evaluated the particularistic Christian 
understandings, i. e. exclusivism and inclusivism. He dismissed them as unsuccessful on 
the grounds similar to what I said about Muslim particularistic approaches, that a loving 
compassionate Divine Reality will not deprive the majority of humankind of salvation on 
the basis of either geographical luck or of the accident of birth. He then pressed on with his 
argument that a new "religious interpretation of religion" was needed, that which avoids the 
shortcomings of both the naturalistic and particularistic accounts. It must, on the one hand, 
acknowledge religions as cognitive realities on the basis of the right to believe -contrary to 
the naturalistic accounts- and, on the other, respect their veridicality on the basis of the 
epistemological Golden Rule, without branding them either totally or partially false, except 
one's own, in contrast to the confessional -particularistic- accounts. This, he asserted, can 
only be attained in his pluralistic account of religions. 
In chapter three, I gave an outline development of Hick's pluralistic approach to 
religions, going back as early as the 1970s. With a "Christian theology of religions, " he 
initially attempted to locate the place of Christ/Christianity among other religions and 
proposed a "Copernican revolution in theology, " according to which he put "God" at the 
centre of the universe of faiths instead of Christianity, which became a, not the, way of 
salvation among many options. The biggest hurdle he encountered in doing so was the 
Incarnation. Therefore, he had to propose a different understanding of the doctrine. To be 
able to do this epistemologically, he appealed to the "world religions" to endorse the idea 
that Jesus's divinity was not unique, for it was natural for the followers of a religion to 
revere their founder through incarnational language. Philosophically, he showed the 
difficulties associated with understanding the incarnation as a theological theory and 
advocated, instead, that it should be interpreted metaphorically; because it was not a theory 
but a myth. As the third resort, he also appealed to modem biblical studies, which cast 
doubt over the authenticity of the incarnational verses. 
It was not long before Hick's controversial, and to some offensive, ideas had been 
attacked from several quarters. As a result, Hick had been busy developing and refining his 
hypothesis throughout the 1980s, which culminated in 1989 with the publication of An 
Interpretation of Religion. As his magnum opus, the book contains Hick's mature thoughts 
on the issue, which he now re-named as "a philosophy of religions, " a further step from a 
"theology of religions. " It was transferred from locating Christianity's place within the 
universe of faiths to understanding the relation between religions and their ultimate ground. 
One of the major developments was Hick's adoption of the Kantian distinction of 
noumenon and phenomenon to religious epistemology in an effort to respond to the charges 
of "theocentricism. " This resulted in a number of changes: i. God is substituted with the 
totally ineffable noumenal Real (the Real an sich) as the ground of all religious experience; 
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ii. religions are considered to be phenomenal manifestations of the Real in the categories of 
different gods and absolutes which are schematised either as personal or impersonal; iii. 
they are equally effective ways of salvation/liberation (this hybrid term is also newly coined 
to embrace theistic as well as nontheistic ways of salvation); iv. religious language is no 
longer applicable to the noumenal Real, since it is beyond the scope of human language and 
conception; v. it should thus be construed as mythical and metaphorical; vi. the pragmatic 
soteriological criterion is introduced as "human transformation from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness, " which can be detected in the daily lives of human beings with its 
fruits, such as striving for justice, equality, the betterment of humankind, etc. Saintliness, 
extant in different forms within the great world religions, is taken as an indication of the 
viability of this criterion. 
Yet, Hick's refined pluralistic hypothesis, too, has been widely criticised, mainly by 
Christians, to which I turned in chapter four. Of all the charges brought up against the 
hypothesis, I concentrated on four crucial points: theological arrogance, reductionism, the 
problems associated with the Real, and the problem of criterion. 
Since Hick's theory claims to have the most comprehensive explanation of the 
religious phenomenon, the charge of theological arrogance is frequently brought up against 
it. Because, critics argue, without holding a privileged position to observe religions, no one 
is able to make such a contention except God. Hick's response is that he never asserts to 
have a God's eye view of religions, but rather maintains that his theory is inductively 
reached. That is to say, he begins with analysing the data produced by the history of 
religions with a conviction that religious experience is not total delusion. But, that is not all. 
Hick employs other epistemological principles in his analysis ( e. g. the criterion of 
saintliness and the cosmic optimism of world religions), that involve a selective attitude to 
the material in hand. In other words, he first epistemologically establishes that "love and 
compassion" are the right responses to the Real, then tries to verify it with saintly data in 
religions. Without the backing of these epistemological principles, Hick's pluralism would 
not have been an inductive hypothesis. Thus, I believe, the charge is sustained. 
Nevertheless, I reckon that the same applies to any other hypothesis, religious or non- 
religious. Therefore, it does not put pluralism in a worse position than others. One problem 
still remains unresolved though: that if the Real is totally unknowable, how can Hick know 
that "love and compassion" are the right responses to it? This was the most important 
charge levelled against Hick's postulated Real, which I considered following reductionism. 
Reductionism on different levels constituted another serious objection I had to Hick's 
pluralism: that it reduces religion to morality (which relates to the last point, the 
soteriological criterion) and holy texts to human products; that its perception contradicts the 
self-perceptions of the religions; and that the mythical/metaphorical understanding of holy 
texts is incomplete. None of these points has been sufficiently answered by Hick. 
Therefore I proposed one of the three modifications I introduced into Hick's pluralism: a 
hermeneutical approach to the holy texts that treats them as revelations, makes a connection 
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between the Real and religions, and offers a wider reading of them in addition to Hick's 
reading. Yet, all these were closely linked with the ineffability of the noumenal Real. 
As has been indicated earlier, the postulation of the noumenal Real posed one of the 
most difficult problems for Hick's theory. My main concern with the noumenal Real was 
its total ineffability. Although Hick starts with the notion of moderate ineffability common 
to the great world religions, he ultimately argues for the strong ineffability of the Real, to 
which human concepts and language do not apply. It involves four fatal problems that 
ultimately threatens the whole project. Firstly, it makes the Real redundant (that ultimately 
we can have religious experiences whether it exists or not). Secondly, the theory cannot 
successfully defend the cognitivity of religions, since it cannot establish the Real as the 
ground of all religious experience. Thirdly, it reduces revelations to human products, 
which generates the fourth problem by creating an apathy among believers towards 
pluralism and a deadlock in interreligious dialogue. To resolve the difficulty that pluralism 
faced, I have argued, along the lines of Ward and Byrne, for the moderate ineffability of 
the noumenal Real. This will, in the first place, salvage pluralism as a coherent hypothesis; 
secondly, defend religious cognitivity; and thirdly, respect revelations as revelations, not 
merely human products. Moderate ineffability holds that the noumenal Real is in essence 
beyond human conception and language, but we can know certain aspects of it (such as 
goodness, the cause of all, all powerful, etc. ). Thus religious language relates to it at a 
minimum level. For if the Real plays an active role in the formation of revelation as it 
makes certain aspects of itself known to us, we cannot say that revelations are human 
products. 
Another point of discussion worth noting in relation to the Real was the relevance of 
the Kantian distinction. In contrast to Rose's claim, I contended that the Kantian distinction 
was still relevant, since the Real is always unknowable in its essence and lies beyond the 
scope of human understanding. I argued that the distinction might also help to boost 
religious tolerance among believers and non-believers alike by reminding them that nobody 
is capable of holding the absolute truth. 
As the last point of chapter four, I studied the charges regarding Hick's criterion of 
"salvation/liberation" as human transformation from "self-centredness to Reality- 
centredness. " I affirmed that the criterion rightly spotted the ultimate aim of religions as 
"recentring one-self in the Real, " but neglected the ritual aspect of religion (hence the 
charge of ethicism). Thus, as the third modification, I concluded that the scope of Hick's 
soteriological criterion has to be widened. This meant that, as it stood, Hick's theory could 
not be applied to Islam and had to be modified in three aspects. 
Chapter five formed the crescendo of my arguments by reconstituting Hick's 
hypothesis, applying it to an Islamic context, identifying possible problems and offering 
solutions to them. I started with a brief summary of points where I thought no change was 
necessary. These included the "right to believe" (i. e. the rationality of religious belief), the 
effect of environment on us in the formation of religious experience and identity (different 
conceptions of the Real and the accident of birth in one's choice of religion), the evaluation 
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of religions by their salvific effectiveness, and the usefulness of Kantian distinction (the 
noumenal and the phenomenal Real). Then I moved on to the three points where I 
considered certain modifications necessary: (i) I argued that a "moderate, " instead of 
"total, " ineffability of the noumenal Real might rescue the pluralistic hypothesis, (ii) I called 
for a "hermeneutical approach" against Hick's reductionist mythical/metaphorical approach 
in dealing with holy texts, and (iii) I asserted that the scope of the soteriological criterion 
needed to be widened by the Dan Cohn-Sherbok's "viability principle" to acknowledge the 
ritual aspect of religions. I called this modified version of Hick's pluralism moderate 
pluralism, which I then applied to an Islamic milieu in order to test its viability. 
In the Islamic context, I addressed five primary concerns. Firstly, I examined the 
possibilities of reconciling the strict monotheistic faith of Islam in one God (namely, 
tawhid) and accepting different religions (theistic and nontheistic) as effective ways of 
salvation/liberation, as argued by moderate pluralism. The solution here was led by "the 
principle of plurality, " as attested by the Qur'an, and explained and applied by the 
Prophetic traditions. My next problem was how to understand the Qur'anic evidence that 
suggested apparently contradictory solutions to religious diversity: on the one side, the 
exclusivistic verses declaring Islam as the only way for salvation and on the other, 
pluralistic verses promising salvation for the followers of other religions. In this dilemma, 
two different but complementary understandings of Islam (Islam as the institutionalised 
religion and as submission oneself to the Real) were offered as a breakthrough in 
understanding exclusivistic verses. This understanding had to be bolstered by the Prophetic 
traditions, which offered several examples of dealings with other religions as salvific paths 
besides Islam. If these findings were true, how did they relate to the "freedom of religion" 
and law of apostasy as understood and applied to the Other (especially ah! a! -Kitab, the 
people of the Book) inhabitants of Islamic communities? This was my third problem to 
resolve in regard to an Islamic context and its relation to moderate pluralism. It became 
clear, at this juncture, that Muslims' recognition of other religions usually remained within 
the boundaries of socio-politics and never reached to the theological level. The law of 
apostasy, which was applied to anybody converting from Islam to any other religion, as 
death or exile, was the most convincing evidence of this double-standard on Muslims' part. 
This must be reconsidered, I argued, in the light of the authentic pluralistic evidence, if 
Muslims seek to have a more positive relation with other religions and those who do not 
make religious choices on the basis of moderate pluralism. Fourthly, I demonstrated the 
workability of a hermeneutical approach to holy texts, as argued for in moderate pluralism, 
with an example from Esack on the Qur'anic term of kufr (unbelief). Lastly, I addressed 
postmodern concerns from an Islamic perspective. Among some Muslims, there is a 
growing tendency of retreating to particularistic enclaves, for they see the advocacy in 
postmodernism of tolerance, respect, equal treatment of others, etc. as another hidden 
agenda of the colonialist West in disguise. I argued that the so-called positive aspects of 
postmodernism belonged to, and were applied fully or partially by Islam since its birth to 
the adherents of other religions. Consequently, as the believers of a religion whose intrinsic 
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nature is pluralistic, Muslims must revive their pluralistic heritage, not the narrow 
understandings of particularism, or tradition as some put it. Moderate pluralism, I 
concluded might offer a plausible framework for Muslims in their effort to develop a more 
pluralistic attitude towards other religions. 
6.2. Contributions 
I believe our study has made several important contributions to the study of religions 
and the philosophy of religion. I may perhaps start with the most important one: that a 
moderate pluralism is more suited to Islam than Hick's. 
The main object of this dissertation was to test the viability of Hick's thesis from 
within an Islamic context. Having examined Hick's pluralistic hypothesis in detail, I 
detected several problems with it and concluded that unless they were overcome, the 
pluralistic hypothesis could not be applicable to an Islamic environment. The problems 
were the strong ineffability of the noumenal Real, the mythical approach to the revealed 
texts, and the scope of the soteriological criterion. 
1. I suggested that the strong ineffability of the Real contradicted, in the first place, 
the notion of God in Islam and in the second, had very serious repercussions on the 
Qur'an. Moderate ineffability of the Transcendent, as Hick also concedes, is common to 
the great world religions, that we can know certain aspects of it (being good, all powerful, 
sustainer of the universe, etc. ), but in its essence it remains beyond the domain of human 
language and conception. This is the case with Islam's Allah, too. But Hick's totally 
ineffable Real lies entirely beyond human language and nothing can be said about it (not 
even good or bad, one or many, etc. ), except the formal qualities, such that it exists. As far 
as Muslims are concerned, this understanding of the Real is nothing but a logical postulate 
and is quite different from the description of Allah in the Qur'an. If any theory cannot 
substantiate the notion of an Ultimate in any religion, I believe, the doors for dialogue are 
closed right from the beginning. 
Secondly, strong ineffability does not acknowledge the contribution of the Real in the 
revelatory process and reduces holy books to human products. The Qur'an effectively 
becomes Muhammad's expression of his religious experience rather than a revelation from 
God. The reduction of Qur'an from a holy text to human production will immediately put 
Muslims off from Hick's pluralism as a possible framework for understanding other 
religions and developing better relations with them. 
My suggestion to the problem, from an Islamic perspective, was to reintroduce the 
notion of "moderate ineffability of the Real" to restore the link between the noumenal Real, 
different concepts of the Divine and the revelatory process. This will not only make room 
for the Muslim notion of Allah but also reinstate the Qur'an's position as revelation. 
Bolstered with other changes, I called this modified version of Hick's hypothesis 
"moderate pluralism, " because of the paramount importance of moderate ineffability both to 
pluralism and Islam. Chapter five has shown the compatibility of moderate pluralism with 
Islam in several aspects. 
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2. The wider reading of the holy texts offered by a hermeneutical approach against 
Hick's mythical understanding was another contribution to the discussion from an Islamic 
perspective. Certainly, when we accept the active role of the Real in revelations, we have 
the momentous task of how to understand them. Hick tried to reduce the greatness of the 
task by regarding them as "useful myths, " i. e. directing us towards the Real. However, 
this proved to be another major obstacle between Hick's pluralism and Islam, since it was 
reductionist, offensive and had a narrow scope in its reading of the holy texts. I argued for 
a "hermeneutical approach" avoiding both the negativity of Hick's method and the 
particularist reading of orthodox Muslims. It respects the Qur'an as revelation, while 
accepting that it contains several discourses in it, of which myth is one of them, but not the 
whole. I believe I have given enough examples, particularly in the last chapter, to illustrate 
this assertion. 
3. I proposed that the soteriological criterion must put more emphasis on the ritual 
aspect of religion and recognise clearly its contribution to the process of 
salvation/liberation. Although Hick's pluralism is right in essence by identifying 
salvation/liberation as human transformation from "self-centredness to Reality- 
centredness, " it does not accentuate the importance of rituals clearly, which brings about 
the charge of ethicism. The emphasis on rituals will respond to this charge and also 
probably boost a more positive Muslim understanding of new religious movements on the 
basis of Cohn-Sherbok's "viability principle. " 
4. The dissertation has also shown that, despite some suggestions of its redundancy, 
the Kantian distinction of noumenal and phenomenal Real was still needed within a 
moderate pluralism. In Islam, moderate ineffability and the principle of plurality endorse 
the distinction, that there is a Transcendent reality that makes itself known to us with certain 
qualities through different means and is experienced differently in the great world religions. 
The distinction will serve a useful purpose to remind believers that nobody holds the 
ultimate way of salvation, which in turn will increase dialogue and co-operation between 
religions. 
5. It became clear that the commonly cited examples in Islamic pluralistic writing 
about the tolerance of Islamic communities to other religions were misleading. Even though 
they correlated to the issue of pluralism at the basic level of peaceful coexistence, they did 
not address the real issue of salvation/liberation. Coexistence with the adherents of other 
religions did not mean recognising their ways as salvifically effective. Asian, and many 
others writing on pluralism and Islam, seem to miss this crucial point. I contended that 
Muslim recognition of other religions has always been limited to the socio-political level 
alone and never extended to the theological. The widening of scope of apostasy law to 
include all religions except Islam bore witness to this claim. I called for a return to the 
original message of the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions to admit other religions as 
salvific ways of salvation/liberation and asserted that moderate pluralism might offer a 
highly plausible framework for accomplishing this task. 
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6. We have demonstrated, for the first time from a Muslim perspective, that Race's 
three-fold typology (exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism) can be successfully applied to 
Islam in order to classify and evaluate Muslim understanding of other religions. 
7. I hold that moderate pluralism offers a middle way between the perils of 
particularist attitudes, the doubts of the postmodernist condition, and the reductionism of 
Hick's pluralism. It argues for accepting religions as equally effective ways of 
salvation/liberation against particularism, secures the foundation of noumenal Real against 
the doubts of postmodernism, and respects religious traditions as they are against Hick's 
reductionist pluralism. 
8. Lastly, in an Islamic context, it is my opinion that moderate pluralism is 
compatible with Islam and can provide Muslims with a helpful general framework both for 
their discovery of the pluralistic aspects of Islam and for developing a more positive and 
tolerant attitude towards other religions. Many of the Muslim scholars I discussed in my 
thesis usually deal with certain aspects of Islam in respect to religious diversity and leave 
the rest. I remember, for instance, Ayoub's silence about certain questions when I 
interviewed him in Birmingham, May 1998. I questioned him repeatedly about how to 
understand certain problematic issues mentioned in the Qur'an, such as the Virgin birth and 
the creation story; shall we say that they are metaphorical (not intended to state a fact, but a 
story told to give lessons) or mythical (and should be dropped all together), or is there 
another way of explaining them? To provide answers to these questions goes beyond the 
aim and limits of my study, but, I think, a careful examination of the data by using a 
hermeneutical approach may provide different answers. 
6.3. Prospects and Proposals 
It is my hope that this work may give rise to new research in the field at three levels. 
1. At the Islamic Level: Previous limited works by Aslan (Hick compared with Nasr) 
and Özcan (a passing reference to Hick) on Islam and Hick's pluralism have concluded that 
it was unsuitable for an Islamic context as an hypothesis in dealing with other religions. 
Our study has found the opposite, that with certain modifications, it could be a workable 
model and was compatible with Islam. Naturally, there will certainly be others who 
disagree with our findings and conclusions. But, on Muslims' part, this will only show the 
need for more work on pluralism, specifically focusing on certain problems, e. g. 
hermeneutics, revelation, and the case of primitive religions, etc. 
2. At the Philosophical Level: My main disagreement with Hick's philosophy of 
religions arose with my insistence on the moderate ineffability of the Real rather than the 
strong version that puts it beyond language and human conception. Hick, and probably 
some others, will disagree with my proposal on the grounds that it leads to ascribing 
contradictory attributes to the Real. As I stated earlier, when put together, certain known 
qualities of the Real, common to world religions, may be incommensurable, but I believe 
they are not contradictory. This is an issue, one among many, for further exploration from 
a philosophical view point. 
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3. At the Global Level: What are the benefits and what can be the contributions of 
moderate pluralism to the religious communities of the world today? I believe that 
particularly in the area of mutual acceptance and tolerance of religions it has a lot to offer. 
Let us take the issue of interreligious dialogue for instance. What is needed on the part of 
Christians is that they should declare an unconditional acceptance of Islam as a religion, 
Muhammad as a prophet, the Qur'an as a divine revelation of God. This point is well 
expressed by Watt in "Islam and the West"' where he clearly states that "when a Christian 
today enters into dialogue with Muslims, he must do so on the basis of accepting Islam as 
genuine religion and Muhammad as inspired by God. "2 Unfortunately, the Crusade 
mentality which views Muslims as a "destructive force, " "against `tolerance"' and "human 
rights, " and ready to wage a "`holy war' against `Christian fellowship' and `against 
Europe"'3 can be documented even in the 1990s. 4 Thus it is ironic that even the present 
Pope John Paul II in his book Crossing the Threshold of Hope avoids discussing either the 
prophethood of Muhammad or the Qur'an in a chapter entitled "Muhammad, " but instead 
he mentions only Muslims and Islam and does not provide anything new which Vatican II 
had not already said. 5 In fact, a recent study on Christian understandings of Muslims 
speculates that there is a growing tendency among some Catholic authorities to "go back to 
the pre-Vatican II period in which good Muslims were regarded as anonymous Christians 
or as those who had an implicit faith in the Church. "6 Even Arkoun, probably the most 
modern of contemporary Muslim scholars, protests against the exclusion of Islam from the 
"Judeo-Christian vision" of "salvation history. " His criticism is directed not only to 
theological bodies but also to academia? 
My point is that polite diplomacy, in both parties, should leave its place to genuine 
acceptance and tolerance if we expect to see real progress and co-operation between 
religions, particularly Christianity and Islam, which seem to be sharing the latest problems 
the world is facing and still faces, for example, the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. 
Unfortunately, neither the Pope nor the Orthodox Church leaders, nor, indeed, the World 
Council of Churches, made any appeal to politicians and army chiefs, or organised 
demonstrations, against the butchering of innocents civilians (Muslims, Christians and 
others) in these wars. Although the Pope and the Church leaders usually produce the 
I Watt, W M, "Islamn and the West, " in Islam in the Modern World, cd. D MucEoin and A al-Shahi, 
London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983. 
2 Watt, "Islam and the WVest, " 2. He furthermore points out another very important matter 
concerning language. He finds it absurd "to suppose that Christians worship God and Muslims 
Allah, " because "Allah is simply the Arabic word for God and is used by several million Arabic- 
speaking Christians" (2). 
3 Siddiqui, A, "Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Problems and Challenges, " Encounters- Journal of l nter- 
Cultural Perspectives 2, no. 2,1996,130-13 1. 
4 For the role of media on creating this negative image see: Ahmed, Posnnodernism and Is/aun, Chp. 
vi, "The evil demon: the media as master", 222-265. 
5 Paul II, J, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, trans. McPhee, Jenny and Martha McPhee, London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1994,91-94. 
6 Aydin, Modern Western Christian Theological Understandings of Muslims, 320. 7 Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, 8. 
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excuse of the religious and politics division in the secular Western democracies (i. e. their 
hands are tied) in real life even the basic condemnation of murdering innocent civilians 
would make big differences. As spiritual leaders their words are taken quite seriously and 
will be effective, both in the short and long runs. Furthermore, when it is necessary to 
defend the rights of Christians in Muslim countries, the Pope, for instance, expresses his 
opinion adamantly without paying much attention to the division of religion and politics .8 
As I see it, the main problem with the sincerity of the whole inter-religious dialogue, 
as Nasr also says vis-a-vis the freedom of worship in the West for Muslims, 9 is due to the 
fact that the movement did not originate from the religions themselves, neither Christianity 
nor Islam nor any other religion. Rather, it was imposed on them because of the pressure 
they were under from modern times, intellectuals, politicians, humanists, etc. It was 
pushed through by outside factors, and that is why it is going very slow and, so far, is 
very ineffective. I still believe that none of the religious institutions, especially the Vatican 
and the World Council of Churches, is taking the issue seriously. The main evidence for 
this, as Nasr rightly puts it, is the fact that "the central issue of the acceptance by 
Christianity and Islam of each other as veritable revelations, without destroying the 
traditional meaning of revelation (the wahy of the Islamic tradition) has not been totally 
settled. " 10 
On Islam's part, the problem is more complicated since there is no official body in the 
Islamic world. Bodies, such as The Organisation of Islamic Conference, are nothing more 
than figureheads with pretentious bureaucracies. They are totally ineffective even among 
the Islamic nations, never mind representing the Islamic world against other religions or 
setting out policies about international or interreligious crises (e. g. the Middle East and 
Kosovo). However, this does not remove the responsibility from the shoulders of 
independent Muslim states. Either independently or collectively, they should make their 
policies clear and live up to their, at least to some extent, pluralist heritage and develop it 
further, rather than resort to exclusivist, particularist and separatist understandings. 
Yet, I am aware of the slowness and sluggishness of official progress on this front, 
especially in the still fiercely-contested realm of religious dominance. Therefore, I think 
Hick is right in his remark that the process of change should first start in the minds of the 
intellectuals, then it may spread to other components of the societies. I I In this respect, it is 
my wish that if at least some of the academics accept a moderate form of pluralism as a 
workable framework for events, such as interreligious dialogue, and declare it with a 
? The Pope severely criticises the Sudanese and the Iranian governments without naming them as 
`fundarnei: talist movements" taking over power and describes the Christian populations' situation 
there as "terribly disturbing" (Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, 94; see also Abu-Rabi, I, 
"Pope John Paul 11 and Islam, " The Muslim World 88, no. 3-4,1998,285-287). 
9 Nasr, S H, "Islamic-Christian Dialogue, " 226. 
10 Nasr, S H, "Islamic-Chrislian Dialogue, " 219. Muslims certainly accept Jesus as a major prophet, 
but ordinary believers of Christianity, i. e. those who believe in Incarnation and Trinity, are still left 
out of the salvational scheme in the eyes of the orthodox Islam, despite the compelling evidence in 
the Qur'an. 
It Private letter, December 1997. 
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world-wide statement, the so-far-ineffective, or with little effect, interreligious dialogue 
may work more efficiently. Such a joint effort on the part of intellectuals, I strongly 
believe, will increase co-operation among the world religions to reduce, primarily, the 
number of evils caused by religious or non-religious disputes and intolerance, and more 
generally, suffering in the world through the unequal distribution of wealth, poverty, etc. 
Will this ever happen? Time will tell, but I trust that these kind of works will make positive 
contributions to this on-going and painfully slow process. 
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